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“Simon Avenell relates the largely untold transnational 
history of Japan’s environmental activism and the ways 
in which Japanese scholars, activists, and environmental 
pollution victims beneted from and contributed to global 
responses to pollution and environmental degradation. 
Avenell invested a great deal of eort in researching this 
work, using a wide variety of original Japanese sources 
as evidence in his investigation. His book is a major 
accomplishment.” 
 —DANIEL ALDRICH, Northeastern University
“is book features rst-rate scholarship on an important 
topic about which relatively little has been published. 
Readers stand to gain a deep and nuanced understanding 
of the origins and evolution of Japanese environmental 
activism thanks to Simon Avenell’s discussion of specic 
cases of pollution that sparked civic activism in Japan and 
how these movements were inuenced by interactions 
with overseas activists. e globalization of Japan’s 
environmental movement is exceptionally interesting, 
and there is really nothing quite like this case study of 
transnational environmental activism viewed through the 
paradigm of injustice.” 
 —JEFFREY KINGSTON, Temple University
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What motivates people to become involved 
in issues and struggles beyond their own 
borders? How are activists changed and 
movements transformed when they reach 
out to others a world away? is adept study 
addresses these questions by tying together 
local, national, regional, and global histori-
cal narratives surrounding the contemporary 
Japanese environmental movement. Span-
ning the era of Japanese industrial pollution 
in the 1960s and the more recent rise of 
movements addressing global environmental 
problems, it shows how Japanese activists 
inuenced approaches to environmentalism 
and industrial pollution in the Asia-Pacic 
region, North America, and Europe, as well as 
landmark United Nations conferences in 1972 
and 1992.
 Japan’s experiences with diseases caused 
by industrial pollution produced a potent 
“environmental injustice paradigm” that 
fueled domestic protest and became the moti-
vation for Japanese groups’ activism abroad. 
From the late 1960s onward Japanese activists 
organized transnational movements address-
ing mercury contamination in Europe and 
North America, industrial pollution through-
out East Asia, radioactive waste disposal in 
the Pacic, and global climate change. In all 
cases, they advocated strongly for the rights 
of pollution victims and people living in 
marginalized communities and nations—a 
position that oen put them at odds with 
those advocating for the global environment 
over local or national rights. Transnational 
involvement profoundly challenged Japanese 
groups’ understanding of and approach to 
activism. Numerous case studies demonstrate 
how border-crossing eorts undermined 
deeply engrained notions of victimhood in 
the domestic movement and nurtured a more 
self-reexive and multidimensional approach 
to environmental problems and social 
activism.
Transnational Japan in the Global Envi-
ronmental Movement will appeal to scholars 
and students interested in the development of 
civil society, social movements, and environ-
mentalism in contemporary Japan; grassroots 
inter-Asian connections in the postwar 
period; and the ways Asian countries and 
their citizens have shaped and been inu-
enced by global issues like environmentalism.
SIMON AVENELL is associate professor of  
history at the College of Asia and the Pacic, 
the Australian National University.
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1Introduction
Japan and the Global Environmental Movement
I’ve often said that the prob lems of pollution in Japan, though regarded 
as a trifl ing  matter by some, portend the destiny of the  whole world.
Ui Jun, 19751
In a document prepared for the United Nations Conference on the  Human 
Environment (UNCHE) in 1972, the activist- engineer Ui Jun declared that 
Japan prob ably had “the worst environmental pollution prob lems of any 
country in the world.”2 Rejecting triumphalist rhe toric about Japan’s eco-
nomic “miracle,” Ui described instead an archipelago disfi gured by “pollu-
tion department stores” with all mea sure of ground,  water, and atmospheric 
contaminants.3 Richard Curtis and Dave Fisher of the New York Times could 
only agree. In a 1971 article for the newspaper, the journalists included smog- 
choked Tokyo in their list of the “seven pollution won ders of the world,” 
and they irreverently advised travelers to pack a “gasmask.” 4 Echoing this 
sentiment, at the fi rst Earth Day in the United States in 1970 and at UNCHE 
in 1972 environmental activists marched with placards demanding “No 
More Tokyos!” and “No More Minamatas.” For the infl uential biologist and 
environmental advocate Paul Ehrlich, Japan was akin to the coal miner’s ca-
nary of old: just as the tiny bird had alerted miners to potentially fatal 
gases, the situation in Japan presaged for humanity an impending global crisis 
born of industrial pollution and overpopulation.5 Even William D. Ruckel-
shaus, head of the newly established Environmental Protection Agency in 
the United States, found the Japa nese case expedient. In arguing for the 
merits of the Clean Air Act of 1970, Ruckelshaus invoked frightening images 
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of Tokyo, with its “world- class smog” and traffi  c policemen shielded by 
pollution- fi ltering facemasks.6 Meanwhile, on the other side of the globe, 
engineers designing a state- of- the- art petrochemical fa cil i ty in Finland care-
fully scrutinized Japan’s infamous Yokkaichi petrochemical complex, site 
of asphyxiating air pollution that had caused nearby residents to literally 
cough themselves to death.7
Indeed, Japan’s ascent as a polluters’ paradise and the strug gles of its 
pollution victims propelled the country to the very forefront of a historic 
global environmental awakening in the 1960s. Japa nese industrial pollution, 
its victims, and the country’s environmental activists became infl uential 
components of what Ursula Heise has called the environmental imagina-
tion of the global: a moment when the entire planet arguably became “grasp-
able as one’s own backyard.”8 Meta phors such as “Spaceship Earth” and the 
hauntingly beautiful images of Earth from the Lunar Orbiter satellites and 
the Apollo missions of the 1960s and 1970s encapsulated this sense of a soli-
tary planet with a fi nite stock of resources and a fragile biosphere. Th e fa-
mous Apollo 8 “Earthrise” image, of the planet appearing from  behind the 
moon, and the  later “Blue Marble” photo graph taken from Apollo 17 helped 
shape a growing sentiment that the environmental issues of one region could 
no longer be ignored as the prob lems of  those “over  there.”
One only need consider the simultaneity of environmental events world-
wide to appreciate how Japan became part of a genuinely global- historical 
moment. In the United States in 1962, marine biologist Rachel Carson 
shocked the nation with her best seller  Silent Spring on pesticides and envi-
ronmental poisons (translated into Japa nese in 1964). Only two years  later, 
in 1964, economist Miyamoto Ken’ichi and engineer Shōji Hikaru provoked 
similar outrage in Japan with their book Osorubeki Kōgai (Fearsome pollu-
tion), which documented chronic industrial contamination throughout the 
archipelago. Antipollution and environmental conservation movements 
proliferated worldwide at this time, not only in the rich “North” but also 
in developing nations of the global South, as in India where the Chipko 
or “tree- hugging” movement began in the early 1970s and in  Kenya where 
Wangari Maathai established her famous Green  Belt Movement in 1977. 
Infl uential international environmental nongovernmental organ izations 
(ENGOs) such as Friends of the Earth (FoE) (1969) and Greenpeace (1971) 
also formed during this period, and mass media reportage increased dramati-
cally, fueled by numerous high- profi le pollution disasters such as Minamata 
disease in Japan in the late 1950s; the Torrey Canyon oil tanker spill off  the 
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coast of Cornwall,  Eng land, in 1967; and the Union Oil Com pany platform 
explosion off  the Santa Barbara coast in 1969. Governments  were also drawn 
into the environmental maelstrom as they groped to address mounting 
public concern about pollution. In 1970 the British government established 
the world’s fi rst cabinet- level Environment Department, followed shortly 
thereafter by establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in the 
United States in 1970, the Environment Agency of Japan (EAJ), and 
Ministère de l’Environnement in France in 1971.9 And, at the international 
level, the convening of UNCHE (the United Nations Conference on the 
 Human Environment) in 1972 broke ground not only as the fi rst UN con-
ference dedicated to a single issue— namely, the environment— but also as 
a formative networking opportunity for NGOs, including Japa nese victims’ 
groups, which traveled to Sweden to participate.
It was against this backdrop of worldwide environmental awakening 
that Ui Jun could speak of the global- historical signifi cance of his country’s 
pollution situation. As he argued in the 1970s,  people elsewhere cared about 
Japan’s polluted archipelago  because they could see in it the fate of their own 
countries. Moreover, they  were genuinely interested in the movements of 
ordinary Japa nese citizens, which  were battling environmental contamina-
tion and  human poisoning of a form, scale, and intensity never before expe-
rienced by humanity. For Ui’s colleague Miyamoto Ken’ichi, Japan had 
become a “laboratory for pollution” without pre ce dent in world history, with 
its toxic mixture of “new pollution” born of recent breakneck economic de-
velopment and “old pollution” carried over from the fi rst phases of heavy 
industrialization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.10 As the 
historian Julia Adeney Th omas has more recently observed, Japan has been 
less a “peculiarity” than “a participant in the global problematic.”11 “Demo-
graphically and in other ways,” Th omas suggests, Japan “provides a labora-
tory for thinking about the global  future in relation to the national past.”12 
Th e disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant  after an earth-
quake and tsunami in 2011 and the resultant worldwide debate about the 
safety of nuclear power attests to the ongoing relevance of par tic u lar national 
experiences like  those in Japan for debates concerning our global  future.
Japan’s Environmental Injustice Paradigm and 
the Role of Rooted Cosmopolitans
In this book I use the national history—or, more correctly, the many local 
histories—of pollution and protest in postwar Japan as a springboard to 
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investigate an untold transnational history of Japa nese environmental ac-
tivism. I argue that the seminal encounter with industrial pollution— 
encapsulated in what I call Japan’s “environmental injustice paradigm”— has 
been a critical and ongoing source of motivation for Japa nese environmental 
activism not only within but also, importantly, beyond the archipelago. 
Th e agonizing experience of industrial pollution victims in local communi-
ties throughout the archipelago inspired some Japa nese activists to look 
abroad, and it profoundly  shaped the messages they sent to the world— 
even when interest shifted from localized pollution to the global environ-
ment in the late 1980s. For many Japa nese activists who became involved 
transnationally, industrial pollution victims represented living proof of 
an unbreakable chain linking po liti cal and economic power, environmental 
degradation, and the violation of basic  human rights. On a personal level, 
the encounter with shocking environmental injustices served as a power ful 
motivation to act. As scientists, activists, and victims from the world’s most 
polluted nation, individuals such as Ui Jun felt an intense responsibility to 
ensure that such  human injury and injustice did not occur elsewhere.
Although this environmental injustice paradigm underwent impor tant 
modifi cations in the pro cess of transnational involvement, throughout the 
book I show how it provided a coherent vocabulary and concrete vision for 
groups engaged in a diversity of transnational initiatives over many de cades. 
In essence it was a decidedly anthropocentric and localistic vision of environ-
mentalism that focused attention on the grassroots victims of environmental 
contamination and degradation, such as industrial pollution disease suff er-
ers and,  later, the marginalized  people of developing nations. Th e paradigm 
pointed to the responsibility of conscientious and knowledgeable individu-
als to off er support for  these local victims and to resist the forces of indus-
trial modernity and cap i tal ist expansion that wreaked havoc on marginalized 
communities. Although this vision was sensitive to the class implications of 
environmental injustice, it recognized that class alone was insuffi  cient to 
explain such injustice or to fashion an eff ective grassroots response. As the 
Japa nese experience revealed, the victims of pollution did not always fi t 
easily into orthodox class categories, nor did the allies and enemies of protest 
movements. Moreover, born as it was in the context of local suff ering in the 
face of all- encompassing ideologies of economic growth and the national 
interest in postwar Japan, the paradigm incorporated a degree of skepticism 
 toward collectivist global discourses like “Spaceship Earth” or “our common 
 future”  because experience in Japan taught that such ideas tended to obscure 
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instances of local injustice, marginalization, and discrimination as much as 
they expressed any sense of comradery or common predicament. Coming 
as it did at a moment of heightened attention to both the environment and 
 human rights worldwide in the 1970s, this focus on the local and injustice 
propelled Japa nese environmental advocates and victims to the very center 
of debates about the environment and development, the “limits to growth,” 
and the objectives of environmentalism in a world of extreme inequity.13
 Th ere is a vigorous debate among theorists in globalization studies over 
the positioning and signifi cance of the local in a global age. Some, such as the 
eco- critic Ursula Heise, subscribe to a resolutely cosmopolitan and global-
ist agenda that privileges an enlightened “sense of planet” over a blinkered 
“sense of place.” Heise is skeptical about the value of local knowledge in the 
environmental movement, arguing that while a “sense of place” might be 
useful “for environmentally oriented arguments,” it “becomes a visionary 
dead end if it is understood as a founding ideological princi ple or a principal 
didactic means of guiding individuals and communities back to nature.”14 
Heise points to the “ambivalent ethical and po liti cal consequences that 
might follow from encouraging attachments to place,” and she criticizes pro-
ponents of the local, such as deep ecol ogy founder Arne Naess, who assume 
the spontaneity and naturalness of “sociocultural, ethical, and aff ective al-
legiances” at the local level while disregarding the possibility of meaningful 
attachments at larger scales.15 Instead of “focusing on the recuperation of 
a sense of place,” argues Heise, “environmentalism needs to foster an under-
standing of how a wide variety of both natu ral and cultural places and 
pro cesses are connected and shape each other around the world, and how 
 human impact aff ects and changes this connectedness.”16
At the other end of the spectrum are thinkers like Arif Dirlik, who see 
the local as a necessary counterweight to the hegemony of globalism. Dirlik 
argues that, precisely  because of the entanglement of “con temporary place 
consciousness” within globalization, “places off er a  counter- paradigm for 
grasping con temporary realities,” and “an alternative vision that focuses 
not on the off - ground operations of global capital . . .  but on the concrete 
conditions of everyday life.”17 From a slightly diff er ent perspective, Sheila 
Jasanoff  and Marybeth Long Martello have questioned the “ wholesale adop-
tion of shared environmental ontologies among the nations of the earth.”18 
Th ey point to the centrality of the local in environmental activism, which 
has derived “emotional force” from attachments to “par tic u lar places, 
landscapes, livelihoods, and to an ethic of communal living that can sustain 
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stable, long- term regimes for the protection of shared resources.”19 Th ey 
criticize social science for not adequately incorporating “the resurgence of 
local epistemologies and their associated politics in the context of globaliza-
tion,” and they call for a conceptualization of the local beyond the epit-
ome of every thing “prescientifi c, traditional, doomed to erasure, and hence 
not requiring rigorous analy sis.” Jasanoff  and Martello note how the local has 
been reconstituted and made “richer” through policymaking for the envi-
ronment and development. No longer is the local constrained to “spatial or 
cultural particularity,” but it becomes also a signifi er for “par tic u lar com-
munities, histories, institutions, and even expert bodies.” Th e “modern local,” 
Jasanoff  and Martello argue, is distinguished not by parochialism but by 
the way it produces “situated knowledge” that creates “communal affi  liations” 
built on “knowing the world in par tic u lar ways.”20  Here they borrow from 
the globalization scholar Roland Robertson, who famously proposed the 
notion of “glocalization” in an attempt to highlight the entanglement of 
the local in translocal, supra- local, and global pro cesses.21 Th e local is cer-
tainly being reconstituted through globalization, but it retains import 
as a situated perspective. As the feminist scholar Donna Haraway has as-
tutely put it, “Th e only way to fi nd a larger vision is to be somewhere in 
par tic u lar.”22
Th e local is at the center of the transnational history I recount in this 
book. For the Japa nese activists and groups I explore herein, the local— 
whether understood as national or subnational space(s)— was a key source 
of inspiration and by no means a visionary dead end when it came to en-
gaging with global environmental prob lems. In the 1960s and 1970s, for in-
stance, pioneering advocates for local pollution victims such as Ui Jun and 
the physician Harada Masazumi undertook overseas investigative tours, 
which off ered the domestic movement an invaluable comparative perspec-
tive on the dynamics of Japa nese pollution— how it diff ered from and how 
it resembled pollution elsewhere.  Th ese early transnational environmental 
advocates used such opportunities to communicate the tragic story of Japa-
nese industrial pollution and injustice to the world. In turn, their knowl-
edge informed and invigorated environmental strug gles worldwide, as in 
Canada where indigenous communities battled mercury contamination in 
the 1970s, and at UNCHE in 1972 where the Japa nese experience became 
a leitmotif for environmental decay  under advanced capitalism. In the 1970s 
and 1980s Japa nese environmental activists extended their reach through-
out Asia and the Pacifi c, protesting the relocation of polluting industries to 
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other East Asian nations and governmental plans to dump radioactive waste 
in the Pacifi c Ocean. Articulating their critique, activists pointed to the Japa-
nese pollution experience, arguing that corporations and the government 
had a moral obligation to not replicate  these injustices elsewhere. With the 
emergence of global- scale environmental issues such as climate change in 
the late 1980s, Japa nese activists modifi ed their message of environmental 
injustice again: rich countries that  were primarily responsible for global- scale 
environmental prob lems had no right to demand environmental compliance 
from developing nations without guarantees of substantive material com-
pensation for centuries of imperialism and exploitation.
What this history reveals, then, is a Japa nese environmental movement 
deeply enmeshed in the con temporary global movement yet driven by a 
profound sense of responsibility born of very local experiences with environ-
mental injustice. In other words, this is not a history in which “parochial” 
or “narrow” local sentiments and perspectives fi  nally matured into a “superior” 
cosmopolitan mentality. On the contrary, it is a history in which transnational 
involvement became a conduit through which the local could be relativized, 
understood, and repositioned within regional and global imaginaries without 
losing its centrality as a site of strug gle and identity.
Scholarship to date has masterfully recounted this tortuous, often- 
tragic, and occasionally redemptive local experience in Japan.23 It began 
around the mid-1950s, when numerous cases of toxic industrial contamina-
tion and urban pollution emerged. In regional communities methyl mercury, 
cadmium, and other chemical pollutants contaminated local ecosystems 
and poisoned  human bodies, while in cities like Tokyo  children collapsed 
in school playgrounds from photochemical smog pollution. In response, 
 people in isolated villages, regional cities, and crowded metropolises mobi-
lized in protracted strug gles against the corporations that poisoned their 
bodies and the government offi  cials who obstructed protest and accused 
victims of local egoism. Th eir wave of protest and strug gle for justice was, 
to a  great extent, a response to the idiosyncrasies of the country’s modern 
po liti cal and economic institutions, which endorsed essentially unrestrained 
industrial— and, for a time, military— expansion from the mid- nineteenth 
 century onward. Th is postwar history of industrial pollution is also a story 
of how legislative and institutional changes ensued, how local governments 
fl exed their progressive muscles, and, ultimately, how by the early 1970s a 
national pollution disaster was, if not eradicated, signifi cantly ameliorated. 
To be sure,  there  were very impor tant instances of industrial pollution in 
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Japan before this period, for instance at the Ashio and Besshi copper mines 
and at the Northern Kyushu Yahata Steelworks. But the postwar encounter 
with and reaction to industrial pollution was of a scale, intensity, and im-
pact unique in modern Japa nese and, perhaps, global history. For certain 
activists such as Ui Jun, it even portended the “destiny” of the  whole world.
As Brett Walker, Timothy George, Ui Jun, Iijima Nobuko, Ishimure 
Michiko, and  others have masterfully and sensitively shown, industrial pol-
lution victims occupy a central place in this history.24 According to Walker, 
the core of the national pollution experience in Japan was pain, especially 
pain infl icted on the weak, the old, the young, the unborn, the marginal-
ized, and the po liti cally disenfranchised. In order to legitimize its claims 
upon citizens to endure pain and even death for the nation, the Japa nese 
state (but, of course, not only the Japa nese state) has devoted a  great deal of 
energy to what Walker characterizes as a pro cess of “interpreting and con-
textualizing such pain as dignifi ed national sacrifi ce.” Yet, as Walker points 
out, not all forms of pain have been so easily absorbed into national narra-
tives and mythologies of selfl ess sacrifi ce. In par tic u lar, “pain caused by in-
dustrial pollution is less easily interpreted and contextualized as dignifi ed 
and so can prove . . .  dangerously subversive to the nation and  those who 
tell its stories.”25 Indeed, so subversive was the experience of pain and dis-
crimination from industrial pollution in Japan, I argue, that it formed the 
foundations of a power ful environmental injustice paradigm that inspired 
some Japa nese to take action even beyond the archipelago—to communi-
cate the national experience of environmental injustice to the world. Th e 
groups I explore in this study took  great care to conscientiously knit this 
local experience of pain and injustice into the very fabric of their movements 
to address environmental prob lems threatening other countries and the 
globe. Th ey  were convinced that local experience, sentiment, and suff ering 
such as that at Minamata Bay or along the Jinzū River could be—in fact, 
had to be— translated across geo graph i cal, po liti cal, and cultural space to 
become the raw material for strug gles elsewhere.
In this book I fi rst want to show how Japa nese transnational activists 
have practiced agency beyond, yet always in connection to, the national and 
the local. Th e Ghanaian phi los o pher Kwame Anthony Appiah has articu-
lated this sentiment most eloquently in his musings on the plausibility of a 
“rooted cosmopolitanism.” For Appiah, the rooted cosmopolitan experience 
is made pos si ble not  because of some “common capacity for reason” but via 
“a diff er ent  human capacity that grounds our sharing: namely the grasp of 
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a narrative logic that allows us to construct the world to which our imagi-
nations respond.”26 For Japa nese transnational activists this meant under-
standing narratives of pollution and re sis tance from abroad through the 
familiar lens of local experience, as if observing a diff er ent yet recogniz-
able refl ection in a mirror. As Appiah puts it, “Cosmopolitanism can work 
 because  there can be common conversations about  these shared ideas and 
objects.”27 He prefers a “form of universalism that is sensitive to the ways in 
which historical context may shape the signifi cance of a practice.”28 Th is is, 
admittedly, an elusive sentiment to pin down, hovering, as it does, between 
the par tic u lar and the universal. But it seems to me to best encapsulate the 
standpoint of most transnational environmental activists in Japan through-
out the period  under study.
Th e social movement scholar Sidney Tarrow off ers an excellent charac-
terization of this locally informed yet globally sensitive “rooted cosmopolitan” 
mindset that I see emerging and developing within Japa nese activists and 
groups involved transnationally from the late 1960s onward. Tarrow defi nes 
transnational activists as “ people and groups who are rooted in specifi c 
national contexts, but who engage in contentious po liti cal activities that in-
volve them in transnational networks of contacts and confl icts.”29 Rootedness 
for Tarrow stems from the fact that, even as activists “move physically and 
cognitively outside their origins, they continue to be linked to place, to the 
social networks that inhabit that space, and to the resources, experiences, and 
opportunities that place provides them with.”30 It is not a pro cess of activists 
“migrating” from the domestic to the international but, rather, activists 
deploying local “resources and opportunities to move in and out of interna-
tional institutions, pro cesses, and alliances.”31 In this way, transnational 
activists become the “connective tissue of the global and the local, working 
as activators, brokers, and advocates for claims both domestic and interna-
tional.”32 Th is aspiration among some Japa nese environmental activists to 
act as the connective tissue between geo graph i cally separated strug gles and 
to proj ect their worldview of environmental injustice onto movements in 
other countries and global initiatives is at the heart of the concept of agency 
I  will illustrate throughout this book: specifi c local experiences of environ-
mental injustice provided them with the raw material for a larger vision 
and mission. Th e activities of  these rooted cosmopolitans provide a marvel-
ous methodological tool for tracking the ways notions of environmental 
injustice  were fi rst absorbed within the activist community in Japan and then 
transmitted by some across borders.
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Transnational Activism and the Historical Development 
of Japa nese Civic Activism
Th e second and related argument of this book is that a transnational his-
torical perspective can tell us impor tant new  things about the trajectory of 
Japa nese environmental activism— and, perhaps, Japa nese civic activism 
more generally— after the country’s massive wave of domestic environmen-
tal protest in the 1960s and early 1970s. Most obviously, this transnational 
history complicates notions of a social movement “ice age” in Japan from 
around the mid-1970s onward. Th roughout the book I show the palpable 
infl uence of Japa nese activism on environmental developments in countries 
as far afi eld as Finland and in international organ izations such as the United 
Nations. Japa nese activists injected their strug gle against environmental 
injustice into a range of movements addressing issues such as chemical con-
tamination in Canada, Italy, and Th ailand; air pollution in the Philippines; 
radioactive waste dumping in Micronesia; deforestation in Malaysia; and 
global climate change. Moreover, a transnational perspective reveals how ex-
ogenous forces (i.e., extranational forces) may have  shaped civic activism in 
the country in a kind of boomerang eff ect.33 A key objective of this work is 
to show how transnational involvement stimulated ideational transformations 
within some leading civic activists and groups in Japan, especially with re-
spect to notions of victimhood prevalent in many Japa nese movements of 
the early postwar period.
Leading civic activists and scholars alike have spoken of an “ice age” 
for contentious activism in Japan  after the high point of antipollution pro-
tests in the early 1970s.34 Herein Japa nese environmental activism— actually, 
contentious, advocacy- focused activism more generally— arguably entered 
a period of prolonged stagnation, only to reignite again in the 1990s fueled 
by the new po liti cal opportunities of a recessionary Japan and the infl uence 
of new norms supportive of civil society.35 Th e ice age thesis is highly per-
suasive to the extent that it explains the mechanisms  behind the waning of 
overt, widespread protest in the early 1970s. Robert Pekkanen, for instance, 
explains the mid-1970s transition from contentious activism to an “ice age” of 
“inward- looking consumer identity- focused groups” in terms of the “regu-
latory framework,” which made it extremely diffi  cult for most civic move-
ments to grow and institutionalize.36 In his classic study on the law and social 
change in Japan, Frank Upham pointed to the role of offi  cials in formulating 
countermea sures to preempt and manage open confl icts like the one they 
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faced at Minamata Bay.37 From a diff er ent perspective, I have also identi-
fi ed the role of leading civic activists in endorsing noncontentious forms of 
associational activity  after the turbulence of the late 1960s and early 1970s—
in eff ect facilitating the “deep freeze.”38
But, as Pekkanen, I, and many other scholars recognize and have shown, 
an ice age should not be interpreted as an extinction.39 Just as some life 
survives— indeed thrives—in climatic ice ages, so too in social movement 
ice ages.  After the cycle of protest receded (as all protest cycles do), conten-
tious environmental activism continued in myriad ways both domestically 
and transnationally, albeit in a diff er ent and far less vis i ble or widespread 
manner than the 1970s high point.40 As I show in subsequent chapters, one 
of  these historical trajectories played out transnationally in manifold move-
ments that crossed the borders of the archipelago relatively unnoticed, only 
to become vis i ble periodically when they confronted national and inter-
national po liti cal institutions and multinational corporations. In fact, the 
notion of a movement ice age is, no doubt, partially a by- product of our 
choosing a par tic u lar scale of analy sis. Focusing on the national level and 
below has made the transnational movements I explore in this book virtually 
invisible to date and has arguably contributed to both activist and scholarly 
notions of an ice age for contentious civic activism from the mid-1970s on-
ward.  Th ere was undoubtedly a waning of high- profi le and widespread 
environmental protest in the early 1970s in Japan, but shifting the spotlight 
to transnational activism complicates the sense of complete rupture or dis-
juncture implicit in the idea of a movement ice age followed by a thawing 
in the 1990s. Indeed, the following chapters point to fascinating continuities 
in contentious environmental activism linking the era of pollution protest 
to the 1990s resurgence of civil society and the rise of movements advocating 
for the global environment in Japan.
By examining involvement beyond the archipelago, we discover 
how Japa nese activists and groups contributed to a nascent environmental 
“transnationality” worldwide based on “the rise of new communities and 
formation of new social identities and relations” not defi nable “through the 
traditional reference point of nation- states.” 41 As  these activists searched 
globally for answers to Japa nese pollution, they became part of the global 
environmental awakening of the 1960s and 1970s. Th ey  were drawn into 
what Sheila Jasanoff  and Peter Haas have called “epistemic” networks and 
communities, and they became part of emergent environmental “transna-
tional advocacy networks.” 42 Some of  these spaces Japa nese activists helped 
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to construct  were  actual physical places such as the parallel NGO forums at 
UN environmental conferences, while  others  were more like shared experien-
tial spaces such as the meetings between Japa nese Minamata disease suff er-
ers and Canadian Indians poisoned by mercury in the 1970s. As Mathias 
Albert and  others contend, such “transnational po liti cal spaces” become 
“crucial locations for the production of cultures and cultural spaces,” and, 
even more signifi cantly, they can also become “new po liti cal spaces above 
and beyond the nation- state framework.” 43 At NGO conferences held paral-
lel to UNCHE (1972) and the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED, 1992), for example, Japa nese activists played 
a role in the construction of an emergent transnational, even global, civil 
society in which participants  were beginning to experiment with new 
forms of citizenship “beyond the state.” 44 As I discuss further in the 
conclusion, the transnational engagement of the Japa nese environmental 
groups analyzed in subsequent chapters was, in fact, part of a wider spectrum 
of Japa nese transnational activism that began to expand and diversify 
from the 1970s. Along with environmental groups, activists involved in 
peace and antiwar issues,  women’s liberationism, Asian developmental as-
sistance, and Japan– South Korean grassroots relations all became active 
from around the early 1970s. Th is study hopes to contribute to this largely 
unresearched history through its focus on transnational Japa nese environ-
mental activism.
Signifi cantly, participation in  these spaces emboldened and empowered 
Japa nese groups to exert pressure back on to Japa nese po liti cal and economic 
institutions and, in some cases, to force substantive modifi cations in be-
hav iors, policies, and practices. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s 
groundbreaking research on transnational advocacy networks is particularly 
impor tant in this context.45 As Keck and Sikkink explain, such networks 
are “bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense 
exchanges of information and ser vices.” Th ey are infl uential on multiple 
levels— locally, nationally, regionally, internationally, and transnationally. 
Th ey build “links among actors in civil socie ties, states and international 
organ izations,” thereby multiplying “the opportunities for dialogue and 
exchange.” Importantly, through their engagement in advocacy networks, 
activists “bring new ideas, norms and discourses into policy debates, and 
serve as sources of information and testimony.” By making “international 
resources” such as ideas about the environment available in domestic strug-
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gles, they blur “the bound aries between a state’s relations with its own na-
tionals” and, in the pro cess, challenge the previously impermeable barrier 
of national sovereignty.
Keck and Sikkink also describe a “boomerang pattern of infl uence” of 
transnational networks, in which “international contacts can ‘amplify’ the 
demands of domestic groups, pry open space for new issues, and then echo 
 these demands back into the domestic arena.” 46 Faced with new pressures 
from without, unresponsive states are often left with no choice but to act. 
Th e Japa nese government’s abandonment of plans to dump radioactive waste 
in the Pacifi c Ocean in the early 1980s, which I explore in chapter 5, is a 
good example of Japa nese activists shrewdly using transnational alliances to 
infl uence domestic policymaking.
But this boomerang pattern of infl uence operated not only at the level 
of po liti cal and economic institutions: activists often found themselves, their 
messages, and their movements transformed in the pro cess of engaging 
abroad. Th us, another central objective of this study is to examine the ways 
Japa nese environmental activists and their environmental injustice paradigm 
changed in response to transnational involvement and, moreover, the conse-
quences of this for the development of civic activism in Japan more generally. 
In the following chapters I endeavor to show how transnationalism— “the 
ongoing interconnection or fl ow of  people, ideas, objects, and capital across 
the borders of nation- states”— had a lasting eff ect on the way the Japa nese 
activists involved contextualized and positioned local and national phenom-
ena, most notably the trauma of industrial pollution in Japan.47 Interactions 
abroad forced them to think very carefully about the pos si ble limitations of 
understanding environmental injustice through the lens of Japa nese vic-
timhood alone. As they engaged with activists throughout East Asia and the 
Pacifi c in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Japa nese activists learned that 
the success of their local strug gles might even, and ironically, be contribut-
ing to the suff ering of  people elsewhere as Japa nese companies relocated 
polluting industries off shore. I believe activists’ refl exive awakening to their 
complicit “aggression” in this system marks an impor tant ideational devel-
opment in the mentality of postwar civic groups in Japan.
Th e kind of ideational change I am referring to becomes clearer if we 
consider what came before. Social movements ( labor, student, antipollution, 
 women, peace, and antiwar) fl ourished in post– World War II Japan in  great 
part  because of the  legal and institutional reforms carried out by the US- led 
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occupation from 1945 to 1951. In terms of popu lar po liti cal empowerment, 
 these  were critical reforms indeed  because,  until the enactment of the postwar 
constitution, legally  there  were no sovereign citizens in Japan, only subjects 
of a sovereign emperor. Th e postwar constitution, however, abolished im-
perial sovereignty and made almost all Japa nese  people fully enfranchised 
citizens of a liberal- democratic polity for the fi rst time in the country’s his-
tory. Th e constitution also guaranteed a space for Japa nese  people to legally 
engage in civic activism and protest without the fear of imprisonment. Th e 
country’s conservative politicians and bureaucrats did their very best to sty-
mie  these newly won freedoms and to curtail the new civic movements, but 
they could not control popu lar energies as clinically and violently as had been 
pos si ble  under the prewar regime. So, in this sense, de jure (i.e., national 
state) citizenship in a demo cratized Japa nese nation made pos si ble— for the 
fi rst time— citizenship as a normative proj ect constructed through the col-
lective and individual practices and ideas of individuals in a civil society. As 
Wesley Sasaki- Uemura and  others have shown, the Japa nese  people embraced 
their new freedoms of association and speech and, through grassroots civic 
activism, they  imagined new forms of citizenship beyond (and often in 
confl ict with) national state citizenship— what we might call the citizenships 
of civil society.48  Th ese new imaginations of citizenship in turn served as 
the ideological foundations of social movements that challenged the state 
and its postwar drive for reconstruction and relentless economic growth.49
In their earliest formations, civic movements tended to adhere to a reac-
tive or defensive model of activism premised on a model of victimized citi-
zens mobilizing to resist the infi ltration of power ful po liti cal and economic 
institutions into their daily lives.50 Civil society was most often understood as 
the sanctuary inside which activists could form tight bonds of solidarity and 
mount their mobilizations of re sis tance.  Th ere was no gray area  here: the state 
and corporations  were aggressors and Japa nese citizens  were always victims. 
Th is imagination of victimhood based on “civil society versus the state and the 
corporation” bore the imprint of history, since it grew directly out of activists’ 
experience of suppression  under war time militarism coupled with their vis-
ceral reaction to the reemergence of conservative rule in the postwar era.
But the late 1960s and 1970s marked a turning point in this mentality, 
thanks in  great part to the infl uence of transnationally active groups and in-
dividuals. Th e earlier defensive model of citizenship based on defense of the 
local did not dis appear as a motivating  factor and key source of identity but, 
through transnational involvement, the activists involved now also recog-
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nized and advocated the need for a refl exive activist agenda cognizant of their 
ambivalent position as both victims and aggressors. Th e novelist and anti– 
Vietnam War activist Oda Makoto was the earliest and most vocal mouth-
piece for this sentiment in his characterization of ordinary Japa nese  people 
as both victims and aggressors in the context of the Vietnam War. Prior to 
this confl ict, Japa nese antiwar pacifi sm was characterized by a strong sense 
of popu lar victimization by the war time Japa nese state, the American atomic 
bombings, and the continued US military presence in the country. Th is men-
tality carried over into the Japa nese anti– Vietnam War movement to the 
extent that activists superimposed their past experience as “war victims” on 
to the current plight of the Viet nam ese  people. But seeing the multidimen-
sional involvement of the Japa nese economy and government in the Vietnam 
War prompted Oda to challenge this logic. As he explained in a seminal 
1966 essay, “Heiwa o Tsukuru” (Making peace), Japa nese citizens  were cer-
tainly victims to the extent they had suff ered in the latter stages of the 
Pacifi c War and afterward as residents of a quasi- US protectorate. But, 
according to Oda, to the extent Japa nese benefi ted and prospered as citizens 
and consumers in this system, they also became accomplices and “aggres-
sors” against the Viet nam ese  people— albeit indirectly.51 Oda’s pre sen ta-
tion of Japan and, more importantly, Japa nese civic activists as aggressors 
provided the ethical foundations for  later mobilizations against so- called 
Japa nese Hyena corporations profi ting from the Vietnam War, but it also 
complicated seamless discourses of grassroots victimhood prominent in 
earlier movements.
 Women’s groups active transnationally from the early 1970s also ex-
pressed a growing sensitivity  toward their complicity as Japa nese citizens. 
Activists opposing so- called kiseng sex tourism by Japa nese men in South 
 Korea, for example, called on Japa nese  women to bravely face their “aggres-
sion”  toward Asia both in the past as “ women on the home front” who had 
supported the war and, in the pres ent, as the  mothers and wives of “corpo-
rate warriors” involved in sex tourism in South  Korea and elsewhere. Among 
the vari ous subcommittees at the 1974 Conference of Asians (discussed in 
chapter 4) was a  women’s group that addressed issues such as po liti cal op-
pression,  labor discrimination, and the sexual exploitation of  women in Asia. 
Th e group highlighted the “shocking real ity” that the expansion of Japa nese 
industry into Asia was forcing  women to “live and work in even more 
oppressive circumstances” than in the past. Even worse, the “advance of Japa-
nese capitalism” brought with it other forms of exploitation such as Japa nese 
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sex tourism in the Philippines, Th ailand, and South  Korea. In their resolution 
at the conference the  women’s group concluded that “the true liberation of 
Asia” was not “merely a  matter of national economic and po liti cal strug gle” 
but also depended on “the strug gle to liberate  women.” To this end they re-
solved “to maintain even closer bonds of contact and cooperation among 
Asian  sisters.”52
We witness a similar shift in the mentality of environmental activists 
and groups involved transnationally. As the student activist Aoyama Tadashi 
observed in 1976, the Japa nese  people had waged many  battles against in-
dustrial pollution in the country. As a result the living environment was now 
undeniably cleaner and the public strongly opposed to industrial pollution. 
Yet, despite all of this, the Japa nese had been oblivious to  those in foreign 
countries suff ering in the shadows of Japa nese affl  uence, especially through-
out Asia.53 “ Haven’t we essentially ignored the voices and existence of our 
neighbors up  until now? I believe that it is necessary for us to listen to the 
appeals of our neighbors if we are to truly understand our position and the 
path Japan is attempting to set out upon.”54 Indeed, involvement in Asia and 
the Pacifi c encouraged— even demanded— that the activists involved engage 
in a critical, historically sensitive self- refl ection on Japan’s tainted legacy in 
Asia and the Pacifi c just as antiwar and  women’s groups  were  doing. In the 
pro cess  these activists discovered that fellow Asians and Pacifi c Islanders 
tended to understand Japan’s environmental incursions into their regions in 
the context of a longer, agonizing history of Japa nese imperialistic misbe-
havior. Th is was a completely unanticipated and unsettling perspective for 
the Japa nese, who had not drawn connections between environmental prob-
lems and the country’s militarist past. Th us, even more than in their global 
encounters, regional engagement encouraged the Japa nese activists involved 
to fundamentally rethink the notion of victimhood underwriting their en-
vironmental injustice paradigm.
Transnational interaction thus became a vehicle for Japa nese activists 
to relativize the local by positioning it in a much wider network of relation-
ships and exchanges in which victims could si mul ta neously be aggressors 
and solutions  were often no more than the offl  oading of prob lems onto 
 others in localities across the sea. Activists too had to reconsider their own 
positions as a result of transnational engagement. It was not enough to see 
themselves as simply virtuous victim advocates. As citizens and consumers 
of a nation committing environmental injustices abroad, they also needed 
to acknowledge and deal with their simultaneous position as complicit 
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aggressors— albeit indirectly and by association. As I discuss further in the 
conclusion, one outcome of this realization was the growth among some 
activists of a more refl exive, expansive, and multidimensional agenda and 
mentality. Th e anthropocentric and localistic foundation of their environ-
mental injustice paradigm remained central, but the range of environmental 
victims in their fi eld of view increased tremendously, as too did the refl exivity 
of their activism.
To summarize, then, this book argues, fi rst, that the trauma of indus-
trial pollution in Japan produced a potent environmental injustice paradigm 
among victims, activists, and environmental groups. Th is paradigm fueled 
the domestic movement, and it became the ideational and motivational 
basis for the transnational activities of some activists and groups—so called 
rooted cosmopolitans— from the late 1960s onward. Although this paradigm 
evolved in the course of transnational involvement, its focus on the margin-
alization and inequity experienced by environmental victims at the very base 
of society remained constant across geo graph i cal space and over time. Indeed, 
I argue that Japa nese groups’ advocacy of a justice- driven, rights- focused, 
emancipatory environmentalism represents their principal contribution to 
the con temporary global movement. Second, in historical terms, the book 
suggests that a transnational focus helps to explain impor tant developments 
in Japa nese civic activism  after the high point of domestic protest in the 
early 1970s. In a kind of boomerang eff ect, involvement in environmental 
transnational advocacy networks in East Asia, Eu rope, and North Amer i ca 
encouraged Japa nese activists to reconsider and reposition their conceptual-
ization of environmental injustice beyond notions of victimhood defi ned 
within the container of the nation. Th e result was a more refl exive and multi-
dimensional activist identity and agenda, which arguably fed into a reimagi-
nation of civil society in the country from the late 1980s onward.
Or ga ni za tion of the Study: Scalar Iterations 
of Environmental Injustice
As noted above, scholarship to date has carefully and sensitively documented 
the ways victims and their supporters mobilized against industrial pollution 
at home from around the late 1950s to the early 1970s. In the following 
chapters I focus on how the environmental injustice paradigm born in  these 
domestic movements subsequently operated and evolved through activism 
at diff er ent scales of activity—in regional spaces such as East Asia and the 
Pacifi c, and in global spaces like UNCHE (1972) and UNCED (1992). Th e 
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earliest transnational interactions  were dominated by a handful of leftist 
social and natu ral scientists like Tsuru Shigeto and Ui Jun who had also 
been leading fi gures in the domestic environmental movement. But the 
activist networks  these individuals established opened the door for other 
actors to become involved in the ensuing years— students, industrial pollu-
tion victims, former anti– Vietnam War activists, anti– nuclear power protest-
ers, and, eventually, full- time activists in professional ENGOs.
Rather than charting a chronological history of one or more of  these 
networks or groups from start to fi nish, however, the case studies that follow 
are designed to investigate the impact of and on Japa nese activists’ environ-
mental injustice paradigm at and within diff er ent scalar imaginaries— local, 
national, regional, and global— from around the late 1960s to the turn of 
the  century. For that reason certain actors  will become prominent in the 
narrative at times only to fade to the background and then return  later 
(which, as Sidney Tarrow notes, is actually how transnational activism tends 
to operate).55 Although I certainly trace in detail the historical trajectory of 
specifi c Japa nese activists and groups such as the In de pen dent Lectures on 
Pollution (ILP) movement started by Ui Jun, my primary interest is in how 
 these groups deployed their environmental injustice paradigm over time and 
at diff er ent scales of involvement and the resulting outcomes. How, for ex-
ample, did engagement with environmental prob lems in the East Asian 
region— site of Japan’s former colonial empire— infl uence the way  those 
Japa nese activists involved understood and articulated concepts of environ-
mental injustice?
I move through six iterations of the environmental injustice paradigm: 
fi rst, its emergence in the domestic pollution crisis and the response of the 
pioneering Research Committee on Pollution (RCP) in the 1960s; second, 
in RCP members travels and activism in North Amer i ca and Eu rope from 
the late 1960s to mid-1970s; third, in Japa nese pollution victims’ and activ-
ists’ involvement at the landmark UNCHE conference in 1972; fourth, in 
movements addressing Japa nese corporate pollution in East Asia throughout 
the 1970s; fi fth, in movements opposing the planned dumping of Japa nese 
radioactive waste in Micronesian  waters in the early 1980s; and sixth, in 
Japa nese involvement in global- scale environmental prob lems beginning 
around the late 1980s and marked by events such as the Earth Summit 
(UNCED) in 1992 and the Kyoto climate conference in 1997.56 Japa nese 
activists mobilized their environmental injustice paradigm to  great eff ect in 
each of  these scalar iterations by informing discourse, imparting knowledge, 
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and supporting movements. But each scalar iteration also served to complicate 
the notion of environmental injustice and push it in new directions beyond 
the defi ning core of Japa nese industrial pollution and its victims. In the pro-
cess, the environmental injustice paradigm arguably became richer and more 
refl exive, as too did the mentalities of the activists involved.
In terms of historical scope, I focus on the period from the 1960s to 
the turn of the  century for three reasons. First, empirically speaking, this is 
when Japa nese transnational environmental activism emerged, developed, 
and diversifi ed from a state of almost nonexistence to a vibrant realm of 
transnationally engaged ENGOs. Second, this period witnessed a critical 
transition in environmentalism worldwide as the prob lems of localized in-
dustrial pollution  were overlaid (although not replaced) by concerns for 
global- scale issues such as climate change. Th ird, in relation to Japa nese civic 
activism, the period stretches from the era of heightened civic protest in 
the 1960s and early 1970s through to the apparent resurgence of civil soci-
ety in the country from the 1990s onward.  Needless to say, I believe  these 
pro cesses are interrelated although, as I show throughout the study, in 
more complex ways than a  simple linear narrative of globalization might 
suggest.
In chapter 1, I begin in Japan, tracing the formative moment of the 
environmental injustice paradigm in the industrial pollution crisis at home 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. I show the intensifying attention 
to the horrifi c  human costs of industrial pollution by the victims, the mass 
media, public intellectuals, the law courts, offi  cialdom, and specialist groups 
like the Research Committee on Pollution (RCP) established in 1963. As I 
explain, although RCP members’ initial interest grew out of their program to 
decipher the class dynamics of pollution, it was the environmental injus-
tices experienced by victims that aff ected them most viscerally and  shaped 
their agenda to fi nd some kind of solution. Researchers such as clinician 
Harada Masazumi and engineer Ui Jun wanted desperately to understand 
not only the epidemiology of pollution but, more critically, the po liti cal and 
social “physiology” of environmental injustice. If orthodox Marxian class 
analy sis could not explain phenomena on the ground, then new responses 
and modes of re sis tance would be required that perhaps crossed even class 
bound aries or national frontiers. As highly educated individuals with a cos-
mopolitan outlook, RCP members quickly recognized the global- historical 
signifi cance of Japa nese industrial pollution. Moreover, they realized that, 
as experts, they possessed knowledge that could potentially circumvent 
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pollution in other places— even in other countries— and perhaps prevent 
further  human misery at the hands of industry. It was through groups such 
as the RCP that the “local” began to take on an enhanced signifi cance.
In chapter 2 I follow RCP members on their initial tours to polluted 
sites in Eu rope and North Amer i ca and in their interactions with foreign 
pollution victims and environmental activists from the late 1960s to the 
mid-1970s. Such activities off ered RCP members an opportunity to test 
their assumptions about industrial pollution and the roots of environ-
mental injustice. For instance,  were the advocates of socialism, who claimed 
that socialist states had solved the prob lem of industrial pollution, to be 
believed, and, if they  were wrong, what would be the consequences for the 
popu lar strug gle against industrial pollution? In fact, what RCP members 
discovered in socialist countries was horrifi c pollution equal to, and often 
worse than, that in Japan and other cap i tal ist countries. Th ereafter they 
became convinced that the  battle against pollution worldwide would not 
succeed if left to atomized local movements or the traditional class pro-
tagonists of Marxian po liti cal theory. Instead, they concluded that local 
movements needed to be strengthened by the creation of new spaces for 
victims of environmental injustice that cut across class lines and national 
bound aries. Th is conclusion found concrete form in a historic transnational 
engagement facilitated by the RCP between Minamata disease suff erers 
in Japan and Native American communities affl  icted by mercury contam-
ination in Canada.
In chapter 3 I shift scale to one of the earliest moments of global envi-
ronmentalism in the con temporary era, the landmark United Nations 
Conference on the  Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. Th e 
RCP, the ILP, and Japa nese industrial pollution victims fi gured prominently 
 here, with the economist Tsuru Shigeto as an infl uential intellectual voice 
in elite academic and intergovernmental circles and pollution victims as vocal 
participants in the NGO forums run parallel to UNCHE. Together  these 
groups and individuals made impor tant contributions to fi ery debates over 
economic growth and development. On the one hand, pollution victims 
used their experience of environmental injustice to emphasize the  human 
as opposed to environmental “limits to growth,” while, on the other, Tsuru 
Shigeto advocated a reformulation of development that transcended the nar-
row GNP index and included fundamental  human welfare concerns. Both 
approaches advocated a strongly anthropocentric environmental agenda in 
keeping with the local experience in Japan.
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In chapter 4 I turn to the region, analyzing Japa nese movements op-
posing the relocation of pollutive industrial pro cesses to East Asia in the 
1970s. Th is regional awakening compelled activists involved in the ILP and 
other spin- off  movements to problematize their position as victims (or spokes-
persons for victims) of environmental injustice. What did local victories 
against industrial pollution mean if Japa nese industry simply relocated pol-
lution and environmental injustice to Asia? If the nation- state became a tool 
to protect localities in Japan at the expense of  those in Asia,  were not  those 
Japa nese localities accomplices or “aggressors” in the overseas pollution of 
Japa nese corporations? In the chapter I argue that engagement with pollution 
issues in Asia in the 1970s became a conduit through which the Japa nese 
groups involved began to refl exively critique the aspect of local victimhood 
implicit in their environmental injustice paradigm. Within the “container” 
of Japan, the victims and perpetrators of environmental justice had been 
relatively distinct, but the discovery of Japa nese pollution in Asia deeply 
complicated such distinctions.
Chapter 5 shifts to another regional imaginary, namely the Pacifi c, fo-
cusing on a particularly toxic and long- lived pollutant: radioactive waste 
material. With the commencement of domestic commercial nuclear- powered 
electricity generation in the late 1960s, Japa nese nuclear offi  cials became 
more and more concerned about the growing stockpile of both high- level 
and low- level radioactive waste material. Pressed for storage solutions for this 
growing mountain of radioactive waste, in the early 1970s nuclear offi  cials 
hatched a plan to dispose of up to 60  percent of low- level radioactive waste 
in steel canisters in the Pacifi c Ocean near the Northern Mariana Islands. 
Outraged Pacifi c Islanders mobilized in opposition on learning of the plan 
in the late 1970s. Importantly,  these protesters brought their strug gle to 
Japan in the early 1980s, speaking at rallies, meeting with activists and of-
fi cials, visiting nuclear power plants, connecting with local strug gles against 
new plant constructions, and coordinating worldwide signature campaigns 
with their Japa nese supporters. As with the earlier industrial pollution ex-
port prob lem in East Asia, this transnational involvement forced Japa nese 
antinuclear activists ( whether opposing A- bombs or nuclear power plants) 
to rethink the power ful narrative of local victimhood in their movements. 
 After all, like the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,  peoples of the 
Pacifi c had had their homes vaporized by nuclear weapons and their bodies 
poisoned by radionuclides. Moreover, Japa nese nuclear power plants  were 
contributing to the destruction of communities at both the front end (i.e., 
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uranium mining on indigenous lands in Australia) and, potentially, at the 
back end (i.e., plans to dump radioactive waste in the Pacifi c) of the global 
nuclear fuel cycle. Such prob lems stimulated the Japa nese antinuclear ac-
tivists involved to rethink their movement in the context of a longer his-
tory of Japa nese colonialism in the Pacifi c and the ongoing culpability of 
Japan in con temporary neo co lo nial ism or, as one Pacifi c leader branded it, 
“nuclearism.”57
In chapter 6 I shift scale to the global, examining Japa nese activists’ 
involvement in movements addressing global- scale environmental prob lems 
from the late 1980s onward. Stratospheric ozone damage, rainforest destruc-
tion, biodiversity depletion, and climate change posed environmental prob-
lems of an immeasurably larger scale than anything before.  Th ese  were truly 
global prob lems that demanded globally coordinated responses if humanity 
was to secure its “common  future” on the planet. But, as I explain, the Japa-
nese activists involved approached  these issues through the familiar para-
digm of local environmental injustice, refi ned of course through many 
de cades of domestic and regional strug gle. Connecting their empathy for 
industrial pollution victims to victims in the marginalized peripheries of the 
developing world, Japa nese activists proposed notions of local empowerment 
and endogenous development as the necessary starting points for any solu-
tions to global- scale environmental prob lems. Th ey challenged discourses 
of shared  human fate like “our common  future,” calling instead for  people 
and institutions in the rich “North” to reform their modern, con ve nient life-
styles built on ravenous consumption of resources, often sourced from the 
“South.” Th e prob lems may have become global and, in a sense, everywhere 
at once, but through the lens of environmental injustice, it appeared obvi-
ous that the burdens  were never so evenly dispersed.
In 1974, when Japa nese antipollution activists  were considering a study 
tour to pollution sites worldwide, some of them wondered if it was a neces-
sary endeavor.  After all, was Japan not a polluters’ paradise full of “pollution 
department stores”? Why look abroad when all kinds of pollution prob lems 
remained in their own backyard? Opinions  were divided, but eventually 
even the most reluctant deci ded to participate.  After the tour one partici-
pant recounted just how valuable an experience it had been. Not only did it 
help him and  others rethink Japa nese pollution in a wider context, it also 
represented a historic recalibration of Japa nese interactions with the outside 
world. Since the beginning of Japan’s hurried rush to modernize in the 
mid- nineteenth  century, international engagement— especially with the in-
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dustrialized West— had been mostly about learning the secrets of growth, 
development, and so- called civilization. But this tour to connect with victims 
elsewhere and to explore the shadows of Western success signaled a new, more 
mature, engagement. More to the point, it involved communicating an impor-
tant story of local environmental injustice to the world.
Th is book charts the emergence and evolution of that environmental 
injustice paradigm from its birth in Japan’s pollution nightmare to the 
multiscalar transnational movements it subsequently informed and invigo-
rated. On one level, it points to the transformations made pos si ble by reposi-
tioning the local in spatial imaginaries that transcend the nation, but, on 
another, it also confi rms the critical importance of the local as an ideational 
platform and motivating  factor in environmental knowledge and transna-
tional action in the modern world.
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CHAPTER 1
Japa nese Industrial Pollution and 
Environmental Injustice
Japan had experienced its share of industrial pollution before the postwar 
era, but nothing of the scale and intensity of that which unfolded from the 
mid-1950s to the early 1970s. Particularly striking was the enormity of 
 human destruction wrought by postwar pollution on livelihoods, living en-
vironments,  human dignity, and  human bodies. In most cases industry was 
to blame, but in large urban centers like Tokyo and Osaka ordinary citizens 
also contributed to environmental degradation through voracious consump-
tion and ever- intensifying demands for con ve nience, construction, and 
mechanization. Th e results of this simultaneous surge in consumerism and 
unyielding industrial expansion  were horrifi c for both the environment 
and the  humans stricken with industrial diseases— not to mention the dent 
on national pride as the country became infamous worldwide as a polluters’ 
paradise. So extreme was the crisis that it provoked a historic wave of grass-
roots re sis tance across Japan as local communities and victims expressed 
their anger in civic protest, in the media, and in the law courts. Th ey  were 
supported by a cadre of pollution- victim advocates— scientists,  lawyers, 
physicians, politicians, local bureaucrats, and schoolteachers— for whom 
the pollution prob lem became an all- absorbing quest for justice. Th roughout 
the period, vari ous victim advocacy groups formed within Japan, like the 
medical researchers studying mercury poisoning at Kumamoto University, 
progressive  lawyers in the Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai (Japan Federation 
of Bar Associations, JFBA), and in de pen dent groups like the Research 
Committee on Pollution (RCP). Participants in  these groups  were among 
the fi rst to communicate the story of Japa nese environmental injustice to 
the world.
Japa nese Industrial Pollution and Environmental Injustice      25
In this chapter I explore the ways  human suff ering in toxic spaces 
throughout Japan helped propel a paradigm of injustice to the very core of 
con temporary Japa nese environmentalism, providing the ethical and ide-
ational sustenance for subsequent generations of transnational activists. I 
trace the rising recognition of, and reaction to, environmental injustices in 
a range of groups, institutions, and media: the victims of industrial pollu-
tion and their movements, the mass media, infl uential publications, the law 
courts, all levels of government, and specialist groups like the RCP. I then 
focus on RCP members’ crucial involvement with pollution victims, in or-
der to understand the intellectual and emotional  factors that  shaped their 
perspectives on environmental injustice and stimulated their subsequent 
transnational action. Th e horrifi c situation of victims was so shocking—so 
morally reprehensible— that the violation of victims’  human rights and their 
protracted strug gles for justice almost completely dominated the activism 
of such groups. We might usefully compare this environmentalism to other 
environmental imaginaries of the time, such as Rachel Carson’s  Silent Spring 
in the United States, which emphasized the violation of the rights of nature 
and living organisms like birds. In the case of polluted 1960s Japan, it was 
the degraded and poisoned  human living environment and, more crucially, 
the  humans located therein that monopolized attention. Once a tool for 
 human nourishment, productivity, and leisure, the natu ral environment now 
became a  silent conduit for the deadly chemical substances of  human injury 
and injustice. In subsequent chapters I explore how this anthropocentric, 
justice- and rights- focused environmentalism would dominate the transna-
tional action of Japa nese environmental activists in the coming de cades.
While the overwhelming majority of antipollution groups in Japan 
focused on their own local strug gles, having neither the resources nor 
the inclination to address the wider implications, for groups like the RCP, 
whose members’  were highly educated and internationally literate, tackling 
the deeper structural aspects of Japa nese industrial pollution was a  matter 
of pressing concern from the outset. Th eir membership’s unique combination 
of scientifi c expertise, fury  toward industry, and compassion for victims 
profoundly  shaped the group’s approach to environmentalism through the 
lenses of inequity, discrimination, and injustice. Moreover, this combination 
of  factors also contributed to their sense of moral obligation to communicate 
Japan’s experience to the world when the opportunity arose. As social and 
natu ral scientists with decidedly humanist leanings, they desperately wanted 
to understand the po liti cal and socioeconomic dynamics of pollution in 
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Japan. What caused it? Was it something to do with capitalism in general 
or Japa nese capitalism in par tic u lar? What might be the most eff ective 
method to eradicate pollution and to secure some form of recompense 
for the victims? More than any other  factor, it was the plight of pollution 
victims that put “fi re in the belly” and “iron in the soul” of groups like the 
RCP.1 Although all communities across the archipelago  were enduring 
the consequences of pollution, antipollution advocates quickly recognized 
that it hit some groups more brutally than  others. Indeed, the unborn, the 
young, the el derly,  women, the poor, and peripheralized rural communities 
emerged as the martyrs of Japan’s relentless drive for affl  uence and so- called 
development.
Japa nese Pollution and Its Victims
It is worth reiterating that, prior to the postwar pollution crisis, Japan 
already had a sorry track rec ord of industrial pollution dating back to at least 
the mid- nineteenth  century, when the country’s samurai rulers abandoned 
relatively regulated involvement with Western countries for full- scale 
Western- style modernization and,  later, imperialistic expansion. Areas of 
Japan had gone toxic long before the 1960s, especially air and river degra-
dation in regions near copper mines and related pro cessing facilities. Th e 
pre– World War II period ‘was not totally devoid of environmental protest 
and offi  cial action  either, with some instances of environmental regulation by 
local governments and pollution abatement mea sures by industry. But  these 
prewar developments  were promptly sidelined when the country mobilized 
for war in the 1930s and they  were essentially abandoned in the postwar re-
construction years.2
With the transition from early post– World War II deprivation to the 
affl  uence of high- speed economic growth from the mid-1950s, Japan entered 
its darkest moment of industrial pollution in the modern era. As early as 
1955— when overall economic growth had recovered to prewar highs— 
newborns  were poisoned by arsenic mistakenly introduced into powdered 
infant formula manufactured by the Morinaga Milk Com pany. Th e poison-
ing caused fever, severe diarrhea, skin spotting, and, in some cases, death. 
For  those infants who survived, the prognosis was dim. Studies revealed that 
victims  were still suff ering the eff ects over a de cade  later, with impeded bone 
development, proteinuria (elevated urinary protein), abnormal brain activ-
ity, hearing loss, and lower IQ levels.3 Over eleven thousand  were aff ected, 
and 133 infants died in 1955 alone. Similar food poisoning occurred in 1968 
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when  people consumed Kanemi Rice Bran Oil contaminated with poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Victims suff ered with painful eye discharge, 
acne- like eruptions on the skin, pigmentation, respiratory diffi  culties, joint 
and muscle pain, and general lethargy.  Because of the skin pigmentation and 
skin eruptions, many victims withdrew from social life and the workplace 
altogether. Th e so- called cola babies born of  mothers poisoned by the oil had 
dark- brown pigmented skin and  were found to have lower IQs. Compound-
ing victims’ misery and sense of injustice, eight months earlier some fi ve 
hundred thousand chickens had died and one million  were made sick  after 
consuming feed containing oil by- products produced by Kanemi in the same 
manufacturing facilities. At the time the com pany had denied any wrong-
doing and government offi  cials refused to follow up, with disastrous eff ects 
for some ten thousand  human victims just months  later.4
Industrial waste contaminated air, land, rivers, and seas— most shock-
ingly in the Big Four pollution incidents at Minamata Bay, Yokkaichi 
City, and the Jinzū (Toyama) and Agano (Niigata) Rivers. In the mid-1950s 
patients living around Minamata Bay in Kumamoto Prefecture began to 
pres ent at local hospitals with abnormalities of the central and peripheral 
ner vous systems, which had been fi rst observed as strange dancing, seizures, 
Infants being examined for 
arsenic contamination, 1955 
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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and sudden death among local cats. Investigations revealed the source of the 
pollution to be effl  uent dumped into the bay by the Chisso Corporation.5 
Th e etiology of this disease, called Minamata disease, lay in consumption 
of seafood containing the bio- accumulative organometallic compound, 
methyl mercury. Typical symptoms included concentric constriction of the 
visual fi eld, sensory disturbances, speech impediment, hearing loss, motor 
coordination disturbances, and convulsions. Tragically also, methyl mercury 
is a developmental neurotoxin that can cross the placenta. Infants born of 
 women who ate polluted seafood exhibited severe symptoms, including 
 mental retardation, involuntary refl exes, and coordination disturbances. As 
one report  later explained, “Th ey have no  mental world and in their crying 
existence they have been condemned to a subhuman existence by the dumb 
inhuman forces of society.”6  Needless to say,  these innocent victims of con-
genital Minamata disease became focal symbols of environmental injustice 
in Japan, most notably in the sensitive yet heartrending photo graphs by 
Eugene Smith that shocked the world in the 1970s.7
Around the same time, residents living downwind from a petrochem-
ical complex in Yokkaichi City in Mie Prefecture began to complain of 
breathing diffi  culties and severe asthma. Subsequent investigations revealed 
the cause to be noxious gases emitted from the complex. Th is second of the 
A congenital Minamata disease 
sufferer and her  mother, 1973
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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Big Four pollution incidents, called “Yokkaichi Asthma,” became synony-
mous with the tragic downside of regional development in the postwar pe-
riod.  People living nearby suff ered from bronchitis, sore throats, and colds at 
rates 220  percent higher than average. Many contracted chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, which caused severe breathing diffi  culty, sore throat, pain-
ful coughing seizures, and sometimes death. An infl uential 1964 publication 
described the condition as follows: “Asthma is the ‘citizen’s disease’ in Yok-
kaichi. In the  middle of the night an attack suddenly occurs. Th e only way 
to escape the pain is to leave this petroleum city.”8
Th e third of the Big Four surfaced in the late 1950s when a local doc-
tor in Toyama Prefecture confi rmed that cadmium dumped into the Jinzū 
River by the Mitsui Mining and Smelting Com pany caused the debilitat-
ing condition known as Itai Itai (It Hurts It Hurts) disease. Th e cadmium 
made victims bones brittle and prone to fracture, caused damage to major 
organs, and resulted in an excruciatingly painful death. Th e caption of one 
photo of a shockingly deformed infant stricken with the poisoning read, 
“Cadmium in my bones from the  water and food make my legs break in a 
dozen places. I suff er from the dread[ed] Itai Itai disease and  there seems no 
hope for me.”9 Th e highest recorded number of bone fractures in the body 
of an individual suff erer was seventy- two, of which twenty- eight fractures 
 were in the rib cage alone.10 If all this was not enough, in 1964 another case 
of methyl mercury poisoning occurred, this time in Niigata Prefecture, 
caused by effl  uent dumped into the Agano River by the Shōwa Denkō 
Com pany.11
Residents of Tokyo and Osaka also suff ered from deteriorating air and 
 water quality. In 1960 Osaka experienced choking smog for 165 days out of 
the year, and Tokyo fared no better. As late as 1969 Mount Fuji, about sixty 
miles (approx. one hundred kilo meters) from central Tokyo, was vis i ble for 
only thirty- eight days; reports from a  century earlier had the number at over 
one hundred days of visibility per year. Air quality became so bad in the 
nation’s capital that in April 1970 forty  children in Tokyo’s central Suginami 
Ward collapsed from photochemical smog inhalation, with some requiring 
hospitalization.12 Th e city’s rivers  were in no better condition. A 1971 report 
by the Tokyo metropolitan government described how, “in the de cade from 
1955,” the Sumida River “was contaminated with factory effl  uents and do-
mestic  water to such an extent that it had turned into an open sewer, not 
only prohibitive for fi sh and other aquatic life but also giving off  unpleasant 
and obnoxious odors.”13
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Japa nese citizens did not suff er in silence. Antipollution protest move-
ments appeared as early as the late 1950s when irate fi shermen in Tokyo 
(1958) and Minamata (1959) stormed the premises of polluting factories and 
demanded recompense. Such local movements  were greatly encouraged in 
1964 when protesters led by schoolteachers in Shizuoka Prefecture south of 
Tokyo forced local politicians to abandon plans for a petrochemical complex 
similar to the noxious Yokkaichi fa cil i ty. Selected as a special industrial region 
by the central government in 1963, the area was slated for a major petro-
chemical development in 1964. By this time, however, local residents knew 
about lethal pollution- induced asthma in Yokkaichi, and they quickly mobi-
lized into an opposition movement to stop construction. Th eir scientifi cally 
savvy and well- organized movement proved successful: by late 1964 local 
offi  cials,  under intense public pressure, deci ded to shelve the proj ect.14 Th e 
Shizuoka opposition movement proved to be a boon for industrial pollu-
tion victims. Enamored by this victory and supported by progressive 
 lawyers and victims’ advocates, beginning in 1967 victims of the Big Four 
pollution incidents instigated civil law proceedings against off ending com-
panies, and from 1971 to 1973 courts delivered monumental victories in 
Itai Itai disease sufferers and their physician, Dr. Hagino Noboru, 1972
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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their  favor. In the long run the Shizuoka movement also contributed to a 
softening of corporate and bureaucratic hypersensitivity to regulation, open-
ing the way for a wave of environmental legislation from the late 1960s. 
Rather than resist regulation, industrial and government elites learned from 
Shizuoka that steering  legal change might be more strategically savvy than 
resisting protest head on.
Antipollution and antidevelopment movements continued to mobilize 
around the nation throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, hitting a peak of 
around three thousand local mobilizations in 1973. Pollution victims began 
to forge rudimentary movement networks and publish their own newsletters 
or minikomi (mini communications), which increased eightfold during the 
period.15 Inspired by the Shizuoka success, other high- profi le prevention 
movements mobilized to stop construction of a freight line in Yokohama 
City and a new international airport in Chiba Prefecture— the latter draw-
ing in radical leftist student activists.16 Both mobilizations began in 1966, 
and although both ultimately failed, they confi rmed just how sensitive 
local communities  were becoming to environmental disruption in the name 
of economic development. Some even heralded this rising “wave of re sis-
tance” as a new stage in the democ ratization of Japan.17 True or not, all 
of  these movements contributed to a growing sense of dissatisfaction with 
unbridled economic growth dependent on the sacrifi ce of the living environ-
ment and  human health.
Together with grassroots protest, the rise of a public discourse on 
industrial pollution also contributed greatly to anger over environmental in-
justices in 1960s Japan. Journalists led the way  here by exposing the shocking 
consequences of pollution and reporting on the abysmal situation of 
victims. In the late 1960s, for example, the newspaper Asahi Shinbun took 
the unpre ce dented step of forming a “pollution team” of reporters to work 
exclusively on the issue. For eigh teen months, beginning in 1970, the team 
wrote pollution- and environment- related articles for their respective depart-
ments and collaborated on a special series called “Kankyō o Mamoru” 
(Protecting the environment).18 Th e newspaper followed up in 1971 with the 
provocative book Kutabare GNP: Kōdo Keizai Seichō no Uchimaku (To hell 
with GNP: Th e lowdown on high- speed economic growth). A sardonically 
titled chapter, “Kokumin Sōkōgai” (Gross national pollution), argued that, 
rather than simply “shifting the burden onto victims,” the  human and en-
vironmental costs of growth should be deducted from the GNP to give a 
more accurate picture of so- called growth.19 Buzzwords made popu lar in the 
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media also capture the tenor of the moment: shokuhin kōgai (food pollution) 
in 1961, kōgai (pollution) in 1965, hedoro (industrial sludge) in 1970, and 
Minamata in 1973.20 Th e foreign media also chimed in. Th e New York Times 
explored Japan’s pollution prob lems in a 1968 article, “Not All Is Serene in 
Cities of Japan” and, more comprehensively, in a multipage 1972 special 
headlined “Students in the elementary schools grow up suff ering from 
Asthma. Plants wither and die. Th e birds around Mount Fuji are decreasing 
in number. Th ey no longer visit the town.”21 So consequential had this 
discourse become by the early 1970s that even conservative politicians found 
it necessary to couch their designs for the country in environmental language. 
In his best- selling 1972 work Nihon Rettō Kaizō Ron (Building a New Japan: 
Plan for Remodelling the Japa nese Archipelago), Liberal Demo cratic Party 
(LDP) heavyweight Tanaka Kakuei  imagined a “re nais sance” for Japan “in 
which man and sunshine and verdant surroundings” would “replace big cities 
or industries as the rightful master of society.”22
Public intellectuals played a crucial role in forcing questions of envi-
ronmental injustice onto the public agenda in the 1960s. In terms of so-
phisticated multidisciplinary analy sis of environmental prob lems worldwide 
during this period,  these Japa nese public intellectuals stood on par with, or 
 were even ahead of, their counter parts elsewhere. In the context of Ameri-
can environmental thought, scientists such as marine biologist Rachel Car-
son, entomologist and population specialist Paul Ehrlich, and antinuclear 
campaigner and ecologist Barry Commoner immediately come to mind. In 
Eu rope it was “small is beautiful” proponent E. F. Schumacher (UK), deep 
ecol ogy founder Arne Naess (Norway), and ocean explorer Jacques Cousteau 
(France) who took the lead. In the case of Japan, however, antipollution 
campaigners and victim advocates took center stage: economists Miyamoto 
Ken’ichi and Tsuru Shigeto, chemical engineer Ui Jun, jurist Kainō Michi-
taka, and writers Ishimure Michiko and Ariyoshi Sawako. Concern for 
victims profoundly infl uenced the public statements and activities of  these 
individuals and, moreover, helped propel notions of injustice to the very fore-
front of environmental debate in Japan at the time.
Th e 1964 book Osorubeki Kōgai (Fearsome pollution) is a case in point. 
Coauthored by Miyamoto Ken’ichi and environmental hygienist Shōji 
Hikaru, this best- selling volume was the fi rst impor tant mainstream publi-
cation documenting the extent, nature, and  causes of industrial pollution 
in Japan. Hardly light reading, Osorubeki Kōgai sold an amazing 430,000 
copies and can be likened to Carson’s  Silent Spring (1962) in the United 
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States or André Gorz’s Ecologie et Politique (1975) in France.23 What made 
the book unique, however, was its focus on the mechanisms of victimization 
and injustice inherent in Japan’s high- growth development model. Osoru-
beki Kōgai became a power ful mouthpiece for Miyamoto and Shōji to 
propagate the viewpoint that industrial pollution was, above all, a story of 
how  human welfare and  human rights had been fl agrantly trampled in the 
relentless march for intensive capitalistic accumulation. Th anks to their 
book, the two authors found themselves transformed into industrial pollution 
authorities almost overnight.
While Miyamoto and Shōji provided the fi rst scientifi c treatment of 
pollution for a mainstream audience, writer Ishimure Michiko gave it a 
 human face with her heartrending 1969 work, Kugai Jōdo: Waga Minamatabyō 
(published in En glish as Paradise in the Sea of Sorrow: Our Minamata Dis-
ease). Ishimure had actually written about pollution victims earlier, but it 
was not  until Kugai Jōdo that she gained national attention. In 1970 the book 
was awarded the fi rst of many prizes, which Ishimure resolutely declined in 
re spect for the victims’ ongoing strug gle. Although somewhat  later, another 
female writer, Ariyoshi Sawako, made a similar impact on the environmen-
tal debate with her serialized documentary- novel Fukugō Osen (Compound 
pollution), which ran in the newspaper Asahi Shinbun from October 1974 
through June 1975.24 Week by week, and somewhat more accessibly than 
Miyamoto and Shōji’s earlier work, Ariyoshi laid out the shocking health 
risks of insecticides and pesticides such as DDT, in the pro cess producing a 
kind of manifesto for the alternative food movement in Japan. One is tempted 
to portray Ishimure and Ariyoshi as the Japa nese equivalents of Rachel 
Carson. Th e similarities are undeniable: they  were both  women writing for a 
mainstream audience on environmental issues at around the same time. But 
unlike Carson, neither Ishimure nor Ariyoshi  were scientists by training, nor 
did they single- handedly start the environmental debate in Japan as Carson 
had done in the United States in 1962. Rather,  these two Japa nese  women 
further clarifi ed and cemented the outrageous injustices of environmental 
pollution in the public mind, and Ishimure’s work, coming as it did in 1969, 
fortifi ed the growing pressure for substantive environmental legislation to 
address  these injustices.
Faced with such pressures, government offi  cials began to react, fi rst at 
the local level. In 1964 Yokohama City signed a landmark pollution pre-
vention agreement with local industry that set voluntary emissions standards 
and formalized pro cesses of citizen participation and oversight. In nearby 
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Tokyo, progressive Governor Minobe Ryōkichi established a dedicated Pol-
lution Research Offi  ce in 1967, and in 1969 passed a landmark pollution 
prevention ordinance with the strictest standards for air and  water quality 
in the nation.25 In contrast to the Minobe administration’s proactive pos-
ture, the response to pollution at the national level came only in agonizingly 
cautious— some would say patently reluctant— steps, which only added to 
a popu lar sense of inaction and injustice. In terms of legislative remedies, 
the national government’s approach  until the 1970s was based on harmoni-
zation, not justice. For example,  after the Honshū Paper Mill polluted Tokyo 
Bay in 1958, a law passed to regulate  water quality was deliberately weak-
ened by a clause specifying that pollution control mea sures should proceed 
in “harmony” with “sound economic development”—in eff ect providing 
a loophole for polluters.26 Th e 1962 Baien no Haishutsu no Kisei tō ni 
Kansuru Hō (Law for the regulation of smoke and soot), passed in response to 
air pollution in Yokkaichi City, contained a similar clause, as did the 1967 
Kōgai Taisaku Kihonhō (Basic law for environmental pollution control)— 
touted by offi  cials as an epoch- making piece of environmental legislation. 
While offi  cials  were prob ably not intent on willfully destroying the environ-
ment or poisoning citizens, in hindsight, the harmonization approach re-
veals a callous disregard for pollution and its hapless victims.  Th ere can be no 
doubt that this stance only added to a growing sense of environmental injus-
tice nationwide.
By the same token, not all national bureaucrats  were cut from the same 
cloth. Given its portfolio, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) was 
among the earliest ministries to pay serious attention to the industrial pol-
lution prob lem. In 1959, only months  after Kumamoto researchers identi-
fi ed methyl mercury as the culprit in Minamata disease, the MHW’s Food 
Hygiene Research Committee reached the same conclusion.27 Similarly, 
in 1965, MHW tests pointed to fi sh in the Agano River as the cause of the 
second Minamata disease outbreak in Niigata. By early 1967 another MHW 
research team was pointing the fi n ger directly at the Shōwa Denkō factory 
upstream.28 Along with this pollution monitoring, the MHW also provided 
funding for nongovernmental groups. Signifi cantly, from 1963 to 1967 the 
MHW provided critical start-up funding for Tsuru Shigeto’s group of anti-
pollution campaigners, the Research Committee on Pollution. Given the 
 later contribution of RCP members to the Japa nese and global environ-
mental movement, this offi  cial state funding for a pioneering ENGO deserves 
recognition.
Japa nese Industrial Pollution and Environmental Injustice      35
Other ministries also responded, although perhaps not always with the 
same level of genuine concern. An industrial pollution division was estab-
lished in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1963, an 
interministerial coordination committee for pollution control at the vice- 
ministerial level in 1964, and a Kōgai Shingikai (Deliberative Council on 
Pollution) in 1965.29 More concretely, the government- owned Kōgai Bōshi 
Jigyōdan (Pollution Prevention Corporation) was established in 1965 with 
the objective of averting  future siting disputes through the procurement 
of environmentally suitable sites, construction of green  belts, installation 
of abatement equipment, and loans for pollution control and prevention 
mea sures.30 Of course, such countermea sures did  little to alleviate suff ering 
on the ground, and well- intentioned offi  cials  were often thwarted by the pre-
vailing consensus on “harmonizing” environmental protection with industrial 
development.
Nevertheless, mounting pressure from protest movements and a 
worried populace eventually forced national lawmakers and bureaucrats to 
respond. By 1968 the MHW was in a suffi  ciently strong position to offi  cially 
recognize the Itai Itai and Minamata conditions as pollution diseases— 
decisions that bolstered the ongoing lawsuits and opened the way for offi  -
cial compensation.31 At a historic session of parliament in 1970— later called 
the Pollution Diet— fourteen laws  were  either newly passed or amended, 
giving Japan one of the strictest environmental regulation regimes in the 
world. Th e strengthening of the Kōgai Taisaku Kihonhō of 1967 was em-
blematic of this Diet session. Notably, lawmakers deleted the pro- industry 
clause in Article 1 of the law, which had required environmental protection 
to proceed “in harmony with sound economic development.”32 Comple-
menting  these historic legislative reforms, in 1971 the Environment Agency 
of Japan (EAJ, Kankyōchō) was established and a nationwide system for 
pollution dispute resolution put in place. Two years  later, in 1973, the Diet 
passed the Kōgai Kenkō Higai Hoshō Hō (Law for the compensation of 
pollution- related health injury), creating the world’s fi rst governmental 
compensation scheme for pollution victims. Japan could now boast a hefty 
suite of antipollution regulations and an environmental bureaucracy staff ed 
by a cadre of ostensibly green offi  cials. Th e creation of this environmental 
bureaucracy is also in ter est ing for what it says about the offi  cial response 
to years of environmental injustice. Rather than leaving disputes between 
polluters and victims to be resolved by the courts, as was done in the Big 
Four, offi  cials thereafter preferred to keep this pro cess informal through 
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bureaucrat- led resolution mechanisms that kept control fi rmly in bureau-
cratic hands.33
 Th ere is no doubt that environmental conditions in mid-1970s Japan 
 were much improved compared with  those a de cade earlier. Of course, in-
dustrial and other forms of pollution  were by no means eradicated and, as 
 others have noted, signifi cant environmental prob lems remained unsolved.34 
Moreover,  after the court cases  were over, the lawmaking done, and the me-
dia hype exhausted, it was the victims of pollution and their families who 
 were left to cope with the aftereff ects of contamination— very often for the 
rest of their lives. Indeed, the victims embodied the very essence of envi-
ronmental injustice wrought by industrial pollution, and as we  will see, their 
plight and their symbolism authenticated and invigorated the environmen-
tal injustice paradigm Japa nese activists fi rst formulated at home and then 
took to the world.
Understanding Environmental Injustice: The Research 
Committee on Pollution
Pioneering antipollution and environmental advocates played a catalytic role 
in the national response to pollution by connecting the dots between con-
tamination, industry, politics, injustice, and injury and by supporting the 
movement for victim recompense. Together with pollution victims,  these in-
dividuals helped fashion Japan’s environmental injustice paradigm. No 
group was more infl uential in this connection than the Research Commit-
tee on Pollution formed in 1963 by eight leftist academics.35 Above all, the 
RCP shared a commitment to the plight of pollution victims and an unre-
lenting determination to expose the perpetrators—an anthropocentric per-
spective that, as I have noted, came to dominate con temporary Japa nese 
environmentalism and deeply informed  later transnational involvement. As 
the RCP’s founder, economist Tsuru Shigeto,  later explained,  these eight aca-
demics represented almost the entire reservoir of pollution expertise in Japan 
at the time, and, working in isolation, each had strug gled greatly to piece 
together a comprehensive picture of the crisis. Once united, however, the 
group generated power ful synergies in terms of multidisciplinary perspec-
tives, investigative methodologies, and social networks. Th e openness of 
group members to diverse and often contradictory strategies helped sustain 
their ongoing collaboration. For instance, while Tsuru, Kainō, and Shōji 
sometimes worked inside the system as pollution czars and government ad-
visers in progressive local governments, Ui waged a public crusade against 
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conservative po liti cal leaders and national ministries. Notably, in 1970 Ui 
was arrested for storming the MHW— a fi nancial patron of the RCP—on 
behalf of Minamata disease suff erers.36
From the late 1950s, RCP members began to visit suspected sites of pol-
lution such as Minamata Bay and the petrochemical complex in Yokkaichi 
City. Th eir fi eldwork experiences forced them to think carefully about the 
politics and economics of pollution and, for a number of them, matured into 
a systematic proj ect to identify and clearly articulate the essential ele ments of 
Japa nese pollution as a fi rst step  toward its eradication. From the mid- to late 
1960s, members’ activities expanded beyond site observations and public 
advocacy to include court appearances, local government ser vice, and activist 
network building. In the law courts, Miyamoto Ken’ichi, Shōji Hikaru, and 
 legal scholar Kainō Michitaka supported Yokkaichi asthma plaintiff s in their 
civil action (1967–1972) against the six polluting petrochemical companies.37 
Miyamoto testifi ed as an expert witness for the plaintiff s, providing the court 
with a detailed history of postwar Japa nese pollution, while Shōji and Kainō 
acted as special advisers to the plaintiff s’ attorneys. Miyamoto and Kainō also 
joined Ui as special advisers to the plaintiff s in the Niigata methyl mercury 
poisoning case (1967–1971). Ui’s background in the etiology and pathology 
of industrial pollution proved invaluable in this intensely scientifi c lawsuit, as 
too did Miyamoto’s persuasive closing argument for the ultimately victorious 
plaintiff s.38 Apart from the Big Four pollution cases, RCP members appeared 
as expert witnesses and  legal advisers in a myriad of pollution suits over air-
port noise, land reclamation, coastal access rights, auto emissions, and bullet 
train vibration. In the pro cess they contributed to a minor revolution in Japa-
nese environmental common law, including innovations such as the princi ple 
of absolute liability in the Itai Itai disease case, joint tortfeasance and corpo-
rate negligence in the Yokkaichi case, and the concept of maximum permis-
sible limits in the Osaka Airport night- fl ights case.39
As they fought alongside victims in the courts, RCP members also 
fanned out as advisers in the many progressive local governments elected 
from the mid-1960s. In Western Honshū, Shōji Hikaru served as chairman 
on pollution advisory boards for Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, and Amazaki Cities, 
where he drafted pollution prevention ordinances that dramatically improved 
air and  water quality. Shōji’s pollution strategy for the smog- ridden Osaka 
City was a crucial ingredient in the successful two- term governorship (1971–
1979) of the socialist constitutional scholar Kuroda Ryōichi, elected on a 
promise to “restore Osaka’s beautiful skies.” 40 Even more infl uential in the 
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local antipollution cleanup was the Tokyo governorship (1967–1979) of 
Marxian economist Minobe Ryōkichi, who swiftly mobilized Tsuru Shigeto 
and Kainō Michitaka into his pollution brain trust. Tsuru served on a spe-
cialist urban planning panel that, in 1969, recommended a sweeping strat-
egy to address pollution through public housing, urban transport, and land 
redevelopments.41
Kainō Michitaka shouldered an even greater responsibility as chief of the 
innovative Tokyo City Pollution Research Bureau, which assembled bureau-
crats responsible for town  water, sanitation, and waste disposal alongside 
medical prac ti tion ers, biologists, botanists, public works specialists, meteo-
rologists, and chemists.42 As the capital city’s pollution czar, Kainō sent fact- 
fi nding missions to China, South  Korea, and the United States, convened 
international conferences, strengthened municipal regulations, and for-
mulated a citywide strategy involving source prevention, industrial reloca-
tion, and greenbelt construction. Like Miyamoto and Shōji, Kainō was 
enamored by Chinese and Soviet communism, and hoped to inject some 
ele ments into Tokyo governance. He was particularly impressed by reports 
from Rus sia describing state- of- the- art automobile factories operating at only 
Photochemical smog and noise pollution meter installed in downtown Tokyo by the 
Minobe administration, 1973
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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30  percent capacity  because communists apparently only made what they 
needed.43
Two of Kainō’s initiatives as pollution czar had nationwide eff ect: the 
1970 volume Kōgai to Tōkyōto (Pollution and Tokyo city), and the Tōkyōto 
Kōgai Bōshi Jōrei (Pollution prevention ordinance) of 1969. A weighty seven 
hundred pages long, Kōgai to Tōkyōto represented a cutting- edge statement 
on urban environmental policymaking, covering the  causes of air,  water, 
sound, and vibratory pollution; their health eff ects; remedial regulatory 
and  legal mechanisms; and the role of civic activism.44 Given that it was an 
offi  cial publication, the volume’s advocacy of vigorous civic opposition to 
pollution was particularly striking, yet understandable given the extent of 
Tokyo’s prob lems and the ideological proclivities of Kainō and  others in 
the Minobe administration. Th e message was that, although Revolution 
with a capital “R” was impossible, through  people power a smaller pollu-
tion revolution could  really happen. Despite its length, Kōgai to Tōkyōto 
sold an impressive thirty thousand copies, becoming required reading for 
local offi  cials nationwide.45
A year before publication of that book, Kainō and his bureau made an 
indelible mark on environmental law in Japan with their brainchild ordi-
nance, the Tōkyōto Kōgai Bōshi Jōrei. What distinguished this ordinance 
from  those in other municipalities was its provocative disregard for national 
standards. Unlike national pollution regulations diluted by economic har-
mony clauses, the Tokyo ordinance set unpre ce dented emissions standards 
for sulfur and other noxious oxides. Pro- industry bureaucrats and politicians 
initially resisted, citing national  legal supremacy, but, faced with a potential 
electoral backlash, a wave of protest, and numerous lawsuits, they eventu-
ally relented, and the ordinance survived intact.46 When the Pollution Diet 
convened in the following year, the ordinance became a minimum standard 
that vote- sensitive national politicians could not simply ignore. Indeed, this 
ordinance represented one of the RCP’s most noteworthy regulatory achieve-
ments, substantively infl uencing both local and national regulation. More 
prosaically, life in Tokyo improved as a result: by the mid-1970s annual av-
erage levels of sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and suspended particulates 
had dramatically decreased, while photochemical oxidants and nitrogen 
dioxide  were leveling off .47
While Kainō and other RCP members tackled Japan’s regulatory defi -
ciencies,  others such as Ui Jun focused on grassroots network building. In 
the eve ning of October 12, 1970, Ui convened the fi rst of his In de pen dent 
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Lectures on Pollution (ILP) at the Urban Engineering Department of 
Tokyo University. Coming at the height of the pollution crisis,  these public 
lectures attracted hundreds of students, offi  ce workers,  house wives, small 
business  owners, and local administrators. Ui presented thirteen lectures 
during the fi rst term, covering the history and current state of Japa nese 
industrial pollution, the situation in Eu ro pean countries, and strategies 
for re sis tance. Th e second term featured guest speakers such as Minamata 
activist Ishimure Michiko, Itai Itai disease researcher Dr. Hagino Noboru, 
and socialist stalwart Arahata Kanson, who captivated a one- thousand- strong 
audience with his talk on the legendary prewar antipollution activist Tanaka 
Shōzō who had fought for the rights of locals.48
Just as impor tant as the lectures  were the publications and activism 
generated by the ILP movement.  After Ui’s initial 1970 lecture, ILP partici-
pants spontaneously formed an executive committee that meticulously tran-
scribed proceedings for a monthly newsletter, Jishu Kōza (Th e in de pen dent 
lectures). Th is publication subsequently became a mouthpiece for environ-
mental movements across Japan. Ui’s fi rst- term pre sen ta tions  were  later pub-
lished in the volume Kōgai Genron (Th e princi ples of pollution), which sold 
one hundred thousand copies and was named among the ten most infl uen-
tial books of postwar Japan by the infl uential weekly Asahi Shūkan.49 Among 
the most impor tant contributions of Ui’s lectures was his characterization of 
industrial pollution not only as technical prob lem to be solved but, more 
fundamentally, as a critical component in a system of discrimination and in-
justice against the very weakest in society and, moreover, a phenomenon that 
implicated not only government and industry but also ordinary citizens, who 
benefi ted from the suff ering of pollution victims and contributed to discrimi-
nation against them.50
Operating from a small apartment in Tokyo, the ILP executive com-
mittee served as a contact point between local activists and urbanites keen 
to join the antipollution strug gle. As Ui explained, many initially came out 
of curiosity but, deeply inspired, joined on as supporters in vari ous initia-
tives such as the movement of Minamata disease suff erers.51 Moreover, from 
1972 onward, Ui and the executive committee expanded their activities 
transnationally, protesting with activists outside UNCHE in Stockholm, 
publishing English- language materials, and guiding foreign journalists 
around Japan’s pollution sites. Th e ILP also became a seedbed for movements 
opposing Japa nese industrial pollution in Asia in the 1970s and radioactive 
waste dumping in the Pacifi c in the 1980s. In this way, a domestic network 
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established to oppose Japa nese industrial pollution, teach about its  causes, 
and seek justice for its victims also served as a launchpad for Japa nese activ-
ists to take their environmental injustice paradigm to the world.
Th roughout the 1960s RCP members feverishly strove to comprehend 
the mechanisms of industrial pollution and, more pointedly, to fashion some 
kind of po liti cal strategy for victim recompense. Most members brought a 
decidedly Marxian perspective to the pollution prob lem, beginning with the 
general assumption that industrial capitalism, ipso facto, produced pollu-
tion. But, as professional social and natu ral scientists, RCP members  were 
also resolutely committed to studying the  causes and manifestations of in-
dustrial pollution as it occurred in  actual places and communities. Th is was 
an impor tant commitment  because empiricism demanded a rigorous testing 
of ideology in the fi eld and ultimately, for some in the group, a modifi ca-
tion of their deepest po liti cal commitments. For example, members’ inves-
tigations into Japa nese cases of pollution revealed that  labor  unions  were not 
necessarily the natu ral allies of industrial pollution victims and, in some 
cases, could even exacerbate injustices. Moreover, in contrast to the impover-
ishment of the working class typical of early- stage capitalism, “immiseration” 
Ui Jun presenting at the In de pen dent Lectures on Pollution, 1973
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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 under con temporary advanced capitalism manifested in diff er ent groups 
and phenomena such as “pollution, urban congestion and decay, or chronic 
infl ation.”52 Such diff erences implied the necessity for modifi cations in both 
theory and strategy. Although members never completely abandoned their 
belief that pollution was more likely  under capitalism than socialism, the 
realities of actually existing industrial pollution encouraged them to rethink 
strategy beyond rigid class lines. Im por tant also, by disrupting the stability 
of their ideological universe, RCP members’ engagement with the prob lem 
of Japa nese industrial pollution raised the question of industrial pollution 
elsewhere, especially in socialist and communist countries where, theoreti-
cally, it should not have existed. To be sure, their Marxist leanings gave them 
a cosmopolitan and international perspective to begin with, but I believe 
that the theoretical, ethical, and strategic challenges posed by Japa nese in-
dustrial pollution also planted the seeds of their  later willingness to travel 
and connect across borders. In a sense, discovering that the local was not 
operating as it should have been theoretically sowed the seeds of a proj ect to 
reimagine and reposition that local.
Consider fi rst the trajectory of Miyamoto Ken’ichi. Miyamoto (1930–), 
an economist and scholar of public fi nance, was a founding member of the 
RCP with Tsuru Shigeto. His approach to pollution and the environment 
had the most palpable Marxian fl avor of the group, a result of what Miya-
moto described as his early “baptism” into Marxism, which for many years 
enjoyed a quasi- religious status among Japa nese social scientists.53 Miya-
moto became concerned about industrial pollution at the 1961 meeting 
of the socialist Zen Nihon Jichi Dantai Rōdō Kumiai (All- Japan Prefectural 
and Municipal Workers Union, or Jichirō), where he learned of offi  cially cen-
sored data evidencing severe air and  water contamination around the new 
petrochemical complex in Yokkaichi City, located in Mie Prefecture around 
230 miles (370 kilo meters) south of Tokyo. Th is data diverged sharply from 
a glossy pamphlet from the Urban Engineering Department at Tokyo 
University (involved in the proj ect), which eulogized Yokkaichi as an “ideal 
industrial city of sunlight and green space” supplanting the asphyxiating 
coal- powered centers of old. Intrigued, Miyamoto traveled to Yokkaichi 
twice over the coming months where he was deeply shocked to discover over 
eight hundred asthma suff erers and a foul- smelling bay with malodorous, 
inedible fi sh. In mid-1962 on a guided tour of the complex Miyamoto ob-
served wastewater treatment facilities and interviewed factory offi  cials who 
insisted the pollution originated from a sunken ship in the bay. Infuriated 
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by  these denials and mindful of the victims, Miyamoto deci ded to gather 
more data on the “insidious” and “fearsome” villain at Yokkaichi.54
 Later in the same year, Miyamoto traveled farther south to the Yahata 
Ironworks in northern Kyushu, where he was shocked again— this time by 
the gray, smog- choked sky and the blackened Dōkai Bay. Coal or oil power 
irrespective, he came to see  these industrial cities as hotbeds of tyrannical 
mono poly capital, modern “corporate  castle towns” like the feudal  castle 
towns of old ruled by sword- wielding samurai warriors.55 With the estab-
lishment of the RCP in 1963, Miyamoto, Tsuru, and other members inten-
sifi ed their fi eld research: Yokkaichi again in 1964 and 1967, the planned 
Shizuoka petrochemical plant in 1964, and myriad other cities such as Mina-
mata, Kisarazu, and Mizushima. At each site they met with activists, victims, 
medical doctors, and industry representatives, carefully documenting the 
devastating progression from industrial irresponsibility to contamination 
and, ultimately,  human suff ering and injustice.56
Deeply disturbed by the  human costs of industrial pollution, members 
began communicating their fi ndings publicly almost immediately. In Decem-
ber 1962 an incensed Miyamoto penned what would be the fi rst postwar 
essay to use kōgai (pollution) in its title. In the essay, “Shinobiyoru Kōgai” 
The “hellish skies” over Yokkaichi City, June 1970
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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(Insidious pollution), Miyamoto lambasted the “hellish skies” over Japan’s 
industrial towns and condemned pollution as the new “king of  human rights 
violations.”57 As mentioned, most widely read and infl uential was his best- 
selling 1964 book, Osorubeki Kōgai (Fearsome pollution), coauthored with 
fellow RCP member Shōji Hikaru.58 As fellow RCP member Ui Jun  later 
explained, Osorubeki Kōgai was more than an alarm bell like Carson’s  Silent 
Spring; it also became the “how to” manual for victims, advocates, and an-
tipollution movements nationwide.59 Inside its covers readers encountered a 
shocking compendium of images and statistics. Along with photos of smoggy 
industrial cities, polluted lakes, and distraught victims, Miyamoto and Shōji 
provided a “pollution map” of Japan, identifying contamination in almost 
 every prefecture nationwide. A “pollution diary” based on newspaper clip-
pings from 1961 to 1962 painted a similar picture. Shōji marshaled his natu-
ral science expertise in chapters on the  causes and consequences of air and 
 water pollution, while Miyamoto discussed the po liti cal economy of pollu-
tion and strategies for re sis tance. Osorubeki Kōgai went through thirty- six 
reprints and sold close to half a million copies; although it was but one part 
of a wider awakening, it must be credited with shaping a public language 
and debate on environmental injustices in Japan where  there had been relative 
silence before. Th at the major Japa nese dictionary, the Kōjien, at that time 
contained no entry for the term kōgai attests to Osorubeki Kōgai’s landmark 
signifi cance.60 Miyamoto and Shōji also found their own lives transformed, 
deluged thereafter with requests for assistance from protest movements, local 
governments, and environmental litigation attorneys.61
Osorubeki Kōgai had an overtly Marxist tone and was littered with blan-
ket assertions such as “the history of pollution” is “the history of capitalism,” 
“pollution is a symptom of class confl ict,” and the “cap i tal ist class” is the 
“pollution aggressor.”62 Th e book singled out Japan as a special case of pol-
lution, pointing to collusion between conservative politicians and industry 
executives. In the absence of an eff ective regulatory framework and driven 
by a catch-up mentality, Japa nese capital concentrated in the highly pol-
luting heavy and chemical sectors, whose fi rms devoted almost no funds 
to pollution prevention.63 Miyamoto and Shōji also highlighted the imbal-
ances both within public spending and between public and private expen-
diture. Th ey noted that, although public spending in Japan for 1960 was 
1.6 times higher than that of a comparable nation (the United Kingdom), 
outlays for public housing, for example,  were 72  percent less than the United 
Kingdom, while outlays for industrial infrastructure  were more than three 
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times greater.64 Both the national and local governments in Japan poured 
public funds into ports, freight lines, roads, power plants, and airports, while 
disregarding daily life infrastructure such as sewerage, cleaning and waste 
management, and hospitals.65 Indeed, rather than portraying a neutral ar-
biter of social and economic interests, Miyamoto, Shōji, and other RCP 
members portrayed a kigyō kokka (private enterprise state) managed by eco-
nomic technocrats and conservative politicians, ever ready to violently de-
fend corporate interests.66
In a Marxian tone, Osorubeki Kōgai concluded that Japa nese pollution 
caused by industry cutting corners was a “social disaster” inherent in the 
“relations of cap i tal ist production.” It was about “class confl ict,” with the “con-
temporary aggressor” being large corporations and the state, and the victims 
being workers, farmers, and fi shermen.67 Of course, this observation that 
pollution aff ected groups beyond the working class did not fi t neatly with 
classical Marxian theory, nor did it translate easily into revolutionary strat-
egies centered on the proletariat. Nor  were such implications lost on the 
orthodox left, and Miyamoto and Shōji found themselves the target of se-
vere criticism from the Japa nese Communist Party and  labor  unions for their 
“bourgeois liberal” discourse of rights.68 For his part, Miyamoto eventually 
concluded that antipollution movements need not be ultimately subsumed 
back into the historical strug gle of the proletariat but would have their own 
unique role to play  under  future socialism.69  Here he shared an affi  nity with 
 later global discourses on  human rights and post- Marxist visions, in which 
groups subject to injustices  because of race, gender, sexuality, or even the 
environment would become part of a “chain of equivalence,” without the 
need to surrender their unique identities for a shared subjectivity of class.70
Moreover, although Osorubeki Kōgai unequivocally linked industrial 
pollution to mono poly capitalism (especially its Japa nese confi guration), the 
book did not ignore reports— sketchy though they  were—of pollution in 
socialist countries. Miyamoto and Shōji briefl y discussed UN reports of the 
time that documented air pollution in the Slezsko coal fi elds in the Ostrava 
region of Czecho slo va kia, which rivaled the worst cases in Japan. Th ey also 
noted urban pollution in the Soviet Union and communist China as large 
numbers of  people moved from rural areas to cities.71 In the fi nal passages 
of the book Miyamoto and Shōji admitted that the history of pollution in 
Japan and its relationship to Japa nese capitalism— which they had so con-
fi dently explained in earlier chapters— really needed to be contextualized 
through comparison to foreign countries, especially socialist ones.72 Th is 
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nagging question about the systemic roots of pollution— was it all about 
(Japa nese) capitalism, or perhaps something more?— would be one  factor 
 behind RCP members’ transnational involvement from the late 1960s 
onward.
While Miyamoto observed the hellish skies and excruciatingly painful 
asthma at Yokkaichi, fellow RCP member Ui Jun (1932–2006) discovered 
a diff er ent kind of hell in Minamata Bay and Niigata Prefecture, produced 
by the chemical methyl mercury. Ui had studied applied chemistry as an 
undergraduate at the University of Tokyo and,  after a brief stint in indus-
try, returned to the university in 1959 as a gradu ate student working on 
plastic manufacturing pro cesses. It was around this time (late 1959) that 
Ui fi rst read reports linking the strange disease in Minamata to methyl mer-
cury. He was immediately intrigued  because Nihon Zeon, the com pany he 
had worked for from 1956 to 1959, regularly dumped a similar kind of 
mercury in its factory effl  uent. Ui promptly began to conduct research on 
Minamata disease in his  free time, and in 1963, he deci ded to quit the 
chemical engineering program at Tokyo University and reenter as a gradu ate 
student in civil engineering, where he could concentrate on the methyl mer-
cury issue. By 1963 Ui and a fellow pollution researcher, the photographer 
Kuwabara Shisei, had confi rmed beyond doubt that methyl mercury in fac-
tory effl  uent was the cause of Minamata disease. But, lacking the courage, 
the pair deci ded not to publish their fi ndings— a decision that Ui greatly 
regretted  later,  because he believed it might have diminished, if not averted, 
the second outbreak of Minamata disease in Nagano Prefecture in 1965.73
Ui Jun is arguably the most impor tant fi gure in transnational environ-
mental activism in postwar Japan. As a scientist he asked questions that could 
only be answered by looking abroad, as an activist he helped mobilize move-
ments with the knowledge and resources to go transnational, and as an 
individual he was thoroughly committed to preventing a repeat of the Japa-
nese disaster anywhere  else in the world. It also helped that Ui was, for want 
of a better term, an indomitable individual. Although he was not a confi -
dent En glish speaker, on many occasions Ui plucked up the courage to speak 
about Japa nese pollution before foreign audiences and in tele vi sion and 
radio interviews. He was willing to travel to foreign countries and contact 
 people out of the blue. And he had no hesitation about directly confronting 
man ag ers of polluting companies,  whether in Japan, Italy, Canada, or else-
where. Supporting this resolve was Ui’s commitment to the victims, espe-
cially the suff erers of Minamata disease, who he felt he had let down. As Ui 
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commented  after an arduous 1969 visit to Finland, “I thought to myself that 
it was the memory of the suff erer’s pain which supported my activities dur-
ing this tense week.”74 Indeed, Ui came to see himself as a kind of “special 
foreign envoy for Minamata,” charged with telling the victims’ tragic story 
to the world.
Like Miyamoto, Ui’s transnational motivation initially stemmed from 
a desire to understand why such terrible  things had happened to innocent 
Japa nese  people—to fi shermen, to young  mothers, and to  children. With 
its extensive coastline, massive tidal fl uctuations, high rainfall, fast- fl owing 
rivers, strong winds, and absence of land borders, Japan appeared to possess 
the perfect conditions for averting pollution. Nevertheless, the country had 
become a polluters’ paradise. For Ui  there  were at least two explanations for 
this situation. First, he believed that, institutionally, the incestuous relations 
between business and government and the resulting consensus on economic 
growth above all  else facilitated and exacerbated pollution. Th e Japa nese gov-
ernment was not a watchdog but a handmaiden of industry.75 Second, he 
pointed to the relative weakness of  human rights consciousness in Japan, 
where  people perceived rights not as benefi ts won through strug gle but 
Ui Jun arrested as he attempts to 
enter the MHW in support of 
Minamata disease sufferers, 
May 1970
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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almost as gifts bestowed from above by the US occupiers  after the war. He 
singled out discrimination against Minamata disease suff erers as a typical 
example of this weak rights consciousness.  After all, what group better typ-
ifi ed an appalling violation of  human rights than the Japa nese  people poi-
soned by methyl mercury? Yet, the real ity for victims once they fell ill was 
discrimination, social exclusion, and poverty. Suff erers found it diffi  cult 
to fi nd work or to get married. To announce that one was a Minamata suf-
ferer, argued Ui, was often tantamount to asking for discrimination. And, 
the fact that  others could so easily discriminate against pollution victims 
proved for him that the Japa nese had a “very weak conceptualization of their 
own rights and the rights of  others.” Only by discriminating against  others 
could they suppress the nagging anxiety that they too  were being discrimi-
nated against in one way or another.76 Like Miyamoto, then, Ui’s concep-
tualization of Japa nese industrial pollution was profoundly  shaped by the 
discrimination against local communities and poisoned victims he witnessed 
at Minamata and elsewhere. In fact, he spent as much time trying to under-
stand the roots of environmental injustice and victim discrimination as he 
did the science of environmental pollution. Th e encounter with this dis-
crimination and injustice instilled in Ui, even more so than in Miyamoto, 
a strong sense of obligation to ensure that the facts of the Japa nese tragedy 
 were correctly communicated abroad and that the voices of the victims  were 
heard— both as a warning to the world and as a pathway to victim empow-
erment. Importantly, this stance deeply colored the activities of the ILP 
movement as well as subsequent spin- off  movements involved in environ-
mental prob lems throughout Asia and the Pacifi c in the 1970s and 1980s.
Th e  career trajectory of Harada Masazumi (1934–2012), a medical re-
searcher and clinician at Kumamoto University on Kyushu Island, off ers 
yet another impor tant insight into the development of an environmental in-
justice paradigm among leading Japa nese antipollution activists in the 1960s. 
It was in 1960 that the twenty- six- year- old Harada, a new gradu ate student 
in the university’s neuropsychiatry laboratory, fi rst learned about the com-
pound methyl mercury and its eff ects on living organisms. For his fi rst 
six months as a gradu ate student, Harada was assigned to laboratory work 
in which he conducted mercury experiments on cats, rodents, rabbits, and 
chickens. It was only in mid-1961 that he was permitted to conduct an 
examination on a  human suff erer of methyl mercury poisoning at Minamata 
Bay. As Harada  later recalled, this visit to the home of a young victim de-
termined how he would live the rest of his life.77 Interacting with a Minamata 
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disease suff erer fi rsthand— especially a child— aff ected him on a deeply emo-
tional level. But just as distressing for the young physician  were the social 
and economic conditions in which  these victims  were forced to live. Similar 
to Ui, Harada also discovered, along with terribly poisoned  human bodies 
in Minamata, horrendous poverty and appalling discrimination.
As a young physician fresh out of university, this terrible situation was 
almost impossible to comprehend, and it immediately provoked within 
Harada a deep sense of resentment and even rage. Th e victims had done noth-
ing more than consume fi sh, yet now they faced pitiless discrimination and 
 were forced to lead their lives hidden away from society.78 As he put it, “Th e 
world I saw through Minamata was a confi guration of the complicated fi s-
sures and discrimination which haunt all of  human society. I too had be-
come used to this world in which  people no longer considered  others as 
 humans. I was able to see [through Minamata disease] how I had positioned 
myself within that structure of discrimination. I concluded that the funda-
mental cause of Minamata disease was the condition of  people not consid-
ering  others as  humans. . . .  I also recognized that the damage was expanding 
and that the lack of any relief mea sures was due to  human discrimination in 
which  people did not view  others as  humans.”79 Harada would  later de-
scribe Minamata disease suff erers and their families as a “discarded” or 
Harada Masazumi examines slides of 
Minamata disease victims, 1972
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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“abandoned”  people, victimized by a cruel structure of dehumaniza-
tion.80 Chisso Corporation, owner of the off ending factory, was certainly to 
blame, but the “condition of dehumanization” involved many more  people—
including Harada himself.
Like Miyamoto and Ui, Harada also became convinced that, to un-
derstand industrial diseases in all their complexity, researchers had no choice 
but to visit polluted spaces directly. Reading or hearing about pollution 
second hand might be useful in relaying certain basic facts, but only by 
seeing toxic environments and interacting with victims fi rsthand would 
advocates truly comprehend the complex structure of discrimination in 
which pollution unfolded. Pollution was about much more than toxic 
chemicals and gases contaminating ecosystems and  human bodies; it was 
also about the pro cesses of dehumanization that made this pos si ble, and 
such  things could only be understood by physically entering into the world 
of victims.
Harada’s commitment to understanding pollution on the ground and 
to meeting victims in their own localities was further strengthened by an 
emotional encounter he had with the  mother of a young Minamata disease 
suff erer. As the  woman explained, she was extremely grateful for the many 
examinations undertaken by Harada and his colleagues at the university, 
but what she  really needed  after six long years was an answer. “ Every time 
I’m asked to bring him in, it takes a full day and I lose a  whole day’s wages 
which makes life very diffi  cult.”81 To this Harada had no reply, but  after 
the encounter he made a commitment that, thereafter, all his consultations 
with Minamata disease suff erers would be conducted in their homes, even 
if this meant laborious hours of travel for himself. Importantly, Harada’s 
commitment to meeting and treating pollution victims in their own spaces 
seems to have made him receptive to helping pollution victims anywhere, 
even if this meant traveling outside Japan, which he would begin to do 
from the mid-1970s.
Moreover, like Ui, Harada’s transnational impulse was fueled by a deep 
sense of responsibility and even remorse as a researcher and clinician from 
polluted Japan. In his and  others’ eff orts to short- cir cuit the denials of Chisso 
offi  cials and their governmental supporters about the  causes of Minamata 
disease, Harada and fellow clinicians and researchers had been left with no 
choice but to formulate a watertight set of “typical” symptoms for the dis-
ease that could not be rebutted or denied. While such defi nitional clarity 
had undoubtedly assisted many Japa nese victims in their  battle for retribu-
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tion and compensation, Harada also recognized how this clarity may have 
too- narrowly demarcated the health eff ects of mercury poisoning, which 
stretched from milder neurological side eff ects to absolute incapacitation. 
Th is sense that he may have somehow unwittingly contributed to the dis-
empowerment of certain mercury- poisoning victims served as a power ful 
motivating  factor  behind his transnational activities from the mid-1970s 
onward.
What we encounter in the cases of Miyamoto Ken’ichi, Ui Jun, and 
Harada Masazumi, then, are three highly educated and empathetic social 
and natu ral scientists whose involvement with industrial pollution and its 
victims in Japan profoundly  shaped their understanding of the phenomenon 
within a paradigm of environmental injustice. In Minamata, in Yokkaichi, 
and at contaminated sites all over Japan, they discovered  human suff ering 
and discrimination that they desperately wanted to understand, explain, 
and eradicate. Each of them harbored a personal sense of remorse and 
responsibility as scientists from a terribly polluted nation about which 
the rest of the world knew very  little. Th ey realized that they possessed 
knowledge that could potentially circumvent pollution in other places— even 
in other countries— and perhaps prevent further  human misery at the hands 
of industry.
Admittedly,  these  factors by no means predetermined that RCP 
members would become active transnationally, but I suggest that, when the 
opportunity to go abroad presented itself, such  factors made them more 
receptive than they may other wise have been. Moreover, one lasting out-
come of pollution protest, media attention, court cases, public activism, 
and, of course, suff ering industrial pollution victims was the production 
of a potent environmental injustice paradigm in 1960s Japan, most vis i ble 
within groups such as the RCP and ILP, but also evident in the media, in 
public discourse, in governmental legislation, and even within national 
bureaucracies such as the MHW. In the following chapters I trace the 
ways Japa nese activists deployed this paradigm in their vari ous transna-
tional involvements beginning in the late 1960s. Although the vari ous scalar 
iterations (e.g., regional, global) of this paradigm would demand modifi ca-
tions and enhancements, environmental victims, the violation of their rights, 
and the mechanisms of injustice harming them would remain central in the 
message that the Japa nese activists involved relayed abroad, as well as in 




The Therapy of Translocal Community
Transnationalism can have vastly diff er ent connotations, ranging from the 
relatively informal diff usion of ideas or practices across borders to highly co-
ordinated mobilizations among activists from diff er ent countries. I am 
receptive to the many shades of transnationalism along this defi nitional 
spectrum but want to give priority to material or physical connections, 
 because it is the face- to- face meetings between  people from diff er ent coun-
tries that very often stimulate meaningful changes in the ways  those in-
volved think, how they act, and the kinds of changes they produce when they 
return home. Particularly impor tant  here is Sidney Tarrow’s idea of trans-
national activists as “connective tissue”; in other words, the ways in which 
such actors move to forge physical, emotional, and intellectual connections 
between  people, communities, and movements separated by geography and 
national borders.1 Like the dynamic connective tissue within living or-
ganisms,  these rooted cosmopolitans are far more than passive conduits, 
 because they are the ones actively creating the network of interconnections 
and becoming the carriers of meanings, of  human experiences, and of 
shared strug gles. I imagine them as the very life force of transnational-
ism, helping to “oxygenate” the system, so to speak. Ui Jun, Harada Ma-
sazumi, and other RCP members appear to have realized very early on that 
their role in the creation of transnational—or more accurately, perhaps, 
translocal— interconnections could be of real value in pollution victim 
empowerment.
Th e sinologist and social theorist Arif Dirlik has proposed this idea of 
“translocal” to signify how geo graph i cally rooted strug gles and identities can 
become springboards for mobilizations, interconnections, and exchanges 
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that transcend national borders. For Dirlik, translocal is far more than a ter-
minological modifi cation of transnational  because it challenges us to recon-
sider the capacity of places to disrupt the ideological hierarchies of scale that 
can serve as strategies of containment in a historical fi eld monopolized by 
the national pa norama.2 As the geographer Ash Amin puts it, places have 
the potential to become “more than what they contain, and what happens 
in them [can be] more than the sum of localised practices and powers, and 
actions at other ‘spatial scales.’ ”3 Some, such as the geographer Sally Mar-
ston, even propose a post- national “fl at ontology” of the world that “discard[s] 
the centring essentialism that infuses not only the up– down vertical imaginary 
but also the radiating (out from  here) spatiality of horizontality.” 4 Instead, 
Marston and fellow geographers envision a world in which “all contempo-
raneous lives . . .  are linked through the unfolding of intermeshed sites.”5 
What interests me in such observations is the suggestion that the local is not— 
and never was— a nationally bounded space, and, more signifi cantly, that 
within the local  there exists a potential for universal vision, consciousness, 
and action transcending the local while remaining attached to it. Indeed, 
one argument I develop in this and the following chapters is that local ex-
perience and attachment served as power ful stimuli for transnational action 
in the con temporary Japa nese environmental movement, even when atten-
tion shifted to prob lems of the globe in the 1980s.
At the height of Japan’s pollution crisis in the late 1960s, Ui Jun made 
a number of pioneering visits to Eu rope to collect information on local in-
stances of industrial pollution and to report on the grave crisis facing Japan. 
Encouraged by one of his superiors at Tokyo University, who feared Ui might 
be drawn into the rising tumult of student protest, for fi fteen months from 
August 1968 Ui traveled throughout Eu rope as a research fellow with the 
World Health Or ga ni za tion (WHO). While in Eu rope, Ui delivered many 
lectures; gave media interviews; met with scientists, activists, and govern-
ment offi  cials; and conducted pollution site investigations in countries 
such as Sweden, Hungary, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands,  Eng land, France, 
Switzerland, West Germany, Austria, Czecho slo va kia, and Belgium. Th e trip 
was eye- opening for him. In the midst of a bitterly cold Hungarian winter, 
he saw how the “blue” Danube River had become a “blackened stream” due 
to toxic industrial sludge, and he experienced fi rsthand the terrible air pol-
lution of Budapest caused by citizens burning low- grade coal for heating. 
Ui estimated that Budapest’s brown tap  water— which he had no choice 
but to drink— had a maximum visibility of only twenty centimeters.6 He 
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witnessed similar pollution in the Soviet Union and in other East Eu ro pean 
socialist states such as Czecho slo va kia and could only conclude that, while 
it was true many of  these states had pollution mea sures in place before West-
ern nations, claims that they had eradicated pollution  were simply wrong. 
In fact, based on his fi eld experiences, Ui concluded that the po liti cal and 
economic system of socialism might even delay the discovery and exacerbate 
the eff ects of pollution— a conclusion greatly at odds with many advocates 
of state socialism in Japan.7 Miyamoto Ken’ichi came to a similar conclu-
sion during a visit to Czecho slo va kia in 1967.  After a conference in Prague, 
he was permitted to visit the industrial region surrounding Ostrava City 
near the Czech- Polish border, where he discovered the same “hellish skies” 
he had seen in northern Kyushu in 1961.8 Seeing pollution in socialist 
countries and interacting with social scientists revealed for Miyamoto the 
“errors of Japa nese Marxian theories on pollution” and contributed to his 
rethinking of po liti cal strategies to address the injustices of environmental 
pollution he had fi rst discovered at home.9
In this chapter I retrace RCP members’ visits to pollution sites world-
wide and their meetings with foreign activists and victims from 1968  until 
the mid-1970s. I am interested in what they learned through  these visits and 
how they  were aff ected, especially with regard to their evolving ideas about 
the  causes of and remedies for industrial pollution and its resultant injus-
tices. I also show how this group began to communicate Japan’s history of 
environmental injustice to the world. I begin with the early travels of Ui Jun 
and Miyamoto Ken’ichi in Eu rope in the late-1960s where they encountered 
 water and air contamination equal to, if not worse than, that in Japan, and 
came face- to- face with the real ity of pollution in socialist countries. I then 
explore the World Environment Investigative Mission funded by the news-
paper Chūnichi Shinbun and or ga nized and led by RCP members in 1975. 
Visiting sixteen countries and forty pollution sites, this mission was the most 
extensive endeavor to study worldwide pollution in modern Japa nese his-
tory. Particularly impor tant  were the linkages RCP members forged with 
Native American communities in Canada affl  icted by mercury poisoning. 
Individuals such as Harada Masazumi off ered their scientifi c expertise and 
also acted as bridges between the Native Americans and Minamata disease 
suff erers in Japan. Emboldened by this support from Japan, the Native 
Americans subsequently pursued their grievances with the Canadian gov-
ernment and in the courts.
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To invoke Keck and Sikkink’s concept, transnational involvement also 
had a “boomerang” eff ect on the activists themselves, especially with regard 
to their attitude to overseas engagement. As we  will see, Ui, Miyamoto, 
Harada, and other RCP members walked away from  these travels with a 
heightened appreciation for the fundamental discrimination feeding envi-
ronmental injustices against minorities, the poor,  women,  children, the dis-
abled, the po liti cally disenfranchised, and  those depending most directly on 
nature for survival worldwide. Th ey became committed to forging alliances 
of victims— regardless of po liti cal systems— based on translocal communities 
of re sis tance and mutual therapy. Initially skeptical about the tour, Miya-
moto even went so far as to declare that the Japa nese pollution experience 
would not be of any real value for the world  unless Japa nese victims 
 actually met with victims elsewhere, and then only if  those researching 
pollution physically traveled to and conducted research at pollution sites 
abroad. Individual cases of pollution in par tic u lar spaces might be solved, 
Miyamoto opined, but without direct interaction they would be repeated 
elsewhere.10 More personally, RCP members’ travels fi lled them with a deep 
sense of remorse and responsibility as scientists from the most polluted 
nation on earth. Th ey  were shocked to discover how  little was known 
about Japa nese pollution, and they lamented their complicity in the global 
development of “typical” (tenkeiteki) diagnoses of pollution maladies such 
as Minamata disease, which tended to recognize only the most acute 
pre sen ta tions.
Involvement with Native American communities and other pollution 
suff erers worldwide presented RCP members with an opportunity to recali-
brate and enhance their environmental injustice paradigm. Th is certainly 
involved the formulation of a new attitude to the outside world, which broke 
with well- established Japa nese patterns of lauding the shining successes of 
the advanced nations while ignoring the shadows. But, more signifi cantly, 
it also involved recognizing the global- historical signifi cance and applicability 
of the Japa nese encounter with industrial pollution and environmental in-
justice—in other words, repositioning the environmental injustice paradigm 
in contexts and prob lems beyond Japan. Th is recognition continued to 
grow in the coming years as subsequent Japa nese groups injected their 
local experience into a diversity of environmental issues worldwide. Ui Jun 
and  others in the RCP can be credited with taking the fi rst steps in this 
direction.
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The Discovery of Eu ro pean Pollution
Ui traveled fi rst to Sweden in 1968, where he learned of the country’s long-
time strug gle with mercury pollution. Since the early twentieth  century it 
had been known that mercury compounds  were highly eff ective as grain fun-
gicides, and they  were extensively utilized for this purpose in Eu rope from 
the 1940s— albeit in small doses—on barley, wheat, corn, and beets.  After 
numerous instances of poisoning, in the 1950s the Swedish authorities (and 
other governments throughout Eu rope) deci ded that all grains treated with 
such fungicides had to be marked with a red dye, Rhodamine B, and spe-
cially handled. At least in Sweden, poisoning instances declined thereafter, 
but the prob lem of mercury already released into the environment was not 
solved. Ui learned how new technology developed by Swedish scientists in 
the mid-1960s uncovered elevated levels of mercury in fi sh taken from vari-
ous lakes throughout the country, leading to concerns about their safety for 
 human consumption.
As an expert in methyl mercury poisoning, Ui arrived in Sweden at an 
opportune moment. In 1968 Swedish scientists fi rst realized that they had 
been misinterpreting the research fi ndings of Japa nese Minamata disease 
specialists. Th e Swedish scientists had overlooked a critical footnote explain-
ing that the reported safe mercury concentration levels  were based on 
yield- to- weight ratios for dried samples, and that fresh fi sh would naturally 
yield lower ratios but with similar levels of toxicity. Th e Swedish scientists 
had been mistakenly comparing mercury levels in their samples of fresh 
fi sh to the safe levels for dried fi sh in the Japa nese report, in eff ect greatly 
underestimating toxicity. Compounding the prob lem, Ui’s imminent arrival 
in Sweden forced government offi  cials to admit that they had kept confi -
dential a report on Niigata Minamata disease sent to them by a research 
team from the Japa nese Ministry of Health and Welfare. As the offi  cials 
had feared, Ui brought a copy of the report with him. Th e high- circulation 
Swedish daily, Svenska Dagbladet, immediately latched on to the story, 
 running a front- page interview with Ui titled “Per sis tent Strug gle Reveals 
Truth about Minamata.” Th anks to the media attention, the Alliance of 
Swedish Freshwater Fishing Industries presented Ui with a letter for Japa nese 
fi shermen that criticized haphazard economic growth and called for a grass-
roots alliance against mercury worldwide. Ui was also invited to pres ent 
on the history of Minamata disease at a mercury prob lems symposium in 
Stockholm.11
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Ui’s visit to Sweden proved valuable for him and for his Swedish hosts. 
To begin with, Swedish scientists’ constantly raised the issue of why research 
from Japan only dealt with typical (i.e., severe) cases of mercury poisoning, 
when it seemed  there was a spectrum of symptoms depending on the level 
of poisoning. For Ui Jun, Harada Masazumi, and other Japa nese Minamata 
researchers, such questions prompted a critical rethinking of their earlier 
work and even a sense of remorse. Investigating mercury in Sweden also 
made Ui all the more indignant about mercury contamination in Japan. In 
Sweden, methyl mercury in the environment stemmed from multiple sources, 
such as factory effl  uent and grain fungicide runoff  and, hence, was hard to 
trace to a single source. But, in the cases of Chisso at Minamata Bay and 
Shōwa Denkō in Niigata Prefecture, the perpetrators  were clear, yet it still 
took over a de cade for offi  cial government and judicial recognition. Ui  later 
described his shame and embarrassment over this situation in Japan and 
recalled wanting to “jump into a hole in the ground”  every time foreign 
scientists confronted him with such questions. But, despite his sense of em-
barrassment, Ui’s Swedish visit unquestionably helped open up the debate 
about mercury contamination in that country and, for Ui personally, posed 
challenging questions that led to new transnational connections. Notably, 
 after his pre sen ta tion in Stockholm, a Finnish biologist invited Ui to exam-
ine mercury pollution in that country, which he promptly agreed to do.12
Before traveling to Finland, however, the trail of Eu ro pean mercury 
contamination led Ui to Italy. At a conference on  water quality in Switzer-
land in May 1969, Ui approached the organizers  after learning  there would 
be no pre sen ta tions on  water quality prob lems in Japan, by then a global 
economic power and, as Ui well knew, a polluters’ paradise. He was given 
permission to screen his documentary fi lm, Polluted Japan, followed by a 
pre sen ta tion on mercury and cadmium poisoning in the country. As he had 
hoped, the fi lm and pre sen ta tion sparked an immediate response from 
Eu ro pean scientists, who  were only beginning to appreciate the dangers of 
environmental mercury contamination. Th ree Italian scientists approached 
Ui  after the pre sen ta tion saying that they suspected at least three sites of mer-
cury contamination in Italy, which they promised to show him if he visited 
the country.13
Ui had been hoping to make contact with Italian scientists working on 
mercury ever since a colleague at the Yokohama National University alerted 
him to reports about industrial contamination from factories in the Italian 
province of Ravenna and near the cities of Milan and Venice.  Th ese factories 
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engaged in similar industrial pro cesses to  those of Shōwa Denkō, the com-
pany responsible for Minamata disease in Niigata Prefecture, so Ui was  eager 
to see conditions fi rsthand. One of Shōwa Denkō’s early refutations had been 
that worldwide  there  were many factories using the same pro cesses yet no-
where had  there been reports of mercury contamination, a claim that Ui and 
many other antipollution protesters found wholly unconvincing.14 Th e meet-
ing with Italian scientists in Switzerland thus provided him with a golden 
opportunity to test out Shōwa Denkō’s claims.
In Italy, Ui traveled with his hosts to a petrochemical complex on the 
outskirts of Milan that reminded him of scenes back in Japan: “As we ap-
proached the factory I began to notice the sour odor I was used to smelling 
each time I visited the Kyushu Minamata Factory.  Th ere was no doubt this 
factory was producing plasticizing agents, butyl alcohol, or acetic acid from 
acetaldehyde.”15 Although offi  cials at the plant denied the acetaldehyde was 
synthesized using a mercury catalyzer, Ui’s own investigations revealed that 
most of its technology came from the Chisso Corporation. On his third 
day in Italy Ui took the bold step of calling on the com pany headquarters 
in central Milan, where he was able to air his concerns with the man ag er of 
technology. As in Sweden,  these provocative activities by a famous mercury 
researcher from Japan elicited an immediate response in the media and 
among Italian scientists. Ui once again found himself front- page news when 
the progressive Catholic Italian newspaper Avvenire ran an interview with 
him ominously titled “ ‘Chemical Death’ to Us as in Japan?”16 At a confer-
ence on oceanic medicine in Naples, Ui shocked his audience with what was 
perhaps the fi rst scientifi c pre sen ta tion on mercury contamination in the 
country and, as he quipped, “the fact they  were hearing it from a  little yel-
low Japa nese shrimp” made it all the more impressive.17
Ui encouraged Italian scientists to focus on mercury levels in fi sh, not 
 water, since the latter would usually be low or negligible and hence could 
mistakenly be overlooked as insignifi cant. He also suggested that the sus-
pect factories in Milan, Ravenna, and Venice immediately be required to 
install treatment facilities to ensure no leakage of mercury in their effl  uent. 
As in Sweden and Switzerland, Ui again found himself the main focus of 
discussion and attention at the Naples conference, which clearly gave him a 
 great sense of vindication and accomplishment: “Th e applause I could hear 
as I wiped the sweat from my brow and stepped down from the podium felt 
wonderful. My strug gles of the past year faded away completely.”18 Th at he 
was also somehow representing the victims—or the potential victims— made 
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his eff orts seem worthwhile. “If my investigations result in preventing an 
outbreak [of mercury poisoning] in Italy, I’ll be able to say that my ten years 
of strug gle  were rewarded,” he concluded. His aim was by no means to 
“frighten  people” but to “communicate the cries of individuals murdered 
by Japa nese pollution.” And, for Ui, they  were “literally murdered.” Although 
his investigations ultimately uncovered no individuals with typical symp-
toms of Minamata disease, Ui was thoroughly satisfi ed: if he could prevent 
a repeat of such crimes elsewhere, then the agony of presenting in tortured 
En glish and of facing off  with combative com pany offi  cials would all have 
been worth it.19
Ui next traveled to Finland, where his hosts took him to the city of 
Kotka on the country’s southwest coast to meet with local fi shermen and 
investigate mercury contamination from upstream pulp mills. At the request 
of the fi shermen Ui agreed to take dried samples of fi sh back to Japan for 
testing. As he had done in Italy, at  every opportunity Ui appealed to the 
Finnish  people to learn from the Japa nese experience. In an interview with 
a tele vi sion crew accompanying him on his investigations in Kotka, Ui was 
asked about Finnish government assurances that mercury levels in fi sh stocks 
 were within safe limits. To this he replied that, although such levels may 
not immediately result in symptoms of Minamata disease, once brain cells 
 were destroyed by mercury they could not be regenerated. Moreover, even 
in Japan, where mercury- contaminated fi sh  were no longer consumed, suf-
ferers  were still being diagnosed  because symptoms often took longer to de-
velop or to be recognized. As he explained, “We [in Japan] put production 
before all  else and  were concerned only about fi lling our stomachs, hence in 
the beginning we  didn’t realize the dreadfulness of industrial wastewater. 
Please  don’t ignore our experience. It’s too late once a suff erer appears.” He 
told the reporter that learning of the mercury contamination in this “magi-
cally beautiful scenery” only made him feel more terrible. “We  don’t want 
the  people of this country to make the same  mistakes we did. Let me re-
peat. Please  don’t repeat our terrible pre ce dent.”20
Ui repeated this mantra in a Helsinki meeting or ga nized by his hosts 
with Finnish government offi  cials and specialists responsible for the country’s 
 water quality. He urged the offi  cials not to use occupational safety limits 
when setting public health standards for mercury and other environmental 
pollutants. As he explained, occupational limits balanced the advantages 
and disadvantages of using a par tic u lar substance in industrial pro cesses 
and implicitly accepted certain levels of poisoning. But, in the case of public 
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health, he argued, the rule of thumb must be that it is unhealthy to absorb 
any level of mercury above that occurring naturally. In his fi nal appeal to 
the offi  cials, Ui again invoked the image of Japa nese victims: “I would like 
to relay to you a request from Minamata suff erers. Th is disease is so painful 
it is beyond the imagination of healthy  people. Among the suff erers was 
one who died saying that, short of contracting the disease,  there was no way 
for  others to understand the pain. But when I left Japan the suff erers who 
came to see me off  said they hoped my activities [abroad] would prevent this 
disease from occurring again elsewhere in the world. It is with their request 
that I conclude.” Indeed, as he  later wrote of his week in Finland, “I thought 
to myself that it was the memory of the suff erers’ pain which supported my 
activities during this tense week.”21
On his return to Japan in mid-1969 Ui delivered lectures and published 
numerous books and articles based on his Eu ro pean travels.22 Apart from 
the knowledge he gained about specifi c forms of pollution, Ui came back 
convinced that government bureaucracies and other confi gurations of cen-
tralized po liti cal power,  whether socialist or cap i tal ist, could not be relied 
upon to defend  people from the threat of pollution. On the contrary, the 
modern nation- state helped to exacerbate pollution by shielding  those re-
sponsible, so the only option was for victims and their supporters to mobi-
lize on their own initiative. Th is was an impor tant insight  because not only 
did it confi rm and legitimize the logic of self- help and localism among many 
environmental protest groups in Japan, but it also suggested that building 
horizontal alliances could even mean joining hands with pollution activists 
beyond the borders of the nation. Ui personally began to sense a global role 
for himself and other Japa nese scientists: “ Whether or not my activities 
equaled the eff orts of Minamata and Niigata suff erers and their supporters 
hinged on what I did  after returning to Japan. Th e truth is that I felt con-
fi dent that, if I could continue on in Japan, then Japa nese scientists could 
become world scientists.”23
Ui wasted no time planning for the next phase of transnational en-
gagement. On the plane fl ight back to Japan he began to conceive of an am-
bitious investigative mission by Japa nese scientists, journalists, and pollution 
disease suff erers to study pollution and environmental degradation and meet 
with victims worldwide. Th e mission would travel the world for a thousand 
days, it would be in de pen dent of government and industry, and it would 
comprise individuals fi ercely committed to autonomous and dispassionate 
research. Th e aims would be twofold: to correctly understand the state of 
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pollution in vari ous parts of the world, and to correctly communicate this 
information to  people in Japan and in other countries. Participants would 
fi rst write essays on aspects of Japa nese pollution, which would then be trans-
lated into En glish and sent to vari ous countries with requests for cooperation. 
A plan for the mission would then be formulated based on a review of the 
existing lit er a ture on pollution from abroad. During the mission, partici-
pants would form small groups of fi ve, spending one to two months in each 
country investigating the full array of pollution prob lems. Th ereafter they 
would coauthor an encyclopedia of pollution prob lems in the late twentieth 
 century, which could serve as a handbook for scientists and offi  cials on 
how to prevent further cases of pollution worldwide. Ui became convinced 
that, if his plan succeeded, Japan could fulfi ll its responsibilities as the 
world’s most advanced polluted nation.24
RCP members  were not immediately responsive to Ui’s  grand proposal, 
however. Shōji Hikaru, Miyamoto Ken’ichi’s coauthor on Osorubeki Kōgai, 
for example, wondered if the time was right to take pollution researchers 
away from Japan where they  were most needed.25 Even Miyamoto was 
initially noncommittal: Japan had some of the worst pollution in the world, 
and moreover, the country was beginning to show leadership in dealing with 
pollution, in regulating industry, and in scientifi c research, so why the need to 
go abroad now?26 For Ui, however,  there was no more timely moment than 
in the midst of this pollution crisis. What better opportunity could  there 
be for Japa nese scientists, journalists, advocates, and victims to shape global 
opinion on the environment? But Ui found an ally in RCP leader Tsuru 
Shigeto, who likened pollution research to cartography and suggested that 
“ those who study pollution must visit and walk  these sites at least once, just 
like the  people who make maps.”27 An unexpected request from abroad 
also bolstered Ui’s plan. In the early 1970s Aileen Smith contacted Miya-
moto with a request from the National Indian Brotherhood and Barney 
Lamm, a tour operator in Canada, to investigate cases of methyl mercury 
contamination in the English- Wabigoon river system and related poisoning 
among indigenous communities on nearby reservations.28 Aileen Smith and 
her photographer husband, W. Eugene Smith, came to international atten-
tion in the early 1970s with their shocking yet sensitive photographic 
portrayals of Minamata victims.29 Miyamoto  later recalled the transfor-
mative eff ect on him of Smith’s request that they go and “teach” not “learn.”30 
Miyamoto suddenly realized that, instead of simply borrowing foreign ideas, 
as had been common practice in Japan from at least the mid- nineteenth 
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 century, the pollution crisis off ered Japa nese scientists a unique opportu-
nity to use their knowledge to infl uence events abroad in a progressive and 
positive way.
With the support of most members, then, Ui’s plan fi  nally came to 
fruition in 1975. Although the undertaking would not be as extensive as he 
had originally envisaged, it was the most comprehensive fact- fi nding mis-
sion on pollution in modern Japa nese history and a key moment in connecting 
the Japa nese environmental injustice paradigm to environmental strug gles 
and issues worldwide. With fi nancial sponsorship from the newspaper 
Chūnichi Shinbun, the so- called Sekai Kankyō Chōsadan (World Environ-
ment Investigative Mission, or WEIM) conducted two tours abroad in 1975. 
Th e fi rst departed on March 8 and spent fi fty- two days visiting sixteen coun-
tries and forty pollution sites worldwide (mainly in Eu rope and North 
Amer i ca but also in Southeast Asia), while the second departed on August 10 
and spent sixteen days engaged in a focused study of mercury poisoning 
among native Indian communities in Ontario, Canada.31 Th e fi rst tour in 
March was divided into two groups: one devoted primarily to mercury con-
tamination throughout the world, consisting of Miyamoto, Ui, Harada, and 
Karaki Kiyoshi (a reporter with the Chūnichi Shinbun), while the second 
focused on urban pollution and activism in Eu rope and North Amer i ca, 
and included economists, engineers, local government offi  cials, and specialists 
on nuclear power. Ui and Harada led the second tour to Canada in August 
1975 and  were accompanied by two young scholars from Tokyo University, 
engineer Nakanishi Junko and sociologist Iijima Nobuko; two Minamata 
disease researchers, Akagi Taketoshi of the Kumamoto University Medical 
School and Fujino Tadashi of the Minamata Medical Offi  ce; and Shigeno 
Toyoji, an editor with the Tokyo Shinbun newspaper.32 Th e aim of the mis-
sion was fourfold: to visit countries with pollution issues similar to  those in 
Japan and witness conditions on the ground fi rsthand; to study environmen-
tal regulations in other countries; to communicate the story of Japa nese 
pollution through fi lm screenings and pre sen ta tions; and, most importantly, 
to interact with foreign researchers, victims, and local residents opposed to 
industrial contamination.33 Th roughout the tours participants fi led regular 
fi eld reports to the newspapers Chūnichi Shinbun and Tokyo Shinbun, and 
afterward Tsuru Shigeto edited a two- volume series titled Sekai no Kōgai 
Chizu (A pollution map of the world), which summarized the experiences 
and main fi ndings of participants.34
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Apart from the mercury investigations, (discussed further below), mis-
sion participants examined an impressive range of issues and networked with 
many leading activists in the  battle against industrial pollution worldwide. 
For nature conservation they studied the US National Park system and the 
British National Trust and, for restoration initiatives, they looked to grass-
roots initiatives against eutrophication in Lake Erie in North Amer i ca. In 
the fi eld of environmental law they scrutinized regulatory regimes in France, 
Germany, and the United States, focusing particularly on automobile emis-
sions regulations. During a meeting with biologist Barry Commoner at 
Washington University in Saint Louis, the world- renowned environmental 
campaigner pessimistically told the group that  there was no incentive for 
US automakers to produce environmentally friendly vehicles  because reca-
librating production lines would cost too much. Commoner did, how-
ever, express hope in the CVCC engines developed by the Honda Motor 
Com pany, which easily met the rigorous emissions standards of the US Clean 
Air Act.35 More viscerally, during their visit to Los Angeles the group experi-
enced noise and air pollution from automobiles fi rsthand. Kayama Ken, an 
engineer from the Tokyo Institute of Technology, wryly observed that 
shopping malls  were about the only places to “escape” from auto fumes but, 
ironically, the only way to get to a shopping mall was by car.36 Participants 
involved in the proj ect also traveled to Budapest, London, Moscow, and New 
York to study the strengths and weaknesses of urban waste disposal systems. 
And, although participants did not travel extensively throughout Asia, the 
mission’s published reports also showed recognition of “pollution export” 
from developed to developing countries, which became a central focus for 
Ui’s ILP movement and vari ous spin- off  groups throughout the 1970s. 
Essentially no stone was left unturned.
When the mission arrived in Finland, a local nature protection asso-
ciation asked the Japa nese group to investigate a state- run petrochemical 
complex. Ui and Miyamoto  were taken to the plant by a member of parlia-
ment, where they received briefi ngs from a pollution countermea sures offi  -
cial and an ecologist from Helsinki University. To their  great surprise, the 
guide at the complex explained how its designers had learned from the 
Yokkaichi experience, making signifi cant improvements and design modi-
fi cations as a result. Miyamoto was skeptical at fi rst but changed his mind 
during the tour. Unlike the Yokkaichi complex, located beside a city, plan-
ners carefully chose a site around twenty- eight miles (forty- fi ve kilo meters) 
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north of Helsinki in the center of a 1,500 acre (625 hectare) pine forest. 
Smokestacks had been purposely built short so as to contain emissions 
within the pine forest buff er zone and to preserve the scenic view. To avoid 
 water contamination and the infamous smelly fi sh of Yokkaichi, factories 
in the complex recycled  water and fi ltered all effl  uent through a treatment 
pond before releasing it into the Gulf of Finland. Fish  were also raised in 
the treatment ponds to monitor pollution levels. Miyamoto was generally 
impressed by  these pollution countermea sures and, in fact, concluded that 
foreign countries seemed to have learned more lessons from Yokkaichi than 
the Japa nese government or industry.37
Among the more in ter est ing fi ndings for participants was the preva-
lence and strength of anti– nuclear power movements abroad. As Hōsei Uni-
versity economist Nagai Susumu described it, a “storm of antinuclear power 
movements” was “sweeping across Eu rope and Amer i ca.”38 During their visit 
to Switzerland, mission participants traveled to the city of Basel in the Rhine 
Valley, where they met with residents protesting the construction of a nu-
clear power plant. Th ey learned from the worried protesters that some nine 
nuclear facilities  were located in a fi fty- kilo meter radius of the city.39 Deter-
mined to stop construction of the tenth fa cil i ty, the opposition group had 
occupied the planned site, pitching their tents and hoisting protest fl ags atop 
a mountain of dirt excavated for the foundations. Th e Japa nese visitors  were 
impressed by the transnational composition of the group, which included 
activists from Switzerland, France, and Germany.40
Antinuclear fervor was no less apparent in the United States. In Cali-
fornia, participants met with the former state governor, Edmund Gerald 
“Pat” Brown, who identifi ed nuclear power plant siting and construction as 
the most contentious and diffi  cult prob lems facing California. He described 
how the utility com pany, Pacifi c Gas and Electric, was forced to abandon 
construction of a nuclear power plant in Bodega Bay in 1964  after residents 
protested the com pany’s inability to guarantee the safety of the fa cil i ty in 
this seismically active area. In the wake of the 1973 oil shock, however, 
Brown sensed moves to rethink the place of nuclear power in the country.41 
At the offi  ces of the Ralph Nader Group in Washington, DC, activists told 
their Japa nese visitors that the anti– nuclear power movement was the very 
core of the antipollution movement in the United States and that their ulti-
mate aim was to halt construction of all nuclear power plants nationwide. 
Th e Nader activists put forward three critical reasons for opposing nuclear 
energy: the grave threat of radioactive materials for the environment, given 
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their half- life periods in the hundreds and thousands of years; the par tic u-
lar risks of fast- breeder reactors using plutonium, one of the most toxic sub-
stances for  human beings, which could also be utilized in nuclear weapons; 
and, more prosaically, the  simple fact that nuclear power was not a cheap 
source of energy, as proponents claimed.42
Th e encounter with anti– nuclear power movements was at once unan-
ticipated and challenging for the mission participants, whose own country 
was on the verge of a nuclear power revolution in the mid-1970s. Offi  cials, 
activists, and scientists they met in the United States  were  eager to learn 
from the group just how Japa nese offi  cials had been able to convince the 
Japa nese public about the necessity and safety of nuclear power given the 
country’s terrible experiences with atomic energy and radiation at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki.43 To that question the Japa nese visitors could provide no an-
swer, and, quite unexpectedly, they  were forced to seriously consider this 
issue of nuclear power, which had been largely sidelined by their concerns 
about more immediate pollution threats. As Karaki Kiyoshi from the news-
paper Chūnichi Shinbun observed, the Japa nese media often spoke of a “nu-
clear allergy” in the country, and many citizens believed that both they and 
offi  cials  were being extremely careful about the commitment to nuclear 
power. But, from the perspective of outsiders, the situation looked very dif-
fer ent: the Japa nese seemed to have bypassed serious discussions about safety 
and  were moving full steam ahead on nuclear power plant construction. 
Some foreign scientists even wondered  whether Japan’s energy challenges 
 were so serious as to demand such an uncritical commitment to nuclear 
power.44 In light of such questions, Nagai Susumu suggested that now was 
the time for Japa nese citizens to seriously reconsider the safety of nuclear 
power, the social structure supporting its promotion, and Japan’s  future eco-
nomic and energy policies.45
Despite the best intentions of mission participants, however, nuclear 
power was relegated to the realm of NIMBY (not- in- my- back- yard) confron-
tations and the peripheralized voices of a few stalwart opponents and was 
never subjected to broad and intensive po liti cal debate in Japan  until a 
major disaster in 2011. One pos si ble reason for activists’ relatively lukewarm 
attention to the issue within Japan lay in the diff erence between nuclear 
power and the other environmental pollution issues they  were addressing. 
 Th ere  were certainly many thousands of radiation victims from Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, but unlike Minamata, Yokkaichi, and other pollution in-
cidents, nuclear power plants had no victims, or at least, no victims with 
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harrowing stories of environmental injustice and suff ering power ful enough 
to elicit a widespread grassroots and public response. Indeed, as I show in 
chapter 5, it was beyond Japan’s borders that the environmental injustice 
paradigm connected with antinuclear issues, notably in protests against 
planned radioactive waste dumping in the Pacifi c Ocean.
Following the Trail of Mercury
So, as much as they appreciated the message of antinuclear activists world-
wide, it was not the risks of radiation but the vis i ble  human injustices of 
mercury and other chemical pollutants that most concerned mission partici-
pants in the early 1970s. Ui, Harada, Miyamoto, and  others followed the 
trail of mercury pollution throughout Eu rope and North Amer i ca, with par-
tic u lar emphasis on cases in Finland, New Mexico in the United States, and 
Ontario Province in Canada. Just as with Ui’s earlier Eu ro pean journey in 
the late 1960s,  these investigations into mercury resulted in some of the most 
fruitful and substantive exchanges of the RCP’s transnational involvement. 
Th e experiences also stimulated the Japa nese travelers to rethink the  causes of 
pollution, the dynamics of discrimination, the responsibility of scientists, and 
the potential of border- crossing communities of victims and advocates.
While Ui and Miyamoto investigated the petrochemical industry in 
Finland, their colleague, clinician and Minamata disease researcher Harada 
Masazumi, delved into the Finnish strug gle with mercury.46 On his fi rst day 
in Finland, Harada joined scholars at Helsinki University in a workshop on 
environmental pollution and the health eff ects of poisoning from heavy met-
als such as cadmium and mercury. Harada learned how, in 1966 alone, 
Finnish pulping industries had used up to 3.6 tons of organic mercury as a 
sterilizing agent in their manufacturing pro cesses. Finnish authorities insti-
tuted countermea sures beginning in 1968,  after which environmental levels 
of mercury slowly began to fall, but numerous sites of contamination 
remained, such as Lake Kirkkojärvi in the municipality of Hämeenkyrö in 
southwest Finland. Individuals tested in that area exhibited elevated mer-
cury levels in their hair and blood samples, but  there had been no offi  -
cially diagnosed cases of typical Minamata disease. Th e Finnish scientists 
did, however, tell Harada about one pos si ble case of poisoning, so, with a 
micro biological chemist as his guide, Harada immediately traveled to Lake 
Kirkkojärvi to investigate.
In Hämeenkyrö, Harada met with an old  couple who lived by Lake 
Kirkkojärvi in a small wooden structure that looked to him “like some-
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thing out of a fairy tale.” 47 Th e  couple had come to live  there in 1962 
 after the husband retired from the railway com pany. Of modest means, 
the  couple had been supplementing their food requirements with fi sh from 
the lake, beekeeping, and by raising chickens. Unfortunately, their cabin 
was located some twelve miles (twenty kilo meters) south of a pulp mill re-
sponsible for dumping organic mercury into the lake and surrounding river 
systems. Authorities prohibited fi shing in the lake in 1967, but in 1970 local 
residents began to observe strange be hav ior among cats, which  were seen 
convulsing and on occasion diving from bridges into the lake and nearby 
rivers.  Th ese cats had, of course, been poisoned by organic mercury  after 
consuming fi sh from the lake and  were displaying typical symptoms of 
Minamata disease. Harada was shocked to learn that the old  couple had 
not been tested for poisoning  until very recently, despite the testing of 
 others in the region— prob ably, he assumed,  because they  were poor and 
lived a somewhat peripheral existence in their small cottage.
Clinical reports based on hair and blood sample tests eventually con-
fi rmed that the husband, at least, had mercury poisoning. Nevertheless, med-
ical authorities had attributed his vari ous maladies to other conditions such 
as coronary disease, angina, asthma, diabetes, hyperlipidemia (high blood 
cholesterol), arthropathy (joint disease), and functional damage to the 
stomach. Harada’s own examinations of the man revealed numbness around 
the mouth and hands, a loss of sensation in the legs, minor convulsions in 
vari ous muscles, a loss of hearing and smell, and a heightened sensitivity 
to cold— all suggestive of mercury poisoning yet not conclusive. Indeed, the 
case of this Finnish man was emblematic for Harada of a tendency among 
clinicians— regardless of the country—to explain pollution disease away by 
attributing it to other diseases and conditions that actually arose as compli-
cations of the initial poisoning. Th e standard medical practice of using dif-
ferential diagnosis to specify a par tic u lar disease based on symptoms also 
explainable for any number of other diseases was not only in eff ec tive in the 
case of pollution disease, but also tended to obscure the seriousness of the situ-
ation from a public health perspective. Pollution disease, Harada concluded, 
was “an entirely new experience for humankind,” and medical science was yet 
to formulate new methods and diagnostics to correctly identify it.48
As a Japa nese specialist on Minamata disease, Harada could not help 
but feel implicated in this worldwide misapprehension of pollution disease, 
especially among  those in the medical fraternity. He felt that Japa nese sci-
entists had helped to solidify a medical defi nition of Minamata disease based 
68     Chapter 2
strictly and narrowly on the typical symptoms of the so- called Hunter- Russell 
syndrome, and the result was that victims of mercury poisoning, like the old 
man he examined in Finland,  were being incorrectly diagnosed with other 
diseases.49 From the early 1970s, Harada and other researchers, in cooperation 
with suff erers at Minamata Bay, had begun to show that, apart from the 
typical symptoms, mercury poisoning induced other systemic conditions 
such as angiosclerosis (hardening of the blood vessel walls), muscular pain, 
heart disease, and diabetes. Harada’s research also revealed that mercury poi-
soning victims  were more susceptible to infectious disease even though a 
causal relationship between the poisoning and the susceptibility to infection 
could not be categorically displayed.50 According to Miyamoto Ken’ichi, 
Harada and his colleagues  were essentially engaged in a proj ect to undo 
or, at least, modify the groundbreaking work of early Minamata disease 
researchers in Japan who “should have constructed a medical diagnosis 
from the conditions of Japa nese suff erers.”51 Instead of simply importing the 
Hunter- Russell diagnosis for Minamata disease, Miyamoto felt that Japa nese 
scientists should have built their own diagnosis based primarily on their own 
fi eld observations in Minamata and then communicated  these fi ndings to 
the world.
 After examining many victims of mercury poisoning worldwide, 
Harada could only agree, suggesting that  there  were  really no “typical” cases 
of pollution diseases such as mercury poisoning, just stages along a spec-
trum of severity. Typicality was also problematic from a public health per-
spective,  because it only recognized the severest pre sen ta tions of a disease 
and, hence, only stimulated a response from offi  cials once poisoning had 
reached dangerous levels.52 What Harada, Miyamoto, Ui, and  others on the 
mission discovered as they traveled the world was how a “decades- old diag-
nosis  shaped by po liti cal conditions in Japan” had disseminated worldwide.53 
Th ey realized that now Japa nese scientists had an obligation to undo this 
situation by correctly and swiftly communicating the facts about Minamata 
disease to an international audience so that victims elsewhere, like the old 
man and his wife, would not be abandoned and ignored.54 Japa nese scien-
tists had to communicate a “complete picture of Minamata disease” by es-
tablishing the absolute minimum symptoms of organic mercury poisoning 
in the  human body.55 Ui was even more specifi c in his prognostications: at 
least once or twice a year, Japa nese researchers had to publish their fi ndings 
in high- circulation English- language scientifi c journals such as Nature and 
Science so as to reach a global audience of scientists.56 Ui was convinced that 
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the current situation of mercury contamination worldwide could have been 
avoided if Japa nese scientists had been more active in the international sci-
entifi c community, for example, by presenting their fi ndings at international 
conferences in En glish.57
From this perspective, the face- to- face meeting and interaction with the 
el derly  couple in Finland was of deep signifi cance for Harada  because it was a 
positive step by a Japa nese scientist to address the diagnostic prob lem of mer-
cury poisoning worldwide.  After sharing some honey, cheese, and crackers 
with the  couple, the man passed some frozen fi sh to Harada, telling him to 
use them for research but not consumption. As the man explained, no doc-
tor had ever shown such concern for him before, and the fact that a Japa-
nese doctor had come so far to examine him was the “proudest moment” of 
his life.58 Harada left the meeting with an even stronger sense of responsi-
bility, concluding that “we are all  brothers, and the prob lem of environmen-
tal contamination is a shared prob lem around the world. We must make the 
most of the lessons of Minamata.”59
If the case of the  couple in Finland spoke to Harada and other partici-
pants’ responsibility as Japa nese scientists, then their experiences in North 
Amer i ca confi rmed their learning from the domestic strug gle that pollution 
aff ected and discriminated against the very weakest and marginalized mem-
bers of society. Before traveling to Canada, Miyamoto and Harada visited 
New Mexico in the United States to investigate the case of an African Ameri-
can  family affl  icted with mercury poisoning. Th e case was quite straight-
forward, and  there was no doubt methyl mercury was to blame for the 
poisoning. But what interested and concerned Miyamoto and Harada was 
the apparent structure of discrimination that caused the poisoning in the 
fi rst place. Th e incident, involving the Huckleby  family of Alamogordo City, 
New Mexico, was fi rst reported nationally in 1970 in the New York Times 
and on NBC tele vi sion.  After consuming pork from a  family- owned pig in 
1969, four members of the Huckleby  family began to display vari ous de-
grees of mercury poisoning symptoms. Ernestine, the eight- year- old  daughter, 
was stricken fi rst, initially experiencing back pain and diffi  culty walking and 
then falling into a coma, although doctors  were initially unable to diag-
nose her condition. A few days  later the thirteen- year- old son, Amos, be-
gan to experience constricted vision and ataxia (loss of voluntary muscle 
coordination), followed soon  after by the twenty- year- old  daughter Dorothy, 
who displayed similar symptoms. All three  were hospitalized. Th e  children’s 
 mother, Lois, was pregnant at the time, and when the child, Michael, was 
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born, he displayed limited movement functions along with sensory distur-
bances to smell, sight, and hearing— symptoms typical of fetal methyl 
mercury poisoning.
Th e source of the contamination was quickly traced to waste grain that 
the  father, Ernest Huckleby, had acquired  free of charge when it was dis-
carded by a granary in the nearby town of Texico. Th e grain had been treated 
with the highly toxic mercurial fungicide Panogen 15, used to prevent mold 
growth on seed and grain. Ernest used the contaminated grain to feed eigh-
teen pigs over a four- to six- week period. He  later recalled that  after a few 
weeks some of the animals began to display erratic be hav ior: fourteen piglets 
went blind and  were unable to walk. Within a month twelve had died and 
 those that survived continued to show impeded development. In the mean-
time Ernest slaughtered one of the pigs for  family consumption.60
Th e Huckleby  family eventually sued the grain com pany on the basis 
that, being illiterate, Ernest Huckleby was unable to read the warning la-
bels on the fi fty- four- gallon (204 liter) storage drums, nor did he understand 
why the grain had been dyed pink. Th e suit was unsuccessful, however, with 
the court fi nding that the com pany had indeed fulfi lled its  legal responsi-
bility by attaching a label clearly warning that the contents  were for seeding 
only, had been treated with a toxic substance, and should not be consumed 
or used as feed  under any circumstances. Specifi cally, the court noted the 
label’s caution that the contents contained a “Category I poison,” “highly 
toxic to man,” that the word “poison” was printed prominently in red, and 
that the label included a skull- and- crossbones mark.61 As Miyamoto cyni-
cally observed, ultimately the court rejected the lawsuit on the basis that 
a poor, uneducated, illiterate black man was in the wrong; that it was his 
defi ciency and his fault for being unable to read or understand the warn-
ings.62 But from Miyamoto’s perspective, a completely diff er ent interpretation 
seemed plausible. Th e com pany knew that a large population of underprivi-
leged and illiterate African Americans living in the region raised their own 
animals on grain, hence it had a greater responsibility to inform them of the 
dangers and to ensure that contaminated grain was not used for feed.63
Th e plight of the  family aff ected Miyamoto and Harada on a deeply 
emotional level, especially in their capacity as so- called Japa nese pollution 
experts.  Here was a clear instance of how the horrors of Minamata had not 
been eff ectively and persuasively communicated to the world.  After all, if 
 people outside Japan had truly understood Minamata, such incidents would 
not have been repeated and companies would not have continued to use such 
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toxic chemicals. Miyamoto was in no doubt that if Americans had known 
more about Minamata disease they would certainly have abandoned the use 
of dangerous mercury and the Huckleby  children would have been spared 
their brutal suff ering.64 It was a clear example of how Japa nese scientists had 
not fulfi lled their responsibility to the world, so they too  were liable.  After 
consulting with the  children’s doctors and examining their medical rec ords, 
Harada and Miyamoto met with the son, Amos, who was receiving special 
care at a county school for the disabled. Th ey observed that, although he 
was blind, his speech impaired, and his mobility limited, “his mind was 
clear.” “Th e  thing he wanted to know most from us was about Japa nese 
Minamata suff erers’ rehabilitation back into society. He wanted us to tell 
him about any cases of  people blinded [by the disease] who had found a 
job and  were working. Th is was a clear sign of his power ful mentality and 
desire to live. But we had no answers to his impassioned questions.”65 Nor 
could they provide Amos’s  mother Lois with the answer she so desper-
ately wanted to hear— that Minamata disease could be cured. “It was the 
most impor tant question in the life of this  woman caring for four victims. 
But the pity is that  there is no cure for Minamata disease at pres ent. With the 
most pained expressions we answered ‘current medicine cannot cure the 
disease. But with appropriate care certain functions can be restored.’ ”66
Traveling on the road from Alamogordo to El Paso with its “never- 
ending sand dunes,” Miyamoto and Harada refl ected on their encounter 
with the Huckleby  family: the young  children, lying helplessly prostrate in 
their hospital beds just like the severely poisoned  children in Minamata, the 
courageous Amos who dreamed of a bright  future, and the anguished  mother 
with no other option but to “pray to God  every day.”67 “Her somberness and 
the warmth of her hands is something we  will never forget,” Miyamoto and 
Harada  later wrote of their meeting with Lois.68 Th ey could provide no re-
lief or remedy to this  woman and her  family, but stepping across national 
borders and reaching out to other  human beings fi ghting the same  battle as 
 those in Japan redefi ned “Minamata” in ways Harada and Miyamoto could 
not have  imagined even fi ve years earlier. Th e injustice of industrial pollution 
knew no borders, so neither could their strug gle against it.
Connecting Minamata and Ontario
Th e culmination of the investigatory mission was participants’ study of mer-
cury poisoning at two Indian reservations in Canada. Not only did mem-
bers meet, examine, and interact with the Indians as they had done with 
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pollution victims elsewhere, they also accompanied them to negotiations 
with Ontario and Canadian government offi  cials, facilitated historic meetings 
in Canada and in Japan with suff erers from Minamata Bay, and encouraged 
the Indians to instigate court proceedings for compensation.  Here, more 
than anywhere  else, the Japa nese participants fulfi lled their self- assigned 
responsibility as scientists from the world’s most polluted nation, and  here 
too they witnessed the potential of transnational action in the global 
strug gle against discrimination and injustice— for them the root  causes 
of pollution.
During March and August of 1975, mission participants conducted in-
vestigations at both the Grassy Narrows and White Dog Indian reserva-
tions, located along the English- Wabigoon River system about sixty- two 
miles (100 kilo meters) northwest of Kenora City in the Canadian province 
of Ontario. Th e source of the mercury contamination was a pulp mill lo-
cated around 124 miles (200 kilo meters) upstream from the reservations 
in the city of Dryden. Th e pulp mill operator, the Dryden Paper and Pulp 
Com pany, was a subsidiary of a joint venture between Canadian busi-
ness interests and the British multinational, Reed International.69 Of the 
 approximately seven thousand inhabitants of Dryden, some 1,600  either 
worked in the factory or  were engaged in activities associated with it, 
prompting Miyamoto to liken the city to the “corporate  castle towns” in 
Japan such as Yokkaichi City.70 Although the com pany initially denied it 
was the cause of the contamination, claiming that natu ral levels of mercury 
in the region  were high, tests on river fi sh showing elevated concentrations 
closer to the factory quickly invalidated such claims.71 Flying into the area, 
mission participants  were shocked by the extent of effl  uent from the factory’s 
pipes, with clumps of frozen brown debris vis i ble for at least sixty miles (97 
kilo meters) downstream. In a report for the newspaper Chūnichi Shinbun, 
Karaki Kiyoshi described the thick smoke plume bellowing from the factory’s 
smokestacks into the clear blue sky and the “reddish- brown effl  uent” spewing 
into the Winnipeg River, turning the melted ice brown.72
Th e Dryden pulp mill began operations in 1962, but it was not  until 
1969 that the Ontario government initiated a study on pos si ble contamina-
tion and poisoning in the river system, primarily in response to the rising 
global concern over mercury but also in response to the grassroots work of 
tour operator Barney Lamm. Blood and hair samples  were taken from eighty- 
eight Indians on the reservations, of which nine individuals with elevated 
mercury readings— some with up to one hundred parts per million (ppm) 
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in their hair samples— were hospitalized for further tests. Th e offi  cial 1971 
report concluded that, while  these individuals did indeed register high bodily 
mercury concentrations, no physiological eff ects had been identifi ed, and 
 there  were no typical cases of Minamata disease.73 Nevertheless, the Ontario 
government ordered the factory to stop dumping mercury- laden effl  uent 
(which it did not do  until  after the 1975 visit of the Japa nese mission). Th e 
government also immediately banned commercial fi shing in the region, and 
it advised tour operators to ensure that sport fi shermen did not consume 
their catch.74
Th e Indian communities  were decimated by the contamination of their 
waterways, and most working in the fi shing and tourism industries lost their 
jobs. Th e spiritual and physiological devastation engendered depression, al-
coholism, vio lence, poverty, and suicide, not to mention a deep animosity 
 toward white Canadians. As the Indian chief explained in his welcome 
speech to the Japa nese mission, “Th e earth is our  father, the  water is our 
 mother. God told us to live by drinking the  water of  mother earth. Th en 
the white man poisoned  mother earth with mercury.  After we are dead, 
the white man  will die too. Never forget that, white man!”75 Moreover, the 
contamination of fi sh stocks not only eliminated a key source of cash in-
come, it also compromised an indispensable source of protein for the com-
munity. Mission participants learned that, in the absence of another food 
source, many Indians  were left with no choice but to continue consuming 
contaminated fi sh. Tour operators also demanded that Indians employed as 
guides cook and eat the fi sh caught by sport fi shermen to avoid alarming 
tourists. Miyamoto and Harada summed up the desperate conditions on 
the reservations as follows: “Th e Indians receive their social security pay-
ments once a week  after which they drink  until they drop or even die. 
On the reservations they resort to hair spray, perfume, and insecticides in 
search of alcohol, mixing  these with  water. Th en, when they get drunk they 
fi ght and commit arson. When they wake up the next morning they have 
no job, just like  every other day, so they light a cigarette and sit in the sun. 
Th ey spend the  whole day sitting in the same way with lethargic hollow 
expressions.”76
Harada Masazumi conducted clinical medical examinations on eighty- 
nine Indians during his visits to the reservations, working side by side with 
a local doctor and advocate for the Indians, Peter Newberry, during the 
March tour, and with the Rochester University toxicologist Th omas W. 
Clarkson during the August visit.77 Harada’s surveys of the Indians revealed 
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that, although most no longer consumed fi sh, close to one- third continued 
to do so. His clinical tests did not uncover any serious (i.e., typical) cases of 
Minamata disease, but thirty- seven individuals presented with sensory dis-
turbances and nine  others with constriction of the visual fi eld— both of 
which are symptoms consistent with heavy metal poisoning.78 On the basis 
of  these examinations, Harada concluded that  there was a very high likeli-
hood of mercury poisoning among inhabitants of the reservations. When 
Harada and mission participants confronted the Dryden Paper and Pulp 
Com pany with  these results, they  were stunned by the nonchalance of com-
pany representatives, who declared, “Our factory has faithfully followed 
government thresholds. So, if damages have been suff ered within the thresh-
olds then the government must pay compensation [to the victims]. If we are 
found liable for negligence in a court of law we  will take responsibility but, 
in that case too, the government  will bear some responsibility.”79
Government agencies proved no more hospitable, but the arrival of 
the Japa nese group did force a number of concessions, including a historic 
meeting between Indian representatives, the offi  cial government mercury 
countermea sures committee, and members of the Japa nese mission. Amaz-
ingly, although this government committee was four years old, only  under 
pressure from the Japa nese mission did its members relent and agree to meet 
with the Indians in person. Moreover, thanks again to the Japa nese visitors, 
prior to the historic meeting, the committee released previously classifi ed 
reports on scientifi c investigations conducted by the Canadian National In-
stitute of Hygiene to determine the toxicity of fi sh in the region. Th e re-
ports revealed that primates and cats fed a diet consisting of 35  percent of 
fi sh from the area contracted Minamata disease in around fi fty days, and 
animals from both species subsequently died.80 At the meeting the Indians 
confronted committee members with diffi  cult questions that hit at the heart 
of discrimination: “We have been crying out for four years, but the Cana-
dian government has not listened at all. But our voices reached far off  Japan 
and  these four scientists came to help. Th is was not  because the Canadian 
and Japa nese governments paid, but with their own funds. But now  we’ve 
learned that a massive $600,000 has been used on research, and that you 
have written research papers. Is this research to ease our concerns or is it 
only so you can profi t? Tell us the truth.”81 In his pre sen ta tion, Harada ap-
pealed to the committee members’ responsibility as scientists and pointed 
out the risks of using “typical” diagnoses: “We’ve had the same debate in 
Japan over and over. While we  were debating about  whether or not ‘typical’ 
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suff erers had surfaced or if the causal chain was clear . . .  a terrible tragedy 
occurred.” As Harada explained, by the time a “typical” case was identifi ed, 
multiple other cases of fetal poisoning and nonspecifi c cases would have 
occurred, so  there was no time to wait. Based on his work on the reservations, 
he told the committee  there  were four indisputable facts: contaminated fi sh, 
inhabitants with elevated mercury levels in blood and hair samples, cat deaths 
caused by mercury poisoning, and a variety of nonspecifi c cases.  Th ese facts, 
he demanded, meant that the discovery of a “typical” suff erer was “only a 
 matter of time.”82 Th e government committee was unmoved, however, and 
announced  there would be no cooperation with the Japa nese mission  because, 
at this stage, no patients had presented with typical symptoms of mercury 
poisoning.83
For Ui, Miyamoto, and Harada, this offi  cial response confi rmed the 
universal law that discrimination was the principal cause of environmental 
destruction, psychological devastation, and  human illness. Mission mem-
bers  were convinced that, had white  people been poisoned, this incident and 
its cover-up would never have occurred.84 How  else was the dismissive at-
titude of Dryden Paper and Pulp Com pany to be explained, or the meeting 
with government offi  cials, which Ui described as a “venue for racial discrimi-
nation”?85 And what of the local doctors, who advised that the Indians had 
no medical prob lem other than alcoholism and that the Japa nese group 
would do best to focus on that issue? As Miyamoto and Harada observed, 
“Such conditions not only made us realize the diffi  culties of our investiga-
tions, they also bore a striking resemblance to Minamata in the 1960s.”86 
Observing the “the desperate pleadings” of this “yellow race” in their bro-
ken En glish to white government offi  cials transported mission participants 
back to Japan and the strug gles of Minamata disease suff erers.87 Regardless 
of the place, pollution seemed to materialize at the very apex of a chain of 
discrimination, the fi nal step in the rapid destruction of the traditional lives 
of local  people such as farmers, fi shermen,  people of color, and indigenous 
communities. Indeed, it seemed that the destruction of community and 
tradition  were critical prerequisites for pollution to occur and to infl ict its 
devastation on innocent  human bodies. Harada expressed this sentiment 
most poignantly as follows:
Th e root of pollution lies in the destruction of lifestyle and culture pro-
duced when a discriminated group is forced to accept a certain set of 
values— whether between nations, races, or classes. In Canada too, the 
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Indians  were forced further and further to the peripheries by the whites 
and, driven on to reservations, their traditional lifestyle and unique cul-
ture was completely destroyed. One result was the occurrence of mer-
cury contamination. Locals could no longer fi sh and lost their jobs as 
tour guides. Over 80  percent of the population started receiving social 
security and, with nothing to do, drowned in a sea of alcohol. Pollution 
disease not only ravages  human fl esh; it is also a social disease which 
destroys the spirit. Wherever pollution occurs in the world, in the 
background  there are always victims who belong to the discriminated 
and powerless masses; defenseless  people who have been spiritually 
wounded.88
Harada’s was a bleak assessment of the mission’s experience in Canada 
indeed, but the story of this exchange between Japa nese scientists and 
Canadian Indians does not end so pessimistically. Th is border- crossing en-
gagement instilled both sides with a sense of hope and the vision of a new, 
translocal community capable of transcending the isolation and alienation 
of discrimination and injustice. In July 1975, nine representatives from the 
Grassy Narrows and White Dog reservations visited Japan to see the pol-
luted Japa nese archipelago fi rsthand and to meet directly with mercury 
poisoning victims in Minamata and Niigata. Th ey  were greeted at Haneda 
Airport in Tokyo by members of Ui Jun’s ILP network, Tokyo supporters of 
Minamata disease suff erers, and Kawamoto Teruo, leader of the Chisso 
Minamatabyō Kanja Renmei (Chisso Minamata Disease Suff erers Alliance). 
Traveling to Minamata Bay in Kumamoto Prefecture, the Indians met with 
Japa nese victims and explained how they too lived off  fi sh and  were at the 
same risk as Minamata residents. In a tender exchange, an Indian named 
Tom took the hand of a bedridden fetal mercury poisoning victim, Chizuru, 
saying softly “Hello, I’m Tom. I’ll send you a letter from Canada.”89 Out-
side the Chisso factory, the same Tom scooped up a handful of sludge 
from a pipe and, smelling the material, concluded it was no worse than sludge 
from the Dryden pulp mill. At an event for the Indians held at the Mina-
mata public hall with three hundred guests, the chief, Andy, spoke of their 
shock but also of their inspiration: “What we have experienced at Minamata 
is beyond imagination. Seeing the destructive power of mercury was a 
heartbreaking lesson for us. Th e Canadian government denied Minamata 
disease at Dryden. Why, despite possessing the knowledge of modern med-
icine and science, did they not clearly advise  people on the reservations of 
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the danger? But we  will not give up our strug gle against the government. 
Th e real strug gle has just begun.”90 As the Indians explained to Ui during 
his March visit to Canada, not  until the Japa nese came did the government 
react, so now the onus was on the Indians themselves to stand up and build 
on the energy from their Japa nese friends.91 At a press conference prior 
to their departure from Japan, their leader struck an optimistic note, com-
menting, “We  were extremely shocked and frightened  because we had not 
thought that mercury poisoning could so totally destroy  human beings. 
But thanks to the warm cooperation of all in Japan, we now have the confi -
dence to win the long and diffi  cult  battle against mercury pollution and racial 
discrimination.”92
Following the Indians visit to Japan, in October 1975, four Minamata 
victims and their supporters visited the Grassy Narrows and White Dog res-
ervations. While in Canada, the Japa nese group joined the Indian suff erers 
in their negotiations with the Dryden Paper and Pulp Com pany, Reed Inter-
national, and Ontario state offi  cials. In the meeting the Minamata group 
screened excerpts from Tsuchimoto Noriaki’s disturbing documentary Igaku 
toshite no Minamatabyō (Minamata as medicine) and presented a letter of 
appeal asking Reed International to take responsibility for dumping the mer-
cury, to pay compensation, and to negotiate directly with the aff ected Indian 
communities. At the Grassy Narrows reservation, two hundred members of 
the community came out to celebrate the Minamata group’s visit.93 Ui best 
summed up the historical signifi cance of  these exchanges in a December 
interview with the progressive magazine, AMPO: Japan- Asia Quarterly Re-
view. As he explained, “for poor and minority  peoples, who are nearly always 
the fi rst victims,” the pro cess of overcoming “their isolation by getting 
together and concretely realizing the worldwide polluting eff ects of multina-
tional corporations” was a development of truly “ great signifi cance.”94 
Knowing that  people thousands of miles away shared in their strug gle gave 
victims strength and the reassurance of belonging to an au then tic commu-
nity opposing environmental injustice.
Conclusion
Th e overseas travels of Ui Jun and Miyamoto Ken’ichi in the late 1960s 
and the encounters of the World Environment Investigative Mission in the 
1970s taught Japa nese activists a  great deal. While confi rming Japan’s 
unenviable position as a global “pollution laboratory,” activists also learned 
that Japan was no outlier: pollution was rapidly spreading and becoming 
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more and more complex in both developed and developing countries alike. 
Established po liti cal paradigms and ideologies could no longer adequately 
explain pollution and environmental injustice, which occurred  under so-
cialism as commonly as  under capitalism.  Going abroad helped Japa nese 
activists realize that con temporary pollution demanded new interpretations 
and innovative po liti cal strategies that responded to the spatial and techno-
logical realities of modern industry and the complex relationships between 
 humans and their living environments in an urbanized world. Th e confl icts 
over nuclear power that Japa nese activists witnessed in Eu rope and the United 
States, although never adequately grasped at the time, alerted them to the 
complicated intersection of energy, the environment, and economic growth 
that would become so central to subsequent debates about the “limits to 
growth” and “sustainable development.” In par tic u lar, their experiences with 
mercury in Canada, Finland, and, earlier, in Japan itself, raised troubling 
questions about the geopolitics of pollution and environmental injustice. 
Mercury contamination hit hardest in geo graph i cally peripheralized and 
impoverished communities, which  were literally sacrifi ced for the affl  uent, 
globally connected metropoles they ser viced. In Ontario, Kotka, Minamata, 
and Niigata they witnessed similar pro cesses at work.
Investigating mercury contamination in other national settings greatly 
expanded their framing of the prob lem. What was previously understood 
as “Chisso Corporation versus the residents of Minamata Bay” or “Shōwa 
Denkō versus  people along the Jinzū River” could now be positioned within 
a framework of global, multinational capitalism: executives of Reed Inter-
national wreaked havoc in indigenous communities in Ontario from board-
rooms a world away in the United Kingdom, factories in Milan borrowed 
technology from Chisso Corporation in Japan, and government offi  cials in 
Finland concealed reports from the Japa nese Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
As we  will see in chapters 4 and 5, opposing “pollution export” by Japa nese 
corporations would come to dominate Japa nese transnational initiatives 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
Yet, while travel abroad alerted Japa nese activists to the intensifi cation 
and interconnectedness of industrial pollution worldwide, it confi rmed the 
importance of local communities as the building blocks of eff ective re sis-
tance to environmental injustice. Ui, Miyamoto, Harada, and  others came 
away convinced that the fi rst step  toward stopping pollution and discrimi-
nation lay in the forging of  human- to- human ties between aff ected local 
communities. Th e Japa nese term kōryū— meaning exchange, interchange, 
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or mingling among  people— appears again and again in their writings of 
the time. Despite the diff er ent social, linguistic, cultural, and po liti cal con-
ditions of countries, Ui saw  great value in exchange and interaction as a way 
to inspire pollution victims to act for themselves.  After all, only when the 
Canadian Indians met with Minamata suff erers and saw polluted sites in 
Japan fi rsthand did they understand the seriousness of the issue and make 
a fi rm commitment to act.95 Harada similarly observed that, while Japa nese 
corporate and government elites feared the negative repercussions of commu-
nicating the story of Japa nese pollution abroad, from a long- term perspective, 
such “negative exchange” or “mutual interchange among victims” represented 
the best way to forge au then tic international friendship and goodwill.96 
Pollution was certainly a “fearsome” phenomenon built on the foundation of 
 human discrimination and injustice, but through it new transnational com-
munities of re sis tance, trust, and mutual therapy had begun to take root.
Indeed, it was in the very creation of such communities that  these Japa-
nese scientists envisioned a new international responsibility for themselves 
as the representatives of victims from the world’s most polluted nation. 
As we have seen in this and the previous chapter, Harada, Ui, and  others 
harbored a deep sense of remorse for their own self- perceived failures, for 
example, in the worldwide propagation of the typical symptoms required 
to diagnose Minamata disease. But their travels and missions abroad dem-
onstrated a new way of seeing the outside world radically at odds with 
the intellectual conventions of modern Japan. As Miyamoto explained, 
for Japa nese from the Meiji era (1868–1912) onward, foreign journeys— 
especially to the West— were all about learning. “But ours was not this kind 
of passive journey,” he observed; it was about “communicating the Japa nese 
experience” and “seeing conditions abroad with our own eyes, and mutu-
ally exchanging information.” In this sense, “learning” took on a slightly 
diff er ent meaning from that to date.97 Meiji- era statesmen, for instance, 
 were only interested in the “bright” aspects of the countries they visited and 
how  these could be useful for an emerging nation. According to Miyamoto, 
they completely ignored the “shadows” of Western development, primarily 
 because they  were part of the elite ruling classes and  were oblivious to the 
“voices of the  people.”98 But, as Miyamoto refl ected, “Our journey is about 
listening to the voices of the  people. What we are ‘learning’ is not only 
about . . .  the environmental policies of central and local governments, but 
we are also listening to the voices of victims and to the opinions of the very 
few scientists and politicians who are struggling with and helping them.”99 
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Miyamoto admitted that he was still not confi dent to speak about the ne-
cessity and value of their journeys abroad, especially given his limited lin-
guistic ability and the very short time spent overseas. But, when they “vis-
ited a rainy Los Angeles suburb located beside an oil refi nery,” and when 
they met with Nicky, the principal physician for the Huckleby  family in 
El Paso, Miyamoto “keenly felt” the signifi cance of their journey, which 
knit together a therapeutic translocal community against discrimination 
and injustice.100 Th e real ity was that they  were not alone, and this was a 
remarkably invigorating discovery for pollution victims and their indefati-
gable advocates. Th e fi nal statement of the Canadian Indian visitors  after 
their 1975 visit to Japan captured this sentiment perfectly:
We came on the invitation of the Minamata disease patients’ alliance.
Our hearts have been warmed by the beauty of the land and the 
warmth and hospitality of our hosts.
But, we came to learn about a horrible truth: Minamata disease— 
industrial methyl mercury poisoning in  human beings.
We have seen the destruction caused by this industrial pollution 
on the  human body and the suff ering of entire communities. And as 
fellow  human beings we are deeply hurt.
We are also horrifi ed at the similarities of the Minamata experi-
ence in the early stages, and our pres ent situation at Grassy Narrows 
and Whitedog in Canada.
Th e facts of our situation in Canada are quite  simple. Th e Dryden 
Chemical Com pany has polluted our  waters and fi sh with mercury. 
Th ey have destroyed our food and livlihood [sic]. During this time they 
have made increasing profi ts and received millions of dollars in govern-
ment aid.
We suff ered for fi ve years without relief from  either the Dryden 
Chemical Com pany or our government.
Now support and help is coming from our  brothers and  sisters, 
the Minamata disease patients, some seven thousand miles away.
Th e strug gle of Japa nese victims has been diffi  cult enough. Our 
strug gle is compounded by a history of racism.
Th is beginning of contact with the Minamata disease patients is 
the beginning of our strug gle in Canada.101
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CHAPTER 3
The  Human Limits to Growth
Japa nese Activists at UNCHE
In a famous speech to the Economic and Social Council of the United Na-
tions in Switzerland in 1965, US ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson 
articulated an embryonic vision of globalism characterized by a “heightened 
sensitivity to the fragility of the life- support system of the planet” and a 
“sense of  human solidarity in a world of increasing interdependence.”1 
Invoking the imagery of a spacecraft, Stevenson observed how “we travel 
together, passengers on a  little space ship, dependent on its vulnerable reserves 
of air and soil; all committed for our safety to its security and peace; pre-
served from annihilation only by the care, the work, and, I  will say, the love 
we give our fragile craft.”2 One year  later the economist Kenneth Boulding 
penned his infl uential essay, “Th e Economics of the Coming Spaceship 
Earth,” in which he argued passionately for a transition from the “cowboy 
economy,” based on a frontier mentality of rampant consumption, to the 
“spaceman economy” informed by prudence and re spect for the limited re-
sources of the planet.3 A combination of images, ideas, and events nurtured 
this perspective, none more so than the photo graphs of the Earth taken from 
the Lunar Orbiter satellites and Apollo missions throughout the 1960s.4 As 
Ursula Heise has argued, this early moment of global environmental sensi-
tivity was the point when it became pos si ble— for some, at least—to com-
prehend the  whole planet “as one’s backyard.”5 For the science fi ction writer 
Arthur C. Clarke, this was the historic moment when “the Earth  really be-
came a planet.”6
Of course, romantic spaceship imagery and communitarian visions of 
“One Earth”  were but one aspect of a global environmental movement 
marked by a good deal of pessimism, accusation, and disagreement. Much 
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of this discord revolved around the seeming clash between  human activity, 
on the one hand, and the long- term well- being of the planetary environ-
ment, on the other. So- called environmental prophets of doom, for example, 
warned about the dire implications for the planet of population growth, 
over- reliance on technology, depletion of resources, and reckless economic 
growth.7 In his 1968 bestseller, Th e Population Bomb, biologist Paul Ehrlich 
cautioned that  there  were too many  people on the planet, that their numbers 
 were increasing too quickly, and that the outcome would be environmental 
catastrophe, international confl ict, starvation, death, and, ultimately, nuclear 
war.8 In the midst of the Cold War, the “bomb” of the book’s title adroitly 
blended fears about nuclear annihilation with concerns over the heaving 
millions of the Th ird World and the looming environmental crisis. Striking 
a diff er ent yet nonetheless similarly pessimistic chord was another biologist, 
Barry Commoner, who argued in his 1971 book Th e Closing Circle: Nature, 
Man, and Technology that the prob lem was neither population nor economic 
growth but the technology utilized by the rich nations in achieving devel-
opment.9 Commoner singled out pesticides, herbicides, synthetic chemicals, 
fossil fuels, and nuclear power, and he pointed the fi n ger accusingly at 
developed nations, which he blamed for the bulk of environmental degra-
dation and resource depletion. Th e rich countries had a moral responsibil-
ity, he said, to compensate and support developing nations— many of which 
 were former colonies— because only through development could popula-
tion stasis be achieved. On this point, Commoner’s neo- Marxist, postco-
lonial environmental agenda contrasted starkly with the neo- Malthusian 
approach of  those like Paul Ehrlich. Moreover, it resonated with other 
emancipatory environmentalisms emerging from the developing world and 
among antipollution campaigners like  those from Japan.
A defi ning statement in this early debate on the environment and 
development appeared in 1972 with the release of Th e Limits to Growth, 
prepared by a team of scientists at the Mas sa chu setts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT) for the think tank, the Club of Rome. Th e report outlined 
pos si ble  future scenarios based on the most sophisticated—if controversial— 
computer modeling techniques of the time. It suggested that, given current 
trends of exponential economic growth,  there was a high likelihood of en-
vironmental and social crisis if not collapse in the near  future. Advances in 
technology and productivity could slow or even reverse such trends, but the 
report’s authors warned that  there  were grave risks in nonchalantly relying 
on some  future technological fi x that may or may not appear: “Faith in tech-
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nology as the ultimate solution to all prob lems can . . .  divert our attention 
from the most fundamental prob lem— the prob lem of growth in a fi nite 
system.”10
In this chapter I turn to the involvement and infl uence of Japa nese ac-
tivists and pollution victims in this early moment of environmental global-
ism, culminating in the UN Conference on the  Human Environment in 
Stockholm in 1972. An examination of UNCHE and the years leading up to 
it off ers a fascinating insight into the ways Japa nese activists became actors 
in the emergent “transnational po liti cal spaces” of the global environmental 
movement.11 In a classic instance of what Saskia Sassen characterizes as 
“local initiatives” becoming “part of a global network of activism without 
losing the focus on specifi c strug gles,” Japa nese pollution victims and activ-
ists took their stories of pollution and environmental injustice to a world 
audience at UNCHE, giving  these strug gles a  human face and relevance 
for many  people unfamiliar with the specifi cities of domestic po liti cal 
strug gles in Japan.12 At the same time,  these activists and victims  were 
able to skillfully utilize transnational spaces to “boomerang” pressure back 
on the Japa nese government, forcing offi  cials such as EAJ director Ōishi 
Buichi to make astonishing admissions before a world audience.
Japa nese activists, such as Tsuru Shigeto and Ui Jun, also emerged as 
quin tes sen tial rooted cosmopolitans who used their knowledge and experi-
ence from Japan to infl uence global debates about industrial pollution, eco-
nomic development, and international inequity. Involvement in this global 
environmental upsurge also proved challenging for the Japa nese participants. 
Th e confl icts among the developed and developing nations forced Japa nese 
activists and victims to think seriously about the role of Japa nese industry 
in environmental destruction abroad, especially in East Asia. If Japa nese pol-
lution was merely being “exported” in response to domestic opposition, was 
this  really a solution?
In this chapter I concentrate on the involvement of Japa nese activists 
in the emergent global debate on the environment during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Where did they stand and what did they advocate? As we have 
seen, the encounter with environmental injustices in Japan deeply infl u-
enced RCP members’ overseas activities. Although they expressed interest 
in a  great many issues, ranging from waste disposal to nuclear power, ul-
timately it was environmental prob lems with clearly discernable  human 
victims that RCP members studied most intensely and supported most vig-
orously. A combination of fury and obligation informed this agenda: fury 
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that pollution had victimized  people in Japan and a sense of obligation to 
stop its spread elsewhere. Recall members’ relatively lukewarm reaction 
to the Ralph Nader Group’s warnings about the growth of nuclear power 
worldwide compared with their deeply emotional response to the plight 
of an obscure community of Native Americans in the Canadian wilder-
ness. Degradation of the natu ral environment alone was not enough. For 
groups such as the RCP, socialized in the crucible of Japa nese industrial 
pollution, the presence of  human victims was also a critical ingredient for 
engagement.
Nowhere is this stance clearer than in Japa nese groups’ interventions 
into the early debate over the environment and economic development. 
 Whether as insiders or outsiders, the Japa nese activists involved tended to 
view the prob lem through an anthropocentric lens of injustice and  human 
rights. Th e issue for them was not so much the natu ral environment versus 
 human activity but, rather, who or what controlled the natu ral environment 
and economic development and, moreover, who did and did not benefi t. Th is 
perspective tended to position Japa nese groups in the camp of individuals 
like Barry Commoner and advocates from developing nations who  were also 
pursuing a rights- focused, emancipatory environmental agenda.  Needless to 
say, it was a perspective that grew directly out of their experience with very 
localized environmental injustices in Japan.
I trace the development of this localistic Japa nese perspective in two 
narratives. Th e fi rst charts the involvement of Japa nese pollution victims and 
their supporters at the United Nations Conference on the  Human Environ-
ment in Stockholm in 1972. Scholarship to date has paid almost no atten-
tion to this involvement despite the fact that Japa nese pollution victims and 
the country’s environmental prob lems became centerpieces of debate dur-
ing this historic conference.  Here I emphasize the Japa nese del e ga tion’s 
cogent  human- centered interpretation of the “limits to growth” idea. Whereas 
most debate at UNCHE focused on the limited capacity of the natu ral en-
vironment to sustain humanity, the Japa nese group stressed the  human 
limits to growth. Japa nese pollution victims off ered their damaged bodies as 
living proof that unbridled economic development was having immediate 
 human costs as grave as any long- term depletion of, or damage to, the envi-
ronment. Industrial pollution in Japan, they argued, spoke to a diff er ent kind 
of limitation: not with re spect to natu ral resources but with re spect to bal-
ancing economic activity with concern for  human health and dignity. Th at 
this argument came from the mouths of Japa nese victims themselves aff orded 
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it an urgency and authority that captured the attention of journalists, del-
egates, and activists alike at the conference.
Th e second narrative of the chapter traces the international activities 
of Tsuru Shigeto in the lead-up to UNCHE. While Japa nese pollution vic-
tims presented to the world a rights- and justice- based critique of economic 
growth based on local experience, Tsuru set about articulating a bold rein-
terpretation of the idea of “development” itself. At infl uential gatherings in 
the early 1970s he argued that the environment- development dilemma could 
only be solved by expanding the concept of development, which had been 
defi ned too narrowly in terms of the GNP index. Instead Tsuru proposed a 
broader concept of development inclusive of  human welfare concerns. Th is 
concept would take into account negative externalities such as pollution that 
 were generally absent in GNP calculations. Tsuru’s attempt to redefi ne de-
velopment was quite innovative, given that most debates at the time tended 
to gravitate around the defi nition of the environment. Of course, Tsuru’s 
thinking about development had deep roots, drawing extensively on his 
encounter with industrial pollution in Japan. He presented Japan as a quin-
tes sen tial example of the tragic environmental and  human costs realized 
when  human welfare was divorced from economic development. Reuniting 
the two, however, off ered a way forward,  because a model of development 
inclusive of  human welfare would implicitly recognize the necessity of a 
habitable living environment while accepting certain necessary levels of 
economic growth. Tsuru seems to have believed that this expanded concept 
of development could si mul ta neously satisfy the growth demands of devel-
oping nations while eliminating the  human costs of GNP economics in 
the rich countries. Although he did not use the term at the time, his thinking 
 here in many ways anticipated the  later concept of sustainable develop-
ment, which would similarly attempt to chart a  middle way between the 
environment and development.
UNCHE 1972: Communicating Japa nese Environmental 
Injustice to the World
It was against the backdrop of worsening industrial pollution worldwide 
in the 1960s and early 1970s that po liti cal leaders and concerned citizens 
around the world began to pay attention to the environment in their back-
yards and beyond. Internationally, the most impor tant event of this era 
was UNCHE, convened in Stockholm in 1972. No other event better encap-
sulated the potential and the complexities of global environmentalism in 
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a world fragmented into nation- states and divided by palpable diff erences 
in ideology, geography, resources, and stages of development. Barbara Ward 
and René Jules Dubos’s Only One Earth: Th e Care and Maintenance of a 
Small Planet, prepared especially for the conference, expressed the desire of 
organizers that the national del e ga tions think about the environment as a 
global issue, transcending borders and the specifi c conditions of individual 
countries. But such lofty aspirations proved diffi  cult to achieve in the 
face of violent disagreements between developed and developing nations, 
not to mention the ideological discords of the Cold War.
On the positive side, historian of the modern environmental movement 
John McCormick describes UNCHE as “the landmark event in the growth 
of international environmentalism.”13 UNCHE certainly broke ground in 
terms of UN history, being the or ga ni za tion’s fi rst international conference 
on the environment and, in fact, its fi rst international event devoted to a 
single issue.14 Th e event undoubtedly propelled the environment to an unpre-
ce dented level of global attention and concern. For two weeks beginning 
on June 5, 1972, one hundred and fourteen countries, nineteen intergov-
ernmental agencies, and over four hundred nongovernmental organ izations 
converged on the city of Stockholm to participate in the formal UN confer-
ence and in many other parallel symposia, rallies, and events. Th ey  were 
accompanied by an army of print and electronic media representatives from 
around the world, who dispatched detailed daily reports on debate both 
within and outside the conference. Th anks to extensive preconference prep-
arations, such as the Founex conference discussed below, delegates  were able 
to fi nalize and approve the Declaration on the  Human Environment, with 
its list of twenty- six princi ples, and an action plan that outlined specifi c mea-
sures individual countries could voluntarily adopt.15 Th e original draft of 
the Declaration drew extensively on ideas from the Tokyo Declaration au-
thored by Tsuru and  others at a 1970 symposium in that city, especially its 
assertion that all  people have “a fundamental right with re spect to the envi-
ronment.” Opposition from Switzerland and Austria, however, forced this 
clause to be changed in its fi nal— arguably watered- down— version to all 
 people have “the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate con-
ditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity 
and well- being.”16 Conference delegates also negotiated a number of inter-
national treaties on the environment relating to cultural and natu ral heri-
tage, marine pollution, endangered species, and pollution from commercial 
shipping.
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Formal agreements aside, UNCHE was a conference riven with 
controversy, disagreement, and contradiction. Despite an agreement to stop 
contamination of the oceans, on the day UNCHE ended, the private ship 
Topaz, loaded with 7,600 drums of industrial waste from Eu rope, resumed 
dumping operations in the Atlantic Ocean as observers from Japan, Ireland, 
and elsewhere looked on.17 Cold War politics also greatly weakened the con-
ference. Apart from Romania, all of the Soviet Bloc countries boycotted the 
conference in support of the German Demo cratic Republic (East Germany), 
excluded from participation  because it was not a member of the United 
Nations.18 Th e Vietnam War also caused sparks  after the Swedish prime 
minister— supported by NGOs and the Chinese del e ga tion— condemned 
the United States, saying that “the im mense destruction brought about by 
indiscriminate bombing, by large- scale use of bulldozers and herbicides is 
an outrage sometimes described as ecocide, which requires urgent interna-
tional attention.”19 Controversy over the proposed ten- year moratorium on 
commercial whaling proved to be a thorn in the side of the offi  cial Japa nese 
del e ga tion, which refused to compromise despite almost total support for 
the ban among participating countries. Th e only consolation for the Japa nese 
was that they  were supported by the boycotting Soviet Union, itself still a 
commercial whaling nation. Even progressive Japa nese observers such as 
Matsui Yayori, a feminist, environmentalist, and journalist with the left- 
leaning newspaper Asahi Shinbun found the uproar over whaling somewhat 
puzzling. Speaking to a Japa nese audience of environmental activists  after 
UNCHE, Matsui wondered if “ whales”  were “more impor tant” than “yellow 
 people” to Americans, given the ongoing “ecocide”  under way in Indochina.20 
Matsui’s observation was an in ter est ing one indeed, inadvertently revealing 
the deeply anthropocentric perspective of Japa nese environmentalism en-
capsulated in the stories of injustice Japa nese victims would relate with such 
poignancy throughout UNCHE.
Most divisive in terms of the environmental debate, however, was the 
simmering “North- South” prob lem, which dominated debate both inside 
and outside the conference. Along with Indira Gandhi, Robert McNamara 
of the World Bank, and the Brazilian del e ga tion, the  People’s Republic of 
China emerged as the champion of the global South. In strongly ideologi-
cal language the Chinese declared that the “major cause of environmental 
pollution” was “capitalism,” which had “developed into a state of imperial-
ism, mono poly, colonialism and neocolonialism— seeking high profi ts, not 
concerned with the life or death of  people, and discharging poisons at  will.”21 
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Th e Chinese asserted that “each country” had “the right to determine its 
own environment standards and policies in the light of its own conditions, 
and no country whatsoever should undermine the interests of the develop-
ing countries  under the pretext of protecting the environment.”22
Events outside the formal conference proved to be just as provocative 
and controversial— not to mention haphazard. Invoking a famous Swedish 
culinary image, one observer likened the activity in and around Stockholm 
city to an “environmental smorgasbord,” while another suggested that “his-
tory may not fi nd it clear which was the main event and which the sideshow.”23 
As McCormick correctly observes, UNCHE represented “the beginning of a 
new and more insistent role for NGOs in the work of governments and inter-
governmental organ izations,” and it connected national NGOs transnation-
ally as never before.24 Not  until the Earth Summit (UNCED) in Rio in 
1992, with its attention to global- scale environmental prob lems such as ozone 
depletion and climate change, would NGOs be involved in such a moment 
of heightened concern for and controversy over the global environment.
When the del e ga tion of Japa nese pollution victims and their advo-
cates stepped off  the airplane in Stockholm, they became part of a re-
markably diverse array of unoffi  cial and semioffi  cial events that, one way or 
another, addressed the burning question of the environment and economic 
growth. Closest in terms of affi  liation to UNCHE was the Environmental 
Forum, fi nancially supported by the Swedish government and approved by 
the UN conference secretariat as the offi  cial venue for nongovernmental 
organ izations. As one attendee  later wrote, the Environmental Forum in-
volved “exhibitions, fi lms and slide shows, panel discussions, lectures, and 
workshops on some fi fty subjects. Books  were sold, pamphlets distributed, 
and petitions signed.  Th ere was  music and biodynamic food (including 
‘poison  free’ soft drinks sold in non- returnable  bottles, which shows how 
diffi  cult it is to live as one teaches).”25 Contrary to organizers hopes that 
the forum would be a compliant and unobtrusive space for congenial NGOs, 
the heated debates over the  causes of environmental degradation at times 
even upstaged the main event. Notably, the Environmental Forum served 
as the venue for the famous Ehrlich- Commoner debate over  whether it was 
population or technology driving global environmental destruction. While 
Barry Commoner criticized the affl  uent countries for irresponsible use of 
technology and neo co lo nial ism, Paul Ehrlich invoked the ire of developing 
nations in his vocal assertion that population growth was one of the most 
signifi cant contributors to environmental degradation.26
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More radical in conception and practice was the Dai Dong Conference, 
named  after the Chinese notion of the  whole world as a  family. Familial 
imagery aside, however, Dai Dong served as a vocal and often militant mouth-
piece for an emancipatory environmentalism advocating the rights of devel-
oping nations. Dai Dong included scientists and other specialists from 
Eu rope, the United States, Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer i ca. Ui Jun partici-
pated as the offi  cial delegate from Japan. In speeches and panel discussions 
he spoke passionately about the country’s severe pollution and the coura-
geous strug gles of victims. Ui also took part in a public dialogue with Barry 
Commoner that was widely reported in Japan and worldwide. Both activ-
ists agreed that environmental prob lems would not be solved without ac-
companying solutions to “poverty, discrimination, and war.” As Commoner 
argued,  because environmental degradation was a “social prob lem,” it was 
not enough to treat it as a “biological issue” or through the lens of “nature 
conservation” alone. Ui could only agree, noting how his involvement with 
Minamata disease had forced him to expand his perspective from “natu ral 
science” to “social science.”27 Given its advocacy of environmental rights and 
justice, Dai Dong thus served as the perfect venue to showcase Japa nese 
industrial pollution and the stories of its hapless victims. As a self- proclaimed 
“transnational peace eff ort” committed to global consciousness, transna-
tional cooperation, and economic justice, Dai Dong participants addressed 
environmental degradation through the lens of wider social, po liti cal, eco-
nomic, and cultural inequities worldwide—an emancipatory focus that 
resonated closely with the agenda of Ui and Japa nese pollution victims. Th e 
United States came in for par tic u lar criticism for its “ecocidal” war in 
Indochina, while developed countries  were lambasted for having “short- 
changed” the Th ird World by monopolizing technology and plundering 
natu ral resources.28
Japa nese activists’ involvement in the UNCHE pro cess began in mid-
1971 when Ui Jun and  others in the ILP movement obtained a draft copy 
of the offi  cial Japa nese national report for the conference prepared by bu-
reaucrats at the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs.29 What they discovered was a 
document largely devoid of detailed discussion about Japa nese pollution, and 
instead fi lled with what they viewed as page  after page of bureaucratic “trum-
pet blowing.”30 Ui was particularly irritated by the total absence of specifi c 
discussion about Minamata disease, Itai Itai disease, Yokkaichi asthma, and 
other infamous incidents of pollution in the country.31 Only in a very short 
section did the report mention how heavy metals such as cadmium and 
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methyl mercury had “caused health eff ects” in  humans in some areas. Th e 
bulk of the report focused on the offi  cial responses and institutional and 
regulatory developments.32 As Ui pointed out, no scientifi c specialists or 
victims  were consulted during the drafting pro cess, resulting in a bland 
and abstract document that gave readers  little sense of the advanced nature 
and horrifi c  human consequences of pollution in Japan.33 Th e phrase 
“caused health eff ects,” for instance, obfuscated the real ity that industrial 
pollution had killed, and was still killing, many innocent Japa nese citizens.34 
Nowhere in the report was  there any sense that many Japa nese  people re-
gretted their path to economic affl  uence, nor was  there any indication that 
some of them  were now reconsidering the benefi ts of so- called growth.35
Th e ILP responded immediately. On the suggestion of Ui, beginning 
in December 1971 the executive committee began to prepare its own in de-
pen dent “alternative” national report on Japan, which was to be circulated 
as widely as pos si ble in Stockholm the following June. A working party con-
stituting students and numerous ordinary citizens set about compiling data 
for case studies on some twenty instances of pollution in Japan. Th e origi-
nal text was then translated into En glish by a group of seventeen Japa nese 
volunteers and subsequently polished for publication by Anthony Car ter, an 
American missionary involved in the movement.36 Volunteers from the 
 Women’s League for Peace in the lay Buddhist or ga ni za tion Sōka Gakkai 
helped raise funds for the publication.37 Th e resulting pamphlet, Polluted 
Japan, proved to be a landmark English- language document on the tragedy 
of Japa nese industrial pollution, to which even the Japa nese government was 
forced to respond. On learning of the pamphlet, the government quickly 
supplemented the fi rst version of its report with three new sections dealing 
more specifi cally with instances of air and  water pollution.38 Th e high- 
circulation newspaper Asahi Shinbun also publicized the pamphlet’s release 
in late February 1972 in an article titled “No More Minamatas.”39
Th roughout UNCHE, the ILP del e ga tion distributed around 2,500 
copies of the pamphlet to activists, NGOs, bureaucrats, journalists, and 
ordinary citizens from around the world.40 Inside Polluted Japan’s covers, 
readers discovered page  after page of photo graphs, maps, sketches,  tables, 
charts, and text documenting industrial pollution and horrifi c  human 
injustice. Th e cover presented readers with a  human hand shockingly de-
formed by mercury contamination, accentuated on subsequent pages by 
photos of fetal mercury poisoning victims, Yokkaichi asthma suff erers, PCB 
contamination victims, and casualties of cadmium poisoning. Th e images 
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are unnerving: a young Minamata suff erer in bed with a terribly distorted 
hand and glass- eyed stare, a  woman’s back covered in literally hundreds 
of painful eruptions caused by PCB- contaminated rice bran oil, and the 
defl ated body of an infant victim of cadmium poisoning whose barely 
recognizable limbs are warped into terrifying  angles from multiple bone 
fractures.  Here indeed was the chilling real ity of the “health eff ects” so non-
chalantly referred to in the government’s national report.
Polluted Japan presented readers with detailed studies on eigh teen forms 
of pollution in Japan including Minamata disease, Itai Itai disease, Yokkaichi 
asthma, arsenic and PCB contamination, farming chemicals, automobile 
fumes, garbage, paper and pulp, oil, and radioactivity. No stone was left 
unturned.41 In his introductory essay, Ui repeated his mantra on Japa nese 
pollution for an international audience: namely, that pollution should not 
be understood as an unexpected and unfortunate outcome of economic 
growth but as something intentional that facilitated Japa nese economic 
development.
It is often said that “kōgai” is a side eff ect or distortion related to devel-
opment. But this type of thinking comes from  those who are primarily 
responsible for the generation of “kōgai.” Th e facts indicate that “kōgai” 
is not such a trifl ing  matter as to simply be called a side eff ect or distortion 
of a rapidly developing economy. To simply say that it is a “distortion” 
is to indicate that if economic development  were carried out rightly, or 
managed in such a way so that it would follow a natu ral course without 
any distortion, then the “kōgai” would not appear. But the fact is that 
“kōgai” is one of the most power ful and central  factors in a rapidly 
developing economy. Japa nese economists have pointed to a number 
of  factors that have spelled success for Japan’s cap i tal ist economy and 
the  factors most stressed have been low wages and trade protectionism. 
But a third  factor must be added and that is the neglect of the “kōgai” 
prob lem or permitting the economy to dirty its own clothes. Th e “kōgai” 
prob lem is an essential part of the structures of the cap i tal ist economy 
of Japan.42
Ui and the ILP also or ga nized a del e ga tion of pollution victims and 
environmental advocates to travel to Stockholm and participate in the vari-
ous parallel NGO conferences.43 Ui and the executive committee deci ded 
on victims of Minamata disease and Kanemi Rice Bran Oil contamination 
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 because their symptoms, being externally vis i ble, would have the greatest 
impact.44 Traveling from Minamata  were thirty- six- year- old suff erer Hama-
moto Tsuginori, wearing a cloth bib reading, “AN INDIVIDUAL CAN-
NOT BE REPLACED,” and fetal mercury poisoning victim Hashimoto 
Shinobu, fi fteen years old, accompanied by her  mother, Fujie.45 Sasaki 
Shigemitsu and Kinoshita Tadayuki represented Kanemi Rice Bran Oil 
victims, while Shibushi Bay resident Tōgo Sōbei spoke for the anti– industrial 
development movement in Japan. Supporting  these victims and activists—in 
what was the fi rst trip abroad for most— were Ui Jun, Harada Masazumi, Itai 
Itai disease specialist Dr. Hagino Noboru, fi lmmaker Tsuchimoto Noriaki, 
and missionary Anthony Car ter.46
Th e group was astounded by their reception in Stockholm. Matsui 
Yayori of the newspaper Asahi Shinbun described how “ordinary citizens are 
showing much more interest in Japan than was expected. TV news is 
constantly  running stories about how Tokyo City was forced to pass traffi  c 
regulations to address the terrible photochemical smog in the city. Major 
newspapers are  running stories on the Minamata and Kanemi incidents. 
Japa nese pollution has become a ‘dining room’ topic for Swedish  people.” 47 
On June 5, Ui and the ILP del e ga tion addressed an audience of some hun-
dred journalists at their  hotel in central Stockholm. With the four victims 
seated beside him, Ui Jun announced that “ these  people’s bodies show the 
horrors of Japa nese pollution.” 48 Th e victims themselves sat with banners 
draped around their necks reading “only one life,” “MINAMATA,” and 
“KOGAI HANTAI.” 49 Hamamoto Tsuginori told the reporters that he 
wanted to express his rage and let the world know the “double damage” in-
fl icted on Japa nese pollution victims by a government that took “sides with 
polluting corporations” and did “nothing  until victims protested.” He spoke 
about the arduous life of Minamata disease suff erers and, with cane in hand, 
shuffl  ed around the room to show the physical challenges of living with 
Minamata disease. Hashimoto Fujie spoke for her  daughter Shinobu, ter-
ribly incapacitated by fetal mercury poisoning. Fujie said that she wanted to 
communicate the agony of a  mother whose eldest  daughter had been killed 
by Minamata disease and whose younger  daughter (Shinobu) was affl  icted 
with the fetal variety. She confessed her worry about Shinobu’s  future and, 
in a poignant admission, said she wanted  people to understand the agony of 
a  mother who hoped her child would die before she did. Kanemi PCB vic-
tim Sasaki Shigemitsu set the room alight with fl ashbulbs when he removed 
his shirt to reveal a torso covered in excruciating skin eruptions. “Look at 
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my body,” he announced, “ Th ese may look like pimples but they are actu-
ally eruptions caused by PCBs.”50
Following the press conference the Dai Dong group, in cooperation 
with the  People’s Forum, or ga nized a “Japan Night” attended by the press 
and around fi ve hundred  people. During the eve ning fi lmmaker Tsuchimoto 
Noriaki screened his confronting documentary, Minamata: Th e Victims and 
Th eir World, which was rescreened by popu lar demand some days  later. Th e 
newspaper Asahi Shinbun reported how the audience cheered loudly during 
scenes of Minamata victims and activists directly confronting executives of 
the Chisso Corporation.51 Ui acted as master of ceremonies for the eve ning, 
while Drs. Hagino and Harada presented slideshows, fi lms, and talks on the 
nature and development of industrial pollution in Japan.52 On June 6, the 
fi rst day of UNCHE, the ILP del e ga tion led a street demonstration in front 
of the  hotels of national delegates and then to the Japa nese embassy. Ui, 
Hagino, and Harada also conducted slideshows and led a panel discussion 
at the Environmental Forum on heavy metal poisoning worldwide.53 On 
June 14, Dr. Lars Friberg, the renowned environmental medicine researcher, 
invited the ILP group to speak on the topic of Japa nese industrial pollution 
at the Karolinska Institute,  after which they  were presented with the Karo-
linska Medal in recognition of their scientifi c research and a donation of 
140,000 yen for the movement. Hagino Noboru’s pre sen ta tion on Itai Itai 
disease at the institute was subsequently recognized as the moment when 
cadmium gained general scientifi c ac cep tance worldwide as the primary 
causal agent of the disease.54
Although they  were unable to gain access to the main conference, the 
victims and activists of the ILP group  were generally satisfi ed with their 
achievements. Hamamoto Tsuginori of Minamata  later observed that “the 
Japa nese government  wasn’t happy we disabled  people participated. It would 
have been nice to have said even something short at the main conference.” 
Nevertheless, Hamamoto concluded, “I’m  really glad I came.”55 For Ui, the 
most surprising and worrying revelation was just how  little the world knew 
about Japan’s pollution nightmare compared with the country’s economic 
miracle. Th e reaction of delegates from developing countries who had pre-
viously looked to Japan as a successful, non- Western role model of develop-
ment was particularly startling. Ui could not forget the look of disbelief 
on the face of a young  woman from Iran as she learned of Japan’s terrible 
pollution situation.56 Indeed, the Stockholm experience imbued the ILP 
group with a renewed commitment to communicate the lessons of Japa nese 
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pollution and injustice to the world. Participants from Minamata and 
elsewhere  were astounded to discover that their local experiences off ered a 
sobering corroboration of arguments about the limits to economic growth. 
What made their message unique and all the more striking was the way 
Japa nese pollution victims physically embodied their critique. As living 
evidence of the  human limits to growth, their message had a visceral and 
emotional immediacy that captured the attention of activists, journal-
ists, and conference delegates alike at UNCHE. Th is was a reaction the 
Japa nese group had not anticipated, and it alerted them to the interna-
tional signifi cance of their very local experiences of physical suff ering and 
injustice.
Tsuru Shigeto: The Quin tes sen tial Rooted Cosmopolitan
Pollution victims and their supporters like Ui Jun  were not the only Japa-
nese voices audible in this early 1970s upsurge of environmental concern 
worldwide. While the ILP and other groups  were pursuing their agendas in 
the spaces of an emergent global civil society,  others like Tsuru Shigeto  were 
si mul ta neously utilizing their status and connections within academic, sci-
entifi c, and po liti cal circles to articulate a Japa nese perspective on environ-
mental prob lems. In Tsuru’s case this perspective revolved around a critique 
of GNP and a fundamental redefi nition of development as  human welfare—
in a sense, becoming the theoretical expression of victims’ emotional and 
embodied critique of environmental injustice.
Th e Limits to Growth neatly encapsulated the sentiment driving envi-
ronmental concern in the years leading up to UNCHE— especially before 
the developing countries began to vociferously challenge what they saw as a 
debate unfairly skewed in  favor of the rich. As the title of that book can-
didly pronounced, “growth”—in population and consumption— was the 
primary cause of environmental degradation and resource depletion and, 
given that it was likely to continue in an exponential way, the prospects for 
humanity  were grim  unless  people somehow brought  these pro cesses  under 
control. As the MIT team ominously concluded from the output of their 
“World Model” (what one skeptic  later ridiculed as “Th e Computer Th at 
Printed Out W*O*L *F*”), “We can thus say with some confi dence that,  under 
the assumption of no major change in the pres ent system, population and indus-
trial growth  will certainly stop within the next  century at the latest.”57 Although 
based on their own in de pen dent computer modeling, the MIT team’s con-
clusions dovetailed with other con temporary analyses of the long- term 
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consequences of global resource depletion by economists, biologists, and 
demographers.
As an internationally recognized economist and antipollution cam-
paigner, Tsuru Shigeto joined this chorus of criticism against growth, al-
though his position on “development” was more moderate than groups such 
as the MIT team. As noted at the outset, Tsuru was not opposed to devel-
opment per se, just its narrow defi nition as an increase in GNP. Th is approach 
to development undoubtedly had to do with his longtime theoretical in-
terest in developmental economics, but it also drew on his experiences in 
the progressive Tokyo administration of Governor Minobe Ryōkichi in the 
1960s, where he helped craft policies for clean living environments and 
citizen participation—in other words, policies based on guaranteeing civic 
rights to enjoy and utilize a clean living environment (as opposed to poli-
cies focused solely on limiting  human eff ects on the natu ral environment). 
Similarly, his desire to deal with environmental protection within the more 
impor tant (for him) issue of  human welfare drew on a Japa nese environmen-
tal injustice paradigm constructed around pollution victims whose welfare 
had been willfully and ruthlessly ignored. Such experiences profoundly 
 shaped Tsuru’s vocal international critique of the GNP index, which he saw 
as a numerical expression of environmental disruption caused by reckless 
growth insensitive to  human welfare.
Tsuru Shigeto, it should be noted, was a thoroughly cosmopolitan in-
dividual years before he became an environmental activist, and his forma-
tive experiences in  these earlier years provided the theoretical basis and 
 human connections necessary for his involvement in international environ-
mental issues in the 1970s and beyond. A remarkably intelligent and con-
templative youth, Tsuru traced the roots of his environmental concern to the 
1917 best seller Binbō Monogatari (Tales of poverty) by the Marxian econo-
mist Kawakami Hajime, which he read in  middle school. Tsuru recalled be-
ing particularly enamored by an episode Kawakami recounted from his 
days as a university student. Th e young Kawakami had traveled to the Ashio 
copper mine, located around one hundred miles (160 kilo meters) north of 
Tokyo in Tochigi Prefecture and site of one of Japan’s most infamous and 
destructive cases of industrial pollution in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. Kawakami explained how he had been overwhelmed with 
sympathy  after hearing speeches from victims of pollution from the mine 
and, in a display of spontaneous altruism, donated some of the clothes he 
was wearing.58 Although Tsuru never went so far, he did develop a similar 
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commitment to the plight of marginalized pollution victims in his own en-
vironmental activism. Moreover, the Ashio copper mine pollution incident 
served as a crucial reference point for Tsuru a  couple of de cades  later when 
he was attempting to rethink development as a pro cess inclusive of  human 
welfare concerns.
Th e tenor of the times in early twentieth  century Japan also played a 
role— albeit inadvertently—in shaping Tsuru’s approach to environmental 
prob lems. Tsuru’s  father, Nobuo, president of the Toho Gas Com pany, then 
the primary gas supplier in the Nagoya region of central Honshū Island, had 
been deeply disappointed with Japa nese diplomats  after the country’s mo-
mentous victory in the Russo- Japanese War of 1904–1905. His  father felt 
that, despite the historic achievements of the Japa nese armed forces, diplo-
mats had let the country down by not securing a more generous postwar 
settlement from the Rus sians. When Tsuru was born in 1912 Nobuo deter-
mined that his son would become an eff ective foreign diplomat with all the 
necessary skills to pursue Japan’s national interest on an international stage. 
To this end he began preparations by arranging for private English- language 
lessons for the young Tsuru from his second year of  middle school.59 Although 
Tsuru would never fulfi ll his  father’s dreams and become a diplomat, years 
of English- language study positioned him well for a cosmopolitan life and 
 career in the coming years.
In the late 1920s Tsuru entered the Number 8 Higher School in Na-
goya (the pre de ces sor of pres ent- day Nagoya University), where he con-
tinued his language study in the En glish Speaking Society and, signifi -
cantly, threw himself into a program of leftist activism on campus that 
would have life- altering consequences. Tsuru became involved in a read-
ing group called Shaken (social research), which included both faculty 
and student members. Although a largely moderate association, the group 
had been banned in 1927 by order of the Japa nese Ministry of Education 
as part of the state’s more general crackdown on leftist ele ments nation-
wide. Th e group continued to operate in secret, however, reading works 
such as the German- language version of Karl Marx and Friedrich En-
gels’s Th e Communist Manifesto and becoming involved in vari ous democ-
ratization movements on campus.60 Among  these, in 1929 Tsuru and his 
fellow members established a campus division of the Japan branch of the 
Anti- Imperialist League and began publishing a monthly newsletter called 
Iskra,  after the Rus sian Social Demo cratic Workers’ Party bulletin of the 
same name.61
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Th e “inevitable”—as Tsuru  later described it— came in early Decem-
ber 1930, when Tsuru and thirty- fi ve other students  were arrested for organ-
izing speaking events critical of the Japa nese army’s incursions into China 
as well as for pasting po liti cal pamphlets outside a number of Nagoya fac-
tories on the request of the National Council of Japa nese  Labor Unions.62 
Tsuru spent the next three months in police detention and on his release 
learned that he had been expelled from the Number 8 Higher School. Aware 
of the peril his son faced as an identifi ed “thought criminal,” Tsuru’s  father 
suggested that he go overseas to continue his studies. Although most Japa-
nese students traveled to Germany at the time, Tsuru’s  father felt that the 
Marxist infl uence was too strong  there, with the Social Demo crats as the 
largest po liti cal party and a power ful Socialist Party. If Tsuru was agree-
able, his  father promised to pay for travel and two years of study and living 
expenses in the United States. Somewhat surprised but not resistant, Tsuru 
boarded the Japa nese mail steamboat Taiyōmaru in August 1931, bound for 
the United States.63  After an initial period at Lawrence University in Wis-
consin, Tsuru transferred to Harvard University, where he graduated with 
honors in 1935 and then went on to complete doctoral studies in economics 
Tsuru Shigeto, 1972
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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in 1940. His advisers and colleagues at Harvard included some of the most 
infl uential fi gures in twentieth- century economics such as Joseph Schum-
peter, Wassily Leontief, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Paul Samuelson. Among 
non- economists, Tsuru became close friends with the Marxian historian of 
Japan and Canadian diplomat E. H. Norman— a friendship that ultimately 
resulted in an order to testify about Norman before the House Un- American 
Activities Committee in the late 1950s and accusations from the left that 
he had somehow contributed to Norman’s untimely suicide.64
With the outbreak of the Pacifi c War in 1941, Tsuru was repatriated to 
Japan with other Japa nese living in the United States, and throughout 
the war years he served in the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (MOFA) and very 
briefl y in the army. At war’s end, Tsuru was invited to join the Strategic 
Bombing Survey of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) 
on the request of two of its members, John Kenneth Galbraith and Paul 
Baran, who  were close associates from his days at Harvard.65 In 1946 Tsuru 
was again seconded to SCAP from his post in MOFA by order of then 
Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru, this time serving in the infl uential Eco-
nomic and Scientifi c Section (ESS). In an in ter est ing twist of circumstances, 
while at the ESS Tsuru was charged with drafting and translating a letter 
from General Douglas MacArthur to Yoshida Shigeru (by then, prime min-
ister) ordering that the Japa nese government immediately adopt mea sures 
to bring rampant infl ation  under control.66 On his return to the Japa nese 
public ser vice in 1947, Yoshida appointed Tsuru to the Keizai Antei Honbu 
(Economic Stabilization Headquarters,  later the Economic Planning Agency, 
EPA, or Keizai Kikakuchō) where he was involved in the preparation of the 
fi rst postwar economic white paper.67
By the age of thirty- fi ve, then, Tsuru had over a de cade of experience 
living and studying abroad, where he had associated with some of the most 
infl uential economists of the time. In two short years  after the war he had 
served at the highest levels of the Japa nese bureaucracy and within the power-
ful economic sections of SCAP. Th is experience as an insider at the most 
elite levels of politics and the acad emy served Tsuru well when he embarked 
on environmental activism beginning in the 1960s. It also fed into his proj-
ect to rethink the notion of development. Most directly, while a student in 
the United States in the 1930s, Tsuru had developed an interest in develop-
ment economics and conducted some research into the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (TVA). Remarkably diff er ent from the Ashio copper mine region in 
Japan, which had been terribly polluted by mining operations, the Tennessee 
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Valley proj ect appeared to Tsuru to have eff ectively integrated development 
and the environment,  because the region had an upstream copper mine 
similar to Ashio but without the pollution. Tsuru was intrigued by the 
contrast and became convinced that the TVA model of nonpollutive (i.e., 
 human- welfare- sensitive) development could be imported into Japan. In 
October 1946 Tsuru or ga nized the TVA Research Colloquium, which met 
monthly to consider how the TVA princi ples might be adapted for regional 
development proj ects in Japan. Members came from across the bureaucratic 
and industrial spectrum and included many technical specialists involved 
in transport, heavy industry, and electrical utilities. Among prominent 
individuals in the colloquium was Okita Saburō, an infl uential economist, 
government offi  cial, and,  later, member of the Club of Rome who, many 
de cades hence, would play a key role in making the notion of “sustainable 
development” environmental common sense worldwide.68
Given Japan’s subsequent torrent of regional development throughout 
the 1960s, and the resulting pollution and environmental destruction, 
Tsuru’s TVA Colloquium can be viewed only as a resounding failure with 
re spect to its direct infl uence on government policy and industrial develop-
ment. Nevertheless, for Tsuru, Okita, and other specialists in the group, it 
was a transformative experience, representing their fi rst opportunity to think 
about development in post- defeat Japan from a comparative perspective. It 
was through the TVA Colloquium that Tsuru was able to conduct a fi eld 
survey of the Ashio copper mine region in 1953 as a member of the govern-
mental consultative committee, the Shigen Chōsakai (Natu ral Resources 
Survey Committee). Th e environmental damage and  human misery Tsuru 
witnessed was shocking and convinced him of the need for thorough eco-
nomic planning, attentive to both the profi tability of individual economic 
actors and the wider macroeconomy as well as to the welfare of ordinary 
citizens and their living environment.69 Although the colloquium ended 
in 1949, it served for Tsuru as a prototype for the Research Committee on 
Pollution with its focus on fi eld research, interdisciplinary exchange, and 
cross- national consideration of local development.70
Tsuru began to tackle environmental issues in earnest from the early 
years of the 1960s while a faculty member and  later president of Hitot-
subashi University in eastern Tokyo. As we saw in chapter 1, in 1963 Tsuru 
and  others established the RCP in response to the unfolding domestic envi-
ronmental crisis.  After resisting insistent pleas to run for the Tokyo City gov-
ernorship, for two years from 1968 Tsuru served in a consultative capacity 
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on the Tokyo Prob lems Research Committee, which advised the progres-
sive governor, Minobe Ryōkichi (who ran for offi  ce when Tsuru declined), 
on issues relating to housing, land, new town development, redevelopment, 
urban transport, and public fi nance. Tsuru used the opportunity to advance 
his embryonic environmental vision, most notably in the committee’s infl u-
ential 1969 policy proposal Tōkyō e no Teigen (Recommendations to Tokyo), 
which sketched out not only an environmentally friendly but also a demo-
cratically or ga nized vision of urban life in the capital, in which local residents 
would have a large role in shaping their living environments.71
In the early 1970s Tsuru became more and more involved in the global 
environmental movement as an opinion leader and as an or ga nizer of infl u-
ential international conferences.  Th ese  were the years when his earlier studies 
and contacts overseas came to fruition, providing him with opportunities 
to build alliances of like- minded scientists and to communicate his critique 
of GNP and vision of development to an international audience. In terms 
of transnational alliances, Tsuru’s fi rst standout achievement was the In-
ternational Symposium on Environmental Disruption held in Tokyo in 
1970, which he or ga nized with the environmental economist Allen Kneese 
of Resources for the  Future in Washington, DC. Formally named “Envi-
ronmental Disruption in the Modern World: A Field of Action for the Social 
Scientists,” the Tokyo symposium was a landmark event in the formation 
of a transnational movement of natu ral and social scientists committed to 
the central tenets of environmentalism. For assistance Tsuru drew on his 
connections in industry and government, arranging fi nancial and logistical 
support from Tokyo City, the Osaka and Mie prefectural governments, the 
Japa nese Ministry of Education, and the Tokyo Electric Power Com pany 
(TEPCO).72 Symposium participants read like a who’s who of international 
environmental specialists at the time. On the Japan side  were members of 
the RCP, Tokyo and Osaka City offi  cials, and representatives from the 
MHW. Overseas participants included Allen Kneese, who proposed a the-
ory of market systems sensitive to common property resources; Harvard 
economist Wassily Leontief, who advocated national accounting refl ective 
of negative externalities (like pollution); Wellesley College economist Marshall 
Goldman, who described widespread pollution in the Soviet Union; Michigan 
University  legal scholar Joseph Sax, who championed environmental litiga-
tion; and the German American economist and founder of ecological 
economics Karl William Kapp, who provided the framing opening remarks 
for the symposium. As Kapp observed, “I consider it as particularly appro-
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priate that this fi rst international symposium on the disruption and pos si-
ble destruction of man’s environment takes place in a country that had to 
endure the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, Japan  today has 
one of the most rapid rates of industrialization and of economic development 
with all its disruptive consequences on the environment.”73 Among the many 
issues debated at the symposium, participants paid  great attention to the 
prob lem of incorporating the costs of pollution into calculations of GNP 
and to methods for making polluters pay for environmental degradation 
caused by industrial processes— both vitally impor tant issues for Tsuru.
Along with the pre sen ta tions and debates, participants in the confer-
ence also signed the Tokyo Declaration, which famously asserted that all 
 people and  future generations have “a fundamental right with re spect to the 
environment”— a Japanese- inspired idea of environmental rights that would 
carry over to the UN conference in Stockholm two years  later. Tsuru and 
other RCP members’ notions of environmental rights (to fresh  water, sun-
light, clean air, and the like) drew heavi ly on their commitment to environ-
mental justice, which, as explained, emerged from their earlier strug gles 
against domestic industrial pollution. Th e Tokyo Declaration closely mir-
rored their anthropocentric concept of environmental rights by stressing the 
entitlement of  humans to certain minimum standards in their living envi-
ronments as opposed to what might be called the intrinsic rights of nature.
RCP members underscored this emphasis on the environmental rights 
of  humans by taking their foreign guests on a “pollution tour” of the coun-
try. In Tokyo, for instance, they visited the city’s polluted bay, a smelly trash 
pro cessing fa cil i ty, a public housing proj ect built on reclaimed land, and 
a sewerage treatment station.74 Th ereafter the group traveled to Osaka, Yok-
kaichi, and Minamata, where they saw— and breathed— pollution fi rst-
hand.75 All  these visits  were designed to leave the foreign participants with 
an indelible appreciation for the  human costs of industrial development, 
which Tsuru and colleagues viewed as the key issue in the environmental 
debate. Th eir intentions did not go unanswered: deeply moved by the expe-
rience, the  legal scholar Joseph Sax obtained a copy of the distressing docu-
mentary Minamata kara no Sakebi (Cries from Minamata) that he  later 
screened for specialists at the infl uential American think tank Resources for 
the  Future, in Washington, DC.76 Tsuru’s prominence in international en-
vironmental circles also increased dramatically  after the symposium, which 
he skillfully utilized to mount an attack on GNP economics and to advo-
cate a welfare- centric vision of development.
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Tsuru Shigeto: Defi ning Development beyond the GNP Index
Most notable in this connection, in the months leading up to UNCHE, 
Tsuru delivered two highly infl uential lectures that clarifi ed his critique of 
GNP and his position on the environment- development dilemma. Th e fi rst, 
In Place of GNP, he delivered in July 1971 at Maison des Sciences de 
l’Homme (MSH) in Paris, and the second, North- South Relations on the 
Environment, he delivered in April 1972 at the Columbia- United Nations 
Conference on Economic Development and Environment in New York.
At the New York conference in early 1972, Tsuru explained how, in 
the days of mass global unemployment during the  Great Depression, econ-
omists had begun to closely associate GNP growth with improvements in 
economic welfare. Th anks to the Keynesian revolution in economic theory, 
they concluded that “any mea sure that would expand eff ective demand, even 
including the nonsensical digging and refi lling of holes in the ground,” 
represented “a positive step  towards increasing welfare so long as it brought 
about a net increase in employment.”77 Although unquestionably appropri-
ate for the acute unemployment of the  Great Depression, the notion that 
GNP growth equated to increased welfare gained such a position of “dom-
inance” and “prestige” that “it acquired the status of orthodoxy” and came 
to be universally applied thereafter to all institutional confi gurations and 
economic circumstances.78 But with the onset of widespread industrial 
pollution and severe degradation of the  human living environment, cracks 
appeared in this seemingly rock- solid orthodoxy and, for Tsuru, presented 
an opportunity for economists and po liti cal leaders to reconsider the dictum 
that an increase in GNP is, ipso facto, an increase in welfare.79
As Tsuru wryly observed in his speech, although called Gross National 
Product, the index was not  really about production, since the most common 
method of its calculation— the expenditure method— totaled outfl ows for 
consumption, investment, government spending, and net exports and, in this 
sense, refl ected gross national costs.80 Tsuru gave the example of trash. In-
tuitively, disposing of more trash might be considered an increased burden 
or “cost” for society, but in expenditure GNP accounting, increased govern-
ment spending on waste disposal (for example, increasing the number of 
garbage trucks) was recorded as a positive addition to economic growth.81 
But, more to the point, diff er ent from the “heyday of competitive capitalism,” 
when the link between GNP and welfare was “ free of seriously misleading 
connotation,” in advanced economies of the con temporary era Tsuru 
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identifi ed two fundamental changes that had severed this link once and for 
all.82 First, technological advances had “heightened the possibility of neg-
ative external eff ects of gigantic proportions,” most discernibly in environ-
mental degradation and  human disease from industrial pollution and 
contamination. Second, affl  uence had also transformed popu lar preferences 
such that  people now valued “goods” not accounted for in calculations of 
GNP, such as public amenities, clean air, beautiful scenery, and a healthy 
living environment.83 Many developed socie ties may have achieved full em-
ployment, but the appearance of  these negative  factors and the changing 
preferences of consumers (i.e., now more post- materialist), paradoxically, had 
served to divorce the GNP index from actually perceived welfare. GNP was, 
according to Tsuru, no more than a “one- dimensional quantitative mea sure 
of growth” that tended to conceal “all kinds of concrete prob lems of social 
and economic reform which usually constitute the contents of development.”84
Of par tic u lar interest to Tsuru and other environmental advocates  were 
the so- called negative externalities or diseconomies born of GNP- centered 
economic growth. As we have seen, Tsuru had been interested in the negative 
eff ects of industry since the prewar years and through his postwar involve-
ment in the TVA Colloquium. An invited lecture at Harvard University in 
the early 1960s on the role of cities in technological innovation and eco-
nomic development further sparked his theoretical interest in the phenom-
enon of externalities.  Th ere he had argued, rather intuitively, that industry 
 will tend to agglomerate near large urban centers  because cities off er many 
positive externalities such as a ready workforce and vari ous forms of infra-
structure such as ports and railroads.85 Applying this same logic in a nega-
tive way, in 1961 he published an essay appropriately titled “Kōdo Seichō e no 
Hansei” (Reconsidering high- speed growth) in which he observed, “If an 
automobile travels at full speed on a muddy road it  will throw up mud. 
Th e faster it goes the worse the spattered mud  will be,” alluding, of course, 
to the pollution produced as a result of industrial activity.86 Indeed, the emer-
gence of pollution confi rmed for Tsuru a number of troubling realities 
about the  free market system. At the microeconomic level, fi rms tended not 
to internalize the costs of negative externalities (especially  those they  were 
responsible for, such as air pollution) but the very shrewdest ones moved 
quickly to internalize positive externalities.87 Extrapolating this to the mac-
roeconomic level, Tsuru observed how the advanced cap i tal ist nations  were 
thus able to grow by “squandering  human stock and disregarding  human 
decency of the working class (both at home and in colonies)” and by “taking 
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full advantage of the economic usefulness of common property resources 
without paying for them at the time of use.”88 Tsuru could only agree with 
Ui Jun, who similarly argued that pollution was not merely a by- product of 
economic growth but a fundamental—if counterintuitive— apparatus of 
growth  under capitalism. As a crude index of growth, GNP failed to account 
for negative externalities like pollution or degradation of lakes, seas, and 
forests, and, as Tsuru explained to a 1971 audience in Paris, “Just as I can 
increase my monthly expenditure by drawing upon my past savings, we can 
make our GNP larger than other wise would be the case by depleting our 
store of resources without replacing them.”89
Th erein lay the rub for Tsuru. When development was left to the vaga-
ries of the  free market, the “built-in bias for market goals” with all the as-
sociated negative externalities would inevitably come to dominate.90 Th e  free 
market, by its very nature, was not capable of refl ecting depletion, degra-
dation, or other deleterious eff ects on so- called public goods like air,  water, 
and scenery. Just as the MIT team predicted, economic activity within the 
GNP regime would continue unchanged regardless of decreasing resources, 
increasing population, or environmental degradation  because the  free mar-
ket encouraged self- interested (and often socially irresponsible) be hav ior 
at the level of the fi rm. But once  people began to question the logic and 
ethics of this dynamic— once the “failure of the market” was “admitted”— 
the fallacy of GNP would be revealed and  people would recognize “that the 
‘invisible hand’ does not work and that ‘someone’ has to take into his own 
hands the task of guiding the economy  towards certain specifi c normative 
goals. . . .  In other words, economics has to become po liti cal economy 
again with all its normative aspects concretely specifi ed and the strategies 
spelled out.”91
Tsuru was not alone in his critique of GNP economics. At the Tokyo 
Symposium Tsuru convened in 1970, for instance, fellow economist Uzawa 
Hirofumi had also referred to the prob lem, observing how, “traditionally, 
the concept of real national income [i.e., real GNP] has been used as a mea-
sure of economic welfare. But this concept is an aggregation of only  those 
goods and ser vices which have positive prices. In order to use that concept 
as a mea sure of economic welfare, we have to deduct the cost involved in 
eliminating external diseconomies, but this is easier said than done  because 
of the absence of market prices on them.”92 As Erik Dahmén put it, “Ex-
pressed in ordinary language, it is a question of considering damage to the 
environment as a cost just like any other cost of  doing business. But this 
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formulation does not solve the prob lem, even theoretically.”93 One solution, 
according to Dahmén and many other economists, was to charge a fee, tax, 
or levy for negative externalities. In this system “no strict limitations would 
be set for the costs in the form of environmental damage that would be ac-
ceptable. Instead, a bill would be presented, the amount of which would be 
reduced or increased proportional to the reduction or increase in environ-
mental damage.”94 At the level of national accounting, Uzawa Hirofumi pro-
posed some kind of adjustment— similar to depreciation methods used in 
fi rms— for “deterioration or depreciation of social and natu ral capital,” hence 
making the GNP index a more accurate indicator of “welfare- oriented real 
national income.”95 Tsuru agreed, pointing to the “polluter pays princi ple” 
(PPP) proposed by the Or ga ni za tion for Economic Co- operation and De-
velopment (OECD) in which externalities  were internalized as ex post or ex 
ante costs “within the atomistic accounting of . . .  originating industries or 
individuals.”96
But as Tsuru and other critical economists from wealthy developed 
countries soon discovered, their proposals to address pollution by imposing 
a charge on economic actors— eff ectively increasing the cost of operations 
and impeding growth— attracted vociferous and indignant opposition from 
the advocates of developing countries who, quite understandably, pointed 
to the hy poc risy of the wealthy nations. In a nutshell,  these advocates ar-
gued that it was not fair that developing countries be forced to balance 
economic growth with environmental responsibility when the First World 
countries had done just the opposite in their own paths to advanced devel-
opment. As the Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, noted in her speech 
at UNCHE, “We do not wish to impoverish the environment any further 
and yet we cannot for a moment forget the grim poverty of large numbers 
of  people. . . .  How can we speak to  those who live in villages and in slums 
about keeping the oceans, the rivers and the air clean when their own lives 
are contaminated at the source?”97 “When it comes to the depletion of natu-
ral resources and environmental pollution,” observed Gandhi, “the increase 
of one inhabitant in an affl  uent country, at his level of living, is equivalent 
to an increase of many Asians, Africans or Latin Americans at their current 
material levels of living.”98 Th e ECO newsletter, published by Friends of the 
Earth (FoE) and the Ecologist magazine, through UNCHE, acknowledged 
this criticism and suspicion about environmentalism among developing 
countries, noting that it was “seen by many as a plot by the rich to hang on 
to wealth won by despoiling the environment, while depriving the poor of 
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the fruits of development, in the name of ecological purity.”99 Th e real ity, 
as Nigerian politician Adebayo Adedeji put it, was that “we may have one 
earth but we certainly do not have one world economy. We have instead an 
eco nom ically segmented world— a world polarized more than ever before 
into the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots.’ ”100 Th e Brazilians, for example, scoff ed 
at discussion about industrial pollution, labeling it a “rich man’s” concern, 
while the Ivory Coast declared that it would welcome pollution if this meant 
higher growth.101 Th is remarkably diff er ent perspective on the environment 
among the “have nots” by no means diminished Tsuru’s commitment to 
stopping environmental degradation from industrial pollution. But its 
focus on injustice and inequity also resonated with Tsuru’s theoretical lean-
ings and his activist experience in Japan. Th e challenge, of course, was to 
formulate a solution responsive to both of  these objectives— somewhere 
between a critique of GNP and the developmental rights of the Th ird World, 
so to speak.
Fearing that the developing nations might boycott the Stockholm 
conference, UNCHE secretary general Maurice Strong hastily brought to-
gether a group of twenty- seven eminent economists, sociologists, and envi-
ronmentalists in the Swedish city of Founex in June 1971 to discuss the 
environment- development dilemma or, as it was often described, the “North- 
South” prob lem. Along with Tsuru, other participants included develop-
ment experts such as the Egyptian Marxian economist Samir Amin, the 
Polish- born French eco- socioeconomist Ignacy Sachs, the Chilean econo-
mist and socialist Felipe Herrera, the Sri Lankan economist and civil 
servant Gamani Corea, and the noted Swedish macroeconomist Jan Tinber-
gen.  After two weeks of intensive and productive discussion— what Strong 
 later described as “one of the best intellectual exchanges” he had ever been 
involved in— the group produced an infl uential publication, Th e Founex 
Report on Environment and Development, which not only helped secure the 
participation of the developing nations at UNCHE the following year, but 
also  shaped the  future direction of the global environmental debate by lay-
ing the foundations of the idea of sustainable development.102
By substantially expanding the defi nition of the environment and by 
recognizing that the relationship between the environment and development 
was essentially diff er ent for developed and developing nations, the Founex 
group was able to argue that the environment and economic development 
need not necessarily be incompatible and that, accordingly, the developing 
nations would not be penalized in any  future environmental protection 
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regime.103 Th e Founex Report argued that, while it was appropriate to 
understand development as a cause of environmental prob lems in developed 
nations, in developing countries development actually represented a cure for 
environmental prob lems. Th is was  because the environmental prob lems 
of developing nations  were of a “diff er ent kind” to the “quality of life” issues 
informing the developed countries’ environmentalism and refl ective of “pov-
erty” and the “lack of development” such as “poor  water, housing, sanitation 
and nutrition . . .  sickness and disease, and . . .  natu ral disasters.”104
Although he participated in the Founex conference and helped craft 
the report, Tsuru was not completely satisfi ed with the outcome. He felt that 
broadening the concept of the environment to include prob lems such as soil 
erosion and  human health was more about “strategic expediency,” to bring 
the developing nations on board, than about dealing with environmental 
destruction “in a straightforward way.”105 Founex solved the tension between 
the North and South, Tsuru argued, by creating two defi nitions of the en-
vironment, one for the developing nations and another for the developed, 
diff erentiated by their stages of economic development.106 As he explained 
in early 1972,
Th e choice before us, it seems to me, is  either (I) to encompass all the 
conceivable major environmental issues  under our purview, including, 
for example, such  matters as soil erosion, urban plight, public health 
prob lems,  etc., or (2) to focus more sharply on  those phenomena which 
can be clearly defi ned as environmental prob lems exemplifi ed typically 
by air and  water pollutions and noise. Th e inclination to take the fi rst of 
 these alternatives appears to be motivated by strategic judgment . . .  that 
the current environmental concern on the international scale can be taken 
advantage of to load onto that concept as many prob lem areas as pos si ble 
so that aid activities in such fi elds can be intensifi ed.  Th ose who take this 
choice apparently fear also that the second alternative, if emphasized 
too sharply,  will result in the recognition that the environmental con-
cern, at least in some areas, confl icts with development objectives.107
In keeping with his critique of GNP- centered growth, Tsuru suggested, 
conversely, that it was the concept of “development” and not the “environ-
ment” that needed to be rethought. On the one hand, he believed the 
environment and environmental prob lems should be defi ned “precisely” and 
narrowly so that “ counter- measures” at the local, national, and international 
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levels would “have a well- defi ned focus.”108 But, on the other hand, as he 
had been advocating to international audiences since well before Founex, 
he felt that development had to be reconceptualized as something far broader 
than the blunt mea sure ment of the GNP index and more attuned to  human 
welfare.109 To the extent that development was understood as the sum total 
of expenditure in the  free market, the environment and development would 
be in confl ict and  there would be external diseconomies such as pollution.110 
But what if the “failure” of market- led growth was fi  nally accepted and 
“development” fundamentally reconceptualized within the “rubric” of 
“welfare- focused development planning”?111 In this rubric  there would be 
no confl ict between the environment and development, nor would  there be 
any need for developing and developed nations to have diff er ent defi nitions 
of the environment.112 “Th e unifying philosophy  here is that development 
has an aspect which has to transcend the market mechanism in the sense 
that public goods of both types— for producers and for consumers— have 
to be provided. It is in this sense that ‘development’ can subsume ‘environ-
ment’; and to the extent that ‘environment’ is subsumed  under ‘development,’ it 
competes for limited funds available for vari ous concrete needs of ‘develop-
ment.’ ”113 Th e Brundtland Report of 1987 would  later popu lar ize this notion 
of environmentally informed development as “sustainable development,” 
but it was Tsuru and his contemporaries at events such as Founex and 
UNCHE who lay the foundations. Indeed, although Tsuru was critical of 
the Founex conference for expanding the scope of environmental prob lems, 
he was actually  doing something similar in his reconceptualization of the 
idea of development. Indeed, the report of the Founex conference repli-
cated, more or less, the same revision of development Tsuru advocated in 
New York, Paris, and elsewhere in the months before UNCHE. As the 
Founex Report stated,
Whilst the concern with  human environment in developing countries 
can only reinforce the commitment to development, it should serve, 
however, to provide new dimensions to the development concept itself. 
In the past,  there has been a tendency to equate the development goal 
with the more narrowly conceived objective of economic growth as mea-
sured by the rise in gross national product. It is usually recognized 
 today that high rates of economic growth, necessary and essential as they 
are, do not by themselves guarantee the easing of urgent social and 
 human prob lems. Indeed in many countries high growth rates have been 
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accompanied by increasing unemployment, rising disparities in incomes 
both between groups and between regions, and the deterioration of so-
cial and cultural conditions. A new emphasis is thus being placed on 
the attainment of social and cultural goals as part of the development 
pro cess. Th e recognition of environmental issues in developing countries 
is an aspect of this widening of the development concept. It is part of a 
more integrated or unifi ed approach to the development objective.114
Of course, Tsuru recognized that redefi ning development away from 
its market focus to include welfare aspects would involve costs, especially 
for developing nations. Given that developed nations produced most global 
pollution, he concluded that  there was an “overwhelming” moral duty for 
the North to pay for the “clean up” and for “any extra costs imposed on 
developing nations by the introduction of nonpollutive technology ahead 
of local saturation.” Rather than “aid,” Tsuru said such transfers from the 
wealthy to the poor must be seen as obligations for technological excesses 
and for past injustices such as the gratuitous and immoral siphoning of natu-
ral resources by imperial powers from their colonies.115 Stockholm would 
be an opportunity to “consolidat[e] international public opinion  towards 
ac cep tance of the general princi ple that developed countries should assume, 
at least for the coming de cade or so, the major cost of keeping the pollutions 
[sic] with international consequences within permissible thresholds.”116
By the eve of UNCHE, then, Tsuru Shigeto had played a major role in 
rallying a transnational alliance committed to tackling the prob lem of en-
vironmental degradation worldwide. Th e Tokyo Symposium’s advocacy 
of “environmental rights” and Tsuru’s international activities from the late 
1960s onward helped propel a worldview  shaped by a specifi c national ex-
perience of environmental injustice to the very center of global debates about 
the environment and development. In his attempt to reconceptualize devel-
opment as a pro cess inclusive of  human welfare considerations, Tsuru not 
only helped secure the participation of developing nations at Stockholm, but, 
just as signifi cantly, he also contributed to the rudimentary formulation of 
a new— yet no less controversial— idea of sustainable development. It seems 
fair to conclude that, coupled with the impact of Japa nese pollution victims 
at UNCHE, Japa nese environmental activists like Tsuru contributed in sig-
nifi cant ways to this defi ning moment of global environmentalism in the 
early 1970s. Importantly, they did so by drawing on a very local experience 
of industrial pollution and environmental injustice.
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Conclusion
In a sardonic twist on the UNCHE slogan “Only One Earth,” the day  after 
the conference the New York Times ran an article titled “One Confused 
Earth,” in which it off ered an understandably ambivalent analy sis of the 
event.117 On the one hand, a participant interviewed for the article ob-
served that what this “frustrating event for idealists” lacked was a “Th omas 
Jeff erson— someone who could lift the delegates above their parochial con-
cerns and rally them  behind a con temporary equivalent of the call for life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” On the other hand, however, although 
no such Jeff ersonian savior emerged, the article still pronounced UNCHE 
a modest success; primarily  because it happened at all, but also  because the 
rich countries “learned in a very direct way” how diff erently the developing 
nations understood the “environment” and “development.” As the article ob-
served, “One per sis tent theme heard from the underdeveloped countries 
was the obligation of the rich few to help them pay for the costs of environ-
mental protection as they develop. Th at may sound strange in Washington, 
but it is the way much of the world feels.”118 According to historian John 
McCormick, UNCHE helped fashion a “more comprehensive view of 
 human mismanagement of the biosphere,” and environmentalism arguably 
shifted from “the popu lar, intuitive, and parochial form” of that in rich coun-
tries to something more “rational and global in outlook” and, hence, more 
acceptable to nations at diff er ent stages of economic development.119
For environmental NGOs such as the group from Japan, UNCHE rep-
resented the beginning of a new phase of transnational interconnectivity 
and global infl uence that would continue to intensify thereafter. UNCHE 
showed Japa nese activists the value of transnational activism as a po liti cal 
tool— a “boomerang” of infl uence, to use Keck and Sikkink’s idea— for 
exerting pressure back on the Japa nese government. Th e eff ect of Polluted 
Japan on the Japa nese government’s involvement at UNCHE revealed this 
potential most graphically. In the transnational activism of Tsuru Shigeto 
we also glimpse how Japa nese transnational activists infl uenced the evolution 
of key concepts and debates on the environment. Tsuru’s critique of GNP 
and his attempt to reconceptualize “development” helped shape a wider de-
bate about North- South inequities and the confl ict between environmental 
protection and economic development. Tsuru’s privileged, cosmopolitan 
background also made it pos si ble for him to move seamlessly between the 
worlds of offi  cialdom, scientifi c experts, international organ izations, and 
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grassroots movements, in eff ect giving voice to the concerns of Japa nese en-
vironmentalists at multiple levels. As Ui Jun observed in the ILP monthly 
newsletter, hereafter Japa nese environmental movements needed to forge ever 
more intensive overseas connections. Th e day  will undoubtedly come, he 
said, when a “blue- eyed stranger  will approach us at a sit-in or a demonstra-
tion and ask for an explanation.”120 In order to cope with this  future, the 
movement had to spread its network beyond the archipelago— which indeed 
it would do.
But engaging in the global environmental movement did not mean 
abandoning the local. As their involvement at UNCHE reveals, Japa nese 
victims and activists drew on local experiences with industrial pollution to 
off er a distinctive interpretation of the limits to growth, which spoke force-
fully to the horrendous  human costs of economic growth. With their words 
and their injured bodies they argued that  these  human limits mattered as 
much as—if not more than— the limited capacity of the natu ral environ-
ment or the need to limit population. Tsuru Shigeto’s critique of GNP and 
his concept of welfare- focused development provided the theoretical frame-
work for this discourse on humane limitations. Like the victims’ bodies, 
his appeal to  human welfare as a guiding princi ple of environmentalism 
bore the undeniable imprint of a national trauma in which economic de-




Pollution Export and Victimhood
Th e UN conference in Stockholm was an eye- opening experience for the 
Japa nese pollution victims and their supporters, thanks in part to the re-
markable media and public attention they received, but also for what the 
group learned about Japa nese corporate pollution worldwide. Activists, 
journalists, and delegates from other countries— especially East Asia— 
confronted the Japa nese with troubling reports about the environmentally 
destructive activities of Japa nese industry: pollutive mining operations in 
the Philippines, logging in Malaysia and Indonesia, and industrial plants in 
Singapore.1 As Ui Jun frankly admitted,  until Stockholm he and  others had 
not  really thought about the Japa nese “economic invasion” of Asia, over-
whelmed as they  were with their concern about pollution at home and their 
desire to communicate this story abroad. But the conference had forced them 
to carefully reconsider Japan’s role in bolstering and perpetuating injustices 
elsewhere; the ways, for example, Japan was buttressing authoritarian regimes 
in East Asia, supporting the US war in Vietnam, and damaging living en-
vironments and  human health— all to support an affl  uent daily life back 
home.2 As sociologist Isomura Eiichi opined in an essay  after UNCHE, 
“From the perspective of Asians, Japan is a ‘factory owner’ and Asians are 
the ‘workers.’ Th is factory owner takes resources from Asia back to the Japa-
nese archipelago where they are pro cessed and then sold back to the ‘work-
ers’ at a high price. In the pro cess, the resources of  these workers’ countries 
are ravaged, the natu ral environment is destroyed, and the standard of liv-
ing does not necessarily improve.”3 Addressing this “pollution export” from 
Japan to Asia would become the primary focus of Japa nese transnational 
environmental activism throughout the 1970s. It would involve establish-
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ing new connections with East Asian activists and movements, communi-
cating the story of Japa nese industrial pollution throughout the region, and 
implementing a range of transnational initiatives to address the prob lem 
head on. It would also necessitate a fundamental rethinking of strategy and 
objectives on the part of Japa nese groups involved.
In this chapter I focus on the ways the pollution export prob lem com-
plicated ideas of environmental injustice fashioned in the domestic strug-
gle. In its international iteration before and during UNCHE, the Japa nese 
environmental injustice paradigm spoke powerfully to the  human limits to 
growth. Japa nese pollution victims served— quite unproblematically—as liv-
ing proof of  these limits. But the eff ect was somewhat diff er ent when this 
local Japa nese experience of injustice was projected on to a regional canvas. 
In the fi rst place, it forced the Japa nese activists involved to carefully recon-
sider the supposed “resolution” of Japa nese industrial pollution in the early 
1970s, exemplifi ed, for instance, by victories in the Big Four pollution 
law suits, the 1970 Pollution Diet, and visibly cleaner living environments. 
Activists began to won der about the legitimacy of local victories if they 
resulted in industry simply relocating pollution, environmental destruction, 
and  human injustice to some locality overseas. If the state and its regulatory 
framework had simply become tools to protect Japa nese localities at the 
expense of  those abroad,  were not  these localities implicated in the overseas 
pollution perpetrated by Japa nese corporations?
Such questions destabilized a power ful assumption that had galvanized 
the strug gle against environmental injustice from its origins in the domes-
tic pollution crisis of the 1960s: namely, that the activists or the  people they 
spoke for  were necessarily and unproblematically positioned on the side of 
victims. As they reached out to the suff erers and opponents of Japa nese pol-
lution export throughout East Asia,  these activists encountered, again and 
again, a troubling narrative that connected the country’s colonial and mili-
tary legacy to its con temporary pollutive activities— a continuous, unbroken 
history of injustice and discrimination  toward the region. Indeed, pollution 
export exposed the limitations of an environmental injustice paradigm per-
meated by a consciousness of victimhood anchored in a distinctive national 
experience. To be sure, empathy based on the shared experience of environ-
mental injustice continued to be a source of motivation and transnational 
solidarity for the Japa nese groups I examine in the chapter. But the fact that 
 those  others happened to be in a region formerly colonized and brutalized 
by the Japa nese military and now ravaged by Japa nese industrial activity 
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disrupted any seamless notions of an alliance of victims. Th is tension be-
tween solidarity and aggression in the regional iteration of environmental 
injustice proved to be one of its most challenging and, I would argue, 
transformative moments.
I begin the chapter with some background on the spread of Japa nese 
industry into East Asia in the 1970s, followed by analy sis of the landmark 
Conference of Asians held in Tokyo in 1974. Th is defi ning event brought 
together activists from antipollution groups, the anti– Vietnam War move-
ment (Beheiren), and from East Asia. Activists such as Oda Makoto of 
Beheiren encouraged antipollution activists to consider the limitations of en-
vironmental injustice framed through the lens of victimhood alone. Instead, 
Oda pushed his environmentalist colleagues to consider their simultaneous 
“aggression”  toward Asia. Mobilizations against specifi c instances of pollu-
tion export in the early 1970s further encouraged this reconsideration of 
victimhood. I analyze four seminal examples in the chapter: the 1973–1974 
action against the Asahi Glass Corporation in Th ailand; two actions against 
the Toyama Chemical Com pany and the Nippon Chemical Com pany in 
South  Korea, both beginning in 1974; and the protest against Kawasaki 
Steel’s sintering operations in the Philippines from late 1975. All four cases 
provide fascinating insights into the ways regional involvement encouraged 
activists to rethink domestic “victories” and notions of victimhood. In Th ai-
land and the Philippines, Japa nese groups discovered a troubling replica-
tion of Japa nese corporate pollution, while in South  Korea they had to face 
the troubling continuities between pollution export in the pres ent and Japa-
nese colonialism and aggression in the past. One concrete outcome of  these 
encounters was the establishment of the Han- Kōgai Yushutsu Tsūhō Sentā 
(Antipollution Export Information Center, AEIC) in 1976. Born as an alli-
ance of antipollution export groups, the AEIC became the orga nizational hub 
for activists committed to transforming their earlier campaign as environ-
mental “victims” into a proactive and refl exive program opposing Japa nese 
industrial “aggression” in Asia and beyond. Once again, leading activists 
like Ui Jun played a key role as rooted cosmopolitans, forging intellectual 
and orga nizational connections between movements at home and in Asia. 
Th ey  were the ones who encouraged local groups to reposition the local in 
wider and often unsettling frameworks of inequity. Moreover, by shining a 
light on pollution export, they helped to “boomerang” pressure back on to 
responsible corporations such that by the late 1980s the costs to corporate 
public image tended to outweigh the benefi ts.
Pollution Export and Victimhood     115
From Pollution Miracle to Pollution Export
As T. J. Pempel and  others have noted, Japan’s economic links with Asia be-
gan to intensify in the 1970s thanks to the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
monetary system in 1971, the dramatic increase in crude oil prices following 
the fi rst oil shock of 1973, and the subsequent regulatory easing on capital 
outfl ows.4 What had previously been a relationship based on  simple trade 
now began to encompass more foreign direct investment (FDI) by Japa nese 
industry. In the period between 1973 and 1976, Japa nese FDI into Asia es-
sentially doubled that of the previous twenty years combined.5 Signifi cantly, 
the composition of this FDI changed in the early 1970s, with greater 
emphasis on “energy- intensive, highly polluting sectors like chemicals, iron 
and steel, and nonferrous metals.”6
Antipollution activists recognized that vari ous  factors  were fueling the 
growth of Japa nese FDI in Asia. In 1974, Ui Jun stated unequivocally that 
cheap wages and resources  were the primary  factors driving Japa nese FDI 
growth in Asia and that stricter domestic antipollution regulations  were only 
a “minor”  factor in the corporate decision- making matrix.7 Broadly speak-
ing he was correct, but  there is no doubt that tougher regulation, coupled 
with a wave of domestic protest, played a role in the relocation decisions of 
corporations involved in the more pollutive industries such as petrochemi-
cals and extractive metallurgy. Th anks to research by Derek Hall, we know 
that pollution export was a deliberate state and corporate strategy in the 
1970s, and, for a time, that elites in both sectors  were “remarkably forth-
right” about this.8 In mid-1970, for example, the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) partially justifi ed a new fund for the relocation 
of petrochemical industries off shore by pointing to the restraining eff ect of 
pollution opposition on new domestic constructions.9 Just one month  later, 
the  giant Mitsubishi Corporation confi rmed this evaluation, noting site 
acquisition diffi  culties in Japan as a  factor in its decision to build an oil re-
fi nery in Southeast Asia.10 As late as 1975, an offi  cial from Kawasaki Steel 
(hereafter Kawatetsu [as known in Japan]) made the following blatant ad-
mission during civil proceedings to stop the com pany constructing a sixth 
blast furnace at its Chiba Prefecture plant:
Although a sintering plant is an indispensable part of a steel plant, it 
also produces more air polluting materials than any other part of the 
plant. Th erefore, we at Kawatetsu have deci ded to build the new sintering 
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plant which is needed for the no.6 blast furnace in a foreign country 
instead of within the Chiba plant. . . .  Th is decision . . .  will enable us 
to drastically reduce the amount of discharge of polluted materials. Th e 
new sintering plant is now  under construction in Mindanao [in] the 
Philippines, as part of Japan’s economic aid to that country.11
At the receiving end, Asian leaders and dictators welcomed Japan’s pol-
luting industries with open arms. South Korean president Park Chung- hee 
actively supported the entry of  these industries into the country through a 
combination of watered- down pollution regulations and suppression or co- 
optation of local protest.12 In 1973 Park nonchalantly stated that “for the 
purposes of the industrial development of our country, it  will be best not to 
worry too much about pollution prob lems.”13 Elite attitudes  were no more 
enlightened in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines the corrupt dictator, Pres-
ident Ferdinand Marcos, allowed Kawatetsu to have 100  percent owner ship 
of a highly polluting sintering plant (alluded to in the quote above) on Min-
danao Island. A 1974 report by the activist publication AMPO: Japan- Asia 
Quarterly Review noted how Marcos unilaterally approved the plant even 
though the Philippines Board of Investment was still considering its eco-
nomic merit and environmental impact. By the time Japa nese prime minis-
ter Tanaka Kakuei visited the country in early 1974, the establishment of 
the Kawatetsu- owned and - operated Philippine Sinter Corporation was es-
sentially a done deal.14 Like his kindred spirit President Park in South  Korea, 
Marcos told the Japa nese in 1976 that the Philippines would “be happy to 
take . . .  polluting industries off  your hands.”15
So, while domestic environmental regulation and protest and hospita-
ble foreign governments do not totally explain Japan’s economic advance 
into Asia in the 1970s,  there is no doubt they  were a consideration, espe-
cially for the dirtiest industries. More pertinently, many Japa nese activists 
became convinced that corporate pursuit of pollution havens lay at the 
core of the country’s FDI boom in the region, and this conviction formed 
the basis of their mobilizations against it.
Regional Solidarity: The Conference of Asians, 1974
In response to this wave of Asian FDI, and on the initiative of the charismatic 
antiwar campaigner and novelist Oda Makoto, in June 1974 activists from 
the Japa nese anti– Vietnam War movement Beheiren, Christian groups, 
and Ui Jun’s ILP movement or ga nized the inaugural Conference of Asians 
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to bring together progressives from the region to consider the nature and 
extent of Japan’s relationship with other Asian nations.16 Apart from opening 
their eyes to a range of inequities and injustices throughout the region, the 
conference also served as a critical opportunity for some activists associated 
with the ILP to reconsider the notion of “victimhood” deeply informing 
ideas about injustice in the Japa nese environmental movement. Oda Makoto 
and other Beheiren activists played a critical role in stimulating this recon-
sideration,  because they had spent the better part of a de cade thinking about 
Japa nese complicity in the Vietnam War and, hence, off ered environmental 
activists a sophisticated analy sis of Japan’s simultaneous “victimhood” and 
“aggression”—as a quasi- colony of the United States on the one hand, and 
as an active supporter of the US campaign in Indochina on the other. Indeed, 
the conference is worth considering in detail  because it was an impor tant 
1970s moment of transnational connection between local Japa nese groups 
and their Asian counter parts, which stimulated signifi cant ideational trans-
formations relating to understandings of the local, injustice, and victim-
hood. We can see in it the ways transnational interaction fostered new ways 
of thinking within domestic civic movements in Japan.
Th e Conference of Asians ran for seven days from June 8 to 16, 1974, and 
involved around 250 participants, forty of whom traveled from six countries 
throughout East Asia, including South  Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Th ailand, and Malaysia. Participants represented a variety of progressive 
organ izations such as  labor  unions, antipollution movements, community 
groups, Christians, and student socie ties.17 On the Japa nese side, ILP activists 
 were joined by stalwarts of the Beheiren movement like Oda Makoto, who 
helped articulate the conceptual par ameters of the event. Th e conference 
was divided into three discrete phases. On the fi rst two days, the foreign 
participants  were taken on a “pollution bus tour” in and around Tokyo, 
similar to the one Tsuru Shigeto had or ga nized for the Tokyo Symposium in 
1971. At Sanrizuka, in nearby Chiba Prefecture, they met with Tomura 
Issaku and comrades involved in a movement to stop construction of the 
New Tokyo International Airport (Narita Airport). While in Chiba the 
group observed the Kawatetsu Steel mill with its fi ve (and soon to be six) 
blast furnaces, as well as the massive Keiyō Industrial Region on the shores 
of Tokyo Bay. At the Asahi Glass factory in Chiba a participant from Th ailand 
could not hold back his tears on coming face- to- face with the com pany re-
sponsible for shocking pollution in Bangkok.18 Visits  were not limited to 
environmental hot spots  either: Paul Chamniern, an activist from the slums 
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of Bangkok, traveled with  others to meet Japa nese volunteer groups work-
ing in Tokyo’s working- class San’ya slum.19 One Malaysian delegate admit-
ted that before the conference he viewed Japan’s antipollution strug gle as 
 little more than a fash ion able activity of well- to-do  people who simply 
shouted slogans. But, coming to Japan, meeting Minamata victims, and 
hearing fi rsthand reports made him realize that it was actually the poorest 
and most underprivileged  people in Japan who  were carry ing the weight of 
the movement on their shoulders.20
 After the bus tour, participants traveled to the six- hundred- year old 
Yugyōji Buddhist  temple in Fujisawa City an hour south of Tokyo, where 
they engaged in a two- day “teach-in.” Discussions ranged from the struc-
ture of American domination in Asia to the exploitation of workers in 
Singapore to the Th ai  labor movement and the legacy of British colonialism in 
Malaysia.21 As the progressive magazine AMPO  later recounted, “ After the 
day’s discussions  were carried on informally into the night, all slept in the 
large common room. One participant commented, ‘this is like a parliament 
called by anarchists.’ Th e eve nings  were sometimes turned over to songs and 
local dances, a welcome relief from the seriousness of discussions of the Asian 
scene. In the  whole pro cess  there developed an unmistakable feeling of par-
ticipating in something unpre ce dented.”22 Oda Makoto was swept up in the 
emotion of the moment, recalling, “When we went out on the [bus tour] 
we all slept side by side at small inns. I became convinced that sleeping on 
futons laid side by side and without regard to nationality was the best and 
the most Asian way of  doing  things.”23
For the main conference, participants moved to Hachiōji City in Tokyo, 
along the way observing a US munitions supply fa cil i ty in Sagamihara 
and the Mitsubishi Caterpillar factory. Like the teach-in, the wide- ranging 
discussions at the conference all in one way or another touched on violations 
of  human rights throughout Asia. Japa nese participants, for instance, ad-
dressed the “mechanism of Japan’s economic invasion” and the responsibil-
ity of ordinary Japa nese for corporate pollution export, while Hamamoto 
Tsuginori and Ishimure Michiko, advocates for Minamata disease victims, 
repeated their cautionary tale about corporate irresponsibility within Japan.24 
Breakout sessions dealing with regional  labor conditions, po liti cal prison-
ers, and  women’s liberation reinforced the themes of injustice, inequity, and 
rights. On the fi nal day, which was open to the public, participants ratifi ed 
the Joint Declaration of the Asian  People authored by Oda Makoto, and 
they made a range of commitments and resolutions to oppose po liti cal im-
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prisonments and discrimination against  women in Asia, confront Japa nese 
corporate polluters, and meet in conference as often as necessary or pos si-
ble.25 Th e declaration reiterated participants’ main objective of collectively 
overcoming injustices and violations of  human rights throughout Asia— 
often perpetrated by the United States and Japan.
As the proceedings of the conference declared, “We want to tease out 
in concrete detail the nature of [Japan’s] economic invasion and its pollu-
tion export. We want to fundamentally rethink  things, and through soli-
darity with the  peoples of Asia, whose daily lives have been stolen, build a 
network of strug gle to steal back  these daily lives.”26 More specifi cally, dele-
gates hoped the gathering would expose the nefarious activities of Japa nese 
companies and the vari ous facilitating policies of corrupt governments in 
Asia and, through exchange of information, become the fi rst step in a mul-
tipronged attack on this structure of domination. For his part, Oda Makoto 
saw the conference as a historic display of unity among Asians and an 
opportunity for them to once again announce to the world “Asia is One.”27
Importantly, for the Japa nese participants— especially environmental 
groups like the ILP— the creation of such “oneness” would fi rst require a 
frank engagement with their complicity in Japa nese corporate be hav ior in 
Asia, as consumers and Japa nese citizens. Oda made this point loud and 
clear, explaining how in the course of the anti– Vietnam War movement he 
had realized that Japan was no longer or simply a victim nation. For Oda, 
earlier Japa nese antiwar and peace movements had been based almost entirely 
on the perspective of victims—in other words, the mentality of having suf-
fered terribly in the war and not wanting to experience such suff ering 
again. But, while ordinary Japa nese  were indeed victims of their state in 
the previous war, they  were also perpetrators, said Oda. For example, what 
the Japa nese did to the Chinese or what Japan did to  Korea was an issue for 
 every Japa nese person. “In other words, the logic that  because we are vic-
tims we cannot be perpetrators does not hold. We are perpetrators  because 
we are victims.”28 In the context of the pollution export prob lem, this meant 
that ordinary Japa nese needed to scrutinize the source of their affl  uent daily 
lives— how  these lives might be connected to Asian suff ering and the kind 
of action needed to “stop walking all over Asian  people,” as Oda put it.29
Again and again foreign delegates called on Japa nese activists to recast 
domestic strug gles in the wider Asian strug gle or risk replaying the tragic 
history of Japa nese aggression in Asia. From the perspective of economic im-
perialism, it was clear to the foreign delegates that victories in antipollution 
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strug gles within Japan actually intensifi ed the export of pollution. Just 
as Japa nese  unionists’ strug gle for higher wages encouraged Japa nese cor-
porations to look abroad in search of cheaper  labor markets, pressure from 
domestic antipollution movements forced industry to fi nd more hospitable 
locations abroad.  Th ese  were “urgent prob lems for the Japa nese movement,” 
which would be solved only through an “Asia- wide perspective.”30 A delegate 
from Th ailand articulated this desire for Japa nese accountability in the 
clearest of terms: “What we want is responsibility not charity.  Th ose of us 
who came from Asian countries [to participate] and all the  people in Asia 
right now do not want to receive charity from Japan. What we want is 
responsibility. We are aware of our own responsibility and wish to cooperate 
and to build an or ga ni za tion within which we can strug gle together. So 
please  don’t treat us like  little  children.”31
Indeed, at a deeper level, the event proved more transformative than a 
mere exposé on Japa nese economic transgressions in Asia; it was an oppor-
tunity for participants— especially Japa nese environmental groups like the 
ILP—to know and understand other Asians, not on the basis of an amor-
phous civilizational “Asianness” but within a progressive imaginary knit 
together by commitment to a new strug gle for the defense of  human rights 
and living environments; a critical and contentious regionalism constructed 
from below and based on mutual responsibility. For their part, ILP activists 
left the conference both inspired and challenged. On the one hand they  were 
able to repeat— for an all- Asian audience— the cautionary tale of Japa nese 
environmental pollution. Ui Jun hoped they would recognize and work to 
avoid Japan’s mistaken and “uncritical importation of Western culture since 
the Meiji era.” He did not want to see Asian countries “suff er in the same 
way” as Japa nese pollution victims had.32
On the other hand, however, Japa nese delegates— many of whom would 
become deeply involved in the pollution export prob lem— began to rethink 
environmental injustice from their position as citizens of an “aggressor” 
nation. Hirayama Takasada, a member of the ILP movement and staunch 
opponent of pollution export, is a case in point. For Hirayama, Japa nese 
pollution in Asia simply had to be connected to a longer history of aggres-
sion and domination in the region. As he explained,
Japa nese lead a daily life stained with the blood and sweat of Asian 
 people.  Today Asia is integrated into Japan’s industrial structure like a 
rubbish heap of contradictions. We (latent) victims of Japa nese pollu-
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tion must recognize our position as accomplices in and benefi ciaries of 
Japa nese imperialism and we must engage in the strug gle to slice into 
the inside of Japa nese imperialism— removing pollution from within 
Japan and stopping the export of pollution to . . .  Asia. Failure to do so 
 will inhibit the formation of strong ties with the  people of Asia and all 
 those countries dominated by Japa nese imperialism.33
Hirayama emphasized that the motivation for this strug gle emerged 
from the Japa nese  people’s “regret for 100 years of incessant invasion of Asia 
from the Meiji era.” Th eir challenge in the pres ent was to connect this history 
of invasion to the “voices of Minamata disease suff ers” and, ultimately, to 
the realities of Japa nese corporate misbehavior in Asia.34 While any transna-
tional movement against pollution export would certainly require “shared 
emotion” as Asians or empathy as “victims” of environmental injustice, 
Hirayama stressed the necessity of connecting that emotion and empathy to 
a recognition of the “aggression” by Japan against Asia in the past and pres-
ent.  Needless to say, this reconsideration of victimhood and recognition of 
complicity marked an impor tant intellectual development in thinking about 
environmental injustice largely absent in the 1960s. It would be reinforced 
by vari ous concrete mobilizations against pollution export, four decisive 
instances of which I turn to now.
Polluted Japan in Bangkok: Beyond the Logic of “Old Maid”
In an impor tant 1977 essay,  Inoue Sumio— a former Beheiren activist now 
leading the strug gle against pollution export— criticized what he called the 
“Old Maid logic” in Japa nese antipollution protest. He was referring  here 
to the card game Old Maid, in which the aim is to not be the one left holding 
the unpaired queen of spades (the joker card in the Japa nese version, Baba-
nuki) by skillfully shifting it to other players. In terms of pollution protest, 
the meta phor symbolized the ways local communities had expelled pollutive 
industry from their localities without the slightest concern for its next 
destination— what might now be described as NIMBY (not- in- my- back- yard) 
logic.35 As I have shown elsewhere, this Old Maid logic held sway among 
many local Japa nese antipollution movements of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
with one prominent advocate even arguing that the wider public interest was 
best served when antipollution groups adhered to a resolute “local egoism.”36
But, as  Inoue’s critique of Old Maid logic evidences, by the mid- to 
late 1970s a growing number of Japa nese environmental activists had rejected 
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local egoism, primarily on ethical grounds, in response to pollution export. 
For  Inoue and  others, the oppressive po liti cal conditions  under which many 
Asians lived often precluded Japa nese forms of grassroots re sis tance, which 
benefi ted from a demo cratic constitution and the rule of law. Th e self- 
gratifying logic of some Japa nese activists that the aggregate of their local 
egoisms would produce a greater overall good collapsed completely when 
pollution crossed national borders. To be sure, protesting communities 
in Japan could, with a degree of confi dence, count on other communities 
nationwide to do the same, eff ectively stranding polluting industries and 
serving a greater overall national good. But what about in countries where 
dictatorial regimes suppressed all expressions of local re sis tance? When 
polluting industries set up operations  there, the chain of re sis tance linking 
local egoisms broke down and the troubling question of responsibility re-
surfaced: if the next community could not continue the strug gle, then who 
would help them offl  oad the pollution card? Moreover, that such questions 
involved Japan and other Asian countries added a  whole other dimension to 
the issue of responsibility, connecting pollution export to the sins of an 
imperial past and a fragile mentality of victimhood.
A sensitivity to this Old Maid logic was evident among some Japa nese 
antipollution groups almost immediately  after UNCHE. Stimulated by their 
interactions with other Asian activists at the conference, members of the ILP 
executive committee started an English- language publication, KOGAI: Th e 
Newsletter from Polluted Japan, with a 140,000- yen donation received from 
the Karolinska Institute. Th is newsletter was distributed  free of charge 
(mainly throughout East Asia) on a seasonal basis, beginning in summer 
1973. Ui Jun’s opening statement in the fi rst edition succinctly articulated 
the new task antipollution activists had set themselves: “Our purpose is to 
place emphasis on the Asian environmental situation and through this em-
phasis and cooperation come to the aid of vari ous  peoples’ movements work-
ing on the same prob lems throughout Asia. . . .  We feel that in this way we 
can in some small re spect compensate for the  great damage that Japa nese 
imperialism has done in the past and  will continue to do in the  future.” Ui 
wanted KOGAI to be a voice for antipollution movements around Asia and 
a source of inspiration for groups as they saw their local strug gles commu-
nicated to activists across the region. KOGAI, Ui and  others hoped, would 
evolve into a vehicle for genuine transnational solidarity based on mutual 
recognition and common strug gle—an Asia in which the  people  were united 
and not just the elites.
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Th e ILP executive committee also established an Asia group dedicated 
to investigating Japa nese economic activity in the region, and the movement’s 
Japanese- language publication, Jishu Kōza, began a new column titled Ajia 
no Mado (Win dow on Asia), which ran dedicated articles on Asian issues. 
 Th ese initiatives served as impor tant vehicles for activists involved in the ILP 
movement to begin a discussion about Japa nese environmental injustices in 
a regional context. In late 1972, for example, ILP activist Matsuoka Nobuo 
reported on his travels throughout Malaysia and Th ailand where he recon-
nected with contacts forged at UNCHE. Matsuoka reported how young 
Malaysian intellectuals  were extremely skeptical, if not cynical, about so- 
called Japa nese economic and technical assistance, which was often no more 
than a euphemism for Japan procuring cheap  labor and materials. As Mat-
suoka put it, “If we fail to carefully reconsider what assistance  really is, 
Japa nese run the risk of losing the good faith of our Asian friends to a point 
where it is irrecoverable.” While in Malaysia, Matsuoka spoke about Japan’s 
environmental prob lems to his hosts, and he investigated the health risks of 
Japa nese pesticides used in Malaysian farming. He also promised to send 
copies of KOGAI to Malaysian activists.37 In Th ailand, Matsuoka visited 
Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, where he learned of student initia-
tives to clean up the city’s rivers.38 As in Malaysia, he gave an hour- long pre-
sen ta tion with slides on Japa nese pollution (Minamata, Itai Itai) to faculty 
members and students (many belonging to nature conservation clubs), and 
he distributed copies of Polluted Japan.39  After the pre sen ta tion at Chul-
alongkorn, the moderator commented that this was the fi rst time many had 
heard about Japa nese pollution, and hence it would serve as a warning and 
something none of them would forget. Matsuoka recalled how, on hearing 
this, he was “overtaken” with the sense that from now on all Japa nese activ-
ists “must be prepared to shoulder another heavy responsibility.” 40 “Can we 
silently watch as Japa nese pollution crosses the sea and spreads throughout 
Asia?” he asked. “Th e time has come for us to act on the realization that we 
have another heavy responsibility. Each and  every one of us should think 
about what we can do.” 41
Matsuoka’s interaction with Th ai environmental groups was propitious, 
 because only months  later, suspicions about Japa nese pollution export to 
Th ailand became realities.  Under the ominous headline “No Repeat of the 
Minamata Tragedy,” on August 5, 1973, the Th ai daily, Siam Rath, began a 
series of articles on contamination of Bangkok’s Chao Phrya River by the 
Th ai Asahi Caustic Soda Com pany (TACS), a Th ai- Japan joint venture 
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established in 1966, with the Asahi Glass Com pany of Japan (part of the 
Mitsubishi Group) providing 49  percent of the capital and all of the techni-
cal expertise.42 According to the Siam Rith, testing conducted by Th ai au-
thorities in September 1973 revealed that river  water contaminated by 
caustic soda dumped from the TACS factory had completely destroyed 
farming crops. More worryingly, for a six- month period beginning in May 
1973, effl  uent dumped from the factory containing chlorine, hydrochloric 
acid, and traces of mercury resulted in a massive die- off  of fi sh and shrimp, 
which local residents had unwittingly consumed.43 As early as May 1973, 
 people along the river had contracted vari ous skin affl  ictions and bouts of 
diarrhea of unknown cause. Fearful of the river  water, many resorted to 
digging makeshift wells.44 For its part, TACS denied dumping any con-
taminated waste and refused all responsibility for the fi sh kill and  human 
health eff ects, saying that its effl  uent was “smelly” but not toxic.45 Th e com-
pany’s Japa nese general man ag er admitted to the use of inorganic mercury 
in production pro cesses but said the utmost eff orts  were made to remove any 
traces from effl  uent and, in any case, this was inorganic mercury and not 
organic mercury, the culprit in Minamata.46 Asahi Glass’s environmental 
track rec ord in Japan, however, suggested other wise. In summer 1973, as 
the com pany faced a brewing controversy in Bangkok, irate fi shermen from 
Chiba blockaded Asahi Glass and other factories responsible for polluting the 
 waters of Tokyo Bay. Tests conducted in  waters near the Asahi Glass plant 
revealed high levels of both inorganic and organic mercury.47
In Th ailand, environmental activists mobilized almost immediately to 
address the Chao Phraya contamination. From August 26 to 31, 1973, nature 
conservation clubs at Th ammasat, Kasetsart, Chulalongkorn, and Mahidol 
Universities or ga nized an urgent nature conservation exhibition on the 
campus of Th ammasat University, which devoted considerable attention to 
the Japa nese pollution experience and its implications for Th ailand.48 Th anks 
to their earlier interactions with Japa nese activists at UNCHE and,  later, 
with Matsuoka Nobuo, the students  were armed with a battery of power ful 
resources such as Polluted Japan and other disturbing slideshows and docu-
mentaries on the Japa nese tragedy.49 Concerned offi  cials from both the Th ai 
Ministry of Industry and of Public Sanitation attended the screening of 
Tsuchimoto Noriaki’s Minamata: Th e Victims and Th eir World, which no 
doubt played into their decision to begin investigations into TACS the fol-
lowing month.50
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Building on Matsuoka Nobuo’s interactions with Th ai students be-
fore the crisis, Hirayama Takasada— also of the ILP Asia group— visited the 
Kasetsart University nature conservation club on August 6, 1973, to give 
another slide pre sen ta tion on Japa nese pollution.51 His timing could not 
have been better. Activists at the university greeted Hirayama with the Siam 
Rath newspaper article of the previous day on the TACS pollution contro-
versy.52 His reaction was one of shock and indignation.
What this!? Th e evil hand of mercury contamination has reached Th ai-
land! My naïve assumption that full- scale pollution export was yet to 
occur had been betrayed with consummate easy by  these cold, hard facts. 
Utterly surprised, for a time I was speechless. I was thrown into utter 
despair by a piercing real ity: “pollution export had begun! Th ai Asahi 
Caustic Soda was just the tip of the iceberg.” Yet I was quickly fi lled with 
rage. I could not allow this. I simply could not allow it. Once again I 
engraved in my mind the purpose of this visit: to communicate the sit-
uation of Japa nese pollution and to fi nd a way to mobilize an antipollu-
tion movement based on cooperation between Japa nese and Southeast 
Asian  people.53
Back in Japan, activists moved quickly against Asahi Glass. Determined 
not to “silently watch the foreign economic invasion and pollution export 
of corporations and the Japa nese government,” on September 14, 1973, 
around 150 protesters from groups including the ILP, Beheiren, and the Mit-
subishi Heavy Industries Antiwar Shareholders Committee demonstrated 
outside the Tokyo headquarters of Asahi Glass with placards—in Japa nese 
and Th ai— reading “Asahi Glass, Stop Exporting Pollution!” and “the Japa-
nese  people  will not allow contamination of the Chao Phraya River by Asahi 
Glass.”54 Th is demonstration was widely reported in major Th ai media out-
lets such as Siam Rath, which ran interviews with protesters and printed large 
photos of the event. Th ereafter, the Japa nese groups received a deluge of 
letters from Bangkok citizens expressing gratitude and asking for more 
information on pollution.55
One month  later, on October 14, 1973,  Inoue Sumio and fellow activ-
ists established the Nichi- Tai Seinen Yūkō Undō (Japan- Th ai Youth Friend-
ship Movement), which served as the central node in the transnational 
mobilization against Asahi Glass.56 Th ereafter, grassroots exchange between 
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activists in both countries intensifi ed, at fi rst primarily through the mailing 
of materials such as the KOGAI magazine and,  later, via mutual visits and 
coordinated protest events. Most impressive of  these transnational phenom-
ena was the simultaneous protest of September 1974 held in Tokyo and 
Bangkok. Th is action was the brainchild of Hirayama Takasada and Sutatip 
Inthon, a young sociologist and member of the nature conservation club 
at Th ammasat University. During his August 1974 visit to the university, 
Hirayama told Inthon about their demonstration against Asahi Glass head-
quarters planned for September of that year, and, in response, she determined 
to hold a major environmental exhibition at the same time, to be called “Th e 
Pollution Export of Polluted Japan.”57 Th e combined actions, the two activ-
ists hoped, would become a power ful “two- front attack” (hasamiuchi) on the 
com pany and pollution export more generally.
On September 14, 1974, a modest group of around eighty protesters 
marched on the headquarters of Asahi Glass in central Tokyo, again with 
Th ai- and Japanese- language banners reading “Asahi Glass, Get Out of 
Th ailand!” More than the protest of a year earlier, the Japa nese  were acutely 
aware of the historical signifi cance of the event as a moment of border- 
crossing solidarity. In spite of their geo graph i cal separation, in this mo-
ment, at least, they shared a common space with Th ai compatriots fi ghting 
for the same cause. Tele grams from Th ailand heightened this sense of joint 
strug gle. A tele gram from the organizers of the Th ai event told the Japa nese 
that “we strug gle together with you in order to survive.”58 Th e Federation 
of In de pen dent Students of Th ailand (FIST), an or ga ni za tion at the fore-
front of the country’s historic October Revolution of 1973, concluded that 
“ people around the world are slowly realizing that the greatest obstacle to 
the real development of mankind is imperialism” and hence “our historic 
mission is to cooperate in the destruction of the destructive system called 
imperialism.”59  Inoue, Hirayama, and the other organizers  were somewhat 
disappointed at the turnout in Tokyo, coming just months  after the buoy-
ant emotion of the Conference of Asians.60 But, in the broader context of 
Japa nese environmental activism, the movement was of historic import. Th is 
was one of the fi rst times Japa nese and other Asians had protested together— 
albeit in diff er ent countries— against an instance of Japa nese corporate 
pollution outside Japan.
Developments at the Th ailand node of the demonstration  were of a 
diff er ent scale altogether. Students and faculty involved in nature conserva-
tion clubs at Th ammasat, Chulalongkorn, and Ramkhamhaeng Universities 
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held their exhibition on “Pollution Export from Polluted Japan” at the 
Th ammasat University auditorium for three days, September 14–16, 1974. 
Th e aims of the event  were threefold: fi rst, to raise consciousness of the 
dangers of environmental pollution by reference to the Japa nese experience; 
second, to pressure the Th ai government to think about eff ective methods 
for regulating waste material from factories; and, third, to caution compa-
nies planning to construct new facilities.61 Okuda Takaharu of the ILP Asia 
group, who was in Th ailand for the exhibition, observed how it represented 
the fi rst serious attempt to think about pollution prob lems in Th ai history.62 
Visitors to the exhibition  were greeted by a large banner at the entrance 
reading “POLLUTED JAPAN,”  under which was placed a coffi  n and a 
photo graph of a child victim of fetal Minamata disease.63 Th e lobby of the 
auditorium displayed photo graphs— supplied by the ILP—of Yokkaichi 
City, Minamata Bay, PCB contamination victims, nuclear power plants, and 
Okinawa US military bases, all with accompanying explanations in Th ai. A 
series of panels dealt with the Japa nese economic penetration into Asia and 
the collusion between Japa nese and Th ai po liti cal leaders.  Th ere was also a 
satirical cartoon titled “Th e Japa nese Monster  Dying from Pollution” and a 
panel asking visitors to sign a petition opposing Japanese- led construction 
of a petrochemical plant in Si Racha on the Gulf of Th ailand.64 Copies of 
the declaration made at the Tokyo protest against Asahi Glass  were also 
distributed to visitors.65
Okuda described how Japan was severely criticized throughout the ex-
hibition, encapsulated by the comment of one individual who bluntly con-
cluded, “Japa nese imperialism is nastier than American imperialism.”66 But 
 there  were also positive moments for Japan during the event, such as the 
outburst of applause when the organizers announced that activists in the 
Japan- Th ai Youth Friendship Movement  were holding a simultaneous dem-
onstration in Tokyo.67 Okuda observed that “through this simultaneous 
demonstration the citizens of Th ailand and Japan are fi  nally being connected 
by a still- delicate thread. In order to strengthen this connection it is noth-
ing more than a  matter of conscientiously monitoring pollution export. Such 
a movement is already underway in Th ailand.”68 Speaking to Okuda  after 
the event, Sutatip Inthon could only agree that the exhibition was a  great 
success but, in a tone of realism, added that “this movement is still a very 
small minority.”69
Small, no doubt, but the simultaneous transnational protest of September 
1974 had lasting eff ects. In the three days of the event, an unpre ce dented 
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fi fteen thousand Th ai citizens came face- to- face— through pre sen ta tions, 
debates, slides, fi lms, and photo graphs— with the realities of Japa nese pollu-
tion and its export to their country.70 Th ereafter the Mitsui and Mitsubishi 
Corporations announced that plans to construct the petrochemical plant at 
the Si Racha district  were to be shelved for at least three years. In their press 
release, the two companies admitted that one reason was Th ai students 
and intellectuals increased attention to the pollution risks of petrochemical 
complexes.71 Activists on both sides also walked away transformed. Sutatip 
Inthon observed that the exhibition was about much more than the TACS 
prob lem  because it introduced the Th ai  people to broader questions of 
economic development, industrial pollution, and  human health. “Momen-
tous” also for Inthon was the transnational coordination with the Tokyo 
protesters.72
Okuda Takaharu was correspondingly impressed by the energy and op-
timism of the Th ai students in the wake of the revolution of October 1973. 
He was pleased and proud to see members of the nature conservation club 
at Th ammasat University diligently translating Polluted Japan into Th ai.73 
As he explained, the eff orts of  these students to tell the Th ai  people about 
an “insignifi cant” antipollution movement started in Japan by “ordinary citi-
zens” four years ago was of “ great encouragement” for  those Japa nese “seek-
ing genuine connections with the  people of Asia and an end to pollution 
export.”74 Okuda believed that the way forward for the diversifi ed antipol-
lution movement in Japan was, on the one hand, to communicate the valu-
able experience of the domestic movement— unique in world history—to 
the  peoples of Asia and, on the other hand, to obtain as much information 
as pos si ble from the  people of Asia. “Only then  will ‘solidarity’ cease to be 
an obsolete concept.” “ Th ere are many  things we need to communicate. And 
 there are so many  things we need to learn. It is clear that the pro cess of build-
ing connections between Th ai and Japa nese citizens has just begun. But to 
the extent that we pursue the common objective of ‘eliminating pollution 
and that which produces it,’  there is a potential for us to build connections 
with the  people of Asia. . . .  Th e task from  here on is to further strengthen 
diverse and substantive connections. Th is is necessary for our mutual 
survival.”75
Pollution Export to South  Korea:  Don’t Let the Pollution Escape
As Hirayama,  Inoue, and other activists scrambled to gather information 
and or ga nize a response to the TACS incident in Th ailand, their unnerving 
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sense of Japa nese pollution export already “well underway” was confi rmed 
in early 1974 when another instance in nearby South  Korea came to light.76 
Even more than pollution export to Th ailand, its occurrence in South  Korea 
disrupted the close association Japa nese groups had drawn between envi-
ronmental injustice and their own victimhood. As they keenly recognized, 
lurking beneath the South Korean pollution export prob lem was a troubling 
legacy of colonization and brutal aggression on the Korean peninsula. In a 
sense, pollution export to South  Korea coalesced with  these unresolved 
historical issues to produce a doubled or compounded sense of aggression in 
the consciousness of activists. Most immediately this recognition inspired 
action in the form of resisting any further violation of Korean  human rights 
by Japa nese industry and its South Korean patrons. But it also provoked a 
reconsideration of the ethical foundations of environmental injustice. As the 
following two movements against the Toyama Chemical and Nippon Chem-
ical companies reveal, Japa nese activists’ engagement in pollution export to 
former colonies like South  Korea not only expanded the geo graph i cal scope 
of their strug gle against environmental injustice, it also fashioned a new 
refl exivity, in which victims recognized their simultaneous position as 
aggressors— just as Oda had done in the context of the Vietnam War and 
repeated at the Conference of Asians. To be sure,  these transnational move-
ments  were small scale and involved but a handful of activists. But together 
with con temporary antiwar, minority, and  women’s liberation groups in-
volved in Asia, they  were pushing Japa nese civic activism in new directions 
and into relatively uncharted geo graph i cal and ideational terrain.
Japa nese activists fi rst became aware of pollution export to South  Korea 
via a February 15, 1974, article in the newspaper Tōyō Keizai Nippō, pub-
lished by the resident Korean community in Japan. According to the article, 
headlined “ ‘Pollutive Plant’ Export, South  Korea?!,” the Japa nese com pany 
Toyama Chemical Industries planned to sell its Toyama mercurochrome 
plant to a Korean entrepreneur  after having being forced to cease its Japa-
nese operations in 1973  because of mercury contamination. Th e new owner, 
Mr. Koe, a Japa nese resident Korean and president of the Sanwa Chemical 
Corporation, intended to dismantle, transport, and then reconstruct the 
plant in Incheon City, eventually exporting the mercurochrome back to 
Japan for use by Toyama Chemical. Mercurochrome, of course, is a power-
ful topical antiseptic containing up to 25  percent mercury content. Despite 
reassurances from the com pany,  there had long been concerns that effl  uent 
from the production pro cess might contain traces of mercury, which it 
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indeed did.77 Th e move to South  Korea appeared to be a con ve nient way to 
continue production of mercurochrome while avoiding annoying regulations 
and noisy protest in Japan.
Incheon residents— mostly members of the Young  Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA)— learned of the planned fa cil i ty from the Tōyō Keizai 
Nippō article, which served as an impor tant vehicle for information ex-
change between Korean activists in Japan and their South Korean counter-
parts. Th e Incheon YWCA quickly convened an emergency meeting at 
which members passed a resolution of opposition, devised a plan of action, 
and issued a warning to Sanwa and Toyama Chemical. Th e  women also 
petitioned the Incheon municipal mayor to stop construction of the mercu-
rochrome plant and to immediately revoke Sanwa Chemical’s com pany 
registration.78 Given the repressive po liti cal atmosphere  under the Park 
Chung- hee dictatorship, their decision to directly lobby offi  cialdom was a 
bold one indeed.
Unaware of the Incheon YWCA movement, in Japan the ILP Asia 
group, led by Hirayama Takasada and his colleague  Inoue Sumio (both stu-
dents at Tokyo University), swung into action. In Tokyo they conducted 
searches on Toyama Chemical at the Japan Patent Information Or ga ni za-
tion, the Patent Agency, the National Diet Library, and the Government 
Printing Center. Th eir investigations into mercurochrome production re-
vealed that inorganic mercury was indeed a by- product of the manufactur-
ing pro cess. Hirayama and  Inoue also traveled to Toyama Prefecture, where 
they met with two grassroots groups: the Kōgai o Kokuhatsu suru Shimin 
Rengō (Citizens’ Alliance to Expose Pollution) and the Toyama Kyūenkai 
(Toyama Relief Association), both of which had been established to support 
industrial pollution victims in that area.79 Representatives of  these groups 
explained the background of Toyama Chemical’s decision to close its mer-
curochrome fa cil i ty in Toyama. In September 1973 the com pany had been 
forced to halt production  after authorities mea sured elevated levels of mer-
cury in Toyama Bay—in some places equivalent to levels in Minamata Bay. 
Th e com pany voluntarily installed an extra mercury extraction device, but 
in December 1973 the Toyama prefectural government advised that mer-
cury exceeding safe limits had again been detected in industrial sludge near 
the factory’s drainpipes. MITI offi  cials also announced that some sites in the 
bay  were still dangerously polluted with mercury.80 It was at this point 
that Toyama Chemical’s executives hatched their scheme to sell the plant to 
Mr. Koe and import mercurochrome from Incheon.81
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On returning to Tokyo, Hirayama and  Inoue wrote up the results of 
their investigations in a report, Toyama Kagaku no Suigin Tarenagashi Sangyō 
to Kankoku e no Kōgai Yushutsu ni tsuite (Toyama chemical’s mercury- 
dumping operations and pollution export to South  Korea) and on April 5, 
1974, they established the Toyama Kagaku no Kōgai Yushutsu o Yame-
saseru Jikkō Iinkai (Executive Committee to Stop Toyama Chemical’s 
Pollution Export, hereafter Stop Toyama).82 Although it would undergo 
numerous name changes, this movement and its monthly publication, 
Kōgai o Nogasuna! ( Don’t let pollution escape!), continued essentially unin-
terrupted for the following twenty years, in many ways becoming the 
backbone of transnational environmental activism in the country during 
this period. Th e publication’s title is symbolic of the transformation  under 
way in some Japa nese activists’ understanding of environmental injustice. 
Whereas earlier the objective had been to simply eradicate industrial pollu-
tion from local living spaces in Japan, now the task also entailed appre-
hending pollution before it “escaped” overseas— that is, dealing with envi-
ronmental injustice at the source rather than shifting it elsewhere, Old 
Maid style.
Around two hundred participants took part in the movement’s fi rst 
demonstration outside Toyama Chemical’s headquarters in Tokyo’s Ni-
honbashi area on April 27, 1974. Protesters carried banners in Korean and 
Japa nese reading “Mercury Polluter Toyama Chemical, Stop Exporting 
Pollution!” Accompanying the Stop Toyama group  were Kawamoto Teruo, 
an advocate for Minamata disease suff erers; Park Cheonsoku and Park 
Soncheon of the Zai- Nihon Daikanmin Kokumindan (the Korean Resi-
dents Union in Japan, or Mindan); and Shimizu Tomohisa, leader of the 
colorfully named Haena Kigyō o Kokuhatsu suru Kai (Association to Expose 
Hyena Corporations), which was a veteran of the anti– Vietnam War strug-
gle.83 Th e demonstration had special signifi cance for the resident Korean 
participants. As their appeal noted, the rally was “a moment of historic 
import as . . .  Koreans seeking the democ ratization of South  Korea and op-
posing Japa nese economic invasion and the imposition of pollution united—
on a common battlefi eld— with Japa nese  people opposed to pollution 
export.” It represented a “ great opportunity for joint strug gle in the  future.”84 
To coincide with the Tokyo protest, activists in Toyama Prefecture conducted 
simultaneous demonstrations outside of Toyama and Takaoka train stations 
and the Toyama Chemical Factory, where they handed out leafl ets to pass-
ers-by and com pany workers.85 Th e following extract, drawn from one of 
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 these leafl ets, is typical of the sense of complicity and responsibility devel-
oping within some environmental groups in Japan at this time: “We cannot 
ignore this mechanism in which our ‘affl  uence’ is built on the sacrifi ce of 
the South Korean  people. . . .  Come on, let’s stop from within Japan the eco-
nomic invasion and export of pollution into Asia by Japan, exemplifi ed by 
Toyama Chemical’s corporate activity.”86
It was at this April demonstration that the Japa nese activists fi rst learned 
of the Incheon YWCA movement. A member of the Japan YWCA partici-
pating in the protest read out an article translated from a South Korean 
Christian newspaper detailing the activities of the Incheon YWCA move-
ment, which was met with warm applause.87 As the KOGAI newsletter  later 
recounted, “Prob ably the  sisters in  Korea had more diffi  culties and  were 
placed  under worse conditions than us to express their protest against the 
‘import of pollution’ from Japan. But they  were brave, and we must learn 
from their anti- pollution movement. On our part though, we have changed 
gradually through our movement. We have  really come to think seriously 
that we must change the pres ent  Korea- Japan relationship from its founda-
tion. Th e pres ent relationship is only serving the interests of the LDP . . . 
and Park regimes.”88  Inoue Sumio observed how, diff er ent from the joint 
strug gle with students in Th ailand, the Park dictatorship made it “next to 
impossible” for South Korean activists to come out in open protest or to 
form direct transnational linkages. But, although they  were not in direct 
contact, for all intents and purposes, the Toyama Chemical movement 
was indeed a “joint strug gle” with the  women of the Incheon YWCA. As he 
concluded, “even if we cannot form strong direct links with the  people of 
South  Korea, . . .  if we can accomplish a ‘de facto joint strug gle’ then that 
is just fi ne.”89
On April 30, 1974, just three days  after the demonstrations in Tokyo 
and Toyama, NHK tele vi sion news announced that the Toyama Chemical 
board of directors had unanimously deci ded to abandon its plan to sell the 
mercurochrome fa cil i ty. When Hirayama and  Inoue subsequently visited the 
com pany headquarters, offi  cials reiterated their decision of the previous year 
to stop production of mercurochrome altogether, although they carefully 
explained the decision on the basis of “lower profi ts,” and not  because of the 
protests in Japan and South  Korea, or the damning report of the Toyama 
Prefectural Pollution Department, which concluded that the com pany had 
dumped close to 2,200 pounds (approximately one ton) of mercury into 
Toyama Bay.90 Given such recalcitrance— even in defeat— activists deci ded 
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to keep their movement afl oat as a watchdog on Toyama Chemical and, in-
deed, on any other com pany that dared to export pollution. A letter by the 
group to Toyama Chemical explained that, although the com pany had 
“wisely” deci ded against the plan, opponents “did not consider the  matter 
to have been solved.”91
Th e reason you wanted to take [the plant] all the way to South  Korea 
was  because you feared the antipollution movement in Japan. If  there 
was no pollution you would have had absolutely no reason to be afraid. 
In other words,  weren’t you afraid  because you had been dumping 
pollution? [ . . .  ] So, even if your com pany says it  will ‘cease all production, 
development, and export of mercurochrome’ we cannot believe you. To-
gether with other antipollution movements, resident South Koreans, and 
the  people of South  Korea, we  will continue to closely monitor the 
activities of your com pany and Sanwa Chemical.92
Ulsan, South  Korea: Local Responsibility and Historical Debts
Members of the Stop Toyama movement did not have to wait long for a new 
challenge. Th e second South Korean incident surfaced in June 1974, as the 
Toyama Chemical protest was drawing to a close and activists  were prepar-
ing for the Conference of Asians. Similar to the Toyama mobilization, local 
antipollution groups in Tokyo also joined this second mobilization out of a 
sense of responsibility to communities at the receiving end of Japa nese pol-
lution export. Th ey drew explicit connections between South  Korea and their 
own peripheralized status within Japan. Moreover, they began to express a 
sense of historical responsibility as citizens of a country that had formerly 
colonized and brutalized the Korean  people.  Needless to say, rooted cosmo-
politan activists like Hirayama and  Inoue played no small role in the devel-
opment of this multidimensional and refl exive consciousness among local 
groups. As the “connective tissue” between local protests, they helped such 
groups reposition their strug gles on a broader regional canvas and within a 
longer historical trajectory.
On June 3, 1974, the newspaper Nikkei Sangyō Shinbun reported that 
the Nippon Chemical Com pany intended to establish a joint venture with 
a South Korean com pany in the Ulsan Industrial Region to manufacture 
sodium bichromate and mirabilite anhydride. Th e article noted that the 
joint- venture com pany, Ulsan Inorganic Chemicals, already had approval 
from the Park government and in quite candid language described the 
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undertaking as “a new direction in the development of production bases 
through the international dispersion of pollutive industries.”93 At the 
time, Nippon Chemical manufactured sodium bichromate in factories 
at Komatsugawa, in Tokyo’s downtown Edogawa ward, and in Tokuyama 
City, located in Yamaguchi Prefecture on the Southern tip of Honshū Island. 
Like Toyama Chemical, Nippon Chemical was a com pany with a check-
ered past both as a polluter and an accessory in Japa nese war time imperial-
ism. Th e hexavalent chromium Nippon Chemical used in the production 
of sodium bichromate is a highly toxic substance that was (and is) listed in the 
Dokubutsu oyobi Gekibutsu Torishimari Hō (Poisonous and deleterious 
substances control act) of Japan. Poisoning symptoms include stomach pain, 
bloody diarrhea, and, in more serious instances, convulsions and coma. 
Inhalation of particles containing the substance can result in asthma, phar-
yngitis, conjunctivitis, and, in the long- term, lung cancer.94 During the 
manufacturing pro cess, toxic hexavalent chromium slag is produced in 
large quantities and must be properly disposed of to avoid environmental 
contamination. Nevertheless, in 1970 Nippon Chemical shamelessly sold 
slag containing hexavalent chromium to Ichikawa City in nearby Chiba 
Prefecture that was used as landfi ll on rice paddy fi elds being converted 
into residential neighborhoods. Th e com pany also sold slag- contaminated 
land— including the site of its Komatsugawa plant in Edogawa Ward—to the 
Tokyo municipal government for some US$40 million, the profi ts of which 
 were used to fi nance construction of the new factory in South  Korea.95 Soon 
 after the Chiba landfi ll proj ect commenced, local residents noticed a strange 
yellow substance leaching from the ground, and ensuing tests by a Tokyo 
University professor revealed dangerously elevated levels of hexavalent chro-
mium, some of which was washing into Tokyo Bay.96
 Under pressure from the media and local residents, in February 1972 
Nippon Chemical shifted all manufacturing of sodium bichromate to its 
Tokuyama factory, but in August of that year a ship carry ing slag from the 
factory sank in  waters off  the coast of Shimonoseki in Yamaguchi Prefec-
ture, exposing Nippon Chemical’s surreptitious dumping of toxic waste at 
sea. Investigations revealed that the com pany had ocean- dumped some 
eleven thousand pounds (approximately fi ve tons) of waste material despite 
a promise—in the form of a pollution prevention agreement with Tokuyama 
City— that it would convert all waste material into insoluble trivalent chro-
mium (and despite two levels of bureaucratic oversight).97 Consequently, in 
September 1972 the Tokuyama Municipal Assembly ordered a temporary 
Pollution Export and Victimhood     135
suspension of production at the Komatsugawa factory.98 In late June 1974, 
a citizens’ group conducted further tests on pools of  water to the south of 
the Komatsugawa factory in Tokyo that revealed levels of chromium 1,300 
times above the regulatory limits. In 1975,  water testing conducted near the 
factory again revealed chromium hot spots with contamination up to 2,200 
times above regulatory limits.99 Hirayama and  Inoue’s own testing around 
the Tokyo factory in 1974 also confi rmed ongoing chromium contamination 
prob lems. As  Inoue explained, this sorry history of lies and cover- ups made 
the logic  behind Nippon Chemical’s decision to go to South  Korea crystal 
clear: “If Tokyo  isn’t pos si ble,  there is always the countryside,” and “if 
Japan  isn’t pos si ble,  there is always South  Korea.”100
But the Nippon Chemical incident was about more than pollution and 
its export—it was also about a history “stained with the blood and sweat of 
Asian  people,” as Hirayama graphically put it. Th e com pany began opera-
tions in 1893 as Tanahashi Phar ma ceu ti cals, and in 1915 started to manu-
facture sodium bichromate, a key ingredient in explosives.101 During World 
War II the com pany used large numbers of forced Korean laborers to mine 
chromium for use in the production of munitions to fuel Japan’s military 
adventures in  Korea and China.102 Nippon Chemical’s remorseless commit-
ment to profi t over ethics continued into the postwar era. Th roughout the 
Vietnam War the com pany brazenly imported chromite from the Soviet 
Union, which was in turn used to manufacture explosives subsequently used 
by the United States in the Vietnam confl ict—in a sense allowing Nippon 
Chemical to profi teer on Cold War rivalries.103 Anti– Vietnam War activists 
often referred to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as a “merchant of death” and 
a “hyena corporation” for its production of armaments, but  these labels seem 
equally applicable to Nippon Chemical. Kōgai o Nogasuna! was even less for-
giving, describing the com pany’s move to South  Korea as part of a longer 
“Asian invasion” built on Nippon Chemical’s remorseless “sucking of the 
South Korean  people’s blood.”104
Members of the Stop Toyama group held their fi rst demonstration 
against Nippon Chemical at Kamedo Station in downtown Tokyo in late 
August 1974, and they continued to do so almost monthly  until the South 
Korean plant commenced operations in 1976 and intermittently thereafter. 
Th e group also held public slide shows on hexavalent chromium contamina-
tion and pollution export, and members distributed leafl ets in neighborhoods 
around the Komatsugawa factory explaining the link between local pollu-
tion and Japa nese industrial expansion into South  Korea. Th roughout the 
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mobilization, Kōgai o Nogasuna! continued to report in  great detail on de-
velopments in South  Korea, and editions carried clippings from South Ko-
rean newspapers accompanied by Japa nese translations, commentaries, and 
clever po liti cal cartoons. In August 1975, at the height of a hot and humid 
summer, the group engaged in a month of daily demonstrations to display 
its resolute opposition to pollution export.105 During  these demonstrations 
protesters often formed a  human chain around the Komatsugawa factory 
to symbolize the movement’s objective of surrounding and obstructing 
Nippon Chemical’s operations in Japan and abroad. For Hirayama and his 
colleagues, the movement was always about far more than pollution export; 
it was about preventing the resurgence of an expansionist Japan only very re-
cently tamed by war defeat. As activists gathered to protest Nippon Chemi-
cal in 1975— the thirtieth anniversary of the war defeat— some even had 
the sense that their country was “leaning in the direction of militarism,” 
moving  toward an “Asian invasion” externally and “suppression of the 
[Japa nese]  people” internally.106 An overreaction perhaps, but activists’ link-
ing together of Japan and  Korea, and the militarist past and the pollutive 
pres ent, clearly transcended earlier imaginations of environmental injustice 
based on local victimhood alone.
Th e involvement of local Tokyo groups such as the Bokutō kara Kōgai 
o nakusu Kumin no Kai (Residents’ Association to Remove Pollution from 
Bokutō) evidenced Hirayama and  others’ success in nurturing a more nu-
anced understanding of environmental injustice among some local grassroots 
groups in Japan.107 Established to deal specifi cally with pollution from Nip-
pon Chemical’s operations in their downtown Tokyo neighborhoods, the 
Bokutō Association attracted a  great deal of media attention in mid-1975 
 after obtaining documents from the Tōkyōto Kōgai Kyoku (Tokyo Municipal 
Pollution Bureau) that identifi ed the com pany’s illegal hexavalent chromate 
slag dumping site.108 Matsuoka Yūji, one of the group’s leaders, explained 
how he became involved when his two young  children suddenly developed 
asthma  after relocating to Kōtō Ward near the Nippon Chemical factory. It 
was not  until attending a slideshow or ga nized by local activists, however, 
that he fi rst heard about the factory and began to suspect a connection to 
his  children’s ailments. At the gathering Matsuoka met with disgruntled 
com pany employees, who explained how they had developed holes in the 
cartilage of their nasal cavities  after working in the factory and inhaling its 
noxious fumes.109
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But it was not only self- interest, local egoism, or even paternal instinct 
that fueled Matsuoka and  others’ activism; they  were also clearly motivated 
by a sense of injustice. Along with the pollution itself, the group pointed to 
the “structure of discrimination” in which  those in uptown Tokyo discarded 
all of their unwanted  things on downtown Tokyo, like trash pro cessing fa-
cilities and chemical factories. It was this sense of injustice that made the 
Bokutō Association’s members all the more receptive to Hirayama and  others’ 
calls to oppose Nippon Chemical’s move into South  Korea.  After all,  wasn’t 
Japan treating Asia in much the same way as uptown Tokyoites  were treat-
ing  people downtown? And, if this was the case,  didn’t members of the 
Bokutō Association have an ethical responsibility to stop Nippon Chemical 
from infl icting pain on the South Korean  people— a pain they knew only 
too well?110 At a June 1975 demonstration against Nippon Chemical, mem-
bers of the association articulated this position unequivocally, declaring 
that “ there could be nothing more disrespectful to South  Korea and its 
 people than to impose this [pollution] on them simply  because it is not 
pos si ble in Japan. Nippon Chemical must not be allowed to replicate the 
A Nippon Chemical employee with a 
nasal cavity hole from hexavalent 
chromium poisoning, 1975
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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same  ‘imperialist mentality’ from the war when it forcibly brought Koreans 
to Japan and imposed abusive  labor on them. We  will fi ght  until pollution 
export is stopped and  until the realization of normal ties of friendship and 
goodwill between South  Korea and Japan which endure for 100  years, 
200 years, or forever.”111
Th e Bokutō Association’s pledge reverberated across the Sea of Japan. 
During August 1975 the South Korean newspaper Dong- A Ilbo ran a series 
of articles on the opposition to pollution export in Japan.112 An August 18, 
1975, editorial in the paper noted how many Japa nese “social organ izations” 
and “conscientious citizens” had come out to protest against companies like 
Toyama and Nippon Chemical  because they felt it would be a “national 
shame to export to neighboring countries pollutive industries which ran the 
risk of mercury poisoning.” “Th eir claim is that ‘we  will absolutely not al-
low [Nippon Chemical] to export pollution to South  Korea without having 
solved the chromium contamination at their own factory.’ ” Th e editorial 
carefully reminded readers that this opposition to pollution export began 
fi rst among citizens in Japan, “a fact which should leave us [South Koreans] 
with ‘red  faces.’ ”113 For Matsuoka and the Bokutō Association, however, if 
pollution kept escaping to Asia, the only red  faces would be theirs, and, worse 
still, red too would be their hands, stained with the blood of other Asians. 
As the KOGAI newsletter of spring 1975 announced to its predominantly 
Asian readership,
We Japa nese have been too indiff erent to the existing exploitation sys-
tem within which we and the Asian  people around us are entrapped. 
Surely we are now living in an expanding “empire.” We have not been 
aware of the economic relations between Asia and Japan, in which the 
pres ent “prosperity” of Japan stands on the sacrifi ce of Asian  people. Th e 
more Japa nese (or more exactly, the more a small number of Japa nese) 
become wealthy, the poorer the other Asian  people become. And what 
is more impor tant, we  haven’t realized that Asians are developing their 
own movements and their own socio- economic development and in de-
pen dence. Now we must have the perspective not of what we can do for 
them, but what we must not do to them.114
Nowhere is this emergent sense of responsibility  toward fellow Asians 
more evident than Chiba residents’ mobilization against the industrial  giant 
Kawatetsu. Th eir movement reveals how by the late 1970s many domestic 
Pollution Export and Victimhood     139
environmental protesters  were both aware of and prepared to act against in-
stances of pollution far beyond their own backyards.
Mindanao: Translocal Empathy
Like the movements against TACS, Toyama Chemical, and Nippon Chemi-
cal, the mobilization opposing Kawatetsu’s pollution export to the Philippines 
off ers an invaluable insight into the pro cess by which some local protest 
movements in 1970s Japan escalated into transnational actions on the basis 
of activists’ expanding sense of injustice and responsibility. Th e Kawatetsu 
issue traced its origins to 1951, when the com pany constructed Japan’s larg-
est integrated steelworks in Chiba City with the strong backing of the gov-
ernment and industrial fi nanciers. Th e fi rst blast furnace became opera-
tional in 1953, and by 1965 the fa cil i ty had fi ve furnaces, making it the larg-
est in Japan and the sixth largest worldwide.115 In its early days, Kawatetsu 
was seen as a beacon of modernity and postwar reconstruction. A local school 
even composed a song celebrating the steelworks’ billowing smokestacks, 
proclaiming “smoke rises up to dye the vast heavens, silver in daytime and 
gold at night, the sound of steel- making is the note of civilization.”116 Th e 
“smoke,” of course, had horrifi c eff ects on  human health,  because it con-
tained a poisonous cocktail of iron oxide, cadmium, nitrogen and sulfur 
dioxides, sulfurous acid gas, and arsenous acid.117 Tests by the Chiba City 
authorities in 1970 recorded concentrations of sulfur dioxide in fi ve sites 
around the city far exceeding national regulatory standards, while data on 
sulfurous acid gas density for the period between 1963 and 1973 revealed 
increasing concentration levels closer to the Kawatetsu fa cil i ty. A 1972 report 
by the EAJ on sulfur dioxide gas pollution listed four sites in the vicinity 
of Kawatetsu among the worst ten nationwide.118 As the KOGAI newsletter 
explained to its readers, residents near the fa cil i ty “cannot hang out their 
washing to dry and are not able to open win dows in spite of the heat of 
summer days  because of the sooty and smoky air created by the steelworks. 
Th ey suff er not only from such diffi  culties as  these in their daily lives but 
also from diseases such as acute infl ammation of the eyes, bronchitis, 
Kawasaki asthma, pulmonary emphysema, and lung cancer  because of the air 
pollution caused by KSC [Kawatetsu].”119 In 1972 Yoshida Akira of the 
Chiba University Medical School issued a damning report on the health con-
dition of  people living around the fa cil i ty, revealing instances of respiratory 
disease exceeding  those in Kawasaki and Fuji Cities, both notorious as “pol-
lution department stores.”120 In response, Chiba City hastily established a 
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pollution- disease certifi cation scheme that by 1974 had recognized fi ve hun-
dred victims, nineteen of whom  were already deceased. By 1977 the number 
of offi  cially recognized pollution suff ers had risen to 699 persons.121
Chiba residents fi rst mobilized in 1972, forming the Chiba Kōgai Juku 
(Chiba Pollution Acad emy), which, as the name suggests, was initially not 
for protest but to gather objective data on the pollution prob lem in the city. 
To this end, local  house wives kept “pollution diaries” while  others built 
 simple devices to mea sure sulfurous acid gas densities and levels of metal 
corrosion. Other members observed plant and animal life to gauge air pol-
lution levels. All of this data was then collated and made public in a series 
of reports.122 According to the progressive AMPO magazine, in 1974 around 
a hundred  people regularly attended monthly meetings and participated in 
grassroots monitoring initiatives associated with the acad emy.123 But the 
activities of the group began to change when Kawatetsu announced plans 
to construct a new— and sixth— blast furnace in May 1973.124 At this 
point the acad emy shifted from citizen science to vigorous opposition to 
Kawatetsu. In May 1975, two hundred Chiba residents instituted court 
proceedings against the com pany. Th e plaintiff s sought an injunction on 
construction of the sixth blast furnace, compliance of existing facilities 
with national environmental pollution standards, and compensation to 
forty- seven pollution victims or their bereaved families.125 Members of 
the Chiba Pollution Acad emy became involved in this initiative via the 
Chiba Kawatetsu Kōgai Soshō o Shien suru Kai (Chiba Kawatetsu Pollu-
tion Lawsuit Support Group), established to assist the plaintiff s and their 
families.126
Up to that point, the  battle with Kawatetsu had been a local one, largely 
between the com pany and residents living within a three- mile (fi ve- kilo meter) 
radius of the fa cil i ty. But all of this changed at the fi rst public hearing at the 
Chiba district court in September 1975, when a Kawatetsu offi  cial stated 
during testimony that the sintering factory—an extremely pollutive stage 
in steel production— would be relocated to Mindanao Island in the Philip-
pines and, hence, Chiba residents need not worry about pollution. Activists 
in the Chiba Pollution Acad emy now faced a conundrum similar to that of 
activists opposing the Toyama and Nippon Chemical companies. Th ey had 
to choose between local egoism and transnational responsibility. Was it 
ethically acceptable to simply stop construction of the sintering plant in 
their own backyard, Old Maid style, or was something more fundamental 
at stake?127 By early 1976 they had made up their minds: Kawatetsu’s pollu-
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tion export plan was—in and of itself— ethically wrong, and they had a 
responsibility to oppose it  whether at home or abroad.
Rooted cosmopolitan activists knowledgeable about the plight of the 
Filipinos played a vital role in convincing local Chiba activists to reach this 
decision and, moreover, to stay committed to a strug gle across the sea. Th ey 
relayed a story not only of pollution but also of po liti cal corruption and com-
munal displacement that bore striking similarities to Kawatetsu’s disregard 
for  human health and the environment in Chiba.  Needless to say, the Chiba 
activists needed no lessons in the detriments of sintering, which is a prepa-
ratory treatment of iron ore in which pulverized ore is burnt with limestone 
and other minerals at extremely high temperatures to produce iron sinter 
suitable for blast furnace use. Th e burning pro cess results in vari ous waste 
products that cause air pollution and related detrimental environmental 
and  human eff ects. Sulfur and nitrogen dioxide, for instance, cause  human 
asthma and, in combination with atmospheric moisture, become acids that 
return to the ground as corrosive acid rain. Along with the gases, sintering 
also produces large quantities of dust, dioxins, and heavy metals such as zinc, 
cadmium, and lead, which, if not properly disposed of, can contaminate the 
ground and  water.128
From spring 1974, Kawatetsu began construction of the sintering fa-
cil i ty at Cagayan de Oro in the north of Mindanao Island. Th anks to the 
strong hand of the Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos, it did so with 
absolute impunity.129 Marcos created a  free trade zone for Kawatetsu that 
allowed it to fully own and control the newly established Philippine Sinter-
ing Corporation. He also gave the com pany tax- free and duty- free status on 
the importation of capital equipment, raw materials, and supplies, and ex-
empted it from any export tax. As the KOGAI newsletter noted, “For good 
mea sure,  there is cheap land and a cheap  labor force and freedom to dis-
charge pollution. . . .  In a  matter of speaking, the [ free trade zone] is a na-
tionalized territory of the foreign cap i tal ists.”130 Kawatetsu brought plenty 
of corporate allies on board, contracting “ every aspect of construction” to 
Japa nese enterprises including Kobe Steel, Nippon Con vey or, and Hitachi 
Shipbuilding & Engineering.131 Marcos also paved the way for Kawatetsu 
po liti cally by ratifying the Japan- Philippine Treaty of Amity, Commerce, 
and Navigation, which had lain idle for close to thirteen years  because of 
strong domestic opposition in the Philippines. In talks with Japa nese prime 
minister Tanaka Kakuei, Marcos also stated that “in order to promote the 
country’s industrialization and to develop the economy,” the Philippines was 
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willing to “accept the polluting plants which could not be permitted to ex-
pand any more in Japan.”132
Th e residents of Cagayan de Oro did not fare so well. Reports from 
the area that fi ltered back to Japan explained how some 1,500  house holds 
 were given the “choice” of relocating to a government- provided alternative 
or other wise fending for themselves in the shadow of the sintering plant.133 
Th e government alternative was a newly constructed village on 215 acres 
(eighty- seven hectares) of denuded land in the mountains twenty miles 
(thirty- two kilo meters) from Cagayan de Oro. Authorities called the new 
community “Andam Mouswag,” meaning “ready for pro gress” or “ready for 
take- off ” and the “neat and modern housing development” was widely 
promoted as a “microscopic” version of the “New Society” Marcos and his 
“new breed of technocrats” envisioned for the Philippine nation.134 But in 
reports for AMPO and the Japanese- language monthly Gendai no Me, in late 
1975, the Filipino activist Wilfredo Salvatierra described a very diff er ent 
situation, characterizing the “Alice in Wonderland” proj ect as an attempt to 
“rewire” the community.135 Salvatierra observed that the  whole scheme 
looked “very much like a copy of Mao’s ideas in China, except for one impor-
tant detail: the  people themselves have no say in what is done. Th ey are simi-
lar to laboratory specimens, and Andam Mouswag is the laboratory. Th ey 
 were ordered out of their original barrio [neighborhood] of Nabacaan so 
that the Kawasaki Steel Corporation could build an iron sintering plant 
 there. Th ey  were off ered the choice of  going to Andam Mouswag or fending 
for themselves.”136 Salvatierra described how coconut farmers  were being 
retrained as carpenters, masons, and heavy equipment operators to work on 
the Kawatetsu construction site. Already by late 1974, some 70  percent of 
the men  were employed  there.137 Nevertheless, the displaced  people  were 
discontented with the shift from an earlier seaside subsistence lifestyle to a 
modern housing development where they  were now compelled to engage in 
wage  labor in order to pay the rent and feed their  children.  People still liv-
ing in the vicinity of the sintering factory  were also upset about the coming 
pollution. As one resident bluntly said to Salvatierra, “Do the Japa nese  people 
think we are  idiots? Do they think we  will open our arms and welcome 
‘fi lth?’ ”138 Such opposition notwithstanding, construction of the sintering 
fa cil i ty fi nished on time in January 1977 and, three months  later, President 
Marcos and his wife Imelda attended the offi  cial opening ceremony.139 As 
nearby residents had feared, pollution ravaged the surrounding environ-
ment. Fishing stocks  were hit particularly hard. What had previously been 
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a 130- pound (59 kilogram) daily catch shrank to a measly 6.5 pounds (three 
kilograms).140 Even President Marcos’s executive director for the relocation 
proj ect, Alejandro Melchor, was equivocal about the wider benefi ts for 
the Philippines, saying “I  don’t know, but it’s certainly benefi ting certain 
 people in the Philippines.”141
Alerted to  these developments in Mindanao, in November 1975 activ-
ists in the Chiba Pollution Acad emy complemented their domestic strug gle 
with a new initiative called “ Don’t Make Mindanao Island a Second Chiba!,” 
which the journalist Sakakibara Shirō described as an attempt to “transcend 
local egoism” by supporting the movement to oppose Kawatetsu’s export 
of polluting pro cesses to Mindanao.142 Activities included leafl eting and 
media campaigns, lobbying Kawatetsu directly, public rallies and marches, 
numerous exchanges with Filipino activists, and fact- fi nding missions to 
Cagayan de Oro and Andam Mouswag. In September 1976, a handful of 
activists in the Pollution Acad emy led a street march from the Chiba pre-
fectural government offi  ce to the front entrance of Kawatetsu’s iron mill in 
Chiba.143 Participants included Yamada Keizō, a Sophia University academic 
and pastor who had visited Mindanao on a fact- fi nding mission in August, 
along with schoolteachers, offi  ce workers, students, and  house wives. In re-
sponse Kawatetsu closed the iron gates at the entrance to the fa cil i ty and 
stopped workers from entering or leaving. Observers at the time suggested 
that such mea sures “proved how threatened” Kawatetsu was “by the possibil-
ity of the  people of Chiba and Mindanao joining together to raise their voice 
against pollution.”144 During the rally Yamada Keizō relayed the unfortu-
nate experiences of  people living near the Kawatetsu plant in Mindanao, 
and he appealed for a transnational grassroots solidarity movement to oppose 
Kawatetsu’s pollution export.
Filipino visitors also confi rmed the story of far- off  Japa nese corporate 
environmental injustices during their visits to Japan. In November 1976 a 
Catholic nun and two priests from the Good Shepherd movement in Min-
danao visited the Chiba factory to see the sintering pro cess with their own 
eyes.145 Surveying the once- venerated “silver smoke” rising from Kawatetsu’s 
smokestacks, the nun wondered out loud: “Is this pollution?”146 In their 
meetings with the Chiba residents, the Filipino visitors  were  eager to learn 
about the health eff ects from the steelworks and also the kinds of po liti cal 
pressures faced by activists. With Yamada acting as interpreter, an el derly 
Chiba man suff ering from pollution disease warned the Filipino visitors to 
be suspicious of leaves unseasonably changing color and falling off  trees. 
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Holding back his tears, the usually reticent old man fi nished by saying 
“Th ank you so much for coming  here on such a cold day. I want to express 
my re spect and gratitude to you all.”147 One of the Filipino priests used the 
opportunity to both thank and entreat his Japa nese hosts: “First of all, I 
would like to express my deepest thanks on behalf of the Philippine  people 
to the Japa nese  people for acting in solidarity with the residents of Cagayan 
de Oro in this Kawasaki Steel prob lem. . . .  Together with you we intend to 
strug gle to minimize the exploitation of Japa nese capital.” Th e priest noted 
that all media— radio, TV, newspapers— were  under the strict censorship 
of Marcos and how “the arrival of Japa nese and American capital” was 
making the dictatorial regime “happy.”148  Under such conditions of po liti cal 
suppression the Filipino  people  were not able to easily resist the Kawatetsu 
proj ect or any  others, but the priest explained that the Marcos regime was 
very sensitive to criticism from without, especially from civic movements in 
Eu rope, North Amer i ca, and Japan. “So, it  will be of  great support to us if 
the  people of Japan communicate the situation of many  people in the Phil-
ippines and the crimes of Japa nese corporations through demonstrations and 
rallies and via the mass media. . . .  We want all citizens movements [in 
Japan] to recognize that, regardless of the pollution, they should not be re-
lieved when the contamination stops in Japan  because  there is a mechanism 
by which such harm is exported intact to other countries. . . .  We pray for 
the growth of your movement and for solidarity with the  people of the 
Philippines.”149
Japa nese activists helped fortify this transnational solidarity through 
numerous visits to the Philippines. In the period from February 1975 to Au-
gust 1976, Yamada Keizō traveled to Mindanao four times, where he con-
sulted with  people at the Cagayan de Oro construction site and with the 
residents of Andam Mouswag.150 Japa nese Catholic priests used their insti-
tutional ties to communicate environmental knowledge from Japan, for ex-
ample, by screening slideshows for locals on the  human health eff ects of 
industrial pollution in Japan. For their part, the Filipinos  were grateful, but 
some wondered— quite realistically— just how much the Japa nese could 
achieve. During a 1976 visit to Cagayan de Oro, a local schoolteacher de-
scribed the real ity to Tsukamoto Hiroki of the ILP as follows: “We  don’t 
want Kawatetsu to come but  there is nothing we can do. At the very least 
we want them to properly install pollution prevention equipment. . . .  We 
are extremely grateful that Japa nese  people have heard our voices. But 
 will you be able to do anything in Japan to stop Kawatetsu setting up  here?” 
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Tsukamoto was left nonplussed, admitting  later that, “honestly speaking,” 
he “ didn’t have the words to respond to this question.”151
Like Th ailand and South  Korea, the situation in the Philippines forced 
Japa nese activists to reconsider the troubling entanglement of the local, the 
regional, and the historical. As the July 1976 edition of Jishu Kōza asked its 
readers, “How are we to answer such voices? What should we do? Th e voices 
of  these Filipinos seeking in de pen dence accuse not only Kawatetsu but also 
we Japa nese. By pushing forward with pollution export and economic ag-
gression, this country and we too are once again becoming enemies of the 
 people of Asia.”152 Jishu Kōza reminded its readers that the prosperity of 
Kawatetsu and Japan  were “built on the destruction of Japa nese  people’s 
daily lives and through the sacrifi ce of Asian  people’s blood.”153 Japa nese in-
dustry was “actively exporting pollution to South  Korea, Th ailand, the 
Philippines, and even far- off  Africa and South Amer i ca, and planning its 
‘economic invasion’ of  these countries.” Ethical Japa nese  people could sim-
ply “not ignore” this “real ity” nor the “demand of  people from the Th ird 
World” to “live as  human beings.”154
From South  Korea to the Third World
Building on the momentum of  these movements, in April 1976 the vari ous 
Japa nese movements protesting pollution export to South  Korea, Th ailand, 
the Philippines, and elsewhere gathered in Tokyo for the Ajia e no Kōgai 
Yushutsu o Kokuhatsu suru Shimin Daishūkai (Citizens Rally to Protest Pol-
lution Export to Asia). Th e event attracted around 550  people from forty- 
six associations nationwide and was extensively covered in the national daily 
newspapers.155 Discussions about the relocation of polluting industries dom-
inated, but activists also considered the broader issue of Japan’s so- called 
economic invasion abroad.156 Activists in the South Korean mobilizations 
and the Chiba Pollution Acad emy or ga nized the event with the assistance 
of prominent groups involved in other specifi c cases of Japa nese pollution 
export worldwide. By 1976, it should be noted, movements  were pursuing 
Japa nese corporate transgressions in all corners of the globe. For example, 
activists in the Afurika Kōdō Iinkai (African Action Committee)  were 
actively opposing Japa nese corporate involvement in Namibia, a country 
administered by the racist apartheid regime in South Africa in direct con-
travention of a resolution putting the country  under UN trusteeship. De-
spite this blatant breach of international law, the Japa nese Kansai Electric 
Power Com pany (KEPKO) continued to import uranium from Namibia. 
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On top of this, the Mitsubishi Corporation was also developing plans to sell 
nuclear power plants and related technology to South Africa.157 On the 
other side of the world, activists in the Raten Amerika Kōdō Iinkai (Latin 
American Action Committee)  were opposing Japa nese involvement in the 
Amazon Development Program in Brazil, which was desolating indigenous 
Indio communities through deforestation to make way for a highway.158 All 
in all, the 1976 event was a testament to the expanded vision that had devel-
oped within the Japa nese environmental movement since activists’ fi rst en-
counter with the pollution export prob lem at UNCHE in 1972. According 
to AMPO, “Report  after report [at the rally] presented a ghastly picture of 
how the Japa nese mini- Empire operates. Th e audience shared the under-
standing that Japa nese capitalism came to fl ourish with the fertilizer of 
Korean and Viet nam ese blood and is maintained by the blood and sweat 
of Th ird World  people  today.”159
Discussion and debate at the rally reiterated many of the themes ex-
plored throughout this chapter, especially the ways pollution export made 
ordinary Japa nese and even activists complicit aggressors— albeit passive—
in the environmental transgressions of Japa nese industry abroad. Advocates 
for Minamata disease suff erers at the rally expressed a renewed appreciation 
for the transnational reach of Japa nese industrial pollution. Th ey noted how 
the strug gle against pollution export had prompted them consider anew the 
blood- soaked history of their “foe,” the Chisso Corporation, which led the 
advance of Japa nese capital onto the Korean peninsula and made profi ts 
through the sacrifi ce of the Korean  people in the prewar and war time years. 
“Th is characteristic of Chisso continued thereafter in the form of Minamata 
disease and the suppression of its suff erers.”160 Of par tic u lar note is the way 
activists at the rally  were now conceptualizing the movement and their own 
role in it as part of a broader strug gle against environmental injustice world-
wide. Consider the following extract from the Kyōdō Sengen (Joint declara-
tion) at the 1976 rally:
We have rediscovered the shocking fact that our daily lives are built on 
the sacrifi ce of  people of the Th ird World. Th e aggression did not end 
on August, 15, 1945, but revived through Japa nese economic complic-
ity in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Th e Japa nese ruling class called 
this affl  uence. But now we want to walk a new path which rejects affl  u-
ence built on the sacrifi ce of our friends in the Th ird World. Th is diffi  -
cult path involves a commitment to fundamentally reconstructing the 
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mechanism in which the Japa nese economy cannot operate without eco-
nomic aggression  toward the vari ous countries and ethnic groups of the 
Th ird World. . . .  We can no longer be concerned only with the wellbe-
ing of the Japa nese  people. We must start a new movement based on a 
new set of values in which anything that disadvantages the  people of 
the Th ird World is something that we too must repudiate. In order to 
destroy all mechanisms which are obstructing the realization of both 
their and our common wellbeing, we want to join hands with them and 
strug gle together with them.161
To this end, participants agreed to establish the Han- Kōgai Yushutsu 
Tsūhō Sentā (Anti- Pollution Export Center) as an or ga ni za tion to expose 
Japa nese pollution export from the “inside.”162 Th ey called on the support of 
courageous corporate whistle- blowers and  people of the Th ird World, and 
committed the newly created center to conducting investigations that would 
“strike a concrete blow on the Japa nese government and business world.”163 
As the declaration concluded, “By clarifying the totality of our connections 
with the  peoples of Asia and the Th ird World we at once become aware of 
our situation and our position and, moreover, just how impor tant such 
awareness is right now.”164 In keeping with this new sentiment, activists 
updated the subtitle of the movement’s monthly,  Don’t Let the Pollution 
Escape: Exposing Pollution Export to South  Korea, by replacing “South  Korea” 
(Kankoku) with “the Th ird World” (Daisan Sekai).165 Th is change in title 
not only spoke to an expanded geo graph i cal perspective but also, just as 
signifi cantly, it signaled the evolution of a richer appreciation of the mecha-
nisms of environmental injustice that overlaid victimhood with aggression— 
the fundamental contradiction haunting Old Maid or NIMBY logic. As I 
explain in the concluding chapter, I believe this melding of aggression with 
victimhood in Japa nese groups’ strug gles against pollution export marked 
an impor tant transition in postwar civic thought in Japan. It broke with 
power ful mentalities of victimhood in earlier antipollution and pacifi st 
thought and fashioned a new, more multidimensional, and refl exive basis for 
activist consciousness. In the following chapter, we see this consciousness 
further refi ned in the early-1980s strug gle against environmental injustice in 
the Pacifi c involving a stubbornly long- lived pollutant: radioactive waste.
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Pacifi c Solidarity and Atomic Aggression
If we remain  silent now,  little by  little we  will become “atomic 
aggressors.”
Japa nese antinuclear activist (1981)1
Just what kind of place is one that  can’t be accessed for twenty- four 
thousand years? What kind of life is  there?
Belauan antinuclear activist, 
Roman Bedor, Tokyo (1981)2
“A  house with no toilet” is one of the less fl attering ways critics have described 
commercial nuclear power in Japan since its beginnings in the 1960s.3 In-
deed, not only in Japan but worldwide, the disposal of radioactive waste from 
nuclear power plants has been the Achilles heel of this industry, and as much 
as proponents speak of a nuclear fuel “cycle,” the real ity is a nuclear dead 
end of radioactive waste material that continues to accumulate and, in some 
cases,  will remain toxic to  human beings essentially forever. As early as 1951, 
the eminent chemist and Harvard University president James B. Conant 
even predicted that humanity would eventually turn away from nuclear 
power not  because of the inherent dangers of nuclear fi ssion but  because of 
the conundrum of radioactive waste disposal.4 Some countries did subse-
quently abandon nuclear power but over half a  century  later  there are still 
hundreds of commercial nuclear power reactors operating worldwide and the 
issue of safe management and disposal of radioactive waste remains unre-
solved. According to a Japa nese Cabinet Offi  ce report of March 8, 2011, in 
2009 Japan had in its possession some 1,692 canisters of high- level radioactive 
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waste and a startling 1,616,910 steel drums (fi fty- three- gallon/200- liter ca-
pacity) of low- level waste, which is provisionally stored at nuclear power 
plants and vari ous other facilities throughout the archipelago.5 Low- level 
waste, it should be noted, does not mean radioactive material harmless to 
 humans. On the contrary, some of this material is so radioactive it must be 
shielded with lead. All of it must be stored for varying periods ranging from 
tens to hundreds of years  until it is no longer toxic to  humans and other life 
on earth. Since the 1990s, the Japa nese government has planned to perma-
nently bury most of this material, but critics question the wisdom of this 
method in a country where the ground is predisposed to seismic disruptions. 
Furthermore, few communities are willing to accept a radioactive graveyard 
in their backyard regardless of how deeply and securely the waste is buried. 
Th e  bitter real ity—as the “no toilet” meta phor implies—is that  there is no 
easy method to fl ush this material away, at least not within the terrestrial 
borders of the archipelago.
Th at Japan has a ballooning radioactive waste dilemma  today  because of 
its enthusiastic embrace of nuclear power over the past half  century or so is a 
self- evident fact.6 As long as the country’s nuclear reactors are producing elec-
tricity, the mountain of radioactive waste in need of storage continues to grow, 
in the case of low- level waste on average at a rate of about 110,000 canisters per 
year.7 A lesser- known aspect of this situation, however, is that the amount of 
low- level radioactive waste material in need of storage would be considerably 
less  today had it not been for a highly successful transnational mobilization in 
the early 1980s involving Japa nese antipollution export groups, local com-
munities opposing nuclear power plant construction, anti– atomic weapons 
organ izations, and protesters from island nations throughout the Pacifi c 
Ocean. Just as the United States, the United Kingdom, and nuclearized states 
throughout Eu rope had done from the earliest days of the post– World War II 
era, during the early 1960s Japa nese nuclear offi  cials began to devise plans to 
dump up to 60  percent of the low- level radioactive waste from nuclear facili-
ties (mainly  future power plants) into the Pacifi c Ocean.8 Th ey realized that 
 doing so would help mitigate if not solve many of the prob lems they faced at 
the so- called back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as terrestrial storage costs 
and disputes over location. Moreover, they assumed no one would care about 
waste dumped into the Mariana Trench, one of the deepest areas of the Pacifi c 
Ocean some 560 miles (900 kilo meters) from Tokyo.
Actually,  there  were many  people living on surrounding Pacifi c 
Ocean islands who cared im mensely, and it is their opposition movement 
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in  solidarity with Japa nese groups that I investigate in this chapter. Diff er-
ent from the industrial pollution export of the 1970s, which was often cam-
oufl aged beneath the image of corporate Japan bestowing the light of in-
dustrial pro gress on developing Asian nations,  there was  really no credible 
justifi cation for dumping radioactive waste beyond the country’s borders 
other than the  simple fact that no Japa nese wanted the material in their 
backyard—in other words, another undeniable case of NIMBY logic. No-
where was this more con spic u ous than in government offi  cials’ inability to 
answer a question posed again and again by Pacifi c activists: If the material 
was as safe as they claimed, then why not dump it in Japa nese coastal  waters 
or, as one protester acerbically put it, “in the moat at the Tokyo Palace”?9
In this chapter I look closely at the rise of this protest movement among 
Pacifi c island nation activists and its uptake and resonance among Japa nese 
antipollution and antinuclear communities in the early 1980s. Th e move-
ment is in ter est ing for two reasons. First, it evidences the continuing and, 
indeed, expanding transnational involvement of Japa nese environmental 
groups led by rooted cosmopolitan activists in the early 1980s— now in con-
cert with antinuclear groups and involving nuclear issues in the Pacifi c. 
Activists and po liti cal leaders from Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and elsewhere 
found Japa nese allies with extensive transnational experience and a shared 
worldview, such as the ILP network, the Antipollution Export Information 
Center (AEIC), and the Pacifi c Asia Resource Center (PARC), publisher 
of the infl uential AMPO: Japan- Asia Quarterly Review. Activists in  these 
Japa nese organ izations subsequently connected the Pacifi c protesters to anti- 
A- bomb movements in Japan such as Gensuikin (Japan Congress Against 
A- and H- Bombs), the Genshiryoku Shiryō Jōhōshitsu (Citizens Nuclear 
Information Center, CNIC), and even local strug gles against nuclear power 
like the one at Kubokawa in Kōchi Prefecture. To invoke Keck and Sikkink’s 
terminology again, this transnational alliance managed to “boomerang” 
suffi  cient pressure back on to Japa nese nuclear offi  cials such that they  were 
forced to halt and eventually abandon their ocean dumping plan.
Second, ideationally, the protest speaks to the ongoing potency of en-
vironmental injustice as a motivational  factor within Japa nese environmen-
tal activism in the early 1980s— but with in ter est ing twists. Activists in the 
ILP, AEIC, and PARC supported the Pacifi c activists’ movement  because it 
resonated with their own strug gle against environmental injustice, initially 
in the domestic crisis of the 1960s and  later in the anti– pollution export 
movements of the 1970s. In this sense, the movement against radioactive 
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waste disposal represented an extension and elaboration of their vision of 
environmental injustice. Social movement scholars have referred to this 
phenomenon as “narrative fi delity”—in other words, the ways in which an 
issue “strikes a responsive chord” and “rings true with extant beliefs, myths, 
folktales, and the like.”10 “Th e more central or salient the espoused beliefs, 
ideas, and values of a movement to the targets of mobilization”—in this case 
to the Japa nese groups— “the greater the probability of their mobilization.”11
But two aspects of this transnational mobilization distinguish it some-
what from the iterations of environmental injustice I have explored in earlier 
chapters. Th e fi rst is the commanding presence of Pacifi c activists in relaying 
their experience of injustice— environmental and historical—in Japan. 
Diff er ent from public protests and publications of the early 1970s, in which 
Japa nese activists largely spoke for their overseas allies, in this mobilization 
Pacifi c voices permeated the discourse in speeches, newspaper reports, es-
says, and protests. Th e infl uence of  these (potential) Pacifi c victims cannot 
be underestimated in the context of a postwar Japa nese movement culture 
animated by the condition of victimhood.
Th e other distinguishing  factor of this mobilization was the way it 
blended— sometimes uncomfortably— notions of environmental injustice, 
nuclear power, and atomic victimization. Pacifi c protesters came to Japan 
primarily to advance their own agenda, but in the pro cess of building a trans-
national movement, they encouraged the Japa nese groups involved (includ-
ing anti- A- bomb groups like Gensuikin) to rethink the nuclear issue—in 
much the same way pollution export to Th ailand, South  Korea, and else-
where in the 1970s stimulated Hirayama Takasada,  Inoue Sumio, and other 
activists to question notions of victimhood in earlier antipollution protests. 
Th e radioactive waste dumping controversy complicated the victim con-
sciousness animating antinuclear protest in postwar Japan. Opponents of 
nuclear weapons in par tic u lar had based their ideology on the victimhood 
of residents in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at war’s end and,  later, of Japa nese 
fi shermen exposed to radioactive fallout  after the US hydrogen bomb test 
at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954. In the anti– nuclear power plant move-
ment gathering steam from the late 1970s, local communities forced or 
other wise cajoled to accept nuclear power plants in their backyards  were also 
portrayed as victims of the nuclear power industry in Japan.
Pacifi c activists complicated both of  these narratives.  People in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki  were certainly victims of the two American bombs, but 
residents of Micronesia had been victimized by close to seventy atomic and 
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hydrogen weapons tests in the 1940s and 1950s alone. Some had lost their 
homes (their islands and atolls  were vaporized) and many  were made sick 
by radioactive fallout and their off spring struck down with lymphatic can-
cers, leukemia, and ge ne tic defects. On top of this, radioactive waste from 
nuclear power plants in Japan was now to be dumped into their  waters. 
Clearly the Japa nese  were not the only victims of the nuclear age and, even 
worse, their nuclear power industry now threatened to make them “atomic 
aggressors” in the Pacifi c.12 Just as pollution export had made some Japa-
nese activists think about Japan’s troubled place and history in Asia, this 
Pacifi c iteration of environmental injustice opened the eyes of many anti-
nuclear advocates to the ways Pacifi c activists connected the radioactive waste 
issue to a longer strug gle for in de pen dence and the obliteration of nuclear 
neo co lo nial ism or, as the prime minister of Vanuatu, Walter Lini, labeled it 
in 1983, “nuclearism.”13 Th e dumping controversy and transnational move-
ment against it exposed a cycle of nuclear discrimination and injustice that 
began with the extraction of uranium— often on indigenous  peoples’ lands— 
continued with enrichment and power production in local communities in 
Japan, and ended with the disposal of radioactive waste material at sea. To 
the extent Japa nese antinuclear activists failed to comprehend this cycle and 
to reposition their individual strug gles within it, they remained open to crit-
icisms of hy poc risy and complicity in Pacifi c nuclearism.
Radioactive Waste: The Pacifi c Solution
Th e Japa nese government’s plan to ocean dump low- level nuclear waste in 
the early 1980s drew on long- established practices among other nuclearized 
nations.14 From 1946 to 1970, the United States dumped close to ninety 
thousand canisters of low- level waste near the Farallon Islands off  the coast 
of San Francisco in Northern California and in the Atlantic Ocean near the 
states of Mas sa chu setts and Texas, in what became a “fairly routine” pro-
cess by the 1950s.15 As Alley and Alley explain, dumping operations “did 
not always run smoothly”: some canisters  were carelessly dumped outside 
of designated disposal sites, while  others resurfaced in unexpected places, 
sometimes in fi shermen’s nets or, in one instance, fl oating two hundred miles 
off  the coast of New York City. Canisters that did not sink  were sprayed with 
bullets  until they did.16 US dumping slowed considerably— although it did 
not stop—in June 1959 when the New York Times ran a story with a map 
showing radioactive dumping sites “off   every major seaport region from 
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Boston to Corpus Christi, Tex.”17  People living in cities such as Boston  were 
incensed to learn that radioactive materials had been dumped in shallow 
areas close to shore that  were known breeding grounds for lobsters and other 
sea life. In October 1980 Jackson Davis, a biologist at the University of Cali-
fornia at Santa Cruz, reported to a House of Representatives subcommittee 
on the environment that at least one- third of the 47,500 canisters dumped off  
the Northern California coast  were leaking “extremely high level” radiation, 
some of which he had detected in fi sh samples.18 Davis’s fi ndings directly 
contradicted the generally accepted assumption that any discharged radia-
tion would be diluted to insignifi cant levels in the ocean rather than concen-
trating locally. As we  will see, Davis and his research  later became impor tant 
 factors in the movement against planned Japa nese waste dumping on the 
other side of the Pacifi c.
Eu ro pean countries also enthusiastically discarded their radioactive 
wastes at sea.  Under the supervision of the Eu ro pean Nuclear Energy Agency 
(ENEA), beginning in 1967 the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the United 
Kingdom, and West Germany dumped low- level radioactive waste, mostly 
in the Atlantic Ocean.19 In 1960, the French Atomic Energy Agency even 
toyed with the idea of dumping waste into the Mediterranean Sea, but this 
plan was scrapped  after a major public outcry led by Prince Rainier of 
Monaco and the famed conservationist and marine photographer, Jacques- 
Yves Cousteau.20 Like the US dumping, the ENEA- supervised pro cess was 
often a messy and dangerous business. In 1976, for example, the specialist 
disposal vessel Topaz was contaminated and its crew exposed to radiation 
when canisters on board  were damaged en route to a dumping site.21 Along 
with the media, the Soviet Union loudly criticized the United States and its 
Western allies for this dumping and contamination of the ocean, but even 
this criticism turned out to be a hollow deceit: the Soviet Union and  later 
Rus sian Federation actually dumped twice the amount of all other countries 
combined during this period.22
As early as 1955, Japan was a player in the shady global practice of ocean 
dumping. Even before the commencement of commercial nuclear power gen-
eration in the country in 1966, Japa nese offi  cials  were concerned about the 
buildup of radioactive waste material from medical and research facilities. 
In 1954 the Nihon Hōshasei Dōigensō Kyōkai (Japan Radioisotope Asso-
ciation, JRA), then responsible for the import, distribution, and management 
of radioactive byproducts, consulted with the government’s Kagaku Gijutsu 
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Chō (Science and Technology Agency, STA), which advised that  there 
was  really no domestic or international regulatory framework in place and 
that standard international practice was to ocean dump low- level radio-
isotopes in concrete- fi lled canisters.23 Low- level radioactive waste dumping 
commenced soon  after, in July 1955, when twenty- seven makeshift oil cans 
fi lled with cobalt 60  were dumped into Sagami Bay just south of Tokyo. 
Two years  later, in September 1957, the JRA dumped a further ten cans of 
concrete- solidifi ed cobalt-60 into nearby Suruga Bay off  the coast of Shi-
zuoka Prefecture.24 But the bulk of ocean dumping occurred at sites off  the 
coast of Tateyama in Chiba Prefecture beside Tokyo. From 1955 to 1969, 
some 1,661 canisters of low- level radioactive waste  were dumped to a depth 
of 8,200 feet (2,500 meters) at  these sites.25 In 1977, the Suisan Chō (Fish-
eries Agency, FA) conducted tests at thirteen points around the Sagami Bay 
disposal area, revealing elevated radiation in two places: cobalt-60 up to 
thirty- two times safe levels at one place and cesium-137 up to twelve times 
acceptable standards at the other.26 Subsequent ocean sediment tests by the 
STA in 1980 revealed ongoing contamination at the Sagami Bay sample 
points, but tests at the dumping site off  the coast of Tateyama revealed no 
abnormalities.27
More than the JRA, however, it was the Genshiryoku Iinkai (Japan 
Atomic Energy Commission, JAEC) that took the lead in formulating and 
attempting to implement an ocean dumping regime in anticipation of the 
commencement of commercial nuclear power in the country. Japan’s fi rst 
test reactor reached criticality in October 1963, and the earliest commercial 
reactors came online at Tōkai (No.1) in July 1966, Tsuruga (No.1) in 
March 1970, Mihama (No.1) in November 1970, and Fukushima (No.1) 
in March 1971. In February 1961 the JAEC established a subcommittee to 
study the feasibility of ocean disposal, which issued its report in June 1964 
to committee chairman Satō Eisaku, who also headed the STA, MITI, and 
the Hokkaidō Kaihatsu Kyoku (Hokkaido Development Agency), and 
would become prime minister only months  later.28 Building on the 1964 
report, in 1969 the STA established the Hōshasei Kotai Haikibutsu Bunkakai 
(Subcommittee on the Management and Disposal of Solid Radioactive 
Wastes), which was charged with identifying potential disposal sites in the 
Pacifi c Ocean.
 After two years of investigations, the study group identifi ed four candi-
date disposal sites, the closest 560 miles (900 kilo meters) from Tokyo and the 
farthest 1,056 miles (1,700 kilo meters) away. Th e JAEC formally articulated 
Pacific Solidarity and Atomic Aggression     155
its stance on low- level waste disposal in its 1972 Genshiryoku Kaihatsu 
Riyō Chōki- Keikaku (Long- term plan for the development and use of nu-
clear power), which concluded that ocean dumping up to a certain level of 
radioactivity was safe and that the country’s low- level radioactive waste 
should be disposed of both at sea and on land.29  After consulting with of-
fi cials in the FA, the Kaijō Hoanchō (Japan Coast Guard, JCG), and the 
Kishō Chō (Japan Meteorological Agency, JMA), the JAEC deci ded that site 
B (coordinates: 30N 147E), located roughly 560 miles southeast of Tokyo 
and 620 miles (1,000 kilo meters) north of the Northern Mariana Islands 
was the most appropriate  because of ocean depth, currents, and prevailing 
weather patterns.30 Interestingly, the JAEC’s subcommittee charged with 
coordinating the disposal program stated unequivocally in its 1974 report 
that, since it would not be pos si ble to manage or monitor materials once 
dumped into the deep ocean, it was of the utmost importance that the au-
thorities conduct a trustworthy and comprehensive safety assessment be-
fore commencing any disposal program.31 But no such safety assessment was 
ever carried out. Instead, in its 1976 Hōshasei Haikibutsu Shori no Kihon 
Hōshin (Basic policy on the management and disposal of radioactive waste 
material), the JAEC announced that trial disposals at site B would begin in 
1978 and full- scale dumping from 1980.32 As they searched for candidate 
disposal sites from the late 1960s, government nuclear offi  cials also diligently 
prepared the regulatory framework to enable ocean disposal.
Th e 1970s  were heady days indeed in the Japa nese nuclear power in-
dustry. Arisawa Hiromi, the infl uential economist and chairman of the Ja-
pan Nuclear Power Industry Council, even  imagined Japan becoming the 
center (and apex) of an “Asian nuclear fuel cycle,” declaring at a conference 
that “if Japan is asked by foreign countries to provide ser vices (enrichment, 
repro cessing) as part of its nuclear fuel cycle, it should do so.” Specifi cally, 
Arisawa wanted Japan to become the central hub for the enrichment of 
uranium and the repro cessing of spent nuclear fuel from power plants 
throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacifi c.33 For a time, offi  cials in 
the nuclear power industry even envisioned the creation of a “Pacifi c Rim 
Nuclear Energy Community,” with,  needless to say, Japan leading the way. 
With the regulatory framework and infrastructure in place for ocean 
dumping, for a brief moment in the late 1970s all of this must have seemed 
pos si ble.
What nuclear offi  cials initially failed to appreciate, however, was the 
potentially disruptive backlash from  people living on islands in the vicinity 
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of site B— not to mention from scientists and technicians long skeptical 
about the safety of ocean dumping. In their rush to ready the  legal and lo-
gistical infrastructure, Japa nese nuclear offi  cials did not seek the approval 
of, nor did they notify,  people living on western Pacifi c islands such as the 
Marianas and the Ogasawaras, which  were located closest (311 miles/500 
kilo meters) to site B. As the AMPO newsletter reported, when the Japa nese 
government was fi nalizing the plan in 1979, it merely sent a letter to the 
Australian government, a partner in the Pacifi c Basin Community Scheme, 
requesting its approval.34 Of course, Japa nese offi  cials  were acutely aware that 
any request for “approval” from governments and  people in the Marianas 
and Ogasawaras ran the risk of accusations of duplicity and contradiction. 
 After all, if this was a lawful pro cess of disposal in international  waters us-
ing supposedly fail- safe techniques, why the need for approval from states 
or communities hundreds of miles away?
Nuclear authorities knew only too well that serious questions remained 
with re spect to the reliability and safety of ocean disposal and that  these 
questions threatened to undermine the  whole scheme if they escalated into 
a widespread public debate. In fact, in 1972, years before ocean disposal 
even became an offi  cial plan in Japan, the Zenkoku Genshiryoku Kagaku 
Gijutsusha Rengō (National Alliance of Nuclear Power Scientists and 
Technicians) writing in the RCP’s journal Kōgai Kenkyū (Pollution research) 
had pointed out that, in the case of ocean dumping, canisters needed to be 
properly weighted to ensure sinkage but that as weight increased so too did 
the risk of rupture on impact. “Th e chance of damage is high,” the article 
concluded.35 Furthermore, even if the steel canisters survived the ocean- 
fl oor impact, over time they would most certainly deteriorate as a result of 
deep ocean pressure and corrosion. Th e discovery of damaged canisters 
and surrounding contamination off  the coast of San Francisco in California 
and in Sagami Bay in Japan only corroborated  these warnings.36 Given 
such data, nuclear offi  cials’ failure to advise and seek the approval of Pacifi c 
residents is hardly surprising. As they realized, guarantees of safety para-
doxically yet inevitably led back to the  simple yet unanswerable question: If 
the material was so safe, why not dump it in Japa nese coastal  waters?
Pacifi c Furor and Japa nese Responses
Despite Japa nese offi  cials’ best attempts to keep the proj ect inconspicuous 
if not clandestine, po liti cal leaders and nongovernmental groups on Pacifi c 
islands eventually learned of the dumping plan in 1979, to which they re-
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acted with immediate and fi erce antipathy. As Alley and Alley point out, 
they “had good reasons to be distrustful” about governmental guarantees 
of safety. In 1954,  people of the Rongelap and Utirik Atolls suff ered serious 
radiation exposure  after the  Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll 
 because they  were not evacuated or even advised of the dangers by the US 
military. Th e  people of Bikini Atoll returned home in 1968 based on assur-
ances that the region was safe, only to learn in 1978 that their foods— 
and, hence, their bodies— were being contaminated by radionuclides.37 Th e 
French government showed a similar indiff erence  toward  people living near 
its nuclear weapons test site at Mururoa (also Moruroa) Atoll in the south 
Pacifi c. When the Belauan antinuclear activist Roman Bedor met with the 
French deputy foreign minister in 1983 to pres ent an anti- bomb petition, 
the deputy minister said that opponents  were completely “misinformed,” 
 because French testing was safe whereas US testing was not.38 According to 
Bedor, the deputy minister advised “that no one had yet been aff ected by 
the testing [and] that he himself had swum in the lagoon in Mouroa [sic] 
and was still in good health.” Bedor asked the deputy minister if the tests 
 were so safe why they  were not conducted in France, but he received no 
satisfactory response.39 Japa nese offi  cials  were no less condescending. In a 
meeting with an offi  cial del e ga tion from Guam and the Northern Marianas 
in 1981, STA director Nakagawa Ichirō condescendingly announced that 
the nuclear waste canisters to be dumped  were “completely safe” and that 
he “ wouldn’t mind embracing them” or “sleeping with them” in his “bed.” 40
Pacifi c protest against the Japa nese dumping plan began in 1979 in the 
Northern Marianas, the closest place to site B other than the Ogasawaras. 
In late November 1979 the governor of the Northern Marianas, Carlos 
Camacho, sent an urgent tele gram to the United States ambassador to Japan, 
Mike Mansfi eld, expressing grave concerns over the possibility of radioac-
tive contamination from nuclear waste disposal and asking him to request 
further information from the Japa nese government.41 Camacho heard noth-
ing  until late January 1980, when the Japa nese STA formally advised the 
US embassy of the plan. In response, Camacho sent another tele gram to 
Mansfi eld in February 1980, asking him to relay the offi  cial opposition of 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.42 Protest spread 
throughout Pacifi c island nations  after the Pacifi c Daily News published out 
of Guam ran an article on the Japa nese dumping plan on February 9, 1980.43 
In Guam, Governor Paul Calvo and the Guam legislature promptly passed a 
resolution of opposition on February 14, while two days  later, on February 16, 
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the Northern Mariana Islands House of Representatives passed a “Decla-
ration of the Northern Marianas as a Nonnuclear Area.” Th ereafter, similar 
resolutions  were passed in the Republic of Belau (Palau), Yap State in the 
Caroline Islands, the Hawai‘i state legislature, and vari ous other Pacifi c na-
tions.44 Th e far- off  In de pen dent State of Samoa even sent an offi  cial tele-
gram to the Japa nese government expressing absolute opposition to the dis-
posal plan.45
Nongovernmental groups also joined the chorus of opposition. On 
Saipan, the largest of the Northern Mariana Islands nature conservation 
groups quickly mobilized a protest movement, as too did activists in Guam, 
who established the Mariana Alliance Opposing Nuclear Waste Dumping 
on April 10, 1980.46 Led by the sixty- nine- year- old mayor of Tinian, Felipe 
Mendiola, the alliance started a signature campaign and immediately be-
gan to build a transnational opposition movement throughout the Pacifi c 
and beyond.47 Signifi cantly, the alliance was quick to forge connections with 
Japa nese groups. In an October 1980 letter to the ILP movement, the alli-
ance explained:
Th e  peoples and governments of the Pacifi c Islands have been opposing 
the Japa nese Government’s plan to dispose of nuclear waste material 
in the Pacifi c and we have called on all Japa nese  people with heart to rise 
up in opposition with us. . . .  We have learned that, in response, voices 
opposing oceanic dumping have appeared throughout Japan and that 
numerous civic and residents groups have started a signature campaign 
demanding an immediate cancellation of the ocean disposal plan. Th is 
news is very pleasing to us and gives us  great encouragement. Japa nese 
and  people of Pacifi c Islands uniting in strug gle across the ocean for a 
shared objective— this is indeed an event of deep signifi cance.48
Opposition to the dumping plan further intensifi ed at two transnational 
gatherings of Pacifi c activists in 1980. At the third Nuclear- Free Pacifi c 
Conference (NFPC) held in Hawai‘i in May, Pacifi c activists unanimously 
passed a resolution opposing the Japa nese plan.49 Th e follow-up conference, 
the Nuclear- Free Pacifi c Forum, held in Sydney, Australia, in September 
1980, passed a similar resolution.50 Th is latter forum was sponsored by the 
Australian communist- pacifi st group, the Association for International Co- 
operation and Disarmament, and attracted some twenty NGOs and  labor 
groups from around the Pacifi c, including anti– uranium mining groups, 
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antinuclear groups, Aboriginal groups, the Australian Railway Workers 
Union, the School Teachers Union, and Greenpeace, as well as delegates from 
Papua New Guinea, West Papua, Vanuatu, Belau, Fiji, Hawai‘i, Samoa, and 
New Zealand. Japan was also strongly represented at the forum, with par-
ticipants and/or statements from the rival organ izations Gensuikin and 
Gensuikyō (Japan Council Against Atomic & Hydrogen Bombs), the ILP 
Nuclear Power Group, PARC, and the AEIC.51 Th anks to such meetings, 
by late 1980 Pacifi c activists had mobilized a high- profi le transnational move-
ment that drew together an impressive array of  labor, antinuclear, pacifi st, and 
environmental groups from around the Pacifi c region. It was a mobilization 
that Japa nese nuclear offi  cials had not anticipated, and they  were left scram-
bling to respond to angry offi  cials and activists in all corners of the Pacifi c.
In the fi rst instance, Japa nese nuclear offi  cials had simply ignored 
expressions of opposition. Th e STA, for example, delayed its response to 
Governor Camacho’s initial letter for some two months and, when it did reply, 
directed the response to the United States government on grounds that the 
Northern Marianas  were  under US control and hence had no formal diplo-
matic ties with Japan.52 But by mid-1980, pressure from the Pacifi c move-
ment was too intense to ignore, and on August 6 the Japa nese government 
announced it would be sending a specialist “explanatory team” to the south 
Pacifi c to allay residents’ apprehensions.53 Th e STA explanatory team—or 
“persuasion team” as critics branded it— faced a diffi  cult task. As the news-
paper Mainichi Shinbun explained, the Japa nese government’s failure to 
consult with Pacifi c residents had resulted in them presenting Japan with an 
ultimatum: “Fish or atoms.” Potentially aff ected nations  were threatening 
that, if Japan proceeded with the dumping, they would revoke fi shing rights 
in their  waters, signifi cantly aff ecting Japa nese catches of tuna and bonito.54 
On August 9, just days before the explanatory team arrived in Guam, 
Governor Calvo told Japa nese tele vi sion reporters, “I assume  these repre-
sentatives  will stress the safety of the disposal plan. But if it  were  really safe 
why  don’t you Japa nese store it in the backyard of your own territory. Our 
Pacifi c Ocean is not a dumping ground for radioactive waste from your 
country. Th e  people of Guam are opposed to this plan and  will unite in 
opposition.”55
During 1980, the explanatory team traveled to fi ve Pacifi c islands: 
Saipan, Chuuk Lagoon (formerly Truk), Yap, Kosrae, and Guam. Th ey also 
intended to visit the Cook Islands and Niue but, in a display of opposition, 
 were refused visas to enter into  these countries.56 According to Kawana 
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Hideyuki, then an environmental reporter with Asahi Shinbun, the initiative 
was ultimately a spectacular debacle, simply failing to convince the  people of 
the Pacifi c that the disposal pro cess would be safe, that discarded radioactive 
material could be monitored and managed, that  there would be no radio-
active leakage, or that the canisters could be sal vaged in an emergency.57
Th e explanatory team faced its fi rst skeptical audience in Guam, where 
members gave a pre sen ta tion at the Pacifi c Islands Conference of Leaders 
(PICL) meeting on August 14 and 15, 1980.58 Using colorful slides and a 
host of impressive statistics, the team stressed the overall safety of the pro-
cess and the Japa nese government’s commitment to act in strict accordance 
with the regulations of the LDC. But their supplications fell on deaf ears.59 
Governor Calvo was the most vocal and trenchant in his questioning: “You 
explained that it is necessary to isolate [the material] from the  human envi-
ronment. But  doesn’t the fact that you have to isolate it mean that [the ma-
terial] is dangerous?  Isn’t it a contradiction to be isolating something which 
is safe?”60 Calvo made explicit comparison to Japa nese mercury poisoning, 
arguing that pollutants (like radioactive material) can have a major impact 
when they enter into the food chain and concentrate through bioaccumula-
tion. Lacking a satisfactory response from the Japa nese team, on August 15, 
1980, the PICL offi  cially rejected the plan, concluding that ocean dumping 
would destroy the ecosystem and threaten marine resources.61 Leaders from 
nine Micronesian states and territories issued a formal statement requesting 
that the Japa nese government abandon the plan.62
Th e team faced similar hostility in Saipan, where they gave a two- hour 
pre sen ta tion to Governor Carlos Camacho and thirty government represen-
tatives. Th e Japa nese  were surprised to discover that Governor Camacho 
had engaged the ser vices of University of California biologist W. Jackson 
Davis, who had detected radioactive contamination in sea life at a nuclear 
waste dumping site near the Farallon Islands off  the coast of San Francisco. 
Davis again raised the issue of bioaccumulation, stating unequivocally that 
“the assumptions on which the Japa nese are basing their appraisals of safety 
are fl awed. Radioactivity is not diluted in sea  water but remains on the ocean 
fl oor from where it reaches our mouths via fi sh.”63 Th e reception was no less 
hostile when the team visited the Ogasawaras in late September 1980 to 
address village leaders, farmers, and fi shermen. Indeed, if government offi  -
cials had hoped for a kinder reception from their fellow countrymen, they 
 were poorly mistaken. Island leaders and fi shermen expressed their staunch 
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 opposition to the dumping of nuclear waste a short 311 miles (500 kilo meters) 
from their islands, with fi shermen threatening to use their boats to blockade 
any vessels attempting to transport radioactive waste material for disposal.64 
More than “Japa nese” or even “Ogasawarans,” the islanders understood their 
opposition in the context of a wider strug gle of Pacifi c Ocean  peoples op-
posed to nuclear power. As they explained in the Hangenpatsu Shinbun 
(Antinuclear power newspaper) in 1980, “We  won’t be satisfi ed if the waste is 
simply not dumped near the Ogasawaras. We believe that  there is a prob lem 
with nuclear- powered electricity generation itself.”65
Th e proximity of the Ogasawaras to the proposed disposal site and to 
other potentially aff ected islands such as Guam and Saipan undoubtedly en-
couraged islanders’ sense of being part of a wider antinuclear strug gle in the 
Pacifi c. But even antipollution and antinuclear activists on the main islands 
came to share this Pacifi c perspective on the nuclear issue— a perspective, 
in fact, that was developing even before the dumping controversy arose and 
against a backdrop of rising anti– nuclear power protest within Japan. As 
early as May 1975, two activists from the ILP movement participated in the 
“Ride Against Uranium” or ga nized by the NGO Friends of the Earth (Aus-
tralia), in which participants cycled for ten days from Sydney to the Parliament 
House in Canberra to protest the mining and export of this ele ment. Ac-
tivists back in Japan supported the protest by staging a simultaneous dem-
onstration outside the Australian embassy in Tokyo.66 Th e title changes of 
activist publications during this period also indicate the broadening trans-
pacifi c consciousness among Japa nese groups throughout the late 1970s 
and 1980s, as well as their rising consciousness of nuclear power as a regional 
and global issue. Recall how the subtitle of  Don’t Let the Pollution Escape! 
Exposing Pollution Export to South  Korea was changed to Exposing Pollution 
Export to the Th ird World in November 1976. In 1982 the subtitle was again 
changed to Resisting Japa nese Aggression Together with the  Peoples of Asia and 
the Pacifi c.67 In June 1986, in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
disaster, the main title  Don’t Let the Pollution Escape! was abandoned alto-
gether, the new title becoming Antinuclear Pacifi c Ocean PACIFICA: Resisting 
Japa nese Aggression Together with the  Peoples of Asia and the Pacifi c.68
Expanding interactions between Japa nese and Pacifi c activists through-
out the 1970s  were also broadening the perspective of domestic antinuclear 
movements.  After participating in the second Nuclear- Free Pacifi c Conference 
on the Micronesian island of Pohnpei in 1978, the ILP activist Yokoyama 
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Masaki or ga nized the Taiheiyō kara Kaku o Nakusō! 3–1 Tōkyō Shūkai 
(Tokyo rally to rid the Pacifi c of nuclear energy) on March 1, 1979.69 Th is 
year marked the twenty- fi fth anniversary of Bikini Day, which in Japan 
was most directly associated with the radiation exposure of Japa nese fi sher-
men on the ship Daigo Fukuryūmaru (Lucky Dragon No. 5)  after the  Castle 
Bravo hydrogen bomb test in 1954. But thanks to his participation at the 
Pohnpei conference, Yokoyama and participants agreed to a new designa-
tion for the Bikini Day event: “Nuclear- Free Pacifi c Day.” In other words, the 
commemoration was to be not only for Japa nese but for all victims of “nucle-
arism” in the Pacifi c, including, for instance, Australian Aborigines, whose 
traditional lands  were being decimated by uranium mining.70 Th us, by 
the time of the ocean dumping controversy in 1980, some Japa nese antipol-
lution and antinuclear groups  were already beginning to think about nuclear 
power and atomic weapons within pro cesses of discrimination and injustice 
beyond the borders of the archipelago and, by consequence, beyond the 
national narrative of nuclear victimhood.
Japa nese opposition to the dumping plan began on August 9, 1980, the 
same day Governor Calvo and  others commenced their mobilization in 
Guam. Some forty civic groups including the ILP, the Nihon Shōhisha 
Renmei (Consumers’ Union of Japan), and the Fujin Minshu Kurabu 
( Women’s Demo cratic Club) established the Hōshasei Haikibutsu no 
Taiheiyō Tōki Keikaku Hakushi Tekkai o Motomeru Jikkō Iinkai (Ex-
ecutive Committee for the Cancellation of the Plan to Dispose of Nuclear 
Waste Material in the Pacifi c), which submitted an open appeal to Prime 
Minister Suzuki Zenkō demanding an immediate end to the plan and com-
menced a nationwide signature campaign.71 Th e executive committee de-
clared, “We [Japa nese] cannot make the  people of Pacifi c Island nations pay 
the price for Japan’s nuclear energy development.”72 Th e newspaper Mainichi 
Shinbun noted that, although  there  were already many local groups opposing 
nuclear power plant construction within Japan, this was  really the fi rst time 
individual Japa nese citizens and civic groups had taken concrete action with 
re spect to the overseas eff ects of the country’s nuclear power industry.73 Th e 
signature campaign turned out to be a resounding success, with over forty- 
fi ve thousand signatures collected by December 1980, all of which  were 
subsequently delivered by hand to the assistant cabinet secretary.74 Building 
on the success of this domestic campaign, from September 1981 the ILP 
antinuclear group, with the cooperation of the Belauan antinuclear activ-
ist Roman Bedor, helped coordinate a worldwide signature campaign against 
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both French nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacifi c and the Japa nese 
dumping plan, which  were both understood as variations of the same con-
temporary “nuclearism.”75 Other domestic groups also joined the protest. 
In February 1981, Christian Bishop Aima Nobuo,  Father Yamada Keizō 
(earlier involved in the Kawatestsu sintering plant opposition on Mindanao), 
 Father John Binsko, and Yokoyama Masaki of the Nihon Kirisutokyō 
Kyōgikai (National Christian Council in Japan) met with Honami Minoru, 
a bureau chief in the Nuclear Power Safety Bureau at the STA. Th e group 
expressed their deep opposition and determination to stop Japan, a “nuclear 
victim nation,” disposing of nuclear waste in the Pacifi c Ocean.76 But Hon-
ami, a member of the failed explanatory team that had visited Guam the 
previous year, was unresponsive, telling the group that the STA was keen to 
start dumping as soon as pos si ble and would do so  after gaining approval 
from the Japa nese cabinet and the relevant international nuclear oversight 
bodies. He advised that the government was “treating this issue as a prob-
lem of national security.”77 Fishermen— who potentially had the most to lose 
economically— also joined the fray. In late June 1981, leaders of fi shing co-
operatives and  those in related industries nationwide gathered in Tokyo to 
discuss their opposition to the dumping plan. As with Christians and other 
civic groups, the expressed basis of their opposition was that the Japa nese 
government had no right to force radioactive waste on  peoples of the Pa-
cifi c. But  there was also a self- interested motive  behind the fi shermen’s op-
position: visitors from vari ous Pacifi c nations such as Belau, while reaching 
out to fi shermen as natu ral allies, also made it patently clear that if the Japa-
nese government plan proceeded, Japa nese fi shing rights in their seas would 
be promptly revoked.78
Japa nese opponents of the dumping plan also traveled to Pacifi c island 
nations. Notably, in January 1981 a Japa nese group visited Belau and Guam 
in reciprocation for a visit by activists from  those countries the previous 
October. Th e Japa nese group included Yasusato Kiyonobu of the Kinwan o 
Mamoru Kai (Association to Protect Kin Bay) in Okinawa; Aramoto Hiro-
fumi of the Hankōgai Uken Mura Sonmin Kaigi (Uken Villa gers Anti-
pollution Conference) on Amami Ōshima Island; Maeda Toshihiko of the 
Narita Airport opposition movement in Chiba Prefecture; and Arakawa 
Shunji and Ōkawa Hōsaku of the ILP movement, who served as guides.79 
During their visit the group attended meetings with local activists, gave media 
interviews and public speeches, and, in Belau, attended the inauguration 
ceremony of Haruo Ignacio Remeliik, the fi rst president of the nuclear- free 
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republic.80 In tele vi sion appearances on two local stations in Guam and in 
interviews with the Pacifi c Daily News, the group off ered detailed updates 
on the antidumping movement in Japan. Yasusato, from the Kinwan group, 
carefully pointed out that the Ryūkyūan Islands and the Marianas  were es-
sentially the same distance from the proposed dumping site and, hence, 
this shared predicament meant that the two communities should strug gle 
together.81 To coincide with this visit, activists on Amami Ōshima Island 
started an English- language newsletter, Kuroshio Tsūshin (Th e black tide cor-
respondence), which they translated and sent to fellow activists in Belau to 
provide updates on the movement and to build solidarity.82 Such engage-
ments reinforced a growing sense of recognition, responsibility, and even 
Pacifi c sentiment among Japa nese activists, evident, for example, in the fol-
lowing appeal by “the  people of Japan, Amami, and Okinawa” delivered at 
the Tokyo antidumping rally in October 1980: “Friends around the world! 
Friends in the Pacifi c! In the midst of a violent, reactionary storm we can 
hear the cries of Pacifi c  peoples.  Th ose voices are piercing through the dark 
clouds and jolting the very base of our hearts. . . .  We cannot express [the 
extent of] our shame over forcing nuclear power plant waste on the  people of 
the Pacifi c merely for the ‘affl  uence of Japan alone.’ ”83
Pacifi c Activists in Japan
Much of the activity I have explored in earlier chapters involved Japa nese 
activists traveling abroad to other countries or to international events to com-
municate their experience of environmental injustice. As the travels of Oki-
nawan and Amami islanders attest, the movement against nuclear dumping 
was no exception, with Japa nese activists conscientiously traveling to Guam, 
Saipan, and other potentially aff ected Pacifi c countries. But what  really 
distinguished this movement was the Pacifi c activists who came to Japan to 
engage with local antinuclear activists—in eff ect creating transnational 
spaces within Japan, much the same as Canadian Indians had done briefl y 
in Minamata a few years earlier. Although some Japa nese  were already at-
tuned to the regional and global ramifi cations of nuclear power in their 
country,  these Pacifi c activists brought such issues into much sharper focus 
by drawing troubling connections between earlier Japa nese colonialism in 
the region and the country’s role in con temporary nuclearism. In par tic-
u lar, they helped disrupt two dominant, albeit erroneous, assumptions in 
the postwar antinuclear movement in Japan: namely, that the prob lems of 
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nuclear- powered electricity generation  were essentially domestic in nature 
and, second, that nuclear power and nuclear weapons  were largely unrelated. 
To challenge  these assumptions, the Pacifi c visitors tied together two dispa-
rate narratives: one a history of Japa nese and Western injustice  toward them, 
the other a vision of Pacifi c community to which they and the Japa nese both 
belonged.
Th e fi rst wave of Pacifi c activists arrived in Japan in late July 1980, in 
time for the annual events to commemorate the atomic bombings of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki in August. At the World Conference against Atomic & 
Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima on August 3, Pacifi c participants 
included Governor Paul Calvo and Marianas Alliance leader David Rosario 
from Guam; the mayor of Saipan, Francisco Diaz; Northern Marianas 
parliamentarian Joaquin Pangelinan; and Belauan antipollution and an-
tinuclear activist Moses Weldon. Th eir attendance brought an entirely new 
fl avor to the annual rally, which had focused on nuclear weapons rather than 
nuclear power and, especially, the symbolism of Japa nese nuclear victimhood 
in the global campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. Now the issue of 
low- level radioactive waste dumping took center stage. Th e Pacifi c visitors 
shrewdly appropriated the narrative of national victimhood, pointing out 
that Japa nese  people— “atomic victims” at Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and 
Bikini— were about to become “atomic aggressors” in the Pacifi c.84 In front 
of rallies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they asked “How can Japan, which 
experienced Hiroshima and Nagasaki, pollute our sea with nuclear waste?!”85 
Saipan mayor Francisco Diaz even posed this question to puzzled nuclear 
offi  cials at the STA, where he was assured that  there was “no chance of 
radioactive materials leaking” and, in the unlikely event of leakage, that 
radiation levels in the material  were fi ve thousand times lower than safe an-
nual exposure limits, so  there was no need to worry at all. In response Diaz 
again confronted offi  cials with the thorny question: “If it is so safe then why 
 don’t you dump it in Tokyo Bay?”86
From the beginning of 1980 to the end of 1983— the high point of the 
movement against Japan’s proposed dumping— foreign activists visited the 
country to participate in rallies, protests, debates, signature campaigns, and 
to lobby government offi  cials. Th e majority came from potentially aff ected 
areas such as Belau, Saipan, and Guam, but their numbers also included Aus-
tralian Aboriginals and American Navaho Indians who opposed uranium 
mining at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle.  Th ese activists’ encouraged 
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Japa nese protesters to reconsider their local strug gles and, indeed, their soci-
ety more generally, in the context of wider confi gurations of discrimination 
and injustice throughout the Pacifi c.
In this connection, during October and early November 1980, two 
native Chamorros of the Mariana Islands traveled throughout Japan to 
communicate their  people’s opposition to the planned disposal of radioac-
tive waste in their  waters. Th e eldest of the two was Felipe Mendiola, the 
seventy- year- old mayor of Tinian Island, located roughly halfway between 
Guam and Saipan in the Northern Marianas. He was accompanied by 
David Rosario, a twenty- seven- year- old activist from Guam who was back 
again  after the August events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.87 During their 
time in Japan, Mendiola and Rosario spoke to groups in Niigata, Fukui, 
Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and they addressed two major rallies in Tokyo: 
the Taiheiyō o Kaku no Gomisuteba ni suru na! Tōkyō Shūkai ( Don’t 
make the Pacifi c a nuclear garbage dump! Tokyo rally) on October 22, and 
the 10.25 Hangenpatsu Kokumin Daishūkai (October 25 national antinu-
clear power plant rally), which  adopted three positions: “A temporary stop 
to nuclear power plants, withdrawal of the plan to dispose of radioactive 
waste material at sea, and an end to Japa nese nuclear armaments.”88 Tin-
ian Island and the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of course, shared a 
fateful nuclear connection  because it was from this small Pacifi c island 
that the B-29 aircraft loaded with their deadly atomic payloads had de-
parted for Japan in August 1945. But Mendiola was determined to speak 
about a diff er ent history; a history not many Japa nese knew of, and one he 
hoped might reinforce or even intensify their growing opposition to the 
dumping issue.
In fl uent Japa nese, Mendiola told audiences that he had come to ap-
peal not so much to the government but to the Japa nese  people  because he 
felt he knew them very well. From 1914, when Mendiola was just three years 
old,  until 1945, when he was thirty- three, Tinian had been a colony of 
Japan. At school he was told to worship an emperor he neither knew about 
nor cared for, and the Japa nese he spoke so fl uently was a remnant of this 
imperial iteration (one of many) in his island’s history.89 Th e Pacifi c War 
only further complicated this sense of detachment. Mendiola explained that, 
being “neither Americans nor Japa nese, we felt the war had nothing to do 
with us.” But the Japa nese military “conscripted all men and forced them 
to construct military bases and to perform nothing but military duties.”90 
During the war, Tinianese accused of spying  were  either brutally murdered 
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by the Japa nese or, if they  were spared, “treated worse than animals.”91 Yet, 
despite this discrimination and cruel treatment during the colonial years and 
despite the  great suff ering of the war— a war they  were drawn into despite 
having no interest in it whatsoever— Mendiola stressed that the Tinianese 
 were “resigned to the fact that the events of the Pacifi c War era  were over” 
and they had deci ded to hold no grudges, letting Japa nese come back to their 
island.92
But reading in the newspaper that Japan intended to dump atomic 
waste in the Pacifi c released a fl ood of painful memories, not to mention a 
new sense of anxiety. Despite its commitments  after the war, the real ity was 
that the Japa nese government had paid only 16  percent of the reparations 
owed to the  people of Micronesia, and now that same government intended 
to dump radioactive waste in their backyard. As Mendiola concluded, 
“Based on this, it is only natu ral that we do not trust the [Japa nese] govern-
ment when it says it  will compensate us if  there are damages [from radioac-
tive waste dumping].”93 Mendiola said that many islanders  were beginning 
to speak about Japan’s plan to dump nuclear waste in the context of a long 
history of “domination” by Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States. 
He felt that the current movement was an expression of Micronesians’ long- 
suppressed fury over this history of oppression.94 Moreover, it was a move-
ment determined to confront Japan head-on. Since war’s end, for instance, 
the  people of Tinian had faithfully maintained the graves of fallen Japa nese 
soldiers and civilians, but the combination of many centuries of outside 
domination and the current nuclearism of power ful countries had caused 
islanders’ bottled-up fury to erupt. Th ey had deci ded that, should the dump-
ing go ahead,  these graves  were to be bulldozed to the ground and all Japa-
nese remains dumped into the Pacifi c, together with Japan’s graveyard of 
radioactive waste. Furthermore, Japa nese fi shermen, who benefi ted so much 
from Micronesian  waters, would no longer be welcome.95 Th e Japa nese and 
other foreign powers may well have trampled all over Micronesians in the past, 
but in the new postwar era of self- determination,  human rights, and minority 
empowerment, it was they who would push back. Indeed, for Mendiola and 
 others, the strug gle of Pacifi c  peoples’ was not merely against nuclear waste 
dumping or even weapons testing but, more fundamentally, for the recogni-
tion of their basic rights and dignity as  human beings.
Younger Pacifi c activists repeated Mendiola’s mantra of rights and rec-
ognition for audiences throughout Japan in the early 1980s. Particularly 
impor tant  were two young Belauan activists: Ignatio Anastacio and Geldens 
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Meyer. Th eir extensive and exhaustive schedule of meetings, speeches, ral-
lies, and site visits speaks volumes of their determination to connect with 
and infl uence Japa nese  people at all levels of society, from the grassroots to 
the Diet. Twenty- nine- year- old Ignatio Anastacio, newly elected to the Belau 
National Congress, toured Japan from late February 1980 with his partner 
and fellow activist Carol Kesolei. He was inspired  after hearing about the 
visits of Felipe Mendiola and David Rosario of the previous year. Assisted 
by ILP activists, Anastacio fi rst traveled to Niigata Prefecture, where he 
addressed a local group opposing (ultimately unsuccessfully) the construc-
tion of a nuclear power plant in the towns of Kashiwazaki and Kariwa. In 
Tokyo, Anastacio met with Japan Socialist Party Diet member Yoshida 
Masao, himself a native of Niigata, to discuss the dumping issue, and in 
successive days he gave speeches outside Shimbashi Station in downtown 
Tokyo, at two anti– nuclear power rallies, and before activists involved in 
a protracted protest against construction of the new Tokyo International 
Airport at the Sanrizuka farming area in Chiba Prefecture. On his fi nal 
day, Anastacio toured the heavi ly industrialized region of Kawasaki just 
south of Tokyo, which had no nuclear power plants but was then one of the 
most polluted regions in the country. In the eve ning he met with represen-
tatives from the Amami Islands and Okinawa, and together this group au-
thored a joint statement that pledged allegiance in the strug gle against the 
dumping plan. “Faced with a common  enemy,” the statement declared, “we 
must join forces as members of the Pacifi c.”96
Th e highlight of Anastacio’s visit was his deeply moving speech at the 
February 28 Tokyo rally against nuclear power, nuclear fuel repro cessing, 
and ocean dumping. He told attendees how “the lives and aspirations of the 
Pacifi c islanders ha[d] always been a small part of their conquerors’ consid-
erations” and that “for centuries their good  will [was] abused and they [had] 
suff ered greatly for it.” “Japan ruled Belau for one quarter of a  century. We 
learned much from our Japa nese rulers. Th ey infl icted much suff ering on 
us. Many  human lives  were lost.”97 But now Belauans  were fi ghting for true 
in de pen dence, of which their antinuclear constitution represented a fi rst 
step.98 “Th e time is past when the big powers can have their way with the 
 little  people.”99 “If Japan wants to use nuclear power, it must assume its own 
responsibility for the waste.”100 And if it failed to do so  there would be con-
sequences: “ Th ere is one  thing I  will do on returning to Belau  after this trip. 
As a member of parliament I  will make a recommendation to the legislature 
to reconsider the fi shing agreement between the Japa nese fi shing industry 
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and Belau. Along with scrapping the fi sheries agreement, I have deci ded to 
start a movement to boycott Japa nese products. I am also considering a total 
halt to Japa nese tourism. I believe that  these [mea sures] should stay in place 
 until the Japa nese government publicly announces its intention to scrap 
[the plan] for nuclear waste dumping.”101 For Belauans and, indeed, for all 
Pacifi c Islanders, the position was  simple: “Dispose of your own trash! We 
do not want that kind of material.”102 Anastacio called on all conscientious 
Japa nese  people to “rise up together with the very strongest bonds of soli-
darity. Th e  peoples of Asia and the Pacifi c must join hands and live together 
in this beautiful natu ral environment, and to ensure that our lifestyle can 
continue.”103
Geldens Meyer, a thirty- year- old fellow Belauan, came to Japan the fol-
lowing month (March 1981) and, during his three- week stay, engaged in a 
grueling schedule of rallies, offi  cial meetings, and speech- giving in the towns 
and cities of Kubokawa (Kōchi Prefecture), Sagamihara and Yokosuka 
(Kanagawa Prefecture), Shizuoka (Shizuoka Prefecture), Nagoya (Aichi Pre-
fecture), Kyoto (Kyoto Prefecture), Osaka (Osaka Prefecture), and Iwanai 
(Hokkaidō).104 In Kubokawa (now Shimantō) Meyer met with local fi sher-
men,  house wives, and residents involved in a (successful) strug gle to stop 
the construction of a nuclear power plant.105 At a rally or ga nized by a Kubo-
kawa  women’s group, Meyer called for a joint strug gle between  people 
opposing nuclear power in the town and Belauans opposing Japan’s radio-
active waste in their backyard. Meyer told the locals that he appreciated the 
Kubokawa strug gle all the more now  because of his movement’s prolonged 
campaign for an antinuclear constitution in Belau, realized just a few 
months earlier.106 Speaking at an event or ga nized by Sanrizuka activists in 
Sagamihara—an area in central Kanagawa Prefecture with numerous muni-
tions and storage facilities of the US military and Japa nese Self- Defense 
Forces (JSDF)— Meyer repeated his call for grassroots solidarity in the face 
of neo co lo nial expansion throughout the Pacifi c, prompting one Japa nese 
participant to observe how “it has become extremely diffi  cult for we Japa nese, 
of course, but also for the  people of the Pacifi c to see just what the prob lem is, 
where the contradictions are, and who the  enemy is. Together with the  people 
of the Pacifi c we must work to disentangle  these similar threads. I believe 
one starting point is nuclear dumping in the Pacifi c. We should work to-
gether in this endeavor.”107 In Yokosuka City, some fi fty kilo meters south- west 
of Sagamihara and home to both US and JSDF naval ports, a local antinu-
clear group showed Meyer canisters fi lled with radioactive waste material 
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stored outside the Kurihama factory of Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited. Th ey 
explained how they held protest rallies once or twice a year to oppose the 
transportation of nuclear fuel from the factory. In fact, just days before 
Meyer’s visit, some members of the group had been arrested during a pro-
test outside the factory to stop transportation of nuclear fuel to a nuclear 
power plant in Fukushima Prefecture in the north.108 One of Meyer’s hosts 
said she felt that Japan had “forgotten” about the “impor tant” yet “obvious” 
 things like the risk of accidents, pollution of the sea, and the eff ects of 
radioactive material on the unborn. Indeed, Japan had become the kind of 
country that quite “nonchalantly” dumped waste from its “own garden” into 
“neighboring gardens.” “I feel ashamed and saddened by this,” she admitted. 
“Each and  every one of us needs to think more seriously about nuclear energy 
as the Belauan  people are.”109
At a rally with antinuclear activists in Shizuoka, Meyer attempted to 
contextualize the nuclear waste dumping issue in the wider structure of 
Pacifi c neo co lo nial ism, explaining, for example, how vegetable oil extracted 
in Belau was exported to the United States, where it was manufactured into 
synthetic soap and then sold back to Belauans at  great profi t. Similarly, he 
pointed to the ways Japa nese tourists fl ew in to Guam on Japa nese airlines, 
stayed at Japa nese  hotels, and spent money at Japanese- owned stores “so all 
the profi ts return to Japan.” As one participant  later opined, the invasion of 
Japa nese capitalism was happening much faster and deeper than the ties now 
being formed between the residents of the two countries.110 During the rally, 
numerous Japa nese participants referred to dumping in the “far- off ” Pacifi c 
Ocean but Meyer reminded them that, on the contrary, Japan was itself an 
island nation of the Pacifi c. He startled a few by pointing out that the dis-
tances from the proposed dumping site to Shizuoka and to Belau  were  really 
not that diff er ent. Moreover, the fact that this area was a popu lar fi shing 
ground for Shizuoka fi shermen made his point about proximity all the more 
convincing. Indeed, the encounter with this young Belauan made Shizuoka 
antinuclear activists rethink their rather parochial mentality. As one leader 
 later wrote, “From now on we want to deepen ties with the  people of the 
Pacifi c Islands (deeper than the ties of Japa nese and American capital  there), 
and create an open movement in Shizuoka [diff er ent from] the somewhat 
insular [movement to date].”111
Th e fi nal stop of Meyer’s journey was far to the north, in the city of 
Iwanai in Hokkaidō, where he met with local citizens and members of the 
local fi shing cooperative opposed to the construction of a nuclear power 
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plant in the nearby city of Tomari (the plant was eventually constructed). 
In a gathering with sixty local residents, one el derly participant off ered an 
emotional response, in which he explained how, during the Pacifi c War, he 
had been injured and taken to Belau. “As a Japa nese I want to apologize for 
causing trou ble to Belauan citizens who had nothing to do [with the con-
fl ict]. I  will spend the rest of my life opposing nuclear power.”112 Anastacio, 
Meyer, and other Pacifi c activists encountered similar emotive reactions in 
towns all across Japan in the early 1980s, and they left the country convinced 
of the groundswell of opposition to ocean dumping at the grassroots and 
even among some local offi  cials.
Th e visits of Pacifi c activists reached a crescendo in mid-1981, when a 
broad spectrum of offi  cials from around the Pacifi c fanned out across Japan. 
In May an offi  cial del e ga tion from the Northern Marianas and Guam arrived 
in Tokyo to submit a petition to the Japa nese Diet on the ocean dumping 
plan. Th e group included many individuals from the del e ga tion of the pre-
vious year, such as Governor Carlos Camacho, Northern Marianas House 
of Representatives speaker Joaquin Pangelinan, Saipan mayor Francisco M. 
Diaz, Tinian mayor Felipe C. Mendiola, Guam lieutenant governor Joseph 
Ada, and a number of other offi  cials from Guam.113 With the assistance of 
JSP chairman Asukata Ichio, the del e ga tion submitted their petition to the 
Diet on May 18 with the endorsement of sixty- two NGOs and governments 
worldwide and reinforced with the scientifi c analy sis of Professor Jackson 
Davis.114 Th e petition harshly criticized “worldwide policies promoting peace-
ful uses of nuclear power without fi rst developing adequate technology to dis-
pose of the waste.”115 At a citizens’ rally on the same day in Tokyo, attended 
by leading nuclear opponents such as Takagi Jinzaburō, Governor Camacho 
received enthusiastic applause for his speech pointing to the global structure 
of discrimination  behind nuclear power. As he explained, “For the  people 
who enjoy nuclear energy, it is immoral and even barbaric to force the danger 
upon presumably ‘unsophisticated  people’ with  little contact with the news 
media.”116 Th e group also had a thirty- minute meeting with STA director 
general Nakagawa Ichirō, at which he made his outrageous claim that the 
radioactive waste– fi lled canisters would be safe enough to “cuddle” and “go 
to sleep beside.”117 He also attempted to address the “not- in- my- backyard” 
issue, saying that “though the waste drums can be safely stored anywhere in 
the world, international law [i.e., the LDC] declares that they should not be 
disposed of on land or in  waters near it, but be done at the bottom of very 
deep ocean regions out of the reach of  humans. Some  people say that our 
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proposal means dumping one’s garbage in other  people’s yards, but we  don’t 
think so  because the dump site is in  waters a  little to our side of the mid- line 
between Japan and the Northern Marianas.”118
What became clearer and clearer to Japa nese in  these encounters was 
the direct link Pacifi c Islanders drew between the Japa nese nuclear power 
industry, the ocean dumping issue, and the neo co lo nial ism of large nations. 
As Roman Bedor explained to Japa nese audiences, “Our strug gle is without 
a doubt a strug gle for survival. Just as  people in Amer i ca and other coun-
tries want to live, we want to live too. Nevertheless, on the one side Amer i ca 
has designs for a nuclear military base, and on the other side the Japa nese 
government is considering disposing of radioactive waste in our ocean. . . . 
France has also tested the neutron bomb in the Pacifi c at Moruroa near to 
us. Moreover, another big country, China, is unilaterally using the Pacifi c 
as a target for ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles].”119 Put simply, 
“Th e last 400 years of history in Belau and Micronesia” had been “a history 
of colonization and exploitation,” and only now  were the  people of the Pa-
cifi c Islands “beginning to raise their voices in pursuit of in de pen dence and a 
nuclear  free region, breaking 400 years of enforced silence.”120
Such observations laid bare the real ity that this was a prob lem far more 
complex than the dumping of radioactive waste material in the Pacifi c. 
Japa nese nuclear power was entangled in a global nuclear architecture that 
could be truly comprehended and addressed only through a new transna-
tional perspective and politics that integrated local strug gles into the larger 
 battle against nuclearism. As the Australian Aboriginal activist Mick Miller 
put it during a 1980 visit to Japan, “Th e uranium dug up from our lands 
not only destroys us, ultimately the nuclear waste material Japan is attempt-
ing to forcibly dispose of in the ocean threatens the lives of Pacifi c island 
 peoples, and it  will come back [to haunt] Japan which relies on fi shing re-
sources of the Pacifi c Ocean.”121 Roman Bedor from Belau saw  things simi-
larly, commenting at a 1981 rally against the US- Japan Security Treaty that 
“the strug gle that we are in,  whether we are from the Pacifi c islands or you 
are from Japan, is the same strug gle. We want to survive.”122 Th e Japa nese 
government may have become an “atomic aggressor,” but Bedor and many 
other activists from the Pacifi c  were convinced the Japa nese  people  were not. 
Bedor felt nothing but gratitude and even a sense of brotherhood with fellow 
Japa nese activists: “Our country is only a small nation of 15,000  people. 
Receiving support from Japan in the midst of vari ous arduous strug gles was 
almost like fi nding a long- lost sibling. Th is was how we felt.”123
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Pacifi c Victory
Although the movement against the Japa nese government’s plan to ocean 
dispose of low- level radioactive waste began initially among offi  cials and civic 
activists on Guam and in the Northern Marianas in 1979, it quickly grew 
to include antinuclear activists within Japan  after Pacifi c activists began vis-
iting the country. From 1981 onward, the movement expanded even fur-
ther thanks to transnational cooperation between Belauans and Japa nese 
groups. In early 1983, Bedor embarked on a lecture tour of Eu rope with 
Australian Aboriginal activist Shorty O’Neill and Yokoyama Masaki of the 
ILP.124 Th e three  were warmly received in Berlin, West Germany, where 
the staunchly antinuclear Green Party, Die Grünen, was on the verge of a 
major breakthrough in federal politics in the upcoming election of March 6, 
1983. In an article for the No Nukes News Japan newsletter, West German 
activists in Friends of the Earth Berlin described how antinuclear strug gles 
a world away in the Pacifi c Ocean  were garnering  great support in their coun-
try, with many  people signing on to the petition against nuclear weapons 
testing and Japa nese dumping.125
Despite this growing international pressure, for a time Japa nese offi  -
cials attempted to maintain the government’s stance. Meeting with a group 
of Japa nese activists in 1983, one STA offi  cial stated that “we would like to 
proceed with nuclear waste ocean dumping as soon as pos si ble since its safety 
assessment has already been completed as far as Japan is concerned. We are 
investigating the possibility of land disposal, but for a country like Japan 
where land is limited, ocean dumping is an impor tant disposal method.”126 
But offi  cials at the STA knew only too well that by 1983 the dumping plan 
was doomed thanks to the vigorous transnational civic response. Indeed, the 
improbability of the plan was apparent to STA offi  cials as early as 1981, when 
they advised representatives from the Japan Catholic Council for Justice and 
Peace, who  were visiting to submit ten thousand signatures of opposition, 
that  there would defi nitely be no dumping in 1981 (despite the initial plan 
to commence that spring)  because of opposition from the Pacifi c.127 In meet-
ings with the Australian prime minister Bob Hawke in January 1984, Japa nese 
prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone advised that his country had postponed 
the commencement of dumping  until at least 1985.128 During a tour of 
the South Pacifi c  later the same year, Nakasone went even further, telling the 
prime ministers of Papua New Guinea and Fiji that the plan would “not be 
implemented against the wishes of concerned countries.”129
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Japa nese activists— whether A- bomb opponents or nuclear power plant 
protesters— walked away from their encounters with Pacifi c activists with a 
new perspective on the issue of nuclear energy in their country. As the dec-
laration of a 1986 Tokyo rally for nuclear- free Pacifi c noted, “Our eyes  were 
opened to the  peoples of the Pacifi c in the midst of our opposition to Japan’s 
planned ocean dumping of nuclear waste material. . . .  Th e  people of the 
Pacifi c  were forced to suff er when [their islands] became the battlefi elds 
for U.S.- Japan hostilities during the Second World War.  After the war they 
suff ered nuclear harm as the large nations conducted over 200 nuclear weap-
ons tests.”130 Closer to home, Japan— itself a victim of atomic weapons— 
was also implicated in this architecture of nuclearism and the associated 
injustices against the  people of the Pacifi c. As the declaration emphasized, 
“We Japa nese are members of the Pacifi c so the objective of a nuclear- free 
Pacifi c should be a task for us too. But now Japan, a country which experi-
enced the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, operates thirty- 
two nuclear power stations, and it has become a nuclear aggressor country 
 toward the  people of the Pacifi c as evidenced in uranium mining and the 
plan to ocean dump nuclear waste material.”131
Indeed, the antidumping movement among Pacifi c activists made 
two  things patently clear to the Japa nese antinuclear advocates involved. 
First,  there could be no such  thing as transnational solidarity  until the 
Japa nese antinuclear movement gave up its insular victim consciousness 
and faced the country’s atomic aggression head on. As No Nuke News 
Japan concluded in an April 1981 article at the height of the dispute, 
“Nuclear power promotion for the Japa nese means that Japan, the world’s 
fi rst victim of nuclear power,  will become a nuclear assailant. At the front 
end of the nuclear fuel cycle, it  will exploit and destroy the lives and envi-
ronment of indigenous  peoples, (e.g., the Black  people of South Africa, 
Native Americans, and Australian Aborigines) while at the [back] end of 
the cycle, impose spent nuclear wastes on the Pacifi c Island  people.”132 
 Th ere could be no genuine solidarity with the  people of the Pacifi c so long 
as the domestic movement was based solely on empathy  toward national 
victims. On the contrary, the movement revealed that silently accepting 
the energy policy of Japa nese elites— permitting them to construct power 
plants and nuclear fuel repro cessing facilities— inevitably and necessar-
ily invited criticism from  people at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle 
who could rightly accuse ordinary Japa nese of being perpetrators— 
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“atomic aggressors” in the destruction of their lives, their health, and their 
environment.133
Second, through this transnational movement the Japa nese activists in-
volved came to understand the perspective of Pacifi c protesters, who saw 
the antidumping movement in the context of a wider  battle against injustice, 
discrimination, and neo co lo nial ism. Yokoyama Masaki of the ILP astutely 
recognized this sentiment  after attending the Nuclear- Free Pacifi c conference 
in Pohnpei in 1978. As he observed, all of the issues— antiwar, anti- bases, 
anti- A- bomb testing— all of  these “necessarily lead to the prob lem of colo-
nial domination by large countries.” Hence, the antinuclear movement of 
Pacifi c island  peoples was quite naturally unfolding within their “strug gle for 
in de pen dence.”134 As he explained in an article written  after Pohnpei, 
Pacifi c activists’ “antinuclear strug gles necessarily evolved into in de pen dence 
strug gles  because local residents said ‘It is not us but you who should get out 
of  here!’ ” According to Yokoyama, this was something “diffi  cult to see” 
for  people “sitting in Tokyo.” “Debating the dangers of radioactive fallout 
and appealing for an end to atomic power  because hydrogen bombs  were 
the  enemy of humanity [made] it diffi  cult to comprehend the obviousness 
of ‘antinuclear strug gle = in de pen dence strug gle’ ” for Pacifi c Islanders and 
other indigenous  peoples.135
Transnational interactions in the 1970s and 1980s with Asian and Pacifi c 
activists forced the Japa nese groups involved to tackle regional iterations of 
environmental injustice disturbingly at odds with both global notions of 
“Spaceship Earth” and “our common  future,” as well as national narratives 
of victimhood. On one level, the strug gles of  people in  these regions reso-
nated with the earlier strug gles of Japa nese localities subjected to environ-
mental injustices in the name of economic growth and the national inter-
est. But, on another level, involvement in  these strug gles also helped fashion 
a new refl exivity (i.e., we are also aggressors) and a stronger focus on the 
invisible spaces of environmental injustice in a globalizing world of extreme 
inequity. By the mid-1980s, some within the Japa nese environmental move-
ment, such as Yokoyama Masaki,  were becoming more and more commit-
ted to this developing- nation perspective in their environmental outlook. 
Th ey began to suspect that pro cesses of globalization, rather than making the 
 whole Earth “our backyard,” in many ways seemed to be replicating the in-
justices of an earlier age of colonialism—if in a more sophisticated way. As 
I argue in the following chapter, one outcome of such thinking was to make 
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some Japa nese activists at the forefront of initiatives for the global environ-
ment more committed, not less, to the local as a critical site of environmen-
tal contention and action in an age of global- scale prob lems. A worldview 




Globality through Local Eyes
In June 1988, Dr. James Hansen, an atmospheric physicist at the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies, told a US congressional committee on energy and natu ral resources 
that he was 99  percent confi dent the temperature increases of the 1980s  were 
not caused by natu ral variation. Hansen’s analy sis of weather data in the 
United States for the previous hundred years revealed that the highest four 
temperatures had occurred in the 1980s and that current average tem-
peratures  were the highest in recorded history. Signifi cantly, Hansen at-
tributed the warming to anthropogenic emissions of green house gases such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2), which he said  were not only contributing to “extreme 
weather events” such as heat waves and droughts but also detrimentally 
transforming the global climate.1
Unusual and in some cases severe weather events at the time seemed to 
corroborate Hansen’s hypothesis. In Canada, the Calgary Winter Olympics 
witnessed some of the warmest temperatures ever experienced in the city at 
that time of year. On February 26 the mercury hit a balmy 64.6 degrees 
Fahrenheit (18.1 degrees Celsius).2 In the United States, a three- month 
drought aff ecting states from California to Georgia resulted in terrible har-
vests in the Midwest and the loss of thousands of head of livestock. Accord-
ing to Time magazine, temperatures in excess of 100 degrees Fahrenheit (37.8 
degrees Celsius) raised fears that the “dreaded green house eff ect . . .  might 
already be underway.”3 “Killer” hurricanes in the Ca rib bean, devastating 
fl oods covering four- fi fths of Bangladesh, and mysterious seal deaths in 
the North Sea only added to the sense that some dramatic pro cess of cli-
mate change had begun.4 Coupled with  these unsettling events  were growing 
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anx i eties about the negative  human health eff ects of the so- called hole in 
the ozone layer caused by damaging chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs). Of such 
concern was the issue that in September 1987 countries worldwide rallied 
to sign the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
in a last- ditch attempt to protect stratospheric ozone.
Sensing the mood of the moment, Time magazine abandoned its usual 
“Man of the Year” edition in early 1989, naming the Earth as its “Planet of 
the Year” for 1988. In his cover story, journalist Th omas A. Sancton observed 
how “every one suddenly sensed that this gyrating globe, this precious re-
pository of all the life that we know of, was in danger. No single individual, 
no event, no movement captured imaginations or dominated headlines more 
than the clump of rock and soil and  water and air that is our common 
home.”5 Th e Japa nese media responded even earlier to concern about the 
global environment. Beginning in late 1987, NHK, the public broadcaster, 
aired a highly rated tele vi sion series on worldwide environmental prob lems; 
in January 1988 the newspaper Asahi Shinbun devoted its New Year’s special 
edition to the “global environment”; and in September 1988, journalists at 
the newspaper Yomiuri Shinbun voted to make the “global environment” 
1989’s topic of the year.6 So intense was media, popu lar, and po liti cal atten-
tion throughout 1988 that some observers in Japan began to optimistically 
look  toward 1989 as “Year One of the Global Environmental Age” (Chikyū 
kankyō gannen) in the country.7
Th e combination of extreme weather, ozone holes, and dire scientifi c 
predictions encouraged po liti cal leaders of all ideological persuasions— 
ranging from Margaret Th atcher to Fidel Castro—to join in the environ-
mental discussion, if only as a form of lip ser vice. In May 1988, US presi-
dent George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev exchanged 
opinions on environmental issues for the fi rst time, paving the way for fur-
ther debate among leaders of the advanced industrialized nations’ Group of 
Seven (G7) during their Toronto summit the following month.  After the 
G7 summit, Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney hosted the landmark 
Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, at which scientists and 
policymakers from around the globe formulated rudimentary countermea-
sures to address global warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, and acid rain. 
Th e conference participants called for an ambitious 20  percent reduction 
in CO2 emissions, compared with 1988 levels, by the year 2000; the cre-
ation of a dedicated United Nations agency; and the implementation of a 
“fossil fuel tax” in developed nations to underwrite a global “atmospheric 
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conservation fund.”8 In a speech at the United Nations General Assembly 
in September, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze noted that 
“the biosphere recognizes no division into blocs, alliances, or systems. All 
share the same climatic system and no one is in a position to build his own 
isolated and in de pen dent line of environmental defense.”9 Th e culmination of 
this po liti cal attention to global environmental prob lems came in December 
1989 when the UN General Assembly deci ded to hold the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)— the Rio Earth 
Summit—in summer 1992. Th ereafter global environmental prob lems— 
mainly climate change— became the central focus of environmental debate 
and discourse worldwide.
Just as Th e Limits to Growth and Only One Earth had framed environ-
mental debate at events such as UNCHE in the early 1970s, the 1987 re-
port Our Common  Future by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED, also known as the Brundtland Commission  after its 
chairperson) brought the idea of “sustainable development” to the very cen-
ter of thinking about global environmental prob lems.10 As Clapp and 
Dauvergne explain, Our Common  Future “went further than any offi  cial in-
ternational document to provide a new defi nition of development with the 
environment at its core.”11 It defi ned the concept of sustainable development 
as “development that meets the needs of the pres ent without compromising 
the ability of  future generations to meet their own needs,” stressing three 
essential ele ments: environmental protection, economic growth, and social 
equity.12 In spirit, at least, Our Common  Future tried to chart a midpoint 
between the “North” and the “South” and between “market- liberal and 
institutionalist views on growth” and “social green and bioenvironmentalist 
views.”13 Economic growth and industrialization  were seen as not “neces-
sarily harmful to the environment,” and WCED members did not see any 
“limits” to  these pro cesses, as the MIT group had. On the contrary, similar 
to the Founex Report prepared by Tsuru Shigeto and  others before UNCHE, 
Our Common  Future pointed to poverty as a fundamental cause of environ-
mental disruption, hence it recognized the necessity and right of developing 
countries to industrialize and grow.14
For critics, however, the prob lem was how sustainable development 
would fi nd expression in a real world shot through with economic and 
po liti cal inequities. As Th iele explains, “While the commission spoke of ‘our 
common  future,’ the rhetorical question that critics asked was, whose common 
 future is  really being secured? Who [was] being protected by centralized 
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control over environmental aff airs, the local dwellers of the land or the bu-
reaucracies and corporations that rule[d] over them?”15 Such worries about 
autonomy in the face of an emergent global environmental governance struc-
ture dovetailed with concerns about the sudden dominance of global prob lems 
over and above other more localized yet nevertheless threatening environ-
mental issues for many, like clean  water or soil erosion. Just as Th ird 
World advocates had done at UNCHE in 1972, activists committed to an 
emancipatory environmentalism and global justice argued that dispropor-
tionate attention to global- level prob lems created a false image of unity that 
obscured more fundamental resource and power inequities worldwide. Th ey 
argued  there could not, in fact, would not, be any “common  future”  until 
such inequities  were addressed and resolved by the wealthy socie ties of the 
global North that  were responsible for the current environmental predica-
ment. To be sure, in its concept of sustainable development, Our Common 
 Future pointed at a  middle way, but as advocates of the developing world 
pointed out, the WECD’s defi nition did  little to address historical injustices 
that greatly disadvantaged the global poor. Although by no means of one 
voice, a number of prominent Japa nese environmental activists and groups 
agreed with and strongly advocated this latter opinion  because it resonated 
with their own worldviews on environmental injustice.
In this chapter I analyze the involvement of Japa nese groups in this mo-
ment of heightened attention to global- scale environmental prob lems be-
ginning in the late 1980s and marked by impor tant events such as the Earth 
Summit (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol climate conference (1997).  Th ese 
groups continued the legacy of Japa nese transnational activism from 
UNCHE in 1972 and subsequent movements opposing forms of pollution 
in East Asia and the Pacifi c, particularly in their focus on environmental 
injustices worldwide. First I trace the role of Japa nese groups in infl uential 
meetings and forums before and during UNCED— especially the Japan 
 People’s Forum for the United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (hereafter the  People’s Forum). I then analyze the ideas of leading 
activists such as Iwasaki Shunsuke on global- scale environmental prob lems. 
My primary objective is to show how extant notions of environmental in-
justice continued to deeply inform and shape approaches to the new global 
environmental agenda. While many Japa nese activists did indeed became 
vocal advocates of a global perspective and ideas like “global citizenship,” 
 there was a steadfast core who remained resolutely committed to a very lo-
calized or situated paradigm of environmental injustice. Th e globe was 
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warming, the ozone layer thinning, and tropical rain forests disappearing, 
but  these activists asserted that such prob lems needed to be anchored in lived 
experience if they  were to be solved in an equitable way. Th ey argued that 
par tic u lar consideration must be aff orded to the lived experience of  those 
most marginalized within nations and globally.
Japa nese groups such as the  People’s Forum tended to resist globalizing 
discourses, much as their pre de ces sors had rejected collectivist ideologies of 
the “national interest,”  because they believed such ideas obscured fundamen-
tal structures of discrimination and marginalization. Instead of global solu-
tions they proposed pro cesses of “endogenous development” that would put 
control of life spaces in the hands of local  people as opposed to corpora-
tions, governments, or the institutions of  “global environmental governance”— 
regardless of how benign or well- intended  these might be.16 Th e central 
assertion of prominent activists such as Iwasaki Shunsuke of the  People’s 
Forum was that local self- management and autonomy,  whether in the devel-
oped or developing world, could form the basis of an au then tic and grounded 
approach to global environmental prob lems from the bottom up.
 Needless to say, in an age of resplendent globalism, this approach left 
itself open to criticisms of naïve and blinkered NIMBYism— the Old Maid 
mentality. But it was more nuanced and historically informed than that. 
Japa nese groups’ appeals for the rights of local communities, developing na-
tions, and other marginalized groups in an age of global- scale prob lems 
drew on a paradigm of environmental injustice  shaped by fi rsthand knowledge 
of suff ering and strug gle at Minamata, Grassy Narrows, Incheon, Belau, and 
other local spaces worldwide. Viewed from this bottom-up perspective, the 
prob lem was not so much in the concept of sustainable development, which 
in ways resonated with their outlook. Rather, it was how this concept would 
be defi ned and who or what would control and monitor its implementation— 
questions, of course, that involved fundamental issues of power, autonomy, 
rights, and justice.
Japa nese Activism in the Global Environmental 
Movement: From Asia to Rio
Th e late 1980s was a moment of frenzied or ga ni za tion and activity for Japa-
nese environmental NGOs, reminiscent on a smaller scale of the wave of 
activism during the country’s “long environmental 1960s.”17 Numerous vet-
eran transnational organ izations opened branches in Japan around this 
time. In 1989, for instance, both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
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began operations in the country, joining their more moderate cousin the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), which had been in Japan since 1971. 
Greenpeace and FoE immediately took aim at the Japa nese state, lobbying 
vigorously on climate change issues and the environmental eff ects of Japa-
nese offi  cial development assistance (ODA) throughout Asia.18  Th ese estab-
lished transnational NGOs  were “instrumental in disseminating knowledge 
and environmental values” from abroad and helping to “insert” environmen-
tal groups “into Japan’s policy- making pro cess.”19 Th ey also provided valu-
able logistical and fi nancial support to domestic groups with a transnational 
and global focus.
But it was a new cadre of homegrown environmental NGOs that led the 
civic engagement with global environmental prob lems from around the 
late 1980s. Although  these homegrown groups  were directly responding to 
the new global environmental agenda of the late 1980s, many— including 
some of the most infl uential— continued to draw on an environmentalism 
attentive to  human rights, justice, and equity. Atsuko Satō has usefully de-
fi ned  these organ izations as “transnationalized domestic actors,” by which 
she means groups that do not have solid transnational institutional struc-
tures, like Greenpeace or FoE, but instead, “use transnational networks when 
necessary” while maintaining their “autonomy within a country.”20 Early 
prominent examples include the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network 
(JATAN), formed in 1987 by the consumer activist Kuroda Yōichi, and 
the Citizens’ Alliance for Saving Earth and Atmosphere (CASA), formed 
by antipollution groups, consumer associations, scientists, and  lawyers in 
1989. Both of  these groups  adopted a decidedly anthropocentric focus in 
their activism for the global environment. In its movement for rain forest 
protection, JATAN, for example, stressed the plight of forest  peoples whose 
living spaces  were being decimated by logging over and above the destruc-
tion of virgin rain forests. CASA, likewise, drew on notions of “aggressors” 
and “victims” in its emphasis on Japan’s international culpability as a per-
petrator of atmospheric pollution. Its leaders drew heavi ly on their earlier 
experience supporting victims in strug gles against air pollution in Japan. 
In December 1996, an alliance of groups including CASA and the WWF 
established the infl uential Kiko Forum, which brought together some 225 
groups committed to infl uencing proceedings at the Th ird Session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Kyoto City the following 
year. Similar to CASA, Kiko Forum leaders’ backgrounds in pollution 
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victim advocacy within Japan deeply  shaped their network’s attention to 
questions of equity and justice in responding to climate change. To invoke 
Sidney Tarrow’s terminology again, the leaders of  these groups  were ideally 
positioned to act as the “connective tissue” in this critical phase of environ-
mental globalism, not only between Japa nese groups and the outside world 
but now also between marginalized groups and the advocates of an all- 
encompassing global agenda for the environment. In this sense they contin-
ued in the tradition of rooted cosmopolitism begun many de cades earlier 
by Ui Jun, Harada Masazumi, Tsuru Shigeto, and  others.
CASA’s expanding agenda from local industrial pollution to global- scale 
environmental prob lems off ers an excellent example of the way  these trans-
nationalized domestic actors embraced the new agendas while staying faithful 
to local perspectives and earlier paradigms of environmental injustice. Es-
tablished in March 1989 by the  lawyer Yamamura Tsunetoshi and fellow 
activists in western Honshū (the Kansai region), CASA was initially called 
the Citizens’ Conference to Consider Atmospheric Prob lems. Similar to the 
 People’s Forum in Tokyo, it consisted of grassroots groups and professionals 
with track rec ords in local, transnational, and global environmental issues. 
Founding members included scientists researching atmospheric pollution; 
the Osaka Alliance of Consumer Associations, which had a background in 
CFC and global warming issues;  lawyers such as Yamamura, with experi-
ence in environmental litigation; and local residents groups that had been 
protesting air pollution in the Osaka region from as early as the 1970s.21 As 
a  lawyer involved in domestic environmental litigation for pollution victims, 
Yamamura was instrumental in formulating and advocating the notion of 
“environmental rights” in the early 1970s as a method of preemptive regu-
latory protection for ordinary citizens. Together with Ui Jun and Japa nese 
pollution victims, he and fellow  lawyers in the JFBA had traveled to UNCHE 
in Stockholm in 1972 to promote this idea by way of a Declaration on En-
vironmental Rights. Although their main aim in Stockholm had been 
primarily to advocate for the rights of domestic pollution victims in Japan, 
meeting with foreign NGOs and discussing environmental prob lems in other 
countries proved to be a “decisive” moment for Yamamura and  others. As 
Yamamura  later explained, it was a fi rst step  toward linking their strug gle 
with domestic pollution to a broader global environmental awareness.22 In-
deed, so “domestic” was his mind- set at the time that Yamamura recalled 
being surprised when a foreign NGO gave him a pamphlet on the prob lem 
of Japa nese whaling.23 Yamamura and CASA activists went on to be involved 
184     Chapter 6
in the  People’s Forum in 1991 and 1992, and thereafter they participated in 
COP (Conference of the Parties) meetings for the UNFCCC and in the 
1996–1997 Kiko Forum movement. So, on one level, international experi-
ence undoubtedly fostered a more global outlook and approach among CASA 
activists.
But Yamamura and his colleagues in the movement stayed committed 
to local prob lems, knowledge, and perspectives. CASA was instrumental, 
for instance, in promoting Japa nese grassroots citizen science practices such 
as air pollution monitoring to foreign activists. In 1994, for example, the 
group sent atmospheric pollution monitoring equipment to thirty- four 
NGOs in seventeen developing countries worldwide. CASA also became a 
member of the Atmospheric Action Network of East Asia formed in Seoul, 
South  Korea, in 1995 by civic groups from China, Japan, South  Korea, Mon-
golia, and Rus sia. Th is initiative set out to become a grassroots network of 
citizens collaboratively monitoring air pollution in the Northeast Asian re-
gion. Th us, CASA’s involvement in global events and pro cesses such as 
UNCHE, UNCED, and the UNFCCC pro cess grew out of a local and re-
gional program to address air pollution and to pursue justice for pollution 
victims. Climate change and ozone depletion  were understood less as new 
issues than as extensions of  these more concrete prob lems.
Other Japa nese NGOs concerned about global- scale environmental 
prob lems began to collectively or ga nize and network in the late 1980s, pri-
marily in response to what they perceived as attempts by Prime Minister 
Takeshita Noboru and environmental bureaucrats to monopolize leadership 
over the emergent global environmental agenda. Th e immediate stimulus 
was the Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and  Human Re-
sponses  toward Sustainable Development, cosponsored by the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) and the Japa nese government and presided 
over by Takeshita from September 11 to 13, 1989.24 In response, activists 
or ga nized “ counter conferences” in the Kansai region (Osaka and Kyoto) 
and Tokyo. From September 8 to 10, 1989, Kansai activists in CASA, FoE 
Japan, the Rachel Carson Association of Japan, and the National Pollu-
tion Victims Alliance convened the Symposium on the Global Environ-
ment and Atmospheric Pollution, which attracted around 1,400 participants 
(1,250  in Osaka, 150  in Kyoto) and included thirteen invitees from nine 
foreign countries.25 Th e symposium was particularly signifi cant in its bold 
attempt to fuse the local and the global: participating groups ranged from 
domestic victims’ movements opposing localized air pollution all the way 
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to newer groups focused on global- scale environmental issues like climate 
change. Im por tant too was the focus on rights, symbolized most poignantly 
on the fi nal day of the Osaka symposium when participants sang a rendition 
of the United States Civil Rights Movement anthem We  Shall Overcome, 
including a verse for “No More Hiroshimas.”26 Predictably, discussion 
gravitated around the (dis)connection between the new global environ-
mental prob lems and the lingering, unsolved North- South issue. Margin-
alized communities received pride of place at the symposium, including a 
slideshow on the victims of atmospheric pollution in Japan and pre sen-
ta tions by representatives of indigenous  peoples in the Amazonian rain 
forest.
In Tokyo, activists held a similar event titled the International Citizens’ 
Conference to Consider the Global Environment and Japan’s Role. Th e 
Tokyo conference attracted around 1,500 participants from within Japan and 
twenty invited guests from ten foreign countries, including progressive 
 lawyers, specialists on global environmental prob lems, and representatives 
from indigenous groups such as the Kayapo  People of the Amazon.27 Like 
the offi  cial Takeshita event, participants addressed global warming, extreme 
weather, rain forest preservation, biodiversity, and the destructive eff ects of 
ODA, but they did so through the eyes of local victims. For instance, spe-
cial attention was aff orded to grassroots groups within Japan from Mina-
mata, from communities aff ected by resort developments, and from urban 
neighborhoods suff ering the eff ects of automobile emissions. Th e domestic 
groups  were joined by representatives from the Amazonian Kayapo  People, 
the Penan forest  people of Sarawak, and activists from West Papua, Th ailand, 
and the Philippines— all of whom repeated a common refrain about daily 
lives ravaged by capital and ODA from rich nations.28
Th e Tokyo Appeal promulgated on the fi nal day of the Tokyo confer-
ence fl atly rejected the notion of “sustainable development” and laid blame 
on “modern industrial society,” which had “expanded from the 16th  century” 
onward on the basis of “exploiting nature and plundering resources from 
colonies.” It was this history that produced the system of “mass consump-
tion of fossil fuels” and “the use of chemical substances” that could not be 
safely reincorporated into the “natu ral cycle.” Th e appeal argued that, to the 
extent mass use of synthetic chemicals and fossil fuels persisted, “economic 
growth” and “development” could not be “harmonized” with “global envi-
ronmental protection.” “Technological contrivances” would not produce so-
lutions, only more “contradictions” for  future generations and for the Th ird 
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World. Necessary  were genuine changes in the lifestyles of citizens in wealthy 
countries, in the logic of administrative organ izations and corporations, and 
in the understanding of and support for NGOs.29
Th e culmination of  these grassroots initiatives for global environmen-
tal prob lems came in May 1991, when three hundred activists from sixty 
civic groups throughout Japan gathered at Tokyo’s Meiji University to es-
tablish the  People’s Forum, which would represent Japan at the NGO events 
at UNCED.30 Th e  People’s Forum was a fascinating blend of the national 
and the transnational, the local and the global, and the old and the new, 
and, in this sense, was an orga nizational manifestation of organizers’ strong 
belief that global- scale environmental prob lems should not— indeed, could 
not—be separated from questions of local rights, equity, and justice. Promi-
nent fi gures in the  People’s Forum, such as Miyamoto Ken’ichi and 
Iwasaki Shunsuke, drew on years of activism for marginalized groups. Miya-
moto, as we have seen, was a longtime advocate for industrial pollution 
victims, while Iwasaki Shunsuke, a young architecture professor and leader 
of the  People’s Forum, had experience working with disadvantaged com-
munities throughout Asia as director of the Japan International Volunteer 
Center (JVC). Member organ izations represented a broad spectrum, includ-
ing groups in very local strug gles such as the Association to Protect the 
Nagara River in Aichi Prefecture, nationwide affi  liations like the Japan Fed-
eration of Bar Associations (JFBA), and internationally active NGOs such 
as CASA, JATAN, and FoE Japan.31 Iwasaki Shunsuke stated emphati-
cally that the  People’s Forum was committed to a “Glocal Action Plan,” 
which ensured that global environmental initiatives did not lose sight of all- 
impor tant local prob lems.32
We can see this perspective clearly in the activities of the  People’s Forum 
in the lead-up to UNCED. In December 1991, for instance, representatives 
of the forum traveled to France to take part in the Paris NGO conference 
on the environment sponsored by the French government and attended by 
close to nine hundred activists from 150 countries. As if to confi rm their 
own perspective, the overwhelming conclusion of the conference was that 
developed countries  were to blame for both global environmental prob lems 
and poverty in developing nations.33 Back in Japan, for three days begin-
ning on May 1, 1992, the group sponsored the Forum on Asian NGOs and 
the Global Environment in Yokohama City. Once again, the explicit objec-
tive of this event was “to make clear the connection between the prob lems 
experienced by  people living in Japan and the environmental prob lems 
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 experienced by  people in the Th ird World, particularly Asia.”34 Around 
2,700  people participated over the three days of the event, which featured 
invited foreign participants from the Narmada Dam opposition movement 
in India, the Th ird World Network in Malaysia, the Environmental Res-
toration Proj ect in Th ailand, and representatives of indigenous Peruvian 
 peoples.35 For Iwasaki and other leaders of the  People’s Forum, this and other 
events leading up to UNCED represented concrete ways for their movement 
to “go to Brazil via Asia.”36 As Iwasaki  later recounted, from the outset their 
explicit objective was to avoid participating in UNCED simply as activists 
from a rich country. Rather,  because Japan was located in Asia, Iwasaki and 
 others in the forum set out to “clarify” their “position” and to “fi nd points 
in common” with  people in Th ailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
and elsewhere.37 Japan’s position as a wealthy non- Western country seems to 
have engendered the belief in forum members that they had a responsibility 
to support and advocate for the globally marginalized.
Th e  People’s Forum advocated three fundamental princi ples with 
re spect to global environmental prob lems: fi rst, that the notion of 
“development”— including “sustainable development”— needed radical re-
defi nition; second, that the local perspective be a central ele ment in any pro-
gram to address global environmental prob lems; and, third, that developed 
nations and their citizens recognize and act on their responsibility to the 
developing world.38  Th ese princi ples put the forum somewhat at odds with 
mainstream discourses and approaches to global environmental prob lems 
yet, as I have noted, unmistakably within a domestic tradition of activism 
animated by notions of rights and justice.
Dissatisfi ed by what they saw as the elite- monopolized discourse on 
“sustainable development,” Iwasaki and  others in the  People’s Forum proposed 
a radical recalibration of “development”— reminiscent of Tsuru Shigeto’s en-
deavors in the 1970s—by introducing notions of equity, interconnectivity, 
and especially endogeneity into its defi nitional par ameters. Th e forum’s 
Kanagawa Declaration of 1992, for example, argued that the concept of 
development must be about far more than the pro cessing of “ things,” and 
must also include the fair division of resources and the active construction 
of interconnections between  people. Borrowing from Ardhen Chatterjee of 
the Regional Center for Development Cooperation in India, the declara-
tion proposed that development for  human beings was about “enriching the 
division of  things with other  people and living  things” as well as “helping 
to strengthen social connections with the very weakest part of society or the 
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very weakest  people.”39 Indeed, the development of social connections be-
tween the “materially wealthy and the very poorest  people” would be vital 
in stimulating citizens in wealthy nations to adopt the “prob lems of  people in 
developing countries” as “their own prob lems.” Conversely, development 
proceeding through the established channels of ODA and foreign investment 
did nothing to “restrain” the “unlimited material desires” of the rich, nor 
did it assist the “ people of Southern countries” in “realizing in de pen dent 
socie ties”  free from the “overwhelming domination of northern countries.” 40 
By broadening the defi nition of development beyond material pro cesses of 
economic growth to include notions of resource equity and social develop-
ment, then, the Kanagawa Declaration proposed a more multifaceted con-
ceptualization that balanced the material with the ethical. Herein the  people 
of the South  were not merely seen as passive subjects in need of develop-
ment from without (or, more to the point, from above), but as  humans with 
the innate right to live their lives in de pen dently with dignity.
In place of the expansionistic and evolutionistic development model 
dominant  under Eurocentric modernity, the  People’s Forum proposed in-
ternal or endogenous development as a revolutionary modifi cation to the 
modern concept of development that would supposedly “transcend the con-
tradictions of ‘environment’ and ‘development’ ” and serve as the central 
dynamic of a “sustainable society of the twenty- fi rst  century.” 41 Th is notion 
of endogeneity called on  people in both the global North and global South 
to satisfy living needs “not by bringing  things from afar” but from within 
the “cycle of materials in one’s locality.” 42 Th e Kanagawa Declaration en-
couraged  people to “source food and other materials necessary for daily life 
from places as close as pos si ble” to where they  were living and, moreover, 
“not to dispose of waste material in places far away but to solve the prob lem 
close to home.” 43 Indeed, dealing with waste locally could help Japa nese 
 people rethink, for example, their “throw- away culture” and begin search-
ing for ways to reuse and recycle that waste. To promote endogenous devel-
opment the declaration proposed a rather blunt policy “stick” in the form 
of a “resource import tax” to be imposed on all new resource imports into 
developed countries, the revenues of which would be transferred back to de-
veloping nations “for the restoration of environments destroyed by resource 
theft.” 44
Of course, the argument about endogeneity was not that  people return 
to a world of absolute self- suffi  ciency and dis- integration but, on the con-
trary, through an exploration of local alternatives, that they confront the 
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 human and environmental costs produced by a modernity underwritten by 
relentless expansionistic development radiating out from North to South. 
As a  People’s Forum publication for the Earth Summit noted, “It is necessary 
to gain a clear understanding of how and by what means the  things sur-
rounding us— food, paper, timber, fuel, energy, industrial raw materials 
and so on— have reached us, and who is aff ected and in what way.” 45 For 
example,  people needed to think about the connection between the “struc-
ture” of a “wasteful, throwaway society” like Japan and “the destruction of 
natu ral environments and local socie ties in developing countries.” 46 Since 
local resources “fundamentally belong to the  people in that area,” the de-
velopment and utilization of  those resources had to be “based on the  will 
of the  people in  those localities,” especially the most rooted individuals like 
“ women” and “indigenous  people.” 47
Under lying the  People’s Forum’s notion of endogenous development 
was an acute sensitivity to the Japa nese experience with industrial pollution 
and environmental injustice. A common theme  running through all of the 
 People’s Forum’s statements at this time was that the Japa nese  people had 
much to teach the world about their traumatic strug gle with industrial pol-
lution. Th e forum’s offi  cial publication for the Earth Summit, the  People’s 
Voice of Japan, for instance, identifi ed three lessons Japan could teach the 
world. First, contrary to the implicit endorsement of economic growth in 
the concept of sustainable development, the Japa nese experience of industrial 
modernization and pollution taught that  there  were clear and incontro-
vertible limits to growth that, if  violated, would result in unconscionable 
 human injustices. Th e victims in Minamata, in Yokkaichi, and in the deci-
mated forests of the Philippines and Malaysia  were proof of this. Second, 
even if development somehow proceeded without physiological and natu ral 
side eff ects, the Japa nese experience suggested that affl  uence born of break-
neck economic development did not necessarily equate to happiness. Since 
the dawn of the country’s industrial modernization in the mid- nineteenth 
 century, the Japa nese had recklessly pursued wealth and power. In the mid- 
twentieth  century this resulted in national decimation and millions of 
“meaningless deaths” at home and throughout Asia and the Pacifi c.48 In the 
1960s it resulted in the environmental and  human tragedies of industrial 
pollution, and it created a society in which  people worked themselves to 
death for the good of the corporation. As the  People’s Voice of Japan observed, 
it was “quite clear” that rapid economic growth in developed countries such 
as Japan had “most certainly not caused the advancement of a fulfi lling life 
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for citizens.” 49 Moreover, the Japa nese response to pollution— especially in 
terms of regulatory reform— off ered a sobering warning about the vulner-
ability of apparent solutions such as “sustainable development.” Th e  People’s 
Voice of Japan reminded readers about Japan’s Kōgai Taisaku Kihonhō 
(Basic law for environmental pollution control) of 1967, which anticipated 
the idea of sustainable development in its infamous “harmonization” clause, 
stating that “preservation of the living environment should proceed in har-
mony with sound economic development.” “But, in the context of a market 
economy, this meant that environmental conservation was limited to the 
extent necessary . . .  for industry to maintain normal levels of profi t, with 
weak environmental quality standards for pollution.”50 Th e cautionary tale 
from Japan, according to the  People’s Voice of Japan, was that “the notion of 
‘sustainable development’  adopted by UNCED must not be based on a ‘har-
mony’ type concept which admits environmental conservation only for the 
purpose of development to sustain the economy.”51
Lying beneath and, to a degree, predetermining their commitment to 
endogeneity and localism was the  People’s Forum’s viewpoint that solutions 
to global environmental prob lems would hinge on the capacity of developed 
nations’ to accept their responsibility  toward the developing world. Th e Japa-
nese Citizens’ Earth Charter, promulgated by the  People’s Forum prior to 
UNCED, described the Earth Summit as a truly historic opportunity to “re-
think the nationalism and evolutionary theory” beating at the heart of a 
modernity that knew no limits.52 “Northern countries, including Japan,” had 
to “accept responsibility for their signifi cant role in the destruction of the 
global environment” and for dividing the world into “rich socie ties” and 
“poor socie ties” over the course of half a millennia.53 Th e “fi rst step  toward 
stopping environmental destruction and realizing a sustainable global soci-
ety” would be the “restoration of equality between the countries of the north 
and  those of the south.”54 Th e developed countries, which had become 
wealthy through imperialistic expansion and plundering the resources of the 
weak, needed to partake in serious historical soul- searching. “Solving the 
North- South prob lem” was thus a central issue in the movement to “protect 
the global environment.”55
From this perspective it became pos si ble for activists in the  People’s 
Forum to position the Earth Summit on numerous historical vectors. Th e 
year 1992 did indeed represent the twentieth anniversary of UNCHE in 
Stockholm, where Japa nese pollution victims had appealed to the  human 
limits to growth and Tsuru Shigeto to  human welfare- sensitive development. 
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But 1992 also arguably marked fi ve hundred years since the beginning of 
Western aggression and exploitation of the world in 1492. It was with this 
profound sense of historical responsibility to the Th ird World, and especially 
Asia, that members of the  People’s Forum and other Japa nese groups de-
parted for Brazil in the summer of 1992.
The Earth Summit as Transnational Contact Zone
Hosted by the Brazilian government, the United Nations Conference on En-
vironment and Development (UNCED) took place from June 3 to June 14, 
1992, at the Riocentro Exhibition and Convention Center about twenty- fi ve 
miles (forty kilo meters) from downtown Rio de Janeiro. Representatives from 
172 governments and 108 heads of state attended the “Earth Summit,” as it 
was informally named, during which they discussed the principal themes of 
the environment and sustainable development. Participating countries 
signed on to a number of agreements and declarations, including the Rio 
Declaration and its implementation strategy, Agenda 21; the Statement of 
Forest Princi ples; the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity; 
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC). Th e summit also established a number of follow-up mechanisms, 
such as the Commission on Sustainable Development, which was charged 
with reviewing the implementation of Agenda 21 in the ensuing years.56 Th e 
Earth Summit was “one of the most publicized large- scale po liti cal events 
since the end of the Cold War” and the largest UN conference up to that 
point.57 As Clapp and Dauvergne note, the Brundtland Commission’s 
recommendations— especially the concept of sustainable development— 
“dominated discussions at Rio.” It was “po liti cally easy” for governments to 
support the summit’s objective to promote “more growth with more envi-
ronmental protection.” Few nations needed convincing that more growth 
would actually produce a “better environment.”58 At the summit’s end, 
Secretary- General Maurice Strong hailed the event as a “historic moment 
for humanity,” adding that, although documents such as Agenda 21 and the 
UNFCCC  were “weakened by compromise and negotiation,” the summit 
still created “the most comprehensive and, if implemented, eff ective program 
of action ever sanctioned by the international community.”59
Th e Earth Summit was not without its controversies and criticisms, 
however. In statements made before the summit, US president George H. W. 
Bush more or less eliminated any possibility of an agreement on numerical 
targets or dates for green house gas emission reductions  under the UNFCCC.60 
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Japa nese prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi also raised eyebrows  after an-
nouncing he would not be attending UNCED  because of impor tant Diet 
deliberations on Japan Self- Defense Force participation in UN peace-
keeping operations. He instead delivered a video address and sent his chief 
cabinet secretary, Katō Kōichi.61 Both Japa nese and foreigners alike  were 
appalled by this decision, which prompted NGOs to confer on Miyazawa 
and the Japa nese government the “Golden Baby Award” for the summit. As 
Honda Masakazu of the newspaper Asahi Shinbun  later confessed,  after 
Miyazawa’s decision  there was “nothing more embarrassing” than being a 
Japa nese citizen at the Earth Summit.62
But beyond such immediate controversies,  there  were deeper reserva-
tions about the meaning of a summit that appeared to so seamlessly com-
bine environmental protection with economic development. Some worried 
about the infl uence of big business  because of Maurice Strong’s background 
in industry as well as the corporate money funding the event.63  Others, such 
as Japa nese activists in the  People’s Forum, feared that the managerial tone 
of discussion might undermine the legitimacy of local responses to global 
prob lems.64 For the most cynical of Japa nese critics, “global environmental 
protection” had been hijacked by the proj ect of promoting economic growth 
and was now nothing more than a shrewd method to solidify North- South 
inequities.65 In his acerbic essay “ ‘Chikyū Samitto’ no giman” (Th e fraud 
of the Earth Summit), Yamamoto Kazuhiko, secretary- general of the Zen-
koku Shizen Hogō Rengō (National Nature Conservation Alliance), ar-
gued that “sustainable development” meant no more than “maintaining the 
system.” It was “crystal clear” he said, that the “provision of funding and 
technology” to developing nations was merely “for the benefi t of advanced 
countries.”66 Many activists— not all from developing countries— felt un-
comfortable with Our Common  Future- type approaches to environmental 
issues  because they believed that the environmental crisis was “precipi-
tated almost exclusively by . . .  wasteful and excessive consumption in the 
North”—in other words, by the 20  percent of the world’s population con-
suming roughly 80  percent of its resources.67 Rather than “commonalities,” 
some, such as Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain of the Centre for Science 
and Environment in India, called for a clear distinction between the neces-
sary “survival emissions” of the South and the reducible “luxury emissions” 
of the North.68 As the British environmental writer Fred Pearce perceptively 
wondered, “Why is it that Western environmentalists worry so much about 
population growth in poor countries when each new child born in North 
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Amer i ca or Eu rope  will consume 10 or 100 times as much of the world’s 
resources and contribute many times as much pollution? A three- child Amer-
ican  family is, in logic, many more times as dangerous to the planet than 
an eight- (or even an eighty-) child African  family.”69
Most of  these criticisms of the Earth Summit emanated from the 
“Global Forum,” a parallel conference for NGOs held in Flamengo Park in 
downtown Rio about one hour by car from the main summit at Riocentro. 
As many attendees noted, the geo graph i cal separation of the Global Forum 
from the Earth Summit was clearly a deliberate strategy on the part of the 
Brazilian authorities to contain popu lar energies within a demarcated area 
well away from the formal proceedings where they could potentially cause 
trou ble. Th e Riocentro summit venue itself was also awash with security, 
ensuring against any “undesirable” events arising in the vicinity.70 Yonemoto 
Shōhei, a historian and science commentator who participated with Japa-
nese NGOs, even suggested that the Global Forum be understood as a sep-
arate meeting of NGOs, rather than as a launchpad for directly lobbying 
and pressuring offi  cial del e ga tions to the main summit. Th is was certainly 
true for Japa nese NGOs, although perhaps less so for US and Eu ro pean 
groups, with their stronger lobbying capacities.71
Nevertheless, the Global Forum was a landmark transnational event 
for environmental NGOs and, in fact, a landmark event in the broader de-
velopment of global civil society in the con temporary world. Around 17,000 
members of 7,500 NGOs from 165 countries participated in the events at 
Flamengo Park. A report by the Center for Applied Studies recorded the 
breakdown of participants by region as follows: Latin Amer i ca, 41  percent; 
North Amer i ca, 22  percent; Eu rope, 20  percent; Asia, 12  percent; and Africa, 
4  percent.72 Th e forum consisted of four ele ments: (1) seven hundred booths 
and tent exhibitions set up by NGOs for information exchange and network-
ing; (2) public lectures, seminars, and fora held at a central venue called “Th e 
Structure”; (3) the preparation of around thirty alternative NGO treaties on 
climate change, forest destruction, species diversity, agriculture, food safety, 
racial discrimination, the military,  women,  children, education, and indig-
enous  people; and (4) the dissemination of information on daily developments 
at the Earth Summit.73
Th e Global Forum was as much a festive and performative space as it 
was a venue for dispassionate discussion and debate on the environment— 
hence the vari ous characterizations of it as a “circus,” a “jungle,” and an “NGO 
Expo.”74 Kikuchi Yumi, of the Japan Environmental Action Network,  likened 
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Flamengo Park to “all the circuses in the world having come to Rio” at once.75 
Among the gaudier of the events at the Global Forum was the opening cere-
mony, attended by Maurice Strong, Gro Harlem Brundtland, and the star of 
the James Bond 007 fi lms, Roger Moore, all of whom watched on as a replica 
Viking ship, the Gaia, arrived with six youths bearing a message on environ-
mental protection for po liti cal leaders from the  people of Planet Earth. Add-
ing to the po liti cal theater of the moment, on the beach a group of Rio street 
 children raised banners reading “Gaia Go Home!” and “Five million rich 
men show off ! Give the money to the favelas [slums].”76
Visitors to the forum  were uniformly intrigued and, in some cases, a 
 little overwhelmed by the carnivalesque of it all. In a fascinating dispatch 
written for the  Women’s Feature Ser vice, Sujata Madhok described a mish-
mash of ideas, images, colors, and per for mances: “An earnest young Japa-
nese girl asks you to sign a petition against the proposed Nagara dam in 
Japan”; a poster at the  women’s tent asserts “How’s God? She’s black”; “doz-
ens of trash cans around— diff er ent ones for wet and dry wastes. Th e toilets 
are eco too, the latest, non- fl ush,  water saving device from the US”; “solar 
cooker stalls stand cheek by jowl with the ‘fridge of the  future’— a green 
refrigerator that does not emit CFCs . . .  and thin the ozone layer”; “a close-
up of India’s Nirmala Mata stares you in the face with the promise of 
Sahaja Yoga and instant bliss”; and “as you walk away from this fi esta  there 
comes a last message from the Hare Krishna cult: ‘Consider the cows’ it tells 
you cryptically.”77 Another popu lar exhibit at the forum was the “Lie- O- 
Meter,” a device depicting a Pinocchio- like fi gure whose extendable nose was 
used to indicate the “sincerity” (or lack thereof ) of governmental decla-
rations and commitments on the environment ranging from zero to 
100  percent. US president Bush’s declarations on biodiversity, for instance, 
pushed the Lie- O- Meter up to 100  percent, while the Japa nese government 
scored in the high ninetieth percentiles for its environmental declarations.78
Amid this fl urry of activity, Japa nese NGOs operated one of the larg-
est tents, the Japan  People’s Center, which served as the base for Japa nese 
civic activity at the Global Forum.79 Around eighty Japa nese groups 
comprising 360 activists traveled to Brazil to participate in the events at 
Flamengo Park. Among  these, the  People’s Forum, the central organ izing 
group for Japa nese NGOs, sent thirty- fi ve representatives.80 During the 
forum the Japan  People’s Center hosted a range of seminars, dialogues, 
and debates, many of which featured activists from developing countries, 
 especially throughout Asia. Th e connection between Asia and Japan was 
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also a dominant theme in the many booths and exhibits run by Japa nese 
NGOs both inside and in the vicinity of their tent.81 Ui Jun, who had led 
the small Japa nese NGO del e ga tion to UNCHE twenty years earlier, ob-
served that the participation from Japan this time stood out both in scale 
and quality compared with Stockholm.82 He was deeply impressed by the 
positive impact of Japa nese groups at the Global Forum, which ranged all 
the way from natu ral farming movements to  children’s road safety initia-
tives, evidencing for him the sheer breadth of groups involved in global 
environmental prob lems in Japan. Ui himself participated in a symposium 
or ga nized by the Association to Protect the Nagara River, during which 
activists, not surprisingly, drew connections between their local anti- dam 
movement in Japan and the strug gle of Indian activists to stop the Narmada 
Dam proj ect in Gujarat.83
Of course, not all was perfect. Ui pointed out that Japa nese govern-
mental attitudes  toward civic groups had changed  little in the two de cades 
since Stockholm. Unlike other governments, Japa nese offi  cials did not 
 conduct daily briefi ngs for NGOs and, in fact, did their best to keep activists 
Youth from the vessel Gaia arrive at the Global Forum.
Third from the right is Japa nese passenger Shibata Hiroko.
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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at arm’s length. Ui recalled hearing one Japa nese offi  cial scoff , “NGOs are 
the ones making a ruckus over in that park,  aren’t they?”84 Some, such as 
Amano Reiko, an outdoor writer and member of the Nagara River move-
ment, even pointed the fi n ger at Japa nese NGOs, saying that it was their 
lack of strategy leading into the Earth Summit that left NGOs without any 
offi  cial pipeline once the event began.85 Blame aside, however, the Earth 
Summit proved to be a wake-up call for Japa nese activists in many ways. 
Despite their impressive eff orts at the Global Forum, they still lagged far 
 behind Western NGOs in terms of infl uence, or ga ni za tion, fi nancing, 
information- gathering skills, and policymaking capacities. Unlike Western 
NGOs, they  were not integrated into the policymaking pro cess, nor did they 
have any established lines of communication with offi  cials. Language limi-
tations also made it diffi  cult for the Japa nese to infl uence foreign govern-
ment del e ga tions and the global media. Th rough the Rio experience many 
activists recognized the urgent need for a stronger fi nancial base, which 
NGOs could use to nurture a cadre of specialists capable of giving Japa nese 
Dancers at “Japan Night” at 
the Global Forum, 1992
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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civic groups a stronger voice in politics and public opinion at home and 
abroad.86 In this sense, the Earth Summit also served as a crucial learning 
experience for Japa nese activists and an impor tant stimulus for the profes-
sionalization of civil society in the country throughout the 1990s.
But Japa nese NGOs’ lack of integration into formal policymaking 
channels, while certainly a function of their orga nizational and fi nancial 
weaknesses, also stemmed from the localism and situated ethics they brought 
to Rio. One of their basic viewpoints was that established institutions and 
top- down, managerial, bureaucratized approaches to global environmental 
prob lems— encapsulated in ideas like sustainable development— only threat-
ened to replicate patterns of inequity that had been in place for many hun-
dreds of years. In the face of this institutional domination, activists saw their 
task as one of shining a local, situated light on global prob lems in order to 
expose the injustices and inequities often obscured beneath the surface. Th e 
range of pre sen ta tions and discussions at the Japan  People’s Center off ers 
the clearest evidence of this “glocal” agenda.
Celebrating “Japan Night” at the 
Global Forum, 1992
(Th e Mainichi Newspapers)
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Discussions on big issues like global warming, forest conservation, and 
sustainable development  were balanced by many more specifi c discussions 
about mercury poisoning, pesticides, plutonium storage, toxic nuclear waste, 
and air pollution— all of which the Japa nese had dealt with  either within 
their country or in the regional contexts of Asia and the Pacifi c. Activists 
from Minamata, the JFBA, and the Air Pollution Mea sur ing Center used 
the Japa nese tent as a platform to promote tactics and methods they had 
found successful in concrete, grassroots strug gles against industrial pollu-
tion at home. Th e under lying focus of discussions in the Japan tent was not 
so much on the big environmental prob lems per se, but on the  human vic-
tims of environmental degradation,  whether local, regional, or global in ori-
gin and scale. Moreover, the solutions presented and discussed  were not 
only comprehensive global strategies but  were also specifi c, realizable initia-
tives undertaken by individuals or small groups of like- minded  people, for 
instance, making and consuming safe food, recycling milk containers, mea-
sur ing air pollution with homemade devices, or monitoring the operations 
of pollutive industries abroad.
Th e pre sen ta tions of activist- lawyers belonging to the JFBA typifi ed 
Japa nese groups’ advocacy of a local, justice- based approach to the global 
environment—in the JFBA’s case, by highlighting their domestic and re-
gional initiatives for victims of environmental pollution.  Lawyers in the 
association explained how their activism began locally in  legal strug gles for 
industrial pollution victims at Minamata Bay and Yokkaichi City in the 
1960s, culminating in momentous victories in the Big Four pollution law-
suits in the 1970s. Th ereafter, their activities expanded to include other forms 
of environmental litigation such as nuclear power plant siting, vibration from 
high- speed railways, and sunlight access rights.87 Th ey told audiences how, 
at UNCHE in 1972, the JFBA group was the fi rst to suggest the princi ple 
of “environmental rights” as a new concept for environmental law world-
wide—an idea born in the context of domestic Japa nese strug gles. Th rough-
out the 1970s and 1980s some of their members became involved in cases of 
Japa nese corporate pollution export to other East Asian nations, for exam-
ple, in Malaysia during the 1980s, when a Mitsubishi Corporation joint 
venture was found to be dumping radioactive thorium waste near  human 
communities. Japa nese  lawyers had joined with Malaysian counter parts to 
bring the aff ected communities’ complaints to court, eventually contrib-
uting to the com pany’s decision to abandon operations.88 Th e  lawyers ex-
plained how the JFBA began to seriously engage with global environmental 
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 prob lems  after holding an international  human rights symposium in Tokyo 
in November 1988 that brought together researchers and activists involved 
in environmental movements worldwide.89 Th e  lawyers had been shocked 
to learn of the extent of rain forest logging in the Philippines, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia, and the terrible results for local and indigenous populations 
in  these countries. Th ey also became more attuned to the detrimental envi-
ronmental consequences of ODA, especially Japa nese ODA in Asia.
To complement their  human rights agenda at the Global Forum, the 
JFBA invited a Brazilian  lawyer to speak about mercury contamination from 
gold mining in the Amazon basin and an Italian judge who gave an address 
on his idea for the creation of an “International Environmental Court” sim-
ilar to the International Criminal Court.90 Th e overall message of the JFBA 
and, in fact, of the bulk of Japa nese groups in attendance, was that engage-
ment in environmental prob lems of any scale proceeded from recognition 
of, and support for, the rights of  human victims of environmental injustices 
on the ground. Although delegates at the main summit  were trumpeting 
sustainable development as a realistic way forward, the JFBA clearly saw 
global environmental prob lems in the context of their earlier (and ongoing) 
strug gles for  human rights and justice in Japan and East Asia to which  there 
had been no magic solutions, simply relentless grassroots re sis tance.91
On the fi nal day of the Earth Summit, members of the Japan  People’s 
Forum issued a Japa nese Citizens’ Rio Declaration, which, in hindsight, en-
dures as a rather bleak commentary on their experience in Rio. Th e declaration 
made four points: fi rst, that the Earth Summit had failed  because nations 
 were not able to conclude treaties strong enough to protect the Earth from 
environmental destruction; second, that the continuing domination of fi -
nancial institutions meant further destruction of the global environment; 
third, that Japa nese NGOs had communicated to other citizens at the Global 
Forum that, despite Japa nese governmental claims to the contrary, their 
country was still dealing with its own prob lems of pollution and environ-
mental degradation; and, fi  nally, that their aims from now on  were to change 
 people’s lifestyles by transforming the system of mass production, mass 
consumption, and mass destruction, and moreover, to work for the reform 
of the UN into an or ga ni za tion for  people not states.92
Yet, although many Japa nese activists left Rio somewhat disheartened 
by what they perceived as a lack of concrete pro gress, the Global Forum 
proved to be an impor tant international opportunity for them to advocate 
their approach to global- scale environmental prob lems fi rmly committed to 
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and anchored in the lived experience and daily lives of ordinary  people. As 
the newspaper Asahi Shinbun noted on the one- year anniversary of the Earth 
Summit, the “greatest change” for Japa nese NGOs  after UNCED was the 
emergence of a new urgency to “internationalize” their local, justice- based 
perspective.93 Th e article described a Tokyo recycling group now thinking 
seriously about natu ral resource prob lems in Asia, a river pollution group 
involved with an anti- dam movement in India, and a Minamata disease 
support group investigating mercury contamination in the Amazon Basin 
caused by mining activity. Moves  were also afoot to establish a new or ga ni-
za tion, the Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JAC-
SES), which would serve as a gateway for Japa nese and foreign environmen-
tal NGOs to build substantive activist networks.94 As the activities of the 
JFBA and other groups at the Global Forum evidence, the pro cess of en-
gaging with this global environmental agenda involved an intricate blend-
ing of extant ideas about environmental injustice with new global agendas 
and paradigms such as sustainable development and climate change. Rather 
than an epistemic transformation, the outcome was more of an epistemic 
adaptation, in which new spheres and scales of concern  were incorporated 
into an existing worldview that remained resolutely situated in outlook and 
committed to the perspectives and rights of the marginalized.
Globality in the Local, the Invisible, and Daily Life
Networks such as the  People’s Forum and rooted cosmopolitan activists at 
the forefront of initiatives addressing global- scale environmental prob lems 
played a particularly impor tant role in advocating an approach based on 
rights and justice. Th ey presented a picture of daily life as an entangled lo-
cus of both vulnerability and complicity. Th ey questioned erstwhile models 
of exogenous development and relentless capitalistic expansion and, most 
of all, they wondered about the feasibility of global solutions to global 
prob lems. Moreover, they demanded that the voices and rights of “invisible” 
localities—in the Th ird World, in the “peripheries of the peripheries,” and 
in “rural Asia”—be duly recognized in any countermea sures for the global 
environment. To better understand this perspective, in this section I exam-
ine three emblematic examples: Iwasaki Shunsuke of the  People’s Forum, 
Kuroda Yōichi of JATAN, and the climate change NGO, Kiko Forum. I 
believe each example points to the continuing salience of environmental in-
justice as a critical paradigm for leading Japa nese activists and groups in 
their engagement with global- scale environmental prob lems.
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Consider fi rst the seminal role of Iwasaki Shunsuke, leader of the Japan 
 People’s Forum.  After graduating from the Department of Architecture 
at Tokyo University of the Arts in 1963, Iwasaki spent two years teaching 
at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Ghana be-
fore  going on to complete a master’s in Urban Design at Harvard Univer-
sity in 1970. Th ereafter Iwasaki worked in the Yokohama City Planning and 
Coordination Bureau for close to a de cade  until being appointed director of 
the Bureau of  Human Settlements Planning in the United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifi c (ESCAP).95 Iwasaki 
did not particularly enjoy his time in the UN, describing his travel from 
city to city to attend conference  after conference like “being on top of the 
clouds.”96 But the experience was an impor tant one, nevertheless,  because it 
gave Iwasaki a fi rsthand insight into the logic and operations of the national 
and international institutions that he would  later challenge. In 1980 Iwasaki 
left the UN to take up directorship of the Japan International Volunteer 
Center (JVC), an atypically large and well- funded Japa nese NGO that 
sent volunteers to assist in developing countries worldwide.97 Diff er ent from 
his earlier activities high up in the “clouds” of the UN, as JVC director 
Iwasaki connected with  people on the ground in “rural Asia.” Th is experience 
proved transformative  because, to use Iwasaki’s own words, it forced him to 
“look at real ity from a diff er ent  angle.”98 Iwasaki became convinced that 
Japa nese NGOs needed to become more active internationally for the global 
poor— a conviction that he faithfully pursued throughout the 1980s as JVC 
director.
More signifi cant for this discussion, in the late 1980s Iwasaki brought 
his Th ird World advocacy into the Japa nese environmental movement 
when he assumed leadership of the Japan  People’s Forum prior to the Earth 
 Summit. Th e signifi cance of Iwasaki’s leadership of this group cannot be 
underestimated. In eff ect, it elevated a staunch advocate for the rights of 
developing nations to the very apex of the Japa nese environmental move-
ment at a formative moment of its engagement with global environmental 
prob lems. Th ereafter Iwasaki served as an infl uential mouthpiece for fellow 
Japa nese activists worldwide and, more importantly, used this position of 
infl uence to advocate his own provocative viewpoints on the  causes of and 
solutions to global environmental prob lems.
Iwasaki described his approach as one of “making vis i ble a world which 
cannot be seen” and “joining hands with  those who are invisible.”99 Organ-
izations like the UN, he said, failed to hear the voices of the “2.8 billion 
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 people living in the countrysides of developing nations”  because they  were 
distracted by the noise emanating from offi  cials and po liti cal elites in the 
cities.100 Personal experience had taught him, however, that the best way to 
see real ity (including the real Japan) was not from the capital cities of devel-
oping nations but from their countrysides; in other words, from the “pe-
ripheries of the peripheries,” where one could “clearly see Japan’s position 
and its form in relative terms.”101 Such ideas found expression in the  People’s 
Forum’s explicit strategy of approaching “Brazil via Asia.” Herein Japa nese 
NGOs  were understood, fi rst and foremost, as advocates and partners of 
other Asian NGOs at the Earth Summit rather than civic groups voicing 
the concerns of “First World Japan.”102
To fully realize this partnership with Asia and the Th ird World, Iwa-
saki believed that the Japa nese  people fi rst needed to fundamentally trans-
form their own consciousness. Above all, they had to recognize the profound 
and undeniable interconnectedness of their daily lives to the developing 
world and especially to the rest of Asia. As he wrote in a 1988 essay, “Th e 
insignifi cance of one banana eaten in Japan is connected to the signifi cance of 
this [same banana] for the  people who grow it in the Philippines.”103 We 
have “no choice,” he argued, “but to recognize that we are connected to 
 people in other countries. . . .  Th e food we eat  every day, what we wear, and 
the materials used in the  houses we live in— all of  these are brought in from 
abroad.”104 For example, “the buckwheat noodles you ate for lunch  today 
are a traditional Japa nese food so you prob ably imagine that they are made 
from white fl owers which blossomed somewhere in the foothills around 
Nagano [Prefecture]. But, actually, 75  percent of buckwheat fl our is imported 
from abroad.”105 So, physically, at least, the Japa nese  people  were no longer 
“purely homemade”: they  were “international organisms” constituted by the 
many foreign- sourced materials they consumed daily.106
But unfortunately, or “tragically,” as Iwasaki put it, despite the real ity 
of their physical interconnectedness, Japa nese  people appeared to have no 
signifi cant recognition of the fact. Th e most “tragic  thing” was that “almost 
all Japa nese” had “limited themselves to the spatial sphere of Japan” and  were 
“unable to understand phenomena in other countries across the sea as their 
own prob lems.”107 Iwasaki spoke of “the tragedy of the Japa nese who can-
not transcend national borders in their consciousness” and the “disappoint-
ment” of a con temporary Japan in which the  people cannot “mentally” and 
“emotionally” transcend the spatial unit of the nation, despite the fact that 
“materially” and “physically” they  were internationalized.108 As he explained, 
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for Japa nese  people foreign issues  were still “wrapped in a veil” and treated 
as “outside events” without any connection to themselves. Most Japa nese 
 were “afraid to go and look outside this veil, preferring to “merely remain in 
a state of tentativeness, sometimes poking their necks out but quickly pull-
ing them back in,” even though they realized that the veil itself was just a 
construct.109 Th e cause of this malady, according to Iwasaki, was the “po-
liti cal unit of the state,” which divided  people and attempted to “crush” any 
initiative to bring  people together by “lodging between  humans” and “cre-
ating unwanted obstacles.”110 Yet the “ future of the globe” depended now 
more than ever on the “success or failure” of attempts by NGOs and  others 
to “transcend the state.”111 In a perceptive observation on the condition of 
globality, Iwasaki noted,
Th e contradictions among  people  today are no longer between cap i tal-
ists and workers or urban dwellers and country folk in developed coun-
tries. Th ey have been transformed into contradictions between  those in 
developed and developing countries. For this reason I feel that in order 
to realize a new set of values, more than anything  else, we need an in-
ternational solidarity which transcends the framework of the state. In 
other words, it is not about  going to developing countries and raising 
the Hinomaru [the Japa nese national fl ag] but working out how to tran-
scend the framework of the state as friends working together with the 
 people  there.112
But the impor tant point to keep in mind  here is that Iwasaki was ad-
vocating not so much a global- scale program as a post- national one. For 
Iwasaki solutions to the prob lems of globality and the barrier of national states 
began at home with local  people and their local knowledge. Turning the 
popu lar catchphrase of the environmental movement on its head, Iwasaki 
said, “It’s not ‘think globally, act locally’ but think locally, act globally.’ ”113 
Instead of waiting for top- down solutions, local  people had to take the ini-
tiative, by circumventing metropoles such as Tokyo and actively “building 
connections with the world” with the help of NGOs.114 NGOs too had to 
stand at the same level as the  people they  were trying to help. Th ey needed 
to produce solutions based on local conditions.115 For instance, although 
NGOs might off er technical know- how, Iwasaki envisioned their primary 
role more as one of empowering local  people to combine “traditional” prac-
tices such as forest farming with “new sustainable agricultural technologies” 
204     Chapter 6
like mixed farming.” In other words, the pro cess was not one of “sending in 
technicians from developed countries but of providing opportunities for 
 people in developing countries to build up experience through individual 
trial and error.”116 Th e ultimate aim, argued Iwasaki, was to create a “new 
civic movement” that united local and transnational energies without repli-
cating imperialistic hierarchies.117 He was convinced that only through a 
translocal network originating in, and fi rmly committed to, local knowl-
edge and local perspectives could NGOs successfully address global- scale 
environmental prob lems.118 Th e key was that such activism had to proceed 
from the local and be steadfastly against the state— this was the essence of 
thinking locally, acting globally.
Of course, Iwasaki was well aware that his localist agenda practically 
invited criticism.  After all, re spect for the in de pen dence and traditions of 
local  people was all well and good, but without a network of roads and ports 
or large- scale infrastructure such as electricity grids and power plants con-
structed or overseen by the nation- state, the gap between the developed and 
developing nations would not narrow.119 Th is was a central assumption of 
the sustainable development idea and, as we saw in the thought of Tsuru 
Shigeto and the Founex Report, it was an idea with deep and often progres-
sive roots (recall Tsuru’s admiration for the Tennessee Valley Authority).
But it was precisely in such assumptions that Iwasaki identifi ed what he 
and other activists felt to be the fundamental fl aw of “development” (sus-
tainable or other wise) controlled by First World governments and interna-
tional organ izations. Iwasaki understood development somewhat diff erently 
from groups such as the WCED. Development was not only about material 
advancement but also about the development of in de pen dence, dignity, and 
relations of re spect— all of which  were local “products” and, hence, pro-
foundly endogenous in nature. Iwasaki, for example, emphasized that, since 
the gap between the developed and developing nations had evolved over a 
period of fi ve hundred years, from around the time of Columbus’s arrival in 
the Amer i cas, it would not be solved overnight through quick technological 
fi xes. To the utmost,  people’s “in de pen dence” must be respected and re-
stored. Assistance focused only on development of the “material environ-
ment” would simply push recipient communities back into a “position of 
subservience,” replicating the historical legacy of inequity between the First 
and Th ird Worlds.120 But a new alliance of local  people and nongovernmen-
tal organ izations promised to sever the link between “1492” and “1992” by 
restoring the primacy of endogenous, locally initiated development.
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Iwasaki was by no means an outlier  here, and his call on Japa nese 
 people, particularly  those involved in environmental activism, to focus on 
the development of Th ird World endogeneity found expression in many other 
infl uential Japa nese movements addressing global environmental prob lems 
from the late 1980s onward. Th at many activists cut their teeth in very 
local activism or had experience in developing countries as Iwasaki did only 
further encouraged this tendency. Kuroda Yōichi of the prominent JATAN 
movement to save tropical rain forests is a case in point.121
A gradu ate in rural sociology, Kuroda worked during the early 1980s 
at the Seikatsu Club, a progressive consumer cooperative based on princi-
ples of collective purchasing and food safety in the Tokyo area. Kuroda’s 
transnational interests appear to have intensifi ed in 1985–1986, when he was 
affi  liated with the  People’s Research Institute on Energy and Environment, 
a nongovernmental think tank focused on alternative energy development, 
antinuclear issues, and alternative agriculture.122 While conducting surveys 
on pesticide use in Southeast Asia, Kuroda came into contact with NGOs 
involved in rain forest conservation movements.123 In Malaysia in 1986, Ku-
roda and seven Japa nese activists attended the Penang Conference on the 
Timber Resource Crisis in the Th ird World, or ga nized by the progressive 
Penang Consumers Association, Sahabat Alam Malaysia (an affi  liate of 
Friends of the Earth International), and the Asia- Pacifi c Environment Net-
work.124 During the conference the Japa nese participants  were shocked to 
learn of the extent of Japa nese corporate involvement in rain forest destruc-
tion throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacifi c. Moreover, they  were stung 
by criticisms that Japa nese citizens  were not  doing enough to oppose such 
practices and mortifi ed at not being able to report on any signifi cant op-
position movements back in Japan.125
With the logistical and fi nancial assistance of Friends of the Earth 
International, in 1987 FoE Japan, the Asian  Women’s Association, the Con-
sumers’ Union of Japan, and the JVC established JATAN, with Kuroda 
Yōichi as its director.126 Th ereafter,  under Kuroda’s leadership, JATAN en-
gaged in a series of highly creative and successful initiatives within Japan to 
raise awareness about the importance of rain forests for the global environ-
ment as well as the destructive role of logging operations by companies from 
rich nations such as Japan. In 1988, Kuroda and fellow author François Nec-
toux published Timber from the South Seas: An Analy sis of Japan’s Tropical 
Timber Trade and Its Environmental Impact, a study commissioned by the 
WWF that outlined in graphic detail Japan’s environmentally destructive 
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logging practices throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacifi c.127 JATAN also 
confronted responsible corporations head-on. In April 1989, JATAN activ-
ists took part in the International Action Day to Support the Indigenous 
 People of Sarawak, a coordinated transnational protest in cities worldwide 
in support of the Malaysian Penan  people, who  were struggling to stop log-
ging operations in their forest home in Sarawak State on Borneo Island.
JATAN’s Tokyo mobilization focused on the Marubeni Corporation, 
a Japa nese trading com pany involved in logging operations in the region. 
Outside Marubeni’s Tokyo headquarters, activists presented the corpo-
ration’s bewildered public relations’ offi  cer with an award for rain forest 
destruction and a large plywood cutout of a chainsaw. In a meeting with 
JATAN activists, Marubeni executives  later refused to accept this “award” 
and denied any wrongdoing in Malaysia. On the same day, JATAN mem-
bers met with government offi  cials to whom they delivered a copy of Timber 
from the South Seas along with sixty thousand signatures calling for a stop 
to logging in Sarawak and support for the aff ected Penan  people. As Ku-
roda and JATAN members would  later learn,  these actions made news in 
Malaysia and even on the radio news in far off  Nepal.128 Japa nese and Ma-
laysian activists also developed transnational ties. Kuroda visited Sarawak for 
the fi rst time in September 1987, and on numerous occasions thereafter, 
JATAN brought representatives of the Penan  people, their local advocates, and 
Malaysian academics to Japan to speak at rallies on rain forest destruction.129 
Notably, in June 1991 a group of Penan  women traveled to thirteen local 
government offi  ces throughout Japan to lobby for ordinances banning the 
use of rain forest timber in public works proj ects.130 JATAN’s public advo-
cacy and po liti cal lobbying proved extremely successful. In October 1991 
the Tokyo municipal government became the fi rst local administration na-
tionwide to announce a trial period during which only non- rain forest- 
sourced timber would be used in public works proj ects. Th is decision was 
followed by similar initiatives in cities and prefectures such as Osaka, Kyoto, 
and Nagoya.131 By mid-1995, sixty- six local administrations had stopped 
using rain forest timber in public works altogether.132
Fascinating in such initiatives is the way Kuroda and his colleagues gar-
nered empathy for the Penan  people and their forest life by framing the is-
sue in terms of a familiar local experience of environmental injustice. As he 
explained, his impression and, indeed, that of “most Japa nese” who visited 
the Penan was not one of a destitute community but, on the contrary, of 
 people living in a kind of “heaven” on earth. Although they  were monetarily 
Globality through Local Eyes     207
“poor,” the Penan had “never been in need of food or  water, and their life-
style based on living with the natu ral cycles and diligently working together 
on the basis of the mutual support of families and villa gers” was a lifestyle 
the Japa nese  people had “lost.”133 Malaysian leaders, however,  were attempt-
ing to portray the Penan as ignorant, backward savages in need of enlight-
enment and domestication, much in the same way Japa nese po liti cal elites 
had promoted industrial development as a cure- all for “backward” regions 
in 1960s Japan. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, for example, said 
his government did not “intend to turn the Penan into  human zoological 
specimens to be gawked at by tourists and studied by anthropologists while 
the rest of the world passes them by.”  Th ere was “nothing romantic” about 
a “helpless, half- starved and disease- ridden  people,” Mahathir declared.134 
Th e Malaysian government even took aim at the Penan’s public advocates, 
writing in a publication for the Earth Summit that “the transition from cave 
and forest dwelling to village and urban living is a phenomenon that has 
marked the transformation of  human socie ties from time immemorial. Th e 
environmental activists have no right to stand in the way of the Penans in 
this pro cess of change and  human development.”135 Such negative portrayals 
of the Penan fed into popu lar misconceptions of them as uncivilized enemies 
of the Malaysian nation and impediments to economic development. Even 
though the Penan (correctly) saw foreign corporations and logging com-
panies as the villains, it was the Penan who  were arrested as they attempted 
to stop the loggers’ trucks.136
 Needless to say, JATAN’s emphasis on the plight of the victimized 
Penan  people (as opposed to the preservation of tropical rain forest for its 
own sake) resonated with power ful and painful memories of industrial pol-
lution, corporate misbehavior, state complicity, and injustice within Japan— 
especially in rural peripheries. Po liti cal scientist Anny Wong, who studied 
JATAN closely at the time, observed how the movement “redefi ned” the 
Sarawak logging “issue within the context of a domestic experience and sen-
timents.” Wong explained how “emphasizing the destructive role played by 
Japa nese development assistance and Japa nese big business in the tropical 
timber trade, the Japa nese anti– tropical timber campaign stirred public 
memory of Japan’s own deforestation and their anger  towards the Japa nese 
government and big business for their poor  handling of domestic industrial 
pollution.”137 Moreover, JATAN activists joined a chorus of Japa nese activ-
ists like Iwasaki Shunsuke who  were attempting to qualify the “novelty” of 
global environmental prob lems by situating them within longer histories of 
208     Chapter 6
imperialism, colonialism, and exploitation of the Th ird World— the so- called 
invisible local.
In a 1992 publication, Kuroda repeated Japa nese activists’ mantra of 
“1492–1992,” explaining that, during fi ve hundred years of colonial inva-
sion, the Western nations had for many years controlled the land and forests 
of other  people for their selfi sh ends, and they had massacred indigenous 
 peoples. Japan did the same  thing over the short period of a few de cades 
during its own imperialistic adventures.138 Kuroda argued that this domina-
tion continued in the pres ent “through multinational corporations and the 
World Bank,” which symbolized the way  those with “money” and “power” 
protected their “self- interests” and continued to “extend the gap between 
rich and poor” to the point of “despair.”139 In order to bring a stop to rain 
forest destruction, citizens of the North and South had to unite. Moreover, 
Japa nese  people needed to address the “local” from two  angles: by changing 
their own lifestyles in their own backyards, and by helping  those in the mar-
ginalized corners of the Th ird World like farmers and indigenous  people 
to attain true autonomy through the advancement of endogenous develop-
ment. Th is, argued Kuroda, “is our challenge as we face the next  century.”140
Th is attentiveness to marginalization and injustice is apparent even in 
leading Japa nese movements dedicated to global- scale prob lems such as cli-
mate change, where we might intuitively expect such sentiment to be less 
prominent. Th e Kiko Forum, established in 1996 in the lead-up to inter-
governmental deliberations on the Kyoto Protocol, is a prime example. Sim-
ilar to the two examples above, the background of the forum’s leader, Asaoka 
Emi, appears to have been an impor tant  factor  here.141 Prior to her involve-
ment in the Kiko Forum, Asaoka practiced law  after graduating from the 
prestigious law faculty at Kyoto University in 1972. Asaoka was an activist 
 lawyer, with a strong background in litigation on behalf of consumers, 
 women, and victims of phar ma ceu ti cal and chemical contamination.142 
Th e Kiko Forum, which Asaoka and  others formed in December 1996, 
brought together an array of progressive environmental groups, consumer 
cooperatives, religious organ izations, agricultural associations, and youth 
groups concerned with environmental pollution, food safety, and related 
issues.143 On one level, the forum was the prototype of a transnationalized 
domestic actor— fi rmly rooted at home yet transnationally connected and 
globally sensitive. In terms of or ga ni za tion and strategy, for example, the 
Kiko Forum (kikō means “climate” in Japa nese) drew liberally on the exam-
ple of the Klima Forum (klima also means “climate” in German)  established 
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by German activists at the First Conference of the Parties (COP1) to the 
UNFCCC, held in Berlin in 1995. Asaoka and other Kiko Forum activists 
who attended COP1 stayed in close contact with Klima Forum activists 
 after initially meeting in Berlin, even inviting Klima’s leader, Sasha Mueller- 
Kraenner, to Japan in 1996 to help with the establishment of the Kiko Fo-
rum.144 Klima Forum activists appear to have provided very concrete and 
valuable assistance to their Japa nese counter parts, for instance with re spect to 
event planning and bud geting.145 Adding to this transnational character, as 
Kim Reimann notes, some 40  percent of the Kiko Forum’s fi nances  were 
sourced abroad, in some cases from governments such as Germany, Denmark, 
and Norway, which wanted signifi cant green house gas emissions reductions at 
Kyoto and saw NGO lobbying as one way to achieve this.146 International 
organ izations such as the UN also opened previously closed doors for groups 
such as the Kiko Forum, giving them “access to policy makers and a new 
channel for lobbying the government, enabling them to overcome prob lems 
of access they faced in Japan.”147
Yet for all its internationalization, the Kiko Forum remained acutely 
sensitive to questions of equity and justice in global environmental prob lems, 
particularly as  these related to the developing world. A four- page pamphlet 
on global warming released by the Kiko Forum in 1996, for example, 
explic itly connected climate change to “the inequity of ‘North’ and ‘South.’ ” 
Th e pamphlet carefully explained that, although all countries worldwide 
would be aff ected by global warming, it was impor tant to recognize that 
“only  people living in wealthy countries during the twentieth  century” had 
actually “enjoyed the affl  uence” from the “economic activity” that had caused 
that global warming. It was the “Northern developed nations” that had con-
sumed countless quantities of natu ral resources and produced colossal 
emissions of green house gases. Th e pamphlet off ered the example of island 
nations such as the Maldives, Kiribati, and Mauritius, whose existence was 
threatened by rising ocean levels caused by global warming. “We simply must 
not forget that  these nations are emitting almost no green house gases,” the 
pamphlet reminded readers.148
A May 1997 pamphlet released by Kiko Forum just months before the 
deliberations over the Kyoto Protocol began reiterated this responsibility of 
the rich to the poor. Th e pamphlet noted that each Japa nese person was, on 
average, responsible for green house gas emissions ten times greater than  those 
of a person in India and one hundred times greater than  those of a person 
in Nepal. Hence “we need to change our lifestyles of excessive  consumption 
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and excessive waste” and, concretely, to reduce individual emissions of CO2 
by 4  percent annually.” Referring to the “North- South Prob lem,” the pam-
phlet argued that the “exceedingly blameworthy” countries of the North 
needed to immediately decrease their emissions but not do so by merely shift-
ing their industrial operations to Southern countries. Echoing Iwasaki and 
other activists’ calls for endogenous as opposed to sustainable modes of de-
velopment, the pamphlet called for “restraint of excessive trade” that tended 
to exacerbate global inequities.149 Like earlier industrial pollution in Japan, 
“the prob lem of global warming” was also a “prob lem of equity,” which 
would have the greatest impacts on  people in conditions of weakness in the 
global South and, moreover, on “ future generations.”150 More than anything 
 else, the rich needed to examine their own daily lives and open their eyes to 
the existential crisis climate change posed to developing nations, some of 
which might be swallowed up by the rising seas.
Th e common refrain in all of  these articulations was that the new 
global- level prob lems still required  people to think locally and, also, to care-
fully reconsider the local made invisible by its marginalization within socie ties 
and globally. Solutions were as much individual as they  were global, since 
they involved a reexamination of “aggression” knit in to the very fabric of 
affl  uent daily lives. Indeed, only by looking somewhere in par tic u lar,  these 
activists asserted, would solutions to the larger prob lems become pos si ble. 
Th is attentiveness to complicity, responsibility, injustice, inequity, and rights 
had inspired some Japa nese activists to look beyond the borders of their 
polluted archipelago many de cades earlier, and it still deeply informed 
the perspectives of a new generation of activists facing the environmental 
 complications of globality in the twenty- fi rst  century.
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CONCLUSION
Transnational Activism, the Local, 
and Japa nese Civil Society
Th e only way to fi nd a larger vision is to be somewhere in par tic u lar.
Donna Haraway1
In a fascinating refl ection on the emergence of global environmental con-
sciousness, science and technology studies expert Sheila Jasanoff  poses a 
number of critical questions about the motivations for transnational activ-
ism.2 “What,” Jasanoff  asks, “makes  people from diff er ent socie ties and cul-
tures believe that they should act to further common goals, even if  these 
goals require them to sacrifi ce or postpone perceived economic and social 
interests?” How do activists “form commitments to collective action on a 
global scale, and from where do they derive notions of an international com-
mon good that are strong enough to override the intense but parochial pull 
of national self- interest?” And, given that politics in the con temporary world 
is usually practiced “through national institutions,” why have we witnessed 
“the rise of transnational co ali tions, such as the con temporary environmen-
tal movement, that seem to articulate their objectives in defi ance of the po-
sitions of nation states?”3
In this study I have attempted to address  these questions by showing 
how a power ful environmental injustice paradigm born of Japan’s traumatic 
experience with industrial pollution informed and invigorated overseas in-
volvements from the late 1960s onward. By providing a coherent vocabu-
lary and concrete vision, this paradigm or “master frame” of environmental 
injustice off ered an overarching worldview for groups involved in diverse 
transnational initiatives over many de cades.4 Initially in the 1960s and early 
1970s, the paradigm served as a persuasive explanation and source of 
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motivation for protestors in thousands of very local strug gles across the 
archipelago. But, in the context of growing international attention to the 
environment, a small number of intellectuals, activists, and pollution vic-
tims began to realize that the country’s pollution prob lems— which  were of a 
scale and intensity unwitnessed in  human history— had signifi cance be-
yond Japan. Th eir transnational involvement and that of subsequent 
groups propelled the Japa nese environmental injustice paradigm “beyond 
the constraints of spatial [and] cultural particularity” into a range of envi-
ronmental issues including mercury contamination in Eu rope and North 
Amer i ca, the relocation of pollutive industries to East Asia, the planned 
ocean dumping of radioactive waste material in the Pacifi c, and global- 
scale environmental prob lems such as climate change.5 In all cases the activ-
ists involved drew on and referred back to the seminal national encounter 
with environmental pollution and injustice, which they put forward as 
Japan’s distinctive—if horrifi c— contribution to environmental knowledge 
worldwide.
Th is pro cess of recalibrating and repositioning the local experience of 
environmental injustice in strug gles and issues beyond Japan resembles what 
Saskia Sassen has called a “multi- scalar politics of the local”—in other words, 
a pro cess in which “local initiatives can become part of a global network of 
activism without losing the focus on specifi c local strug gles.”6 Central in this 
multiscalar politics of the local  were individuals like Ui Jun, who not only 
communicated but also, importantly, interpreted the story of Japa nese en-
vironmental injustice so that it could speak to issues and activists separated 
by geography, po liti cal systems, and culture. Th eir facilitative role cannot 
be underestimated in any attempt to address Jasanoff ’s question about why 
transnational activism happens. Such rooted cosmopolitans served as the 
all- impor tant “connective tissue,” translating the Japa nese environmental 
injustice paradigm for diff er ent groups and situations and convincing local 
pollution victims within Japan that their experience could be meaningful— 
indeed lifesaving— for  others far away. To borrow from Sidney Tarrow, 
 these activists did not become “rootless cosmopolitans” in the pro cess of 
transnational action but retained their links to place, to the social networks 
of  those places, “and to the resources, experiences, and opportunities that 
place provide[d] them with.”7 Shared emotions such as “anger at injustice or 
exclusion, feelings of solidarity, or hope for change” helped foster in such 
activists the conviction that transnational collaboration could “produce  desired 
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social transformation” and, on a personal level, satisfy their growing sense 
of responsibility as citizens of the world’s “most advanced polluted nation.”8 
Th e result was a dynamic, multiscalar spectrum of transnational interaction 
that greatly enriched local strug gles and multiplied the contexts in which 
activists lived their lives, institutions functioned, and ideas evolved.9
Although activists’ idea of environmental injustice underwent signifi -
cant modifi cation in its vari ous iterations beyond the archipelago, its atten-
tion to the local, to inequity, to marginalization, and to fundamental  human 
rights remained as common threads connecting movements and activists 
over time. Four enduring attributes stand out. First, the paradigm identifi ed 
the root cause of environmental prob lems in discrimination and injustices 
against local communities and marginalized  peoples, especially by power-
ful, centralized po liti cal and economic institutions. Industrial activity was 
certainly the immediate cause of environmental degradation, but it was the 
under lying structures of power and inequity that  really mattered. Second, 
the paradigm identifi ed a solution in local or endogenous empowerment. If 
marginalized communities or developing nations gained full autonomy and 
control of their living environments, then environmental injustices would 
arguably not occur. Th ird, in terms of strategy, although the paradigm was 
sensitive to the class implications of environmental injustice, it pointed to an 
alliance of the marginalized that might transcend orthodox class divisions 
and ideological divides. Th is implied a “chain of equivalence” that could 
even connect local industrial pollution victims in advanced economies to 
marginalized  people in developing nations.10 Fourth, the paradigm was 
deeply skeptical of globalized discourses on the environment such as “only 
one earth,” “our common  future,” or “Spaceship Earth”  because experience 
in Japan taught that collectivist ideologies like “GNP” or the “national in-
terest” often obscured fundamental injustices and discrimination against 
the marginalized in society.
At the core of  these four attributes was a decidedly anthropocentric and 
“situated” approach to environmental prob lems— a distinctive feature of 
con temporary Japa nese environmentalism produced by the postwar indus-
trial pollution experience.11 Signifi cantly, this attention to the local, ineq-
uity, rights, and marginalization closely resonated with environmental ideas 
and critiques emanating from the global South and burgeoning global 
discourses on  human rights such that, by the time of the Earth Summit in 
1992, Japa nese environmental groups  were proactively advocating for the 
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rights of developing nations alongside their traditional constituency of in-
dustrial pollution victims.
In this concluding chapter I reconsider the iterations of the Japa nese 
environmental injustice paradigm of the preceding chapters in connection 
to two issues at the core of this study: fi rst, the implications of the injustice 
paradigm for debates about the global and the local in con temporary envi-
ronmentalism and, second, the insights a transnational historical approach 
off ers for our understanding of the ideational trajectory of Japa nese civic ac-
tivism  after the massive wave of protest in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Here 
I state my conclusions upfront: I think the Japa nese environmental injus-
tice paradigm off ers a compelling historical example of the relevance of lo-
cal knowledge in a global age. Th rough their transnational interactions, the 
Japa nese activists involved came to richer understanding of the local— not 
only as a besieged subnational space but also as a potent resource to gener-
ate and cultivate knowledge useful beyond the local and the national and, 
moreover, as a counterweight to homogenizing global discourses. In terms 
of the historical trajectory of Japa nese civic activism, I think a transnational 
historical approach opens fascinating interpretive possibilities. In the case 
of the Japa nese environmental movement, transnational involvement con-
tributed to impor tant ideational transformations. It encouraged a funda-
mental reconsideration of the victim consciousness in many earlier Japa nese 
social movements and, in turn, opened the way for more refl exive and mul-
tidimensional activist identities and agendas.
The Local, the Global, and Japa nese Environmental Injustice
 Th ere is lively debate among scholars of globalization studies over the role 
of the local and of place consciousness in a globalizing age. Some, such as 
the eco- critic Ursula Heise, are thoroughly committed to the “deterritorial-
ization of local knowledge” and the formation of an “eco- cosmopolitanism” 
that envisions “individuals and groups as part of planetary ‘ imagined 
 communities’ of both  human and nonhuman kinds.”12 Heise argues that the 
deterritorialization of knowledge need not “necessarily . . .  be detrimental 
for an environmental perspective” and actually “opens up new ave nues into 
ecological consciousness.”13  Others such as the social theorist Arif Dirlik, 
however, have championed “place consciousness” and “place- based imagi-
nation.”14 Dirlik is dissatisfi ed with what he sees as the “relegation of the 
local to subordinate status against the global, which is also associated with 
the universal.”15 Rather than viewing the local and place consciousness “as a 
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legacy of history or geography,” Dirlik envisages  these as part of “a proj ect 
that is devoted to the creation and construction of new contexts for think-
ing about politics and the production of knowledge.”16 Places, argues Dirlik, 
“off er not only vantage points for a fundamental critique of globalism, but 
also locations for new kinds of radical po liti cal activity that reaffi  rm the 
priorities of everyday life against the abstract developmentalism of cap i tal-
ist modernity.”17 In this connection, Sheila Jasanoff  and Marybeth Long 
Martello suggest that we should “resist the tendency to equate ‘global’ with 
pro gress or inevitability and ‘local’ with tradition or re sis tance,” and instead 
“explore the complementarity between the local and the global”— for ex-
ample, how “diff er ent conceptions of the local help to authorize the turn to 
the global, or vice versa.”18
From its very origins, con temporary environmentalism has incorpo-
rated  these global and local “modes”— and tensions—in ideas like “our 
common  future” or “think globally, act locally.”19 Occasionally, of course, 
they have come into open confl ict, as at UNCHE in 1972 when delegates 
from developing countries vehemently defended their right to development 
in the face of collectivist discourses such as “only one earth.” Indira Gandhi 
was the most forceful advocate of this position, arguing that “if pollution 
was the price of pro gress, her  people wanted more of it.”20 Similar criticisms 
arose almost two de cades  later with the publication of the Brundtland Com-
mission’s Our Common  Future in 1987. Critics wondered just whose common 
 future was “being protected”: “the local dwellers of the land or the bureau-
cracies and corporations that rule over them?”21 Th e core of the prob lem for 
Gandhi and other critics of this “Spaceship Earth” imagery was that putting 
every one on the same “ship” implied the existence of a “universal equality” 
that was clearly not the case.22 Arguments linking overpopulation to envi-
ronmental degradation tended to underplay the fact that around 80  percent 
of the resources of the planet are being consumed by the 20  percent living in 
rich countries.23
Similar prob lems of inequity and historical injustice continue to 
confound the issue of climate change, for example. As Brian Doherty and 
Timothy Doyle put it, “Th e story of climate has become such a large meta-
narrative that it almost embraces all ele ments of environmental discourse.”24 
Such narratives, they warn, “are the songlines of ecological conditionality, 
mapping out the coordinates that determine which groups  shall be included 
in agenda- setting and decision making; determining  those who  will be 
funded; selecting  those who  shall be corporatized into the global governance 
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state and relegating  those who  shall remain on the non- institutionalized 
outer.”25 From the perspective of the global South, of course, climate change 
is often perceived as receiving excessive attention. “It is seen as a  matter en-
dorsed by affl  uent- world, Western, science, and then utilized as an environ-
mental security issue to control the less affl  uent from pursuing the very path 
of development that the minority world has pursued without restraint since 
the industrial revolution.”26 Indeed, renowned Indian activist Vandana Shiva 
provocatively argues that the focus on “global environmental prob lems, 
instead of expanding the perspective, has in fact narrowed the radius of 
activism.”27
Leading voices from the global South— but not only the South— have 
articulated their own alternative vision of environmentalism that refuses to 
separate global environmental issues from more immediate local issues such 
as securing the  human food supply or health.28 Advocates of this perspective 
argue for attention to environmental issues, such as atmospheric pollution, 
that are directly aff ecting  humans.29 As I noted in the previous chapter, in 
the climate change debate, some such as Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain 
of the Centre for Science and Environment in India even draw a distinction 
between what they call the “survival emissions of the poor” and the “luxury 
emissions of the rich.”30  Needless to say, common to all of  these perspec-
tives is the assertion that any mea sures to address global- scale environ-
mental prob lems  will have to genuinely address local viewpoints and pre-
rogatives. In the language of emancipatory environmentalism: “Only by 
engaging with the subjective voices of the local, traditional and indigenous 
 peoples”  will “adequate ecological management strategies be assembled.”31 
As the po liti cal theorist Leslie Paul Th iele argues, “Local activism must work 
in tandem with, not become subservient to, global thinking. To the extent 
that ecological care begins at home, relatively small, active, self- responsible 
communities of citizens are required. Cultivating such communities proves 
diffi  cult within large nation- states and would be even more diffi  cult within 
a global regime.”32 “A good rule of thumb for environmentalists,” says Th iele, 
is not to “globalize a prob lem if it can possibly be dealt with locally.”33
Th e seeming impasse between  these global and local perspectives on 
environmental issues, of course, only serves to highlight how, to a  great ex-
tent, “the global and the local are terms that derive their meanings from 
each other.”34 As Sheila Jasanoff  and Marybeth Long Martello note, “What 
is in ter est ing about the local in all  these senses is how it comes into being, 
sustains itself, competes with other localisms, and sometimes . . .  moves be-
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yond the constraints of spatial or cultural particularity.”35 Th is is what the 
geographer Ash Amin means about places having the potential to become 
“more than what they contain.”36
Th e Japa nese environmental injustice paradigm— precisely  because of 
its focus on rights, marginalization, and discrimination— has clearly inclined 
 toward the localist perspective in  these debates. Th is has facilitated alliances 
with both environmental victims in other advanced industrialized nations 
and advocates from developing countries asserting their developmental 
rights. It has also infl uenced Japa nese activists’ contribution to the critical 
globalism that emerged and evolved in the 1970s as a corrective to the ex-
tant internationalism in organ izations such as the United Nations. Th is criti-
cal globalism certainly addressed the very big questions of planetary limits 
but,  under the infl uence of Southern advocates and Japa nese groups like the 
ILP, it also incorporated local perspectives sensitive to inequity and injus-
tice. In 1972— a watershed year for environmental concern worldwide— the 
prominent UN offi  cial Philippe de Seynes was among the fi rst to diff erenti-
ate “internationalism” and “globalism” in a speech delivered at the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley. For de Seynes, internationalism “derived from 
the dictates of po liti cal wisdom and a sense of  human solidarity in a world 
of growing inter- dependence but of unlimited horizons opened up by tech-
nology.” Globalism, conversely, de Seynes described as a standpoint sensitive 
to “the ambivalence of technology, its negative eff ects on the degradation of 
the environment, the destruction of ecological balances, the limited capac-
ity of the biosphere, the pos si ble depletion of natu ral resources, the popu-
lation explosion, the fi niteness of the planet, and perhaps even the fi niteness 
of knowledge.”37 In other words, a core ele ment of the globalism de Seynes 
described was that we live in a world of limits, not unlimited possibilities, 
hence the need for “care and maintenance,” as René Dubos and Barbara 
Ward put it in their infl uential 1972 book Only One Earth. Of course, the 
burning question was, “care and maintenance” for what and for whom.
Japa nese activists articulated their own distinctly anthropocentric and 
situated version of this critical globalism by invoking injustices  toward en-
vironmental victims at Minamata, Yokkaichi, Toyama, and elsewhere 
throughout Japan. In key controversies over the environment and development 
stretching from the “limits to growth” to “sustainable development,” they 
concentrated fi rst and foremost on questions of discrimination, inequity, 
and injustice. Th e Japa nese case, they argued, taught that environmental 
prob lems occurred when local communities  were excluded from decisions 
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about development in their own backyards. Th ey pointed to state- endorsed 
and defended industrial development in Japan that proceeded— indeed 
fl ourished—on the basis of a litany of injustices  toward marginalized local 
communities. What this taught, they argued, was not about the discord 
between the environment and development but, more fundamentally, about 
the injustices born of grossly distorted power relations between marginal-
ized communities and power ful po liti cal and economic institutions  whether 
within Japan or between the global North and South. Th is was a perspec-
tive Japa nese groups articulated repeatedly at international gatherings, in 
person- to- person exchanges, and though infl uential English- language pub-
lications such as Polluted Japan.
Recall Ui Jun’s pre sen ta tions and interviews on mercury contamina-
tion in Eu ro pean countries from the late 1960s. As much as the scientifi c 
facts of industrial pollution, Ui stressed its po liti cal  causes in center- periphery 
disparities in Japan, which for him preordained the tragic  human injustices 
in communities at Minamata and elsewhere. Harada Masazumi and the 
World Environment Investigative Mission brought a similar message about 
marginalization and suff ering to the Native American communities aff ected 
by mercury contamination in Canada. Along with thorough medical inves-
tigations, Japa nese activists and mercury poisoning victims conveyed a story 
of injustices against the very weakest in society that resonated deeply with 
the discrimination their Canadian hosts  were enduring. Polluted Japan and 
other material documenting environmental injustices in Japan also served 
as damning indictments of economic development built on local disem-
powerment and environmental degradation. In Th ailand, Polluted Japan’s 
message of  human suff ering fueled student mobilizations against Japa nese 
industrial pollution in Bangkok in the 1970s. On the Pacifi c Island of Belau, 
activists such as Moses Weldon also used the pamphlet to convince residents 
that the  human and environmental costs of a planned Japanese- US oil stor-
age and nuclear repro cessing fa cil i ty far outweighed any promised economic 
benefi ts.38 Just as Hiroshima and Nagasaki became iconic symbols in con-
temporary antiwar and antinuclear movements worldwide, in the global 
environmental movement Polluted Japan and Minamata: Th e Victims and 
Th eir World and other material emanating from Japan served as damning 
indictments of modern industrial excess, as if confi rming the dire warnings 
of works such as Carson’s  Silent Spring, Commoner’s Th e Closing Circle, and 
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons.”
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In 1970s events such as UNCHE and in swirling debates over the “limits 
to growth,” Japa nese activists’ mantra of environmental injustice found com-
mon cause with the ideas of  those such as Barry Commoner who identifi ed 
poverty, underdevelopment, and global inequity as key  causes of environ-
mental degradation worldwide. At the base of both positions was a convic-
tion that environmental prob lems  were inextricably linked to the violation 
of  human rights— a position,  needless to say, that diff ered markedly from 
the demographic approaches of Paul Ehrlich and  others who singled out 
overpopulation among the world’s poor as a major source of environmental 
degradation. Th e same was true de cades  later at the Earth Summit in 1992. 
Japa nese activists such as Iwasaki Shunsuke found common voice with 
activists from developing nations who argued that solutions to global- 
scale environmental prob lems like climate change must take into account 
the developmental rights of local communities and developing nations— not 
to mention recognizing the structural inequities resulting from centuries of 
Western and, for a time, Japa nese imperialism. Iwasaki and  others notion 
of “endogenous development” drew directly on the experience of local dis-
empowerment and marginalization informing notions of environmental 
injustice in Japan, but now they used it to advocate for the relevance and the 
rights of local communities in an age of global concern.
Th is commitment to  human victims and to defending a  human living 
space resistant to the toxicity of industrial modernity and the intrusion of 
exogenous po liti cal power is a common thread  running through the mes-
sages many Japa nese activists conveyed over de cades of involvement in trans-
national environmental initiatives. Along with its intrinsic symbolism, part 
of the paradigm’s appeal no doubt had to do with the historical juncture at 
which  human rights  were emerging as a central issue in international poli-
tics. As Samuel Moyn has provocatively put it, “ Human rights . . .  emerged 
in the 1970s seemingly from nowhere,” gaining “an unpre ce dented new 
prominence in world aff airs.”39 Japa nese industrial pollution victims and 
their environmental injustice paradigm exemplifi ed the themes of this new 
age of  human rights, as too did their advocates, who epitomized the men-
tality and approach of  human rights advocacy and discourse. As Jan Eckle 
explains, the “po liti cal uses of suff ering  were widespread in the period and 
not the exclusive domain of  human rights groups. More and more groups 
started to refer to their own history of suff ering to justify claims for po liti cal 
participation and nondiscrimination; victimhood formed an integral ele ment 
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of what came to be called ‘identity politics.’ Th is was notably true for Ho-
locaust survivors but also for homosexuals and nativist groups, to name just 
a few.” 40 Th e same might be said of the Japa nese environmental injustice 
paradigm, which spoke directly and shockingly to  these very questions of 
suff ering and discrimination. Indeed, looked at in this way, we can see how 
Japan’s traumatic experience with industrial pollution converged with, ben-
efi ted from, and actually fed in to the development of two central issues in 
con temporary international politics: namely, the environment and  human 
rights.
Victimhood, Aggression, and the Insights of Transnational History
Of course, engagement with the outside world was hardly a one- way street, 
so along with tracing the eff ects of Japa nese activists and their environmen-
tal injustice paradigm overseas, a second major objective of this study has 
been to inquire into the reverse eff ects. In other words, how can a transna-
tional historical approach enrich our understanding of the historical trajec-
tory of Japa nese environmental activism, especially  after the massive wave 
of domestic protest in the 1960s and early 1970s? How did transnational 
engagement infl uence or transform activists’ mentality and the shape and 
content of their environmental injustice paradigm? And, what eff ect did such 
transformations have on po liti cal and economic institutions and civic activ-
ism in Japan more generally— Keck and Sikkink’s so- called boomerang 
pattern of infl uence?
Before answering  these questions, it is worth reconsidering both the ad-
vantages and limits of a transnational historical approach. As Iacobelli, 
Leary, and Takahashi note in a recent volume on this topic, “Transnational 
history . . .  as a category in its own right . . .  remains a relatively new fi eld 
within historical studies.” 41 Th e same could be said— perhaps in more pro-
nounced terms—in relation to the study of modern Japa nese history, which 
has most often been approached within the container of the nation. Th at 
being said, I have not  adopted a transnational approach in this study,  because 
I think earlier national- or subnational- focused histories of pollution and en-
vironmental activism  were somehow fl awed or that national history, even 
in its most critical forms, merely authenticates the ideology of the nation- 
state as the only legitimate theater of history. As Richard White has percep-
tively observed, “ Th ere are no absolutely right or wrong scales” of historical 
analy sis since “each scale reveals some  things while masking  others.” 42 In-
deed, one of my aims in transnationalizing the historical narrative of pollu-
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tion and environmentalism in Japan was to show just how deeply events 
within the country  were interconnected to  those in other countries and to 
environmental developments on a global scale.
As the morphemes “trans” and “national” imply, for me the idea en-
compasses both the nation and the phenomena that move across and 
beyond it or exist on the other side of it. As one of the pioneers of transna-
tional history, Ian Tyrell, has noted, the original focus of the transnational 
concept was “the relationship between the nation and  factors both beyond 
and below the level of the nation that  shaped the nation and, equally impor-
tant, that the nation’s institutions  shaped.” 43 Although the subsequent de-
velopment of transnational history has arguably moved away from this some-
what nation- focused conceptualization, most studies continue to accept—as 
I do— the ongoing importance of the nation- state and “its capacity to con-
trol and channel border- transcending movements.” 44 We might say  there 
has been a gradual deemphasis of the nation and the nation- state in trans-
national history, such that the national, although an essential scale of 
analy sis, becomes but “one spatial dimension among  others ranging from 
global history and international dynamics to (supra- or subnational) regional 
to local and individual levels.” 45 Bender usefully describes this as a pro cess 
of historicizing the nation by relating “its dominant narrative . . .  to other 
narratives that refer to both smaller histories and larger ones” and recogniz-
ing the “historical production of the nation and locating it in a context 
larger than itself.” 46 Th e task is thus not one of substituting “a history of the 
nation- state with a history without or against the nation- state” but, as 
French historian Pierre- Yves Saunier suggests, fi nding “a way to study how 
nation- states and fl ows of all sorts are entangled components of the modern 
age.” 47 How, for instance, is the history of pollution and injustice in Japan 
entangled in the global history of science, technology, capitalism, and war-
fare throughout the twentieth  century?
In broad terms, then, the concept of transnational history I subscribe 
to and have attempted to employ in this study corresponds closely to the 
defi nition off ered by David Th elen, who characterizes it as an exploration 
of “how  people and ideas and institutions and cultures moved above, be-
low, through, and around, as well as within, the nation- state” coupled with 
an investigation of “how well national borders contained or explained how 
 people experienced history.” 48 I was particularly interested in the ways trans-
national activism and spaces became resources for activists to address and 
overcome national issues such as pollution and environmental degradation and, 
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throughout the study, have attempted to use  these transnational movements 
and moments as a way to “listen” to historical actors (many Japa nese, some not) 
as they looked beyond and within Japan’s borders “to place in larger context 
and fi nd solutions for prob lems they fi rst discovered within” their countries.49 
While I was certainly interested in the simultaneity of Japa nese domestic 
movements with  those in other countries and with the global movement, I 
devoted most attention to the concrete material and intellectual connections 
Japa nese activists forged with non- Japanese activists  because I feel that it is 
in  these person- to- person exchanges and the translocal spaces or places that 
evolved that a transnational historical approach has most to off er.50
I believe that repositioning the con temporary history of Japa nese pol-
lution and environmental activism within such a transnational history can 
at once defamiliarize and enrich the national while continuing to accept its 
importance as a crucial historical perspective in itself. In fact, in terms of 
the critical proj ect to address dominant methodological nationalism and the 
so- called complicity of modern historiography in empowering the nation- 
state to, as Prasenjit Duara puts it, “defi ne the framework of its self- 
understanding,” transnational historians become kindred spirits with  those 
who would write the subnational, shadow narratives of nations such as the 
micro- histories of local industrial pollution and overdevelopment through-
out the Japa nese archipelago.51 Both approaches interrogate what Bernhard 
Struck and his colleagues call the “normative macro- model of modernisa-
tion theory,” based as it was on “the successful building of states and nation 
states with their bureaucracy and institutions as an integral part of the West-
ern story of successful modernisation.”52 Shadow narratives chip away at 
this ideology from the inside while transnational histories attempt to pierce 
its rigid external shell by connecting the sub- with the supranational. By 
excavating previously obscured or invisible histories, I believe historians of 
transnationalisms and shadow narratives together help in the deconstruc-
tion and disruption of the power ful naturalization of national space implicit 
in modernization theory, undermining “modernity’s strategies of contain-
ment” and opening up an “awareness of what was suppressed in a historiog-
raphy of order.”53
I think the vari ous transnational involvements and movements 
 discussed in this book open up a new vista on the development of Japa nese 
environmental and civic activism  after the high point of environmen-
tal protest in the early 1970s. While not undermining or negating (and in 
some ways actually substantiating) the quantitative waning in contentious 
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protest— the social movement “ice age”— these and other movements chal-
lenge us to reconsider the scope of activism in this period stretching from 
the early 1970s through  until around the late 1980s. As Daniel Aldrich, 
Jeff rey Broadbent, Hasegawa Kōichi, Peter Wynn Kirby, and  others have 
shown, although smaller scale than the earlier cycle of protest, contentious 
domestic environmental activism continued throughout this period over 
issues as diverse as regional development, nuclear power plant siting, toxic 
urban waste, and bullet train vibration.54 Other environmental movements 
focusing on safe food, organic agriculture, and the improvement of local 
living environments also proliferated throughout the country.55 Th e transna-
tional interactions and movements explored in this book  were also unfolding 
during this period, but they have largely escaped the attention of historians 
and other social scientists who, for the most part, have been interested in na-
tional and subnational phenomena.56 I believe that this comes at a cost to our 
understanding for two reasons. First, empirically,  these transnational involve-
ments evidence a broader scope of civic activism complementing and feeding 
into the domestic movements. Second, ideationally, transnational involve-
ment contributed in impor tant ways to the evolution of activist identity and 
civic movement ethos.
Empirically speaking, the movements explored in earlier chapters 
 belonged to a small yet growing sphere of transnational engagement by Japa-
nese civic groups from the late 1960s onward.57 Th is is an aspect of Japa nese 
social activism that deserves more intensive historical research. Th eir areas 
of involvement  were diverse and included environment, gender, minorities, 
peace and antiwar, anti– nuclear power,  human and indigenous rights, 
and grassroots development. Pioneering groups such as the In de pen dent 
Lectures on Pollution (1969–1985) and the anti– Vietnam War movement 
Beheiren (1965–1974) led the way, serving as models for overseas engagement 
and stepping- stones for  later groups. In 1973, for instance, Oda Makoto, 
Mutoh Ichiyo, and other former Beheiren leaders established the Pacifi c 
Asia Resource Center, or PARC.58 One of the earliest advocacy- style non-
governmental groups in postwar Japan, PARC became a kind of quasi- 
national center for information about grassroots movements in the Asia- Pacifi c 
region, a hub for Japa nese, Western, and Asian activists and intellectuals, 
and a launchpad for nongovernmental research on regional prob lems. As we 
have seen, the center’s English- language publication AMPO: Japan- Asia Quar-
terly Review also served as a mouthpiece for Japa nese and other Asia- Pacifi c 
activists to communicate instances of economic and po liti cal exploitation in 
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their countries.59 Two years  later, in 1975, the nuclear chemist Takagi 
Jinzaburō joined with other antinuclear activists and groups to form the 
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) to disseminate information 
on nuclear power and serve as a hub for antinuclear experts and activists 
nationwide. Importantly, Takagi and the CNIC had extensive transnational 
contacts from the outset, which they used to obtain information about 
nuclear power and protest worldwide as well as to communicate news 
from Japan through the CNIC’s English- language newsletter, Nuke Info 
Tokyo.60
Japa nese  women’s groups also began to develop new transnational 
ties from the 1970s, especially in Asia. In 1970 the prominent  women’s 
liberation activist Iijima Aiko and  others established the Shinryaku=Sabetsu 
to Tatakau Ajia Fujin Kaigi (Asian  Women’s Conference Opposing Invasion= 
Discrimination), which took direct aim at the “victim consciousness” in 
existing  women’s liberationism and called on  women to recognize their com-
plicity as the one’s “giving birth” to a Japan deeply implicated in the Viet-
nam War.61 Some  women’s groups began to scrutinize the be hav ior of 
Japa nese men abroad, notably in connection to kiseng or sex tourism in 
South  Korea and other countries throughout Asia. Th e kiseng tourism op-
position movement traced its origins to a historic July 1973 meeting of the 
South Korean and Japa nese Councils of Churches in Seoul, at which  women 
participants issued a declaration lambasting Japa nese sex tourism. Groups 
in Japan such as the Association of Anti- Prostitution Activity immediately 
took up the issue. Representatives traveled to South  Korea to conduct fi eld 
research and, together with other  women’s groups, in December 1973 they 
formed the Kīsen Kankō ni Hantai suru Onnatachi no Kai ( Women’s 
Association to Oppose Kiseng Tourism).62 Among this association’s im-
mediate activities was a demonstration at Haneda Airport in Tokyo in sup-
port of students from Ewha  Women’s University who had protested kiseng 
tourism a week earlier at Gimpo International Airport in Seoul.63 Led by 
Matsui Yayori, a prominent journalist at the newspaper Asahi Shinbun, in 
1977 this group was renamed the Ajia no Onnatachi no Kai (Asian  Women’s 
Association) and thereafter became a hub for information and activism 
relating to Asian sex tourism, cultural exploitation, Japan’s war responsibil-
ity,  women’s movements in Asia, and Japan- Asia relations.64
Japa nese grassroots groups involved in development, education, and 
public health issues overseas also proliferated during the 1970s and 1980s. 
A few of  these groups, such as the PHD Association, grew out of earlier 
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organ izations— especially religions— but most  were new.65 Among the ear-
liest was Shalpa Neer (Bengali for “lotus  house”), established in 1972 by 
Japa nese youths who had participated in agricultural volunteering in the 
wake of the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. Initially the group focused 
on educational assistance by sending pencils and notebooks to Bangladeshi 
 children. But this approach failed miserably, as locals simply exchanged  these 
items for food. Th e group faced a further setback in 1977 when two Japa-
nese volunteers  were seriously injured in a robbery by a group of local ban-
dits.  After much internal debate and rethinking of the movement, in the 
1980s Shalpa Neer discarded its self- confessed indulgent, ignorant, and pa-
tronizing approach of “saving helpless Asians” in  favor of local empower-
ment and participatory development with Japa nese serving in a backup role 
only— similar in many aspects to the endogenous development model ad-
vocated by Japa nese environmental activists.66 Other developmental groups 
appeared around the same time, such as the Asian Rural Institute established 
by Toshihiro Takami in 1973 to train leaders from developing countries in 
sustainable agriculture, organic farming, community building, and leader-
ship, and the Institute for Himalayan Conservation (1974), which focused 
on providing infrastructure such as mountain rope- lines to aid in the trans-
portation of fi rewood and livestock, and pipelines for the provision of clean 
 water.67
Considered alongside the environmental groups traced throughout this 
study, the above activism points to an expanding engagement with the 
outside world among Japa nese civic groups, especially from the late 1960s 
onward. As already noted, this is an underresearched aspect of postwar 
Japa nese history that deserves more attention for what it tells us about the 
growing internationalization of civil society in Japan as well as for charting 
the palpable eff ects of transnational interaction on many civic activists and 
their groups. On this latter point, I believe that the transnational involve-
ments and movements explored in this study off er a novel perspective on 
our understanding of the ideational transformation of civil society in con-
temporary Japan, especially in the crucial 1970s de cade. Th roughout the 
study I have alluded to Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s notion of 
the boomerang pattern of infl uence of transnational activism on domestic 
politics. We saw this, for example, in the response of the Japa nese government 
to the ILP’s publication Polluted Japan at UNCHE in 1972 and,  later, to the 
protest against proposed radioactive waste dumping in the Pacifi c. But along 
with  these po liti cal outcomes I have also tried to  emphasize the boomerang 
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eff ect at the grassroots level. In other words, the ways activists, their move-
ments, and their ideas (about environmental injustice, for example)  were 
changed through transnational involvement. Taking this grassroots boomer-
ang eff ect of transnationalism into account, I believe, off ers a new  angle on 
our understanding of the evolution of civil society in Japan.
Th e apparent burgeoning of the country’s civil society in the 1990s 
stimulated a veritable fl ood of scholarship that attempted to explain its his-
torical contours and internal dynamics and the reason for its rise to promi-
nence at that moment. In very broad strokes, this scholarship proposed three 
key causative  factors to explain the nature and development of civil society 
in the country: po liti cal institutions and regulations, globalization and in-
ternational norms, and the role of civil society actors.
Institutional explanations have pointed to the crucial role of the Japa-
nese state— purposively and inadvertently—in “molding” or shaping civil 
society.68 Susan Pharr, for instance, argues that the Japa nese state “has taken 
an activist stance  toward civic life, monitoring it, penetrating it, and seek-
ing to steer it with a wide range of distinct policy tools targeted by group or 
sector.”69 More specifi cally, Robert Pekkanen persuasively shows how the 
 legal framework, limited funding, indirect regulations, and the limited op-
portunities for infl uencing policy in Japan have determined the contours of 
Japan’s “dual civil society.”70 In the case of nuclear power plant siting, Daniel 
Aldrich compellingly shows how authorities chose “rural communities, 
which  were less coordinated and more fragmented, and, hence, less likely to 
successfully mount antinuclear campaigns. To overcome any remaining op-
position . . .  the government often off ered jobs and assistance to fi shermen 
to ensure that the nuclear power plant would not be seen as curtailing their 
livelihoods.”71 Th e impact of the Japa nese state on civil society utilizing hard 
and soft techniques is undeniable and, as we have seen in this study, Japa-
nese environmental activists expended a  great deal of energy attempting to 
 counter state initiatives through transnational bridge- building. Nevertheless, 
institutional analy sis focusing on the role of the state in shaping Japa nese 
civil society— precisely  because of its focus on the state- society nexus— 
tends to underplay the infl uence of exogenous  factors on civil society such 
as the border- crossing movements outlined in this book.
Working from an “outside-in” perspective, another stream of scholar-
ship directly addresses this issue by highlighting the role of international 
norms in the development of Japa nese civil society. Notably, Kim Reimann 
has cogently demonstrated how international norms supportive of state- 
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NGO cooperation from the 1980s eff ectively pressured (even “shamed”) 
Japa nese offi  cials into recalibrating and strengthening their relationships 
with and support for NGOs.72 Th is scholarship pointing to the eff ects of 
globalization and international norms on civil society resonates closely with 
my emphasis on the transformative aspects of transnational activism. Th e 
diff erence, however, is the level of analy sis. Whereas Reimann highlights the 
impact of international (top- down) norms on the Japa nese state and, in turn, 
civil society, I emphasize the role of ideational  factors  shaped by the trans-
national interactions of civil society actors from the bottom up.
Another stream of scholarship— including that of Wesley Sasaki- 
Uemura and my own earlier work— looks to ideational  factors and civic 
actors themselves, arguing that grassroots activism and the ideas that emerged 
from this have  shaped the development of civil society in con temporary 
Japan.73 Koichi Hasegawa, Chika Shinohara, and Jeff rey Broadbent have 
pointed to “initiatives taken by NGO leaders, scholars, younger liberal pol-
iticians, and the media to encourage civil activism in Japan.”74 Historians 
trace the constructivist role of civil society actors back even further. For in-
stance, I have explored the instrumental role of civic activists and their 
movements in shaping visions of nonstate or “shimin” citizenship in con-
temporary Japan.75 Th e argument  there is that civic activists’ ideas and 
their movements have helped to shape the dynamics and development of civil 
society in con temporary Japan. While that approach also resonates with my 
ideational perspective in this book, for the most part, in that earlier work I 
limited analy sis to the national level and below, arguing that transforma-
tions in activists’ consciousness and modes of be hav ior  were attributable to 
endogenous  factors,  whether of an institutional or ideational nature.76
Although occasionally implicit in the above scholarship, researchers 
have not carefully considered the role of grassroots transnational interactions 
on the evolution of Japa nese civil society. Yet, as I have shown in this book, 
looking abroad and engaging in transnational grassroots initiatives encour-
aged some activists to resituate their environmental injustice paradigm in 
the context of broader movements (regional and even global in scale) and, 
moreover, to rethink their activist identity and agenda. Indeed, in ideational 
terms, I think that  these transnational involvements  were extremely impor-
tant in stimulating a more refl exive and multidimensional— perhaps even 
post- national— mentality among the activists involved, which broke sharply 
with long- established notions of victimhood within much civic activism and 
discourse in postwar Japan. Engagement with issues and movements in Asia 
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and the Pacifi c in the 1970s and 1980s was particularly impor tant in this 
re spect. In the case of the environmental injustice paradigm, in each of its 
iterations activists had no choice but to reimagine injustice beyond its ori-
gins in discrete local experiences of industrial pollution in Japan. What be-
gan as a somewhat insular account of local Japa nese pollution victims by 
necessity expanded to incorporate environmental victims in other countries 
as well as the perspectives of marginalized communities at the wrong end 
of so- called global economic development. Engagement in environmental 
prob lems overseas brought the aspect of victimhood in the environmen-
tal injustice paradigm into question by exposing the complicity— albeit 
indirect—of all Japa nese in the operations of Japa nese po liti cal and economic 
institutions abroad. Th e more refl exive and multidimensional conceptualiza-
tion of environmental injustice that resulted resonated with similar ideational 
transformations  under way in the peace and antiwar movement,  women’s 
movements, and the development NGOs discussed above. Historically, I 
believe this enriched concept of environmental injustice marks an impor tant 
ideational transformation in postwar civic consciousness.
We saw this transformation  under way in the 1974 Conference of 
Asians, where Oda Makoto and  others from the anti– Vietnam War move-
ment encouraged their environmentalist colleagues to draw direct connec-
tions between Japa nese imperialism and colonialism of the past and the 
country’s con temporary military alliance with the United States and its eco-
nomic expansion throughout Asia. As Oda explained, this was not merely 
an intellectual exercise but a frank admission of Japan’s ongoing aggression 
 toward the  people of Asia. Activists opposing the planned radioactive waste 
dumping in the Pacifi c pushed this self- critique even further, provocatively 
questioning the narrative of “national victimhood” built around the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When viewed from the perspective 
of regional and global history, they realized, the notion of victimhood ap-
peared very brittle and even contradictory. Japa nese claims about being the 
only nation to have suff ered from atomic bombing, for instance, became 
problematic when the misery of  people in the Marshall Islands and French 
Polynesia subjected to US and French nuclear weapons testing was taken 
into account. It appeared self- contradictory to many that a nation that pro-
claimed to understand the side eff ects of radiation fi rsthand would so non-
chalantly consider a policy to dump such material despite  there being no 
scientifi c consensus on the safety of ocean disposal. Moreover, as much as 
nuclear power was conceived of as a phenomenon and prob lem of the post-
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war era for many Japa nese activists, the arrival of Pacifi c activists in Japa-
nese localities opened residents’ eyes to the concrete links  these visitors drew 
to earlier Japa nese imperialism and colonialism. Th us, while on one level 
involvement in Asia and the Pacifi c helped make the regional “local” by 
drawing activists into regional communities of fate, on another level, it also 
laid bare their ambivalent position as citizens of a nation perpetrating envi-
ronmental injustices against  these very same regions. In turn, this realiza-
tion opened the way for a reconsideration of the motivations and methods 
of civic action that broke sharply with earlier models based on victimhood 
and domestic strug gle alone.77
Th e result, I argue, was an enriched comprehension of environmental 
injustice, which combined the earlier consciousness of victimhood with a 
more refl exive, proactive, and multidimensional outlook. Together with the 
ideas of Oda Makoto in the peace movement and  women’s groups involved 
in the kiseng prob lem, I believe that this conceptual enrichment of environ-
mental injustice served as another fertile intellectual springboard for the 
imagination and development of Japa nese civil society in  later de cades. It 
off ered a power ful model of open, advocacy- focused civic activism. As the 
debate and movement for civil society unfolded in Japan throughout the 
1990s, transnationally active groups such as the JVC, the Kiko Forum, 
JATAN, and CASA became prominent models for the kind of civil society 
many civic advocates hoped to construct in Japan.  Th ese groups exempli-
fi ed the image of civil society as a progressive, open space with solid domes-
tic roots yet deeply cognizant of and connected to the multiple contexts in 
which the local and national  were enmeshed. Such groups contributed to 
this enhanced vision of civic activism and civil society by employing novel 
ideas, approaches, and perspectives garnered through their interactions with 
foreign groups (recall how Kiko Forum activists learned from Klima Forum 
activists). A key  factor fueling the resurgence of civil society in 1990s Japan 
was the notion that the country’s institutions— political, economic, and 
social— were far too insular and that, in a globalizing age, Japan needed 
to become more open. A strong and in de pen dent civil society was seen as 
one crucial method of achieving this more open society. Transnationally 
active groups, as we have seen, had been practicing such open, multidi-
mensional activism for many de cades. In par tic u lar, their rethinking of 
victimhood and their formulation of a more refl exive activist identity (i.e., that 
victims might also be aggressors) off ered a power ful vision for civil society in 
the country.
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As Janet Conway has observed, “ People, communities, organ izations 
and movements are being po liti cal in ways that are not intelligible in the 
conventional narratives of liberal citizenship contained in the national 
(welfare) state.”78 Rather than “looking for the new sovereign,” Conway ad-
vises us to search for “new citizens, in social movements whose practices are 
calling into being new sovereignties and new citizenships.”79 As I have at-
tempted to show throughout this book, transnational involvement has been 
an impor tant method for some Japa nese activists to negotiate the dynamics 
of  these new sovereignties and citizenships of civil society, especially with 
regard to conceptualizations of environmental injustice and local strug gle 
in a globalizing age. To the extent that transnational interaction encouraged 
 these Japa nese activists to reconsider environmental injustice beyond the 
locality and the nation, it undoubtedly made their injustice paradigm less 
insular and more thoroughly global, cosmopolitan, and inclusive in outlook. 
In turn, this perspective arguably fl owed back into and infl uenced the 
development of Japa nese civic activism more generally, undermining en-
trenched notions of victimhood.
But neither globalism nor cosmopolitanism off ered the initial spark for 
the environmental injustice paradigm. Th is came from attention to, and 
involvement in, local, situated strug gles involving victimized  people and 
communities. As Joachim Radkau argues, “ Today it is frequently implied 
that the global perspective is morally superior, and the focus on the protec-
tion of one’s own immediate environment is ridiculed as a short- sighted 
NIMBY . . .  syndrome.” But, in the end, the real task is one of forging 
genuine connections—to issues, to  people, and to princi ples— rather than one 
of choosing a “better” scale.80 Extending this to the case of Japa nese trans-
national involvement, it was the national trauma of industrial pollution and 
the suff ering of  people in localities across the archipelago that provided the 
initial emotional, intellectual, and ethical spark for the Japa nese environ-
mental injustice paradigm. Although the paradigm was recalibrated and 
repositioned in subsequent iterations abroad, its anthropocentric focus on 
victims and marginalization endured as common, connecting threads. Indeed, 
this attention to injustice and fundamental  human rights arguably represents 
one of the key contributions of the Japa nese environmental experience to 
the evolution of environmentalism in the con temporary world.
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